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Foreword 
Today, there is no more denying the significance attributed to research and 
development (R&D) as a component of modern economic growth. Though a 
neglected topic of economic study in the first half of this century, the increas- 
ing rapidity of technological change swayed the attention of both academics 
and policy-makers towards the role of R&D in enhancing social and eco- 
nomic welfare. In a market system, the externalities characteristic of R&D 
make its support more difficult than most goods in which the contrasting 
of private benefits with private costs approximates the well-being of society 
a t  large. Thus, the organization of R&D becomes a key issue in a transi- 
tion to  a market system, particularly for the Russian Federation, which has 
inherited the majority of the scientific and technological resources after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. 
Members of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) and, more specifically, the Economic Transition and Integration 
(ETI) Project recognized the importance of this matter and welcomed the 
proposal of then USSR Deputy Prime Minister Laverov to initiate collab- 
orative work with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology 
and the USSR Academy of Sciences on the topic of Research and Devel- 
opment Management in the Transition to a Market Economy. Due to its 
relevance, this activity has persevered and endured al l  the political changes 
since its inception in late 1990. In fact, our ties have become more direct to 
top-level decision-makers and scholars as numerous conference and project 
participants and colleagues now hold high offices in the Russian Ministry for 
Science, Higher Education, and Technical Policy, the Ministry for Foreign 
Economic Relations, the Committee for the Management of State Property, 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, and influential academic institutes. Sev- 
eral of them are represented in this volume with valuable contributions. 
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This collaborative paper (CP) is a collection of some of the most re- 
vealing, interesting, instructive, and insightful contributions of authors who 
participated in the three conferences of this ETI Activity held between 
November 1990 and March 1992. In the words of then co-leader of this 
IIASA activity, Prof. Richard Levin from Yale University (USA), this vol- 
ume contains papers by Russians that present the boldest and most virtuous 
statements regarding reform of post-Soviet R&D management yet to  be pub- 
licized in the West (not t o  mention the dispersion of these ideas among Rus- 
sian colleagues). In addition, the CP contains studies revealing previously 
unpublished non-official data (i.e., not provided by Goskomstat), results of 
Russian research documenting a general willingness of R&D managers to  
accept a more market oriented style of operation, the most accurate ac- 
counts of the first stages of changes in Russian science administration policy 
reported anywhere, accounts of renown Western science policy experts of 
market economic experiences with R&D management and possible lessons 
for the evolving systems in the post-Soviet region, and much more. 
Considerable careful effort has gone into the selection and revision of the 
papers in order to  produce a volume rich in quantity and quality of infor- 
mation regarding the R&D sector in transition from a planned to  a market 
economic system. In fact, much of the material as well as the style and open- 
ness with which it  is discussed will be new to readers, particularly those in 
the West. Thus, this C P  acquires great significance as useful background 
information for future study concerning this field of activity at IIASA and 
elsewhere. 
These papers draw our attention to  several principles basic t o  the devel- 
opment and preservation of R&D in the transition to  a market economy in 
Russia. 
1. Basic scientific research will need continued support by the State, both 
in the transition period and beyond. 
2. Most applied research and development should eventually be financed 
by the private sector, with the exception of specific programs that cor- 
respond to  national purposes. 
3. The lack of adequate demand for all forms of research is a major problem 
of the transition. During this period, there are serious risks with respect 
t o  the potential destruction of the R&D sector while enterprises still 
search for its true value. Consequently, there may well be a need for 
transitional subsidies. 
With respect to  basic research, the source of financing is not a tran- 
sitional issue. While organizational changes in the structure of Russian 
research are needed, a major change in the source of funding (i.e., the 
government) is not. In the case of applied R&D, care must be taken that 
transitional subsidies do not distort the choice of organizational form. 
4. International experience has shown that a diversity of organizational 
forms is desirable. The market will provide adequate guidance con- 
cerning the organizational forms that make the most sense. Experience 
in market economies reveal that a variety of such forms can ceexist 
(i.e., State laboratories, free-standing contract private research laborate  
ries, in-house proprietary laboratories). The predominant organizational 
form, the one most important to  hamper, is the in-house, proprietary 
form done within large corporations. Nevertheless, this is no reason to  
maintain the enormous R&D groups and laboratories of the former So- 
viet science community. The spin-off of scientists to  private industry 
should be encouraged, not discouraged. 
5. Finally, there is a fundamental dependence of science and technology 
reform on the success of the overall legal and economic reform. As for 
the overall economic transition, one can only reemphasize the crucial im- 
portance of free, equilibrium prices for evaluating the profitability and 
usefulness of various alternative research and development projects and 
technologies. This means, of course, that demonopolization is required 
in order to  have competition drive R&D investment (though mobility of 
factor inputs such as labor, capital, and material resources is a prereq- 
uisite). This will result in an increase of absolute R&D spending and 
will stimulate the market selection process to  work more smoothly and 
efficiently. 
The Russian Federation faces a long road ahead in the attempt to  achieve 
the optimal organization of R&D management in the transition to  a market 
economy and beyond. Despite the wealth of resources or possibly because 
of them, the conversion of the system inherited from the Soviet Union will 
not be easy or inexpensive. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that 
R&D systems in Western market economies were not born overnight and 
that, in fact, they are subject to  continual modifications depending on the 
corresponding economic situation. In this sense, Western economies and 
their science policies are also in transition. 
The ETI R&D Activity is dedicated to working closely with its interna- 
tional collaborators in search for sensible alternatives that can be of use to 
relevant policy-makers and simultaneously make a contribution to academic 
research. This collaborative paper is evidence of the possibility of such a 
constructive partnership. 
V.A. Mikhailov 
Introduction 
The adjustment of R&D management to the new economic situation has 
become one of the key problems for the former centrally planned countries 
in their attempt a t  a successful transition to a market economy. Scientific 
and technical development is an instrumental key source of modern economic 
growth. The destruction of the accumulated R&D resources during the tran- 
sition process can undermine secure economic growth and recovery in these 
countries. This fact is especially significant for Russia with its enormous sci- 
entific and technical potential which was indispensable in order to  maintain 
the military strategic parity during the cold war and which still maintains a 
leading role in some high technological fields of the world economy. 
Now, during the transition to the market economy, the R&D sector in 
Russia undergoes a radical transformation. This transformation is mostly 
spontaneous and creates not only the growth of market forms of R&D activ- 
ity, but also the spontaneous deterioration of viable research structures and 
scientific schools. 
In order to  set up a proper scenario of R&D reorganization in Russia, 
to  create market institutions of innovation activity, and to construct a long- 
range orientation, state support of fundamental and applied research can 
not be carried out based only on a simple imitation of Western experience. 
A successful solution to  this urgent practical problem demands a complex 
of interdisciplinary and international research to  be conducted by specialists 
from different countries. The necessity of such a research program is urged on 
by the difficulties of R&D transformation, as well as by the unintelligibility of 
many theoretical questions. The organization of R&D management and the 
combination of the state and private forms in this process are still neglected 
issues of economic theory. 
Hence, on the initiative of the USSR State Committee for Science and 
Technology (now the Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Technology 
Policy of the Russian Federation), the Russian Academy of Sciences, the 
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International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, 
Austria, together with the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute 
(CEMI) and the International Center for Research into Economic Transfor- 
mation (ICRET), an international research Project under the title UR&D 
Management in the Transition to  a Market Economy" was created in 1991. 
The main goals of the Project include the study of international expe- 
riences of R&D management and elaboration of proposals on the reorga- 
nization of science and technology development management in the former 
centrally planned countries, and primarily in Russia. The proposed research 
can be divided according to  three main themes: 
to  study conditions, tendencies and problems of the reorganization of the 
scientific and industrial complex in the state and private sector during 
the economic transition period; 
to  study international experience of industrial R&D management during 
the transition to  a market economy; 
to  carry out scenarios of R&D reorganization and restructuring in Russia 
and other post-communist countries. 
During the first year of the Project, several studies have been completed. 
The most important of them were dealing with intellectual property rights 
issues; elaboration of proposals on the reorganization process; research in- 
stitutes and laboratories behavior under the conditions of economic reform. 
By now, the Project organized two international conferences: Research 
and Development Management in the Tmnsition to a Market Economy, 
Moscow, July 1991; and Industrial R&D Management in the Tmnsition to a 
Market Economy, Laxenburg, Austria, March 1992; as well as a Workshop 
on Patent Legislation and Protection of Intellectual Property, New Haven, 
USA, February 1992. 
This book includes papers, presented a t  these three meetings, which 
summarize the results of studies carried out within the Project. The au- 
thors deserve much credit for their efforts to  describe the rapidly changing 
events that constitute the transition to  a market economy in the former 
Soviet Union. Their analysis reveals that practices and policies are often 
incomplete, contradictory, or insufficient. All the more reason to  appreciate 
their ability to  formulate and present the situation in a manner that  signifi- 
cantly enhances our existing knowledge and provides valuable insight for the 
rhyme and reason behind Soviet and now Russian R&D policy. 
In addition to  the authors, a large number of individuals from the col- 
laborating institutions deserve our gratitude for their administrative and 
technical support. With respect to the completion of this volume, we es- 
pecially appreciate the excellent secretarial assistance of Sabine Malek from 
the Economic Transition and Integration Project at IIASA, who tirelessly 
and accurately converted our illegible editorial revisions into a worthy prod- 
uct. Of course, all these organizations and the individuals who helped us 
are not responsible for the views expressed here, which are solely those of 
the authors. 
The editors thank all those who have made our work possible. 
Serguei Glaziev Christoph M. Schneider 
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Part I 
R&D and Technology Policy 

Soviet R&D Resources: 
Basic Characteristics 
L. Gokhbergl and L. Mindelg 
Introduction 
The management of research and development (R&D) cannot be reorganized 
as part of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy without a comprehensive evaluation of the resources allocated for 
research and development activities. Until recently, only a very limited set 
of R&D indicators were in use. In 1989, these official statistics revealed that 
4.2 million people were employed in the "Science and scientific services" 
sector, including 1.5 million of scientific and tutorial staff; and that R&D 
expenditures were 43.6 million rubles. 
However, such data neither characterize the real situation regarding the 
true extent, structure and quality of resources invested in Soviet science, 
nor do they permit a comparison of scientific performance with the leading 
industrially developed nations. Thus, radical restructuring of statistics re- 
lated to scientific research and development becomes a crucial component in 
reforming the management of R&D. 
'Head of Department, Center for Research in Statistics, Ministry of Science and Tech- 
nological Policy, Russian Academy of Sciences. 
2~irector,  Center for Research in Statistics, Ministry of Science and Technological 
Policy, Russian Academy of Sciences. 
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Statistics for Science in the USSR: Past Situation 
and Future Prospects 
Collection and analysis of statistics representing scientific resources and per- 
formance was one of the youngest branches of Soviet socio-economic study 
to  emerge in the last years. Initially, it developed in accordance with the ex- 
isting administrative-bureaucratic practice of science management, planning 
and funding, and was mostly based on gross indicators oriented towards in- 
formation support for the decision-making bodies. However, these statistics 
were ill-suited for analytical studies. No comprehensive set of indicators con- 
cerning R&D resources was developed; therefore, the data was incompatible 
because of the methodological differences in the calculation of indicators and 
the methods of da ta  collection and processing in different economic sectors. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, statistics for science in the USSR un- 
derwent serious transformations. New methodology for data  collection and 
a new set of indicators were to be implemented. Re-shaping the institu- 
tional structure of science management in connection with the changes in 
the composition of ministries and departments, the formation of new, hor- 
izontal structures (interindustry state-owned amalgamations, corporations, 
associations, consortia etc.), and the growing independence of the union re- 
publics required a transfer from the departmental (ministry-oriented) profile 
of the statistical information to  sector and territorial profiles. 
During 1989 and 1990, considerable work was done in the restructuring 
the methodology and practices governing R&D statistics. Indicators widely- 
used in the industrially developed countries such as the number of special- 
ists employed in the R&D, the proportion of expenditures for science in the 
gross national product, and others were introduced into the Soviet statisti- 
cal practice. Starting in 1989, annual statistical information regarding R&D 
resources was collected in accordance with the standard reporting form sub- 
mitted by all the country's organizations and enterprises where R&D were 
being performed. 
Labor Resources of Science and Research 
For some time already, the published official statistics revealed that  one 
fourth of all the scientists in the world worked in the USSR. However, this 
data  seems unrealistic. For instance, from 1975 to  1985 the number of sci- 
entists and engineers employed in the field of R&D in the USA increased 
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by 85%, while in the USSR the number of scientific and scientific-tutorial 
personnel grew by only 22%. Misrepresentation of the numbers of Soviet 
R&D staff was caused by the methodology of statistical data  recording. 
The number of people employed in the sector "Science and scientific ser- 
vices" was only recorded for scientific organizations with a separate financial 
balance. It excludes research, design, and experimental divisions of indus- 
trial enterprises (so-called "factory" sector of science), as well as a number 
of higher education institutions and other organizations. According t o  our 
calculations, this sector actually accounted for 71% of the overall number of 
employees in scientific organizations, 74% of the total volume of work which 
they did independently, and 79% of the value of fixed assets in the scientific 
sector in 1989. Thus, one fourth of Soviet scientific potential is concentrated 
outside of this sector (1, p. 116); namely, in the formal science and scientific 
services sector. 
The category of scientific workers (on the basis of a scientific degree, 
place of employment, etc.) formally included all scientific-tutorial personnel 
of higher education institutions notwithstanding their actual participation 
in scientific research, and persons with a degree but not directly engaged 
in R&D (administrative and management personnel of industry, agriculture 
and other sectors; art  workers teaching a t  the higher education institutions). 
Yet, post-graduates and specialists employed in a considerable part of the 
design organizations and industrial enterprises were left out. 
In 1989, all the various forms of scientific organizations employed almost 
3.3 million people. According t o  the authors' estimates, approximately 2.1 
million (63.5%) were engaged in R&D activities (Table 1). The highest 
degree of qualification was in academic sector: while its share of the total 
number of researchers and technicians was only 12%, almost 52% had an 
advanced (Ph.D.) degree (Table 2). The industrial sector employed 76.8% of 
all researchers with higher education, 47% of which had doctor and candidate 
of science degrees and, 88.7% of all technicians. The proportion of the latter 
is almost ten times the level in the academic science. 
Estimates (see References M.L. Gokhberg (1990), Gokhberg, Maslen- 
nikov, and Mindely (1990)) reveal that  the numerical superiority of the USSR 
over the USA in terms of absolute numbers of specialists engaged in R&D, 
which existed in the early 1980s, was replaced by the parity between the 
two countries by the mid-1980s (Table 3). Furthermore by 1988/1989, the 
rapid increase of employment in US science resulted in the number of R&D 
specialists in the USA t o  be 1.2 times more than that in the USSR. If we 
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include American scientists and engineers engaged in consulting, this gap 
grows to  1.4 times. 
During the second half of the 1980s, Soviet growth in scientific personnel 
practically stopped: from 1985 to  1988 the increase was only 3.5%. During 
this period the number of the specialists engaged in R&D increased by only 
0.3%, while it decreased by 6.1% in the designing organizations. The expan- 
sion of scientific employment primarily occurred at  the industrial enterprises 
and research divisions of higher education institutions. So, by 1990, each 
ten thousand people employed in the Soviet national economy included 128 
specialists engaged in R&D versus 152 in the USA. 
The higher education sector exhibited declining growth in the 1980s. In 
1985, there were 894 higher education institutions in the USSR: in compar- 
ison, the USA had 2,029. Even though the Soviet number climbed to  904 in 
1990, the gap essentially remained unchanged. The training of specialists in 
the leading capitalist countries is secured with considerable financial support 
of the state, local authorities, and corporations. Average expenses for one 
student in the USA amount to  US$ 3,800 annually, while expenditures per 
student in the Soviet Union amount to approximately one thousand rubles 
or US$ 1,800 at  the present official exchange rate (1, p. 193-194). This af- 
fects the level of technical support of the educational process and scientific 
research at  the higher education institutions, especially the remuneration of 
professors and teachers, quality of training, and qualification level of gradu- 
ates. 
In 1985, there were 184 undergraduate students and 3 post-graduate stu- 
dents in the USSR per 10,000 residents, while the American higher education 
system featured a ratio of 322 to 10 respectively. The last two decades, in 
general, were characterized by the absolute decrease of the number of post- 
graduate students in the USSR. Between 1970 and 1989 this has decreased 
by 4.1%, the annual number of those completing post-graduate declining 
f ~ r t h e r . ~  
Irrespective of the fact that the number of post-graduate students has 
remained practically unchanged (95-100 thousand). During this period, the 
number of scientists has increased more than 1.6 times and the number of 
those with a candidate's degree 2.2 times. The number of post-graduates 
annually finishing their studies in 1970 was equivalent to  2.8% of the total 
number of scientific workers and 11.5% of those with a candidate's degree. 
'For comparison, it is interesting to note that the number of post-graduate students in 
the USA in 1980-1988 has increased by 16.9%. 
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In 1988, these figures were 1.6% and 5.0% respectively. The falling absolute 
number of post-graduate students was accompanied by a set of negative 
changes in post-graduate education (such as insufficient relevance, lack of 
novelty and practical usefulness of dissertations, duplication of subjects, and 
so on). 
The quantitative decrease of R&D staff was accompanied by a deterio- 
ration in quality; particularly with the progression in the age structure (see 
Table 4). Among the scholars with scientific degrees in the USSR senior 
persons predominate: over 51 years of age among the Ph.Ds, 41 to  60 years 
among the candidates of science, and both their proportions continued to 
increase. In comparison, the majority of American Ph.Ds was in the 36- 
50 years age group, though the proportion of those older than 50 increased 
somewhat between 1981 and 1985. Still, the proportion of persons less than 
40 years old among the American Ph.Ds was higher than among Soviet can- 
didates and doctors of science by 8.1 and 31.1 points respectively in 1985. 
The structure of the scientific personnel (SP) changed very slowly and 
did not satisfy the requirements of technological change (Table 5). Contrary 
to world-wide trends, the share of specialists in the field of mathematics, 
computer science, and physics has decreased during 1976-1986 in the USSR. 
In sharp contrast, these branches of science exhibited the highest growth 
rates of employment in the USA during some time interval. A clear illus- 
tration of this trend is revealed by the numbers of scientists in the fields of 
computer and mathematical sciences; both increased 4.7 and 2.7 times re- 
spectively. In spite of a certain decrease in the share of the life sciences in the 
USA, the absolute numbers of biologists, medical scientists, and agronomists 
almost doubled while their growth rate has slowed significantly in the USSR. 
A particularly large gap exists in psychological sciences: 1976 statistics show 
that the proportion of scientific personnel in this filed (as a percentage of the 
total SP employed) is 16 times higher in the USA than the corresponding 
figure in the Soviet Union. In fact, the absolute number of psychological sci- 
entists in the USSR was 38 times smaller than in USA. In 1986, these gaps 
increased to  18 and 58 times respectively. In the United States, as opposed 
to the USSR, the share of technical sciences has diminished somewhat, while 
their structure has changed in favor of aeronautics, chemical technologies, 
electronics, and material-studying science. 
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Material and Technical Resources 
In the USSR, the material and technical resources utilized for R&D purposes 
include buildings, facilities, machinery, equipment, materials, reagents, and 
so forth. Inferior standards of R&D equipment, insufficient supply of ad- 
vanced instruments, lack of premises, and lack of experimental base hinder 
the development of fundamental research, and the creation of radically new 
technology and equipment. 
Only during the last years did the material and technical base of the sci- 
entific sector become the subject of a comprehensive and systematic study. 
Indicators for statistical reporting provided only the most general charac- 
teristics of scientific organizations' fixed assets and did not describe, to  any 
precise detail, the movement, structure, condition and utilization of technical 
means and their quality. 
A 1989 survey concerning the resources of research, designing, project- 
designing, and technological organizations, and higher education institutions 
finally provided some statistical data. The survey encompassed 5,400 re- 
search and designing organizations and higher education institutions. The 
amount of fixed assets of the research (designing) activity as of 1 June 1989, 
exceeded 36.5 billion rubles which, according to  our calculations, was about 
90% of the value of the total fixed assets for science (together with those 
owned by industrial enterprises). About 60% of these were concentrated in 
the industrial science organizations, 22% in the academic sector, and 18% 
in the higher education institutions. A considerable part of the fixed assets 
of industrial science was concentrated in the scientific organizations of the 
machine-building, chemical and forestry, agroindustrial, and energy and fuel 
complexes. The analysis regarding the distribution of the fixed assets by 
branch of science demonstrated that half were the property of the technical 
sciences, almost 20% belonged to  the natural sciences, the agricultural and 
medical sciences account for 4%, and the social and humanitarian sciences 
for only 2%. 
The overall value of machinery and equipment in the scientific sector was 
22.3 billion rubles; together with the experimental bases (factories, plants, 
units) of the scientific organizations it increased to  24 billion rubles. Ma- 
chinery and equipment dominated the fixed assets of science within the tech- 
nological structure (refer to  Table 6). 
The analysis of the latter also demonstrated the deficiencies regarding 
the equipment in scientific organizations with special requirements for re- 
search machinery. Namely, the share of instruments and laboratory equip- 
L.  Gokhberg and L. Mindely 9 
ment accounted for only one fifth of the total value of fixed assets. In the 
branch and higher education sectors it is even lower. Furthermore, in exper- 
imental production the general purpose production equipment accounted for 
69% of total fixed asset value, while the proportion of specialized equipment 
for experimentation constituted only 12%. 
In order to  successfully perform standard research and even more so 
in priority areas is the availability of usually expensive, sophisticated sci- 
entific instruments and equipment (electronic microscopes, spectrometers, 
chromatographs, X-ray machines, ultra-centrifuges etc.) crucial. However, 
their average share in the total value of machinery and equipment of scien- 
tific organizations was 7.5%; the academic sector privileged at  10.4%, while 
higher education and branch sectors were forced to make do with 6,5% and 
6.7% respectively. The absolute majority of such equipment (93%) was con- 
centrated in the fields of technical, natural, and medical sciences. However, 
even there, the proportion in the total value of machinery and equipment 
was not too impressive: just 5.7%, 12.8% and 18.5%, respectively. In ad- 
dition, the level of specialization of computing equipment used in scientific 
organizations was rather low. On average, 46% of the total value of com- 
puting equipment were accounted for by computing centers and computers 
based on general-purpose processors. A very similar situation exists in the 
natural (48.8%) and technical (45.6%) sciences, while the situation in the 
field of medicine is somewhat better (33.9%). 
The aggregate characteristics regarding the viability and potential of a 
scientific organization are usually described using indicators such as capital- 
labor ratio and equipment-labor ratio. The former is calculated as a ratio 
between the volume of fixed assets of science and the number of scientific 
employees and the latter as a ratio between the value of machinery and 
equipment and the number of employees engaged in the R&D. From the 
point of view of analysis, the supply of instruments and computers available 
to  scientists is of special interest. 
According to  our calculations, the capital-labor ratio in Soviet science 
amounted to  12,800 rubles in 1989 (Table 7); 1.75 times lower than in the 
industrial sector. 
The supply of technical means for fundamental research on a priority 
basis caused such indicators as capital-labor ratios or other ratios involving 
specific types of assets for the academic science to  be twice as high on average 
as in other sectors. The capital-labor ratio in scientific organizations under 
the jurisdiction of the mining industry is about 7,000 to  9,000 rubles; in the 
ministries of the machine-building complex the figure lies between 7,000 and 
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11,000 rubles, which is still somewhat lower than the average. Equipment- 
labor ratio in the scientific experimental base was only 5,500 rubles (3 times 
lower than that in industry). Obviously, such a situation did not promote the 
quality of developments, samples of new technology, and industrial products 
and, consequently, affected the condition of the material and technical base 
of the whole national economy. 
The instruments-labor ratio and computer-labor ratio are 3 times lower 
than the capital-labor ratio in science. The highest instrument-labor ratio 
was registered in natural (9,900 rubles) and medical (8,200 rubles) sciences. 
This indicator was recorded to  have the values of 3,200 and 2,900 rubles in 
the agricultural and technical sciences respectively. It reached a minimum in 
the field of humanitarian and social sciences, and information and informa- 
tion systems (700 to  1,200 rubles). However, this is influenced, to  a certain 
degree, by the unique feature of the latter research areas. In the field of in- 
formatics, the computer-labor ratio (9,800 rubles) was 2.4 times higher than 
the average across all sectors; it's level is lower in the social (5,400 rubles), 
natural (5,100), and technical (4,100) sciences. Among the less-computerized 
branches of research are the medical (2,000), humanitarian (1,700), and agri- 
cultural (1,100) sciences. Our estimates indicate that, on average, there were 
no more than 20 personal computers (PCs) per 1000 Soviet scientists. In 
certain ministries and departments this figure was actually even less than 
5. All these determinants demonstrated a cross inconsistency between the 
technological structure of fixed assets and the true needs of modern science. 
An ineffective replacement policy with respect to  scientific fixed assets 
resulted in the accumulation of a vast amount of physically and technically 
obsolete equipment in the scientific organizations. As shown in Table 8, 
20.8% of the machinery and equipment in scientific organizations were more 
than 10 years old including one fourth of them older than 20 years. The 
proportion of scientific instruments and equipment less than five years old 
amounted to  44.2% of the total volume of machinery and equipment in gen- 
eral, while the proportion over 10 years of-age accounts for 25.1%. The age 
characteristics of the machinery and equipment belonging to  independent 
experimental bases are even worse: in 1989,32% of the equipment was older 
than 10 years. According to our calculations, the proportion of the most 
modern equipment (up to 2 years of age) in the Soviet science was 1.5 t o  2 
times lower than in the USA (1, p. 205). 
The system of providing resources for scientific activity did not stimu- 
late rapid breakthroughs in the priority directions of development. Thus, in 
the case of biotechnology, 50% of the R&D institutes did not have experi- 
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mental facilities, and 35% did not even have their own. The volume of fixed 
assets and current capital of these organizations were, on average, 1.5 and 
1.3 times lower than those of the research institutions specializing in natural 
sciences in general. It is significant that 20% of the equipment in biotech- 
nological research institutions were more than 10 years old and that half of 
the high-cost equipment exhibited a technical level which was lower than 
the best international standards. Overall, only a small percentage of such 
biotechnological equipment (0.4%) is more advanced than the best world 
standards. The proportion of Soviet high-cost machinery and equipment (as 
a percentage of the total value) above or equal to  that of the best world 
technical standards varied depending on the research field as follows: only 
14% in biotechnology, 21% in machine-building related research, manage- 
ment processes and mechanics, and 24% in general physics and astronomy, 
informatics, computers and automatization. This indicator was highest in 
the field of biochemistry, biophysics, general and technical problems of power 
engineering (35%), physical chemistry and technology of non-organic mate- 
rials (41%); yet, even these levels were clearly insufficient in order to achieve 
advanced scientific results. According to the existing estimates, the overall 
demand for scientific instruments in the USSR is only 20-25% satisfied; for 
a number of important groups a mere 10% of demand is covered. 
This has been a very brief review, of the survey results concerning the 
Soviet material and technical base of science in 1989. In future, such sur- 
veys should take place more often and at regular intervals. A systematic 
approach to the statistical analysis of scientific resources additionally envis- 
ages a comprehensive system of regularly conducted, subject-specific surveys 
of the following issues: level of computerization in scientific activity, exper- 
imental and pilot facilities, production and social infrastructure, material 
and technical supply of different R&D sectors, and orientation of scientific 
research. 
Financial Resources for R&D 
The overall amount of science related expenditures in the USSR was cal- 
culated as the sum of current expenses and capital investments in the con- 
struction of facilities connected with the development of ~c ience .~  The former 
'Capital construction performed by the scientific organizations did not include housing, 
cultural and consumer service installations, and other structures that were not connected 
with the scientific activity as such. 
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includes volume of work performed by independent scientific organizations 
as well as by divisions of enterprises, scientific-production and production 
associations, higher education institutions and other business entities. The 
latter refers to scientific organizations, their experimental and production 
bases, independent laboratories, meteorological service installations, botan- 
ical and experimental gardens, wild-life preserves, and so forth. 
In the calculations performed in order to determine R&D expenditures 
the work fulfilled on a contractual basis for enterprises and organizations 
was recorded in both the executing agencies category (which place orders) 
and the research contractors category. The result was a duplication in the 
calculation of costs. The proportion of such double count reached almost one 
third of the overall value of R&D expenditures by our estimates. In addi- 
tion, allocations for science included certain types of expenditures which are 
generally not included into the scientific budget of most major R&D nations 
(expenditures of museums, libraries, etc.). At the same time such calcula- 
tions tended to omit certain types of expenses. These included investments 
in scientific divisions of industrial enterprises and higher education institu- 
tions, and depreciation payments for the renovation of their fixed assets; 
costs of maintenance of research and experimental facilities; costs of R&D 
done by the faculty of higher education institutions; training and upgrading 
the qualification level of the scientific personnel of these institutions financed 
from the state budget item "Education;" and, volume of work conducted by 
scientific and technological cooperatives. Nevertheless, even the most con- 
servative estimates indicate that the amount of duplicated costs was more 
than twice the total amount of expenses omitted. 
Our calculations permitted us to adjust the official statistical data on 
science expenditures by eliminating double-counted expenses (Table 9). In 
1989, total expenditures on science (including that performed by the scien- 
tific and technological cooperatives) amounted to approximately 35 billion 
rubles. In contrast, R&D expenditures between 1987 and 1989 in the USA 
(including investments into science, costs of research in humanitarian sci- 
ences and at the foreign branches of American companies which the US 
statistics do not take into account) increased from US$ 135.1 billion to US$ 
151.2 billion (1, p. 202). The 1988 science expenditures to national income 
ratio in the USSR was 4.2% as compared to 6.2% in the USA. 
Throughout the past decades in the Soviet Union, the so-called "resid- 
ual" principle was predominant as the method to allocate funds for the de- 
velopment of science. In regard to the structure of expenditures in the state 
budget of the USSR, science expenditures traditionally held one of the last 
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places: in 1970-1989 their share was consistently between 3.4% and 4.5%. 
In the United States, as in a number of other leading capitalist countries, 
the state expenditures for science are growing more rapidly in comparison 
with the total budget allocations. In 1989, 7.9% of the US federal budget 
funds were allocated for scientific R&D. This proportion was expected to  be 
increased to  8,6% in 1991 (7, p. 5). 
As part of the overall R&D budget, the costs of defense-oriented R&D 
accounted for a considerable part of the total science expenditures in both 
nations. In 1989, the Soviets spent 15.3 billion rubles for these purposes, 
while the Americans spent US$ 37.5 billion or, 71% and 62%, respectively, 
of state allocations for science. In our country the share of science in the 
military expenditures amount to  almost 20%; in the USA the share is 13%.~  
considiring the gap in the absolute level of funding between the two 
super powers, it becomes evident that the Soviet state-spent at least 4.5 
times less than the American for civilian science (2, p. 55). World experi- 
ence demonstrates that countries with relatively low levels of military R&D 
expenditures (in particular the former FRG and Japan), undergo more rapid 
scientific and technological development, achieve stable economic growth and 
improve their competitiveness in the world market. As implied by this ex- 
ample, it is necessary to  speed up the conversion of the defense complex 
organizations in the Soviet Union, and more fully utilize their potential for 
solutions of the problems facing the national economy. However, the share 
of budget allocations for civilian science as a percentage of total R&D ex- 
penditures has been decreasing over time: from 54.7% in 1970 to  44.8% in 
1988. In 1989 it dropped by half to  23.2%. In the USA, this value amounted 
to  46.7% in 1989. 
The growing decentralization of the science funding, characteristic for its 
development during the late 1980s in the USSR, together with continually 
worsening state budge deficit may bring about the further serious deteriora- 
tion of resource provision for fundamental science and the priority fields of 
scientific research. 
The share of fundamental research in general science expenditure of the 
Soviet Union was lower than in the leading capitalist countries. It amounted 
to  only 7.2%, while in Great Britain it was 12%, Japan had 13%, the USA 
equaled 1476, the former FRG share was 18%, and fiance boasted a high of 
20%. 
'source: (1, p. 203). Calculated on the basis of the data of: (6,8,9). 
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The main part of the Soviet fundamental research (about 61.5% of total 
volume) was done in the academic sector. Here, the proportion of such stud- 
ies in the structure of R&D expenditures was highest in comparison with 
the other sectors of science (Table 10). In the factory and industrial branch 
science sectors development was predominant, and the share of fundamental 
research was extremely low. The higher education institutions accounted 
for only one-seventh of the total volume of R&D. In conjunction with the 
insufficient level of development of fundamental research in the branch and 
even higher education sectors, it  became difficult to  justify the high aggre- 
gate percentage of applied research and development in the academic science 
(62.5%). The situation with respect to  very low share of fundamental re- 
search (based on R&D expenditures) in the fields of technical sciences and 
informatics 5% and 9% respectively was particularly disturbing. 
A comparative analysis of the distribution of R&D expenditures in the 
USSR and the USA (Table 11) demonstrates the disproportions in the disci- 
plinary structure of Soviet science due to  its strong technocratic orientation. 
The technical sciences in the USSR accounted for 75% of the total amount 
of R&D expenditures and the shares of other branches of science were lower 
than in USA. The gap in the field of medical and natural science research 
was especially large despite the fact that these very branches could provide 
effective solutions to  health-care and environmental problems, for the uti- 
lization of natural riches, and for the creation of equipment, technology, and 
materials which are capable of revolutionizing production. 
Development of market relationships began to  assist in the formation 
of the non-state (cooperative-public) R&D sector and promoted the grad- 
ual increase of its role in the financing of R&D. In its early stages during 
the 1980s, this sector was comprised of mostly various small organizations. 
Their activities included R&D, implementation of innovations, information 
and computing, consulting, intermediary and other services, and copying 
of product and process developments. These activities were (and continue 
to  be) organized on contractual basis. The specialists from the academic, 
branch science, and higher education institutions are invited to  fulfill certain 
work based on the orders from enterprises and organizations. 
In 1989, there were approximately 4,500 research and designing organiza- 
tions, 528 scientific and production associations in industry, 23 intersectoral 
scientific and technological complexes, and 904 higher education institutions 
in the USSR. R&D was also performed by 720 enterprises and production 
associations, more than one thousand designing organizations in the field 
of construction, and other institutions. Since 1987 new forms of R&D in- 
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stitutions were established. These essentially constituted the emerging and 
growing non-state R&D sector. The various forms included about 500 eco- 
nomically independent youth centers for scientific and technological activity 
(YCSTA) and numerous innovation small enterprises (centers). The latter 
were established within the USSR Academy of Sciences, branch institutes, 
industrial enterprises within the system of the Union of the Scientific and 
Engineering Societies (USES) of the USSR, and under the auspices of the 
All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers (ASIR). 
The volume of the scientific and technological products of the non-state 
scientific sector continuously expanded: while i t  accounted for less than one 
tenth of one per cent of the total (gross) amount of Soviet science expen- 
ditures in 1987, this value rose t o  3.2% in 1988 and t o  almost 11% in 1989 
(Table 12). 
The highest growth rate was registered by the scientific and technological 
(S&T) c ~ o ~ e r a t i v e s . ~  Their number has reached 2,100 by the end of 1988 
and grew five times during 1989. By the beginning of 1990, they employed 
321,500 people, their volume of products (services) sold exceeded 3.15 billion 
rubles (Table 13). According t o  our estimates, the number of employees per 
scientific and technological cooperative is about 10, while approximately 20 
more work there part-time. 
High flexibility, shorter completion time for projects, and the desire t o  
satisfy clients' requirements t o  a maximum degree made the S&T cooper- 
atives increasingly competitive relative t o  the state organizations, further 
eroding the monopolization of individual fields of the R&D. A considerable 
portion of their activity consisted of software development (40%), informa- 
tion services, consulting and economic research (22%), project preparation 
(13%), and search and repair of equipment (10%). The orientation of S&T 
cooperatives activities primarily towards labor-intensive services, and many 
from fundamental research and science-intensive production are, t o  a large 
degree, explained by the difficulties with investments, material and techni- 
cal supplies, rigid taxation, and the desire to  avoid the high business risks 
associated with the conditions of an unstable economic situation. 
Joint ventures with foreign companies became a new institutional form of 
development, production, and dissemination of advanced types of equipment 
and technology. Their establishment facilitated the implementation of so- 
'In the statistics, scientific and technological cooperatives include research, designing, 
innovation-implementing, cooperatives as well as software developing and information ser- 
vice cooperatives. 
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phisticated foreign scientific products, Western management experience, and 
material and financial resources for the development of the science-intensive 
production in the Soviet Union. However, out of 1274 joint ventures regis- 
tered in the USSR as of 1 January 1990, only 307 were actually operational. 
Only 22 (7%) of these were active in the R&D sector. The economic and 
practical risks made the majority of the foreign investors cautious and in- 
clined to  avoid large long- term investments. The average amount of a foreign 
partner's contribution between 1987 and 1989 decreased from 2,4 million to  
less than 1 million rubles. 
In order to  generate reliable and valuable statistical information con- 
cerning the USSR's R&D resources price deflation is necessary. In 1989, 
future inflation in this sector was to reach 40-50%. 
Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in this paper only touched upon the most general 
issues related to  the evaluation of resources in Soviet science. Proposals 
drafted regarding the reorganization of science and technology management 
under the conditions of a transition to a market economy, which is the main 
objective of the present international project, should be based upon compre- 
hensive statistical information characterizing all aspects of the development 
of science in the USSR. For this purpose, it would be advisable to  create a 
working group within the framework of this project that specializes in the 
reorganization of scientific statistics in the USSR. These should adhere more 
closely to  the international standards, and be more frequently presented in 
intercountry comparisons. The above mentioned group could coordinate ef- 
forts connected with the improvement of the methodological and practical 
basis of the scientific statistics, the organization of special statistical surveys, 
expert evaluation of the reliability of statistical data, and its analysis. 
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Table 1. The structure of Soviet scientific personnel by level of qualification, 
1989 (%).' 
R&D Academic Higher Branch 
producing Sector Education Sectorb 
All Sectors Sector 
Persons employed in 
scientific organizations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which: 
Supporting personnel 22.0 22.0 15.0 22.7 
Specialists engaged in R&D 63.5 63.4 75.4 62.4 
of which: 
degree holders 
wiih: 
higher education 81.8 89.1 91.7 79.6 
special secondary education 18.2 10.9 8.3 20.4 
'Source: (1, p. 135). 
b~ncluding research and design divisions of industrial enterprises and designing organi- 
zation in the field of construction. 
Table 2. Distribution of Soviet scientific personnel by branches of industry, 
1989 (%).' 
R&D Academic Higher Indus- 
producing Sector Education trial 
All Sectors Sector Sectorb 
Total Persons employed in 
scientific organizations 100.0 12.0 7.6 80.4 
of which: 
Supporting personnel 100.0 12.0 5.2 82.8 
Specialists engaged in R&D 100.0 12.0 9.1 79.0 
of which: 
degree holders 
wiih: 
higher education 100.0 13.0 10.2 76.8 
special secondary education 100.0 7.2 4.1 88.7 
'Source: (1,p. 136). 
b~ncluding research and design divisions of industrial enterprises and designing organi- 
zations in the field of construction. 
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Table 3. Number of specialists engaged in R&D in the Soviet Union and 
the United States (thousands). 
1981 1986 1989 
USSR USA USSR USA USSR USAa 
Specialists 
engaged in R&D 1434.2 1258.7 1599.4 1725.5 1654.6 2026.9 
1977.6~ 2318.4~ 
b~ncluding consulting personnel. 
Table 4. Age structure of scientific workers with highest qualifications in 
the USSR and the USA (as of year's beginning, %).' 
USSR USA 
Doctors of Candidates of Ph.D's 
science science 
1983 1988 1983 1988 1981 1985 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
up t o  35 10.0 10.0 17.3 13.6 
36-40 2.0 2.0 13.0 15.0 32.4 19.5 
41-50 23.0 20.0 47.0 40.0 32.5 37.2 
51-60 42.0 41.0 23.0 27.0 19.3 19.5 
61 and above 33.0 37.0 7.0 8.0 8.5 10.2 
'Compiled from: (3, p. 22; 4, p. 86; 5, p. 76) 
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Table 5. Distribution of scientific personnel by branch of science, USSR 
and USA (as of year's beginning, %). 
USSRa USAb 
1976 1986 1976 1986 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mathematical, computer, 
and physical sciences 15.0 14.6 15.3 21.2 
Life sciences 12.9 12.9 9.2 8.9 
Environmental sciences 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.4 
Technical sciences 48.7 49.5 58.8 52.7 
Psychology 0.3 0.3 4.8 5.5 
Social and 
humanitarian sciences 20.3 20.2 9.5 9.3 
aScientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel employed in the economy. 
b~cientists and engineers employed in the national economy. 
Table 6. Technological structure of fixed assets utilized for scientific pur- 
poses (%). 
Sectors of Science 
Higher 
Total Academic Branch Education 
Fixed Assets of scientific 
organizations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
including: 
Machinery & equipment 61.1 62.8 62.9 53.3 
including: 
Instruments & labo- 
ratory equipment 20.5 26.2 18.7 19.7 
Comvuters 21.1 15.6 24.0 18.3 
Source: (1, p. 150.) 
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Table 7. Capital-labor ratio in science (thousand rubleslunit labor). 
Sectors 
Higher 
Total Academic Branch Education Factory 
Capital-Labor Ratio in the 
main line of activity 12.8 22.3 11.3 12.8 12.2 
Equipment-Labor Ratio 
(per specialists engaged 
in R&D) 11.5 21 .O 10.3 9.6 10.6 
Instrument-Labor Ratio 
(per scientist) 4.0 8.4 3.0 5.3 
Computer-Labor Ratio 
(per scientist) 4.1 5.0 3.9 4.9 
Source: (1,p. 151). 
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Table 8. Age structure of machinery and equipment in scientific organiza- 
tions (%). 
1-2 3-5 6-10 11-20 over 20 
years years years years years 
Machinery and equipment of 
scientific organizations 21.9 28.1 29.2 15.7 5.1 
including: 
Instruments and 
laboratory equipment 18.1 26.1 30.7 19.4 5.7 
Computers 30.0 32.7 27.7 8.5 1.1 
Machinery and equipment 
of independent 
experimental bases 16.1 23.9 28.0 23.3 8.7 
Source: (1, p. 157). 
Table 9. Science expenditures in the USSR. 
USSR State Committee 
Estimates 
Table 10. Structure of R&D expenditures by sector and type, 1989 (%). 
Fundamental Applied Develop- 
Total Research Research ment 
R&D expenditures 100 7.2 33.2 59.6 
on Statistics' data 
Bln. Rbls. 24 26 32 
Percentage of 
National income 4.1 4.2 4.9 
Gross National Product 2.9 3.0 3.5 
Sectors of science: 
academic 100 37.5 37.6 24.9 
branch 100 2.5 31.7 65.8 
higher education 100 13.7 60.4 25.9 
factory 100 0.7 20.7 78.6 
Source: (1, p. 167). 
1987 1988 1989 1 1987 1988 1989 
32.8 37.8 43.6 
5.5 6.0 6.6 
4.0 4.3 4.7 
~ources: (1, p. 164) and (6, p. 290). 
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T a b l e  11. Distribution of scientific research expenditures in the USSR and 
the USA by branch of science, 1988 (%). 
USSR USA 
Total 100.0 100.0 
including the following branches: 
natural 16.0 29.7 
social and humanitarian 4.1 6.0 
agricultural 2.4 3.9 
medical 2.2 10.2 
technical 75.3 50.2 
Source: (1, p. 205). 
T a b l e  12. Volume of scientific and technological products sold by alterna- 
tive institutional forms of R&D (billion rubles). 
1987 1988 1989 
Volume of the scientific and 
technological products sold 0.03 1.2 4.7 
including: 
by the YCSTA 
by temporary creative teams 
with the ASIR councils 
be temporary creative teams 
with the USES 0.12 0.35 
by scientific and 
technological cooperatives 0.008 0.17 3.15 
T a b l e  13. Main indicators of scientific and technological cooperatives (as 
of year's end). 
Number of operating cooperatives 2,100 10,400 
- 
Number of workers 55,000 321,500 
Volume of products (work, services) 
sold, mln.rbls. 167.1 3151.3 
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Transformat ion 
of Basic Structures and 
Operating Mechanisms of 
Soviet Science 
D. ~iskunot?  and B. Saltykot? 
The 1990/91 stage in the socio-economic evolution of the Soviet Union 
is unique in many ways, but predominantly in terms of extraordinarily low 
stability of the social system. Most traditional stabilization mechanisms 
were faltering. As a result, the number of possible states t o  which the 
system could deviate under the impact of relatively weak disturbances grew 
tremendously. Soviet science was a most conservative social institution, and 
due t o  its comparatively small size and strong dependence on the condition 
of political and economic structures i t  was destined t o  experience the  same 
changes as the economy: therefore, stable structures and ties collapsed, and 
old operating mechanisms dramatically changed. In order t o  have a proper 
insight into the painful transformation processes one must return to  the 
principles and traditions that  constituted the cornerstone of the powerful, 
though mythological, system that  Soviet science was. 
The  structure and dynamics of scientific potential for an individual coun- 
try are essentially determined by some basic features of the social system. 
The most important among these features are: political and economic tar- 
gets, historic and regional peculiarities, and ethnic traditions. 
'Director, Analytical Center of the Russian National Academy of Sciences, Russia. 
'Minister, Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology Policy, Russia. 
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The type of centralized state that was historically formed in the USSR 
with its long-term traditions of authoritarian power could not help but es- 
tablish similar structures in science. Moreover, combined with such fac- 
tors as the vast territory and long period of socio-economic backwardness of 
Russia's outlying districts, this created a marked differentiation in scientific 
potential with a bias toward the "center-provinces." On the other hand, 
political goals, and invariable centrally-determined priorities (frequently t o  
the detriment of economic ends) caused the evolution of regional science to  
be frequently determined by factors of national prestige rather than by the 
real needs of economy and society at  large. 
A prolonged period of international isolation, even antagonism, caused 
Soviet, national security interests to  enjoy highest priority. Consequently, a 
significant portion of resources was concentrated in military-oriented R&D. 
The post World War I1 tensions of the Cold War saw this type of scientific 
potential even more strongly encouraged. Historically inherited autarchy of 
the USSR and its weak involvement in international economic cooperation 
stimulated the evolution of a continuous research front in Soviet science. 
Still, the factor that played the decisive role in forming the basic struc- 
tures of Soviet science and created procedures and operating mechanisms 
inherent only to  this science was the administrative-command system (ACS). 
Bmnchdom, a socio-economic phenomenon, referred to  the partition- 
ing of the economy into rather isolated sectors operating in the monopoly 
mode and completely managed and controlled by special integrated power 
structures (government-party-business). By the end of the 1930s, when the 
basic features of the ACS had already been established, all production deci- 
sions including R&D and long-term construction issues were taken from the 
authority of industrial enterprises and transferred to  higher management 
levels (ministries and agencies). It is in this way that the branch-type or 
ministry-type science system was established in the Soviet Union. Branch- 
dom eventually became the principal way of organizing productive forces in 
the ACS. 
Due to  the chief emphasis on production criteria for national economic 
development, the organizational structure, planning techniques, and man- 
agement methods of Soviet science were essentially completely borrowed 
from material production planning . Accordingly, all relations between the 
subjects producing new knowledge and the remainder of the national econ- 
omy were also regulated by the command-administrative type of manage- 
ment mechanism. The basic features of this mechanism included: branch- 
type organization of R&D; absolute dominance of power in management and 
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control; planning and management of scientific activities in terms of formal 
indicators; and (rationed) allocation of material inputs. Furthermore, this 
mechanism also accounted for cost-based pricing of R&D products and a 
subordinate (essentially, accounting) role for financial indicators. Although 
consisting of a seemingly wide variety of forms the system of science financing 
was actually designed in order t o  allocate funds t o  support slowly evolving 
research institutions. 
No matter how paradoxical i t  may appear, efficient ways and means for 
implementing an integrated government-science policy were never achieved 
in the overcentralized ACS management system. Part  of the problem lay in 
the fact that  branch property rights for science as a production input were 
only gradually established by legislation, while problems of its use and devel- 
opment were practically wholly the responsibility of the branch (ministry) 
apparatus, including the bureaucratic apparatus of the scientific community 
itself. 
This management style made i t  impossible for the  scientific community 
and customers of R&D products t o  participate in the assessment of research 
efforts by R&D institutions. There was no opportunity t o  influence selection 
of priority areas and the amount of funding for particular research topics. 
Conditions of economic protection were created for branch R&D institutions, 
allowing a branch (agency) t o  support its own science irrespective of quality. 
Such organization generated branch patriotism, distorted objective crite- 
ria and logic of science development, and led t o  the disruption of the natural 
structure of science communities that  are formed on the principle of common 
research problems in market economies. The final consequence was a sepa- 
ration of Soviet scientific potential into isolated branch dominated groups. 
During recent decades, the resulting particular structure of Soviet scien- 
tific potential was molded under the strong influence of individual priorities 
assigned by various branches and agencies in the overall hierarchy of eco- 
nomic  subject^.^ In turn, these priorities reflected the ranking of government 
goals: first, military, then space research, then some fields of basic science, 
heavy industry, and, lastly came social goals. 
In this respect, the commonly established tradition of dividing Soviet 
science into three sectors: branch (ministry/industry), academy (Academy 
of Sciences), and higher education (and sometimes, quite reasonably, the 
'It should be stressed that historically generated differentiation of regional science from 
the pole "Center-West" to the pole "South-Eastn was superimposed on branch (agency) 
priorities. 
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fourth factory science sector is also specified) seemed rather ineffectual. In 
fact, the various scientific fields that  exhibit common systemic features were 
evidently not organized according t o  some formal principles but, rather, 
according t o  the influential power of a particular agency on the ranking of 
government priorities. 
The most important and impressive R&D sector incorporated high- 
priority, science-intensive engineering institutions in conjunction with well- 
developed material-laboratory facilities; the sector was characterized by sta- 
ble growth rates and investment ratios. This was so-called defense science. 
By the end of 1980s, R&D institutions in this sector allocated about half 
of the total expenditures on R&D exclusively for military research; this 
amounted t o  75% of the state budget allocations for R&D. Since a consider- 
able portion of work conducted in this sector is concerned with the national 
economy a t  large, its share in the total expenditure on science was even 
higher. 
A set of factors were a t  work in this sector that  ensured the maintenance 
of scientific potential a t  an adequate level. These factors included reactively 
independent management, coordination, communication, logistic, and long- 
term construction systems that  were more or less separated from similar 
systems in the remainder of the national economy. 
The same features were characteristic with regard to  higher education 
establishment. Consequently, several dozen educational institutions should 
conceptually also be included in the branch sector. They are distinguished 
by an exceptionally high quality of graduates who dealt primarily with R&D 
topics important t o  the branch sector. In addition, the materials-engineering 
base of these educational institutions, including their research and experi- 
mental units, were of considerably higher quality than the average. Part of 
the reasoning lay in the various economic and non-economic measures imple- 
mented t o  maintain and promote the levels of skilled personnel in this group 
of industries such as higher wage rates, inhouse system of direct allocation 
of social benefits, and many more. 
Fundamental research was more fully developed in this area of industrial 
science than in other fields. There were broad work and business contacts 
between this sector and the institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
that  might have secured a higher potential level. International competition 
served as an efficient incentive t o  constantly search for new solutions in the 
respective fields of science and engineering fostered a t  establishments of the 
defense complex. 
D. Piskunou and B. Saltykou 29 
The second ranked R&D sector, which could be arbitrarily called Big 
Academy, involved the scientific complex of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
and also a number of research institutions of the republican Academies (pri- 
marily from the Ukrainian, Belarus and the Baltics) where the level of R&D, 
and the quality of materials base and personnel were generally similar to  
those of the national Academy. Some universities and educational institu- 
tions that trained specialists for the sector and maintained close contacts 
with academic institutions also fell in this category. Characteristic features 
of this sector were a relatively high share of basic research and a significant 
ranking of the respective agencies in the economic hierarchy of the country 
or of an individual republic. 
A relatively high qualification of scientific personnel was achieved in 
the academy sector due to in-depth general education, considerable num- 
ber of distinguished scientific schools, inter disciplinary and inter-branch 
approaches to the solution of research and engineering problems, and com- 
paratively close ties with international science. A higher degree of openness 
and democracy traditionally inherent to  the academic sector was also of 
major importance. 
The third leading R&D sector consisted of research and engineering es- 
tablishments belonging to  the majority of civilian ministries and agencies 
and constituted civilian branch science. 
Despite the rather sophisticated inner structure of this sector, specific 
important features were common to the majority of its institutions. First, 
these institutions were typically plagued by a low-level of resource support, 
including obsolete and disintegrated instrumentation, material and experi- 
mental facilities. Second, the scientific personnel in the sector was recruited 
from graduates with narrow, specialized engineering backgrounds from a 
weaker group of educational institutes belonging to  the non-metropolitan 
section of higher education. Thus, the resulting R&D was specialized and 
restricted to  its own scientific-engineering connections and had almost no 
relations with basic and international science (Big Academy included). 
The fourth level in rank of Soviet R&D comprised institutions of prouin- 
cia1 science. It was regarded as the most backward portion of branch sci- 
ence under the auspices of low-priority ministries and agencies, local R&D 
establishments and academic and educational institutions located in some 
relatively underdeveloped regions of the country. Typical features of the sec- 
tor included: very low qualifications of R&D personnel, low quality material 
inputs, and strong orientation to applied problems of specifically regional 
nature. 
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The logistical system of the R&D sector, based on standards borrowed 
from the production sector, played an important role in strengthening deep 
differentiation in science. This situation was accentuated under the condi- 
tions of a shortage economy in which the distribution of instruments, ma- 
terials and services were predominantly based on the system of branch pri- 
orities. Therefore, the four-tier Soviet science system was in fact finally 
partitioned into two large spheres: big and small. These two groupings op- 
erated under dramatically different conditions of resource support. On the 
one hand, big science was represented by the defense industries' and a part 
of academia's institutions; while, on the other hand, small science was em- 
bodied in low-priority branches that had practically no access t o  modern 
instruments, materials, and equipment. 
By the mid-1980s, Soviet scientific potential, in particular with respect 
to  R&D personnel but also the knowledge base, instrumentation, and tech- 
nologies, was differentiated to  such an extent that an evidently impenetrable 
barrier was created between the upper and lower levels of the scientific hi- 
erarchy. The science and technology sector, as also other sectors of the 
national economy, had very limited possibilities to  substitute specific qual- 
ity resources with generally available ones. Even the ten-fold increase in 
the number of mnk-and-file researchers could not substitute a single really 
brilliant scientist. 
Branchdom combined with an ACS did not offer an opportunity t o  fully 
implement even a theoretical advantage of this pattern: namely, the possibil- 
ity to  mobilize large-scale structural resource rechannelling in the centralized 
manner in favor of the most challenging research areas. In practice, the pri- 
orities of branches and agencies were a more dominant factor. Consequently, 
the possibility to  develop most relevant and urgent study areas was depen- 
dent on resources allocated to  an individual ministry (agency). In other 
words, branch priorities sort of dissolved government or public ones. 
In addition, each level of the national economy production structure, 
specifically in all the various branches was subordinate to  the priority of 
the so-called leading ink either explicitly or implicitly. This mechanism was 
not influential when focussed on the growth of the main parameter (be i t  
an individual machine, a production process, etc.) in a particular economic 
sector. As a result, a specific type of technological progress inherent only 
to  Soviet economic management emerged. This type of progress might be 
referred to  as gross-like technological progress. Its distinguishing feature was 
to  strive for the improvement of technological efficiency almost exclusively 
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by increasing unit capacities of existing equipment types and production 
volumes, frequently beyond economically (and ecologically) justified limits. 
The gross-like type of technological progress distorted the structure of 
scientific potential. As a result, inter-branch R&D was poorly developed 
and studies a t  the cross-mads of various fields of science were inadequate. 
At the same time, these factors are now of major importance in terms of con- 
sumer characteristics and efficiency of integrated technologies and machine 
systems. Also, back-logs in the development of resource-saving technologies 
(that were unprofitable under the then existing management mechanism) 
were rather meager. Conversely, back-logs in the traditional fields of science 
and technology are relatively hypertrophied. A similar situation is observed 
in the branches of the economy engaged in the production of the leading 
ink of integrated systems (for example, tractors in agricultural machine- 
building, earth-moving machinery as a part of construction equipment, and 
main-frames in information processing systems). 
The science management system was contaminated with the formal at-  
tributes, standards, values, and aims borrowed from the ACS. Therefore, 
the domination of gross-like categories in the entire planning system biased 
the criteria for assessing the results of scientific activities towards the purely 
utilitarian sphere. In fact, applied research designed t o  be implemented in 
various branches of the national economy was recognized as most important 
and useful. This direction caused the level and prestige of basic research 
t o  decline. In selecting projects, scholars chose those that guaranteed some 
form of practical application, no matter how far-fetched they may have been 
a t  such an early stage. 
Bmnchdom in science cultivated monopoly - the main source of low 
technological progress standards in the Soviet national economy. It stimu- 
lated the development of a "natural science economy" within agencies and 
individual institutions. This led the most common form of R&D organization 
t o  be a multi-purpose research institution that  combined all creative scientific 
functions with services. Such a pattern prevented functional specialization 
in science and eventually lowered the total efficiency of science-technology 
potential. 
Within such an organizational setting, the cognitive potential could only 
be enhanced by the establishment of new laboratories and R&D institutions 
that  were designed t o  cope with new fields of knowledge. Soviet science 
was exemplary for this style of development in the 1960s. Over a period of 
some 10 years (from 1960 through 1972), the number of research institutions 
increased by more than a thousand units (from 4,196 t o  5,307). Strict re- 
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strictions were imposed on the process of establishing new R&D institutions 
when the government suddenly perceived a real danger of loosing control 
over the development of the R&D network. 
However, significant growth in the numbers of R&D personnel persisted. 
Although the structure of the network was ~ tab i l ized ,~  the average size of 
an R&D institution (based on employment) increased by more than 25% 
in the period between 1975 and 1985.5 Eventually, the ACS had produced 
a structure of scientific potential in which only large-scale or, rather, giant 
R&D organizations (numbering several thousand and sometimes dozens of 
thousand persons) were viable. A srnall-size R&D institution became syn- 
onymous to  a weak or a poor one. 
Hence, the over-centralized allocation type economy had created a very 
peculiar and permanently self-reproducing structure of scientific potential 
by the early 1980s. The most typical features of this structure were: 
unusually high monopolization level officially promoted by the branch- 
type management and organization of the economy; 
stable differentiation in the quality of R&D resources (and, consequently, 
in the results) among various fields of science and regions of the country; 
extremely low flexibility and mobility, i.e., the capability to respond to  
new requirements of society and science itself. 
Despite periodic demonstrations of achievements, Soviet science was ex- 
periencing ever worsening stagnation by the mid-1980s.~ The gap between 
the rate of intellectual pduc t ion  in the industrialized countries and that in 
the Soviet Union was permanently widening. 
The situation finally became so critical that a radical change utilizing 
traditional measures involving organizational transformations, and introduc- 
tion or cancellation of customary measures would have proven impossible. 
The entire management paradigm had to be changed both in science and in 
the national economy at  large. 
With the beginning of perestroika (actually, from 1987), a radically new 
stage of organizational-economic transformations in Soviet science was ini- 
tiated. ~ ika rch i ca l  relations of subordination between the R&D subjects 
'Their total number of R&D institutions practically did not change over the last 20 
years, reaching 5,111 units in 1989. 
5~ccording  to our est imate,  an average s t a f  of an R&D institution w a  280-300 persons 
in the mid-1980s. 
'In the 1980s the rate of growth in the number of R&D personnel frequently dropped 
below 1% a year, whereas 3-5% growth would have been necessary to secure consistent 
production of the scientific community and development of new research areas. 
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and management structures were to be gradually replaced by the relations 
of legislative and economic independence and equality. The principle of self- 
organization was more or less implemented: scientists and engineers were 
given an opportunity to  set up provisional research groups and to  unite into 
associations, unions, R&D cooperatives, etc. The price setting mechanism 
for R&D products ceased to  be the domain of the state and their prices 
became a matter of agreement between the researcher and the client. The 
control of government agencies over the network of R&D institutions was 
considerably weakened (though not completely lifted). A portion of con- 
trol functions of the administrative bodies was delegated downwanls; for 
instance, t o  the leading R&D institutions or councils responsible for the de- 
velopment of individual programs. And, lastly, almost all limits on the size 
of personal income in the realm of R&D activities were abandoned, including 
limitations on combining jobs. 
The results of these decisions turned out to  be very important but con- 
troversial. As could have been expected, the process of denationalization 
(or, more exactly, semi-legal privatization) of R&D set in, creating a rapidly 
expanding new sector in this sphere referred to  as the cooperative sector. By 
early 1990, R&D cooperatives (NTK) employed more than 320,000 persons 
who, in 1989, performed work and supplied services to  the value of more than 
3 billion rubles. Provisional teams of researchers and engineers operating un- 
der the auspices of various unions, associations, and cost-accounting centers 
performed work valued at  another 2 billion rubles over the same period. So, 
the total amount of work performed by the new sector and reimbursed by 
customers amounted to some 5 billion rubles. 
Small, flexible groups in this sector quickly seized the as yet unrealized 
opportunities for R&D, engineering and broker activities that were beyond 
the reach of the government. The spirit of competition revealed itself both in 
lower prices for studies and services offered by NTK and provisional research 
teams, and in much shorter periods for project completion as compared to  
those in the government sector. During 1988 and 1989 a sharp increase in the 
number of non-government R&D institutions was recorded. The consequence 
was a drastic reduction in the size of commission (from 40% to 10% and less) 
charged by cost-accounting institutions for their services.? This market soon 
became increasingly tight. 
Ln 1988 and 1989, dramatic changes took place in the wage dynamics 
for those employed in Soviet R&D activities everywhere, not only in the 
'Frequently, merely for an opportunity to pay in cash. 
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cooperative sector. For the first time in recent decades, wage growth rates 
in R&D were highest compared to those in other sectors of the national 
economy. The wage level of personnel employed in research institutions and 
design bureaus rose as much as 40% only in 1989. Due to the sharp wage 
increases, the benefits of a purely administrative career in science diminished 
and the former status credentials of scholars simultaneously more or less lost 
their previous value. 
Concurrent shifts in the structure and quality of R&D activities failed 
to keep pace with the scale of this Financial Revolution. One of the rea- 
sons for these developments lay in the fact that reforms in science often 
preceded necessary changes in the national economy. On the one hand, mar- 
ket relations had been introduced in the realm of science. Consequently the 
transition of the national economy had not yet set the framework for or ini- 
tiated demonopolization, conditions stimulating demand for highly efficient 
and science-intensive technologies had not been created, and a new compre- 
hensive legislation regulating current relations among the subjects of R&D 
activities had not been introduced. 
On the other hand, the transformations that had been effected did not 
always take account of the specific nature of R&D. Informative by defini- 
tion, the results of Soviet R&D facilitated very cheap, or practically free, 
duplication. Due to the uniqueness and risk often associated with a good 
portion of scientific work, the concept of average prices was non-existent 
in this sector in the USSR and there is ample opportunity for almost arbi- 
trary "costing." Hence, legal prospects for making superprofits emerge after 
commodity-money relations were established in the R&D sector. During 
the late 1980s, the phenomena immediately led to a sharp rise in personal 
income. 
Under contract prices, the increase in R&D institution and design bureau 
revenues could have been curtailed due to limited funds of customers, essen- 
tially enterprises or government. But it is exactly during this period that the 
amount of "money supplyn for science increased significantly. First, govern- 
ment expenditures on basic research were considerably increased. Second, a 
large amount of money was accumulated by development funds of industrial 
enterprises and this money could not be spent for procuring equipment and 
materials due to the shortage of such paraphernalia. Science became one of 
the safest and useful ways to get rid of ezcess money. The strong growth 
in the amount of R&D work in 1988-1989 is mainly explained by the price 
hike. 
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The relative easy money of clients prevented the natural selection of 
potentially most efficient research teams and institutions since these could 
afford to  pay all their staff including the ballast. Funds continued to  be 
wasted on worthless, antiquated studies directed by their privileged, "dis- 
tinguished" leaders. Unfortunately, despite a considerable increase in R&D 
allocations, all these factors prevented fundamental changes to  occur in the 
quality of Soviet R&D. 
The ballast was also preserved due to  the fact that labor relations and 
hiring methods remained unchanged. Hope was still placed on material 
incentives to  stimulate productivity growth in science, whereas the main 
feature of a market (i.e., efficient economy), as is well-known, is the existence 
of labor market. 
Regional science labor markets sprouted rapidly in a number of large 
cities of the USSR in the late 1980s. However, as a rule, they were second 
employment markets. These markets consisted of hundreds of thousands 
researchers and engineers working on a contract basis for the organizations 
of the non-government sector where the customer exercised control by the 
ruble and the performer had his reputation at  stake. Here one could order 
a specific job from a single or several specialists instead of hiring a whole 
institution. At the same time, most actors in this sector bore no risks since 
they were permanently employed elsewhere. 
As time passed, we witnessed the emergence of second or black science, 
or to be more exact, an entirely new innovation sector. Due to  a lack of 
essential legislation, operating time, materials, equipment and, of course, 
final products began to  be abused. The latter as a result of the problem of 
property rights for R&D products, which was not even close to  being solved 
in the Soviet Union at  that time. 
In 1990 and 1991 the consumer market, business relations, and confi- 
dence in the ability and influence of institutions were practically completely 
disrupted. As sociologists put it: uthe peak of social disintegmtion was 
reached; the situation in Soviet science was markedly changed for the worse." 
Demand for R&D products on the part of industrial and agricultural 
enterprises dropped considerably, budget financing opportunities for R&D 
were curtailed (both on the national and republican levels), and a process 
of disintegration of a number of R&D institutions set in. Unemployment 
in science become a stark reality and at  the same time the influx of young 
researchers simultaneously declined considerably. The bmin dmin process 
gained in strength. The persistence of these trends were sure to  damage 
scientific potential in the USSR and may have had irreversible effects since 
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scientific institutions and teams disintegrated rather quickly, while their es- 
tablishment would take much time and effort. 
What was needed at  this time was a radical change in the goals and 
criteria of science policy. The then existing economic and political situation 
should have been reoriented from the past focus on the transfer ambitious 
large-scale projects from the U.S., European, and Japanese to Soviet soil 
to  a realization that the main issue on hand was the need to  support the 
survival of those structures in Soviet science that were still capable of as- 
serting themselves. The main difficulty of this time and beyond was the 
search for realistic survival mechanisms that need not require multibillion 
ruble investments, since these were simply not available. 
Restructuring processes observed in Soviet science generated severe so- 
cial problems and  contradiction^.^ Unless efficiently resolved, and as long 
as the priorities in science policy remain based on the past technocratic 
ideology, the system could not survive. 
Suggestions for Reorganization of Science and Research in the 
Transition to a Market Economy 
During the transition to  a new system as is happening today, a considerable 
portion of R&D resources should be allocated to  create the so-called buffer 
systems capable of alleviating the conflicts that are yet in their initial stage. 
The personnel dismissed from R&D institutions and design bureaus should 
not become unemployed. It is necessary to  invent generators of new jobs 
that are to  be designed in accordance with the dynamics of the situation or 
t o  organize a planned evacuation of some Soviet specialists abroad. Their 
resettlement and employment in foreign countries through a government 
supported system of international cooperation is completely different from 
individual emigration and employment. 
A system of small-scale science-intensive ventures may become the most 
efficient solution to  the problem of providing jobs for skilled researchers 
inside the country. This is a specific social-production system which has to  
be created as soon as possible. Another priority issue for new science policy 
is to ensure rapid design and implementation of a program for establishing 
incubators of small-scale ventures for R&D personnel. 
In our opinion, the major difficulty which explains the failures of all 
previous reasonable attempted changes in Soviet science was a strong belief 
'Here we use some ideas suggested by S.G. Kara-Murza. 
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in and adherence t o  a certain unified mechanism suitable for the entire R&D 
sphere. However, two basically different sectors of science emerged in the 
latter stages of the Soviet Union: the non-profit (conventionally basic) sector, 
functioning for public benefit a t  large, and the commercial sector, where 
the key incentives are individual profits. These blocks of science were not 
arranged as some specific organizational structures. They became radically 
different in terms of operating criteria, the labor motivation, value system, 
and even the standards of economic behavior. 
Therefore, although the general concept of perestroika (freedom, democ- 
racy, and competitive markets for producers and consumers) is quite accept- 
able for the entire R&D sphere, specific methods of organizing, managing, 
and financing must account for individual features of each type of R&D in- 
stitution. Operating mechanisms of the new non-government sector should 
be designed on a pattern completely different from that for the traditional 
branch, military and academic sectors. The regional aspect is also very im- 
portant: the same problems for an R&D institution in Moscow should be 
handled in a different way for an institution of a similar type in, say, Riga. 
The fall of the curtain that protected Soviet science from the necessity 
to  compare its results with the levels attained by the international scientific 
community has revealed abominable gaps in the seemingly continuous front 
of domestic R&D. A particularly dangerous situation is observed in the civil- 
ian branch sector of science. Neither the available results, nor the quality of 
science potential in this sector allow production of new products and devel- 
opment of new technologies that can be competitive in the world market. In 
this respect, the Asian way of developing science and technology seems to be 
most effective and rational. An example would be the purchase of complete, 
modern enterprises and technologies on the turn-key basis with subsequent 
adaptation of soviet R&D and economic environment to  the necessary level. 
A rational conversion of the military sector should become an efficient 
way of preserving its scientific potential. This could simultaneously solve 
the problem of employment for scientists and engineers working at R&D 
institutions and design bureaus in this sector where demand for military 
products has dropped drastically. In order to  develop an efficient conver- 
sion mechanism, current and potential scientific and engineering capabilities 
of military R&D must be thoroughly analyzed in addition to  the level and 
types of technologies achieved in the rest of the world and used in the civilian 
sector. The demand perspective and other factors should also be evaluated. 
Next, interface areas are to  be determined, amounts of investments defined, 
and operating mechanisms for project implementation designed. A critical 
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prerequisite for efficient conversion should be mutual interests of all the par- 
ties involved (R&D institutions, design bureaus, industrial enterprises, bro- 
kers, trade agencies, etc., including the government). Indeed, many defense 
sector establishments are very close to  the model of a modern diversified 
science-intensive company which interacts with a network of independent 
or semi-independent ventures. However, the organization and management 
scheme operating in this sector is not suitable for market conditions. It is 
not capable to adequately respond to the changes in demand structure, to  
make instant decisions on the necessary revisions of research agenda, cus- 
tomer and subcontractors, and so forth. We believe that to  solve the problem 
of elaborating an efficient conversion alternative it should be necessary to 
gradually relieve scientific and engineering institutions of the defense sector 
from ministerial control, to  denationalize and demonopolize this sector. 
At present, it is hardly possible to  develop the concept of science policy 
for the transition period separately from the concept of transforming the 
higher education system. One may easily forecast that close integration 
of science with the higher education system during the transition period is 
becoming a necessary condition for the Soviet science community t o  survive 
in its new polito-economic environment. Perhaps, new hybrid organizational 
forms will have t o  be established and supported that will possess enhanced 
stability during hard times even if pure scientific efficiency is to  be sacrificed. 
Finally, of greatest importance today is the large-scale effort in dissemi- 
nating modern economic and social knowledge with the purpose of creating 
a new economic culture in the successor states of the Soviet Union. The 
changing attitudes to  private property, to  the role of government in the 
economy and social sphere, to  the rights and responsibilities of an individual 
and many other new factors in the post-communist regions cause the existing 
value system to disintegrate and radically change the standards and rules of 
economic behavior. At the same time, rapid transition to the use of formal 
market attributes lacking necessary traditions and inner culture frequently 
puts new obstacles in the way of solving old problems. In particular, science 
experiences strong commercial pressure nowadays. There is a serious danger 
to  lose all values that have been accumulated by the Russian and Soviet 
science genotype over many decades in the whirlwind of transition to  the 
market economy. It is the duty of the new government and international 
science community to  prevent this. 
Responsiveness of the Soviet 
Economy to Scientific and 
Technical Innovat ions: 
Comparison with World 
Experience 
A.Z. ~ ~ e e v '  and D.V. Kouzin2 
Why was the economic and political system established in the USSR 
so unresponsive to innovations? The answer to  this question apparently in- 
volves two aspects: firstly, the existence of a glaring discrepancy between 
management and regulation by administrative means and innovation pro- 
cesses, particularly in modern, extremely dynamic and changing conditions; 
and, secondly, consideration of a number of economic, ideological, and socio- 
cultural peculiarities of Soviet development. 
As far as the first aspect is concerned, it has been basically proven 
that creative, exploratory, and science-intensive management is incompatible 
with order-giving methods, strict regulation and directive planning. It is no 
coincidence that virtually all major inter-state surveys in the 1980s distinctly 
refer t o  factors of red tape and ineffective state regulation as chief obstacles 
t o  i n n ~ v a t i o n . ~  
'Head of Department of Statistics, Planning and Analysis of Foreign Economic Rela- 
tions, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation. 
'Deputy Director, Institute for System Studies into Entrepreneurship and Marketing, 
Council of Ministers, Russia. 
'Piater A., Barriers to Innovation, I, 1984, p. 176, 697. 
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The second aspect concerning the unresponsiveness of the command sys- 
tem is much more ambiguous and complicated. At this point, it is necessary 
to  consider several key characteristics of the command system and its inno- 
vation ability, to compare a whole range of factors with similar ones acting 
in capitalist economies in order to reveal common trends, and also to suggest 
remedies. In this paper, we consider five groups of such factors which seem 
to be most important. 
State Control and Militarization 
The command system essentially led to total s t a t e  control of economic 
life, rigid central planning, and decision-making in all spheres of activity, 
including science and technology. 
Firstly, the control over science was unprecedented; the established plan- 
ning mechanism made the very substance of scientific work subject to control. 
Academic freedom gave way to state discipline. A measure of success was 
the fulfillment of plan assignments and not the making of discoveries. More- 
over, science came to  be controlled by an administrative apparatus ignorant 
to the substance of research. 
Secondly, the investment, research and technical polices were essentially 
dependent on the state budget. The independence of enterprises and associ- 
ations has been hitherto limited as regards to their financing and directions 
of scientific and technological progress. All major decisions in this field 
were to  be agreed at many levels, which consumed considerable amounts of 
t i m ~ n e  of the most important and difficult-to-compensate resources in 
implementation of innovation processes. 
Thirdly, a prolonged period of prevalence for short-term interests (ful- 
fillment of the plan) over long-term interests in no way contributed to  the 
formation of a "future investment" culture at the level of enterprises. As a 
result, there was only stable demand for RDT&E (research, development, 
testing and evaluation) programs that generated innovations facilitating re- 
source saving within the framework of existing technologies. 
Conversely, in developed capitalist countries many scientific and techni- 
cal decisions were and are made directly by firms. In the 1980s, U.S. firms 
financed 48% and performed 73% of all RDT&E  program^,^ while respective 
'Science and Technology Data Book, NSF, Washington, 1988, p. 2. 
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figures in Japan were 70 % and 73% .5 It should be noted that  Japanese firms 
financed 98% of industrial RDT&E programs, which constituted about 2% of 
the GNP (gross national product). In leading capitalist countries, RDT&E 
expenses of firms constituted 4% to  10% of their sales during this period. 
As far as the state is concerned, its relative role in financing RDT&E 
programs decreased from 57% t o  48% in the USA and from 33% t o  21% 
in Japan in the seventies and eighties. Of course, this did not indicate any 
decrease in absolute expenditure. Quite the opposite, it increased on average 
by 6% in the USA and by 3% in Japan in the 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~  
Recent evidence would seem t o  imply that  the state's strategic and stim- 
ulating role, not t o  mention its innovation, research and technology policy, 
have been crucial in procuring scientific and technological progress. However, 
such a role of the state in developed capitalist countries has been fundamen- 
tally different from total state control and rigid planning regarding both 
scientific and technological progress and operation of i ts  basic associated en- 
tities which were the enterprises and associations in the former USSR. The 
following have been primary functions of the state in capitalist countries; 
formation of integrated research infrastructure; 
partial financing of RDT&E programs and education from the state 
budget. (Absolute sums seem to  be fairly large in the late 1980s: 9 billion 
dollars spent on fundamental science alone in the USA as compared with 
1.5 t o  2 billion rubles spent for similar purposes in the USSR); 
performance of a share of research activities in state-owned laboratories 
and transfer of relevant data  to  firms for commercialization; 
elaboration of a research and technological policy and top-priority pro- 
grams (goal-oriented program financing); 
control over contract activities; 
creation of an innovation climate (in the form of privileges, sanctions, 
certain control measures) in the country as whole and in certain regions, 
zones, research parks, etc., t o  secure, among other things, participation 
of firms in the implementation of the chosen programs. 
It should be stressed that  the role of the state in inducing scientific 
and technological progress has increased with its military-space orientation. 
Specifically in the USA, France, and Great Britain, the proportion of state 
'The Science and Technology Resources of Japan: A Comparieon with the 
United States, NSF, Washington, 1988, p. 9. 
"Ibid. 
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financing of RDT&E has been substantially higher than, for example, in 
Japan (state expenditure on RDT&E was about 80% in the USA in 1986, 
military research accounting for 90% of the growth of state financing; cor- 
responding figures were 31% in France, 52% in Great Britain and 4% in 
~ a ~ a n ) . ~  Scientific and technological progress has been characterized by a 
three-way orientation: military purposes, creating more national economic 
competition, and developing the consumer sector. Japan and Finland have 
been convincing examples of the effectiveness of the second and third vari- 
ants. It is only natural that, according to different studies in the mid-1980s, 
militarization of the economy and scientific and technical progress was one 
of the reasons for a relative fall in competitive power of American industry.8 
The basic arguments were as  follow^.^ First, the development and mar- 
keting of new commercial products were stimulated primarily by competi- 
tion. On this issue, the approaches of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Industry and the U.S. Ministry of Defense were fundamentally 
different. The Japanese set up industry specific regulations t o  maintain and 
change in a flexible manner the character of cooperation between firms and 
their competition. Between 1981 and 1984, a period noted for a drastic rise 
in military spending, five leading contractors of the Pentagon increased their 
share in contracts from 18% to 22%. In 1985 there was no rivalry for 65% 
of the value of all military contracts. 
Second, the creation of new products and the introduction of innovations 
generally required considerable time and resources. Therefore, many projects 
led by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry took years, 
but their implementation was very purposeful and consistent, while U.S. 
military programs were strongly dependent on the political situation. Their 
rapid build-up created certain shortages, even in the American economy. 
According to  Data Resources, a 20% increase in military orders resulted 
in a shortage of 30,000 skilled workers in the manufacturing industry in 1984- 
1985 alone. These and other limitations caused commercial considerations 
to  be pushed into the background. 
Third, technological competitiveness necessitated transfer of innovations 
from the military to  the civil sphere with comparatively low expenses. Such 
a diffusion of innovations was the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Industry. However, intricate technology, say of the SDI (Strategic 
"ME&MO." 1988, No. 4, p. 53 (in Russian). 
'America's Competitive Crisis. Confronting the New Reality. Washington, 
1987. 
'R. Reich, Tales of a New America, N.Y., 1987, pp. 70-73. 
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Defense Initiative) program, could not be easily transferred to the civil sphere 
for commercialization (at least by comparison with the technology of the 
1950s). Purely military technology oriented scientists and engineers to other 
goals that were remote from a commercial system of values. 
Fourth, new technology was commercially advantageous and meaning- 
ful only when it made the production cheaper. Cost reduction was at least 
as important and difficult as the development stage. The U.S. Ministry of 
Defense was, however, concerned with the obtained results and not with 
expenses incurred. In the case of contractors, therefore, incentives (profits) 
were directly dependent on the growth of resources and expenditure, while 
price formation was generally expenditure-dependent in much the same man- 
ner as in the USSR. 
Fifth, a commercial success was supposed to do more than simply satisfy 
the conditions of competition; namely, satisfy consumer demand. However, 
the Pentagon always safeguarded U.S. companies against the risk of global 
competition. In its attempts to prevent foreign supplies, the Pentagon at all 
times gave preference to domestic producers, who often applied for govern- 
mental protection under the pretext of a threat to national security when 
under commercial pressure from foreign competitors. 
In the USSR, scientific and technological progress had a pronounced 
military-space orientation (with all the ensuing consequences such as cus- 
tomer's monopoly, distorted price formation, secrecy, and the like), was 
characterized by limited relation to economic growth issues (without regard 
for national competitiveness), and exhibited almost total neglect of the con- 
sumer sector. Such a situation not only imposed a burden on the national 
economy but, in many respects, undermined its viability. There is every 
reason to believe that militarization of scientific and technological progress 
in the USSR created even greater problems for the R&D sector than, for 
example, in the USA. In comparison with the USA, the USSR had, firstly, 
significantly weaker channels for transmitting advanced technology to civil 
branches due to various economic barriers and, secondly, much more rigid 
directive management of enterprises in this field; a factor noticeably nar- 
rowing the scope of scientific and technological progress and substantially 
restricting the range of their choice. 
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Waste and Shortage Economy 
The command-and-administer system established and promoted an expen- 
diture-oriented economy which became a Shortage economy" in the long 
run. Such a system essentially had little interest in scientific and technologi- 
cal progress for stabilization purposes. Indeed, functions therein suppressed 
creativity, innovation, and development. Part of the establishment (primar- 
ily bureaucrats) was particularly interested in curbing innovations. "Easyn 
sales conditions in no way stimulated enterprises to  improve their prod- 
ucts beyond limits allowing "objectiven substantiation of a price rise. This 
stemmed from the departmental form of organization of productive forces. 
As centers of their own economic subsystems, departments were primarily 
interested in steadily amassing resources and power and they had no interest 
in scientific and technological progress which eventually could have led to  
material, labor, and financial savings, and new economic ties and structures. 
This created a need for freedom and decentralization. 
As regards to  huge shortages characterizing the Soviet economy, their 
presence was in itself a direct hindrance to  scientific and technological pro- 
gress. Firstly, such supply impasses imposed restrictions on the scope of 
research operations. Secondly, such a situation revealed a shift in political 
and ideological priorities towards the financial side of the Soviet Union's 
economic problems and away from research and technical (i.e., long-term) 
tasks without which there would be virtually no progress a t  all. Thirdly, the 
scarcity of necessities appreciably distracted people's energy and attention 
from creative activity. 
A significant feature of Soviet economy, which influenced its expendi- 
ture orientation and deficiency, was its anti-innovation branch  s t ruc-  
tu re .  This structure was utterly incapable of providing a steady flow of 
innovations, effective transfer of technologies, and their rapid introduction. 
The structure was exceedingly bulky and archaic in character when com- 
pared with branch structures of the leading countries of the OECD (Orga- 
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Data obtained in 
the mid-1980s for leading industrial countries showed that high-technology 
industries accounted for 51% of RDT&E, 11% of production and 16% of ex- 
port; corresponding figures were 32%, 32% 44% for medium-technology and 
17%, 57%) 40% for low-technology industries.1° 
'OOECD, Science and Technology Indicators, 1986, No. 2, p. 61. 
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The main problem that made the Soviet Union distinct from developed 
capitalist countries was the absence of restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s 
in order t o  become more science-intensive. Furthermore, spheres of various 
services were still not sufficiently developed, a factor preventing effective 
growth of vanguard industries, and a sizable part of the country's produc- 
tion machinery was obsolete and generally worn-out with a very insignificant 
proportion meeting top world standards. So, the Soviet national economy 
was characterized by deep structural and technological imbalances. Figura- 
tively speaking, the economy was a combination of black holes formed by a 
multitude of discrepancies and a wide gap between out-of-date and advanced 
production practices. The range of technologically lagging industries with 
unacceptable levels of inefficiency and was to  by present-day standards not 
only required huge production resources (for example, annual repairs cost 
over 40 billion rubles in engineering industry, which is one of the highest fig- 
ures in the world), but also employed tens of millions of workers in the style 
reminiscent of the thirties or even, uncertain instances, of past centuries. Ac- 
cording to data supplied by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions 
and the USSR State Committee for Standards, only 8% of the models of 
machines and mechanisms batch-produced (to say nothing of the previously 
installed equipment) by enterprises of 12 engineering industries met labor 
safety requirements and human adaptation conditions. In the USA there 
was one "human factor" expert per 300 specialists developing new equip- 
ment, as compared with one such expert per 30,000 development engineers 
in the USSR. 
The situation progressively worsened due to  the missed opportunities 
to  leap-frog in few industries for the general advancement of the national 
economy. It became more and more difficult to  clearly separate the leading 
branches of economy from the economic laggards. Progress in high technol- 
ogy was impossible or ruinously expensive without an harmonious upsurge 
in all spheres of life of the modern society, ranging from education and 
nourishment to  freedom of speech and conscience. P. Drucker, a prominent 
American economist, justly remarked: "In economy there can be no isolated 
viable sector of high technology as there can not be sound mind in a dead 
body."" Generally, the Soviet economic system in the last years of commu- 
nist rule was not found in a neglected state but lacked any prospects in the 
event of a further drop in production efficiency and innovation, degradation 
of the environment, and aggregation of socio-economic problems. 
"Drucker P., Innovation and Entrepreneurship, N.Y., 1985, p. 265. 
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Monopoly and Monotonous Organization of Inno- 
vat ions 
Monopoly power was a great hindrance to scientific and technological pro- 
gress in the former USSR. This type of monopoly was largely of artificial, 
administrative origin. 
Apart from the afore-mentioned factors (absence of any interest in sci- 
entific and technological progress, preservation of the old branch structure, 
expenditure orientation, sole rights to inventions, etc.), a direct consequence 
of the departmental monopoly was the creation of rigid vertical economic 
barriers. However, modern technology, knowledge, and information were of 
an inter-branch character. Under these conditions, the existing ministerial 
branch management was not merely an anachronism but a direct hindrance 
to  scientific and technological progress. 
In fact, this structural development was contrary to  the global trend of 
that time. World experience in the organization of economic management 
showed a common trend in favor of the expansion of horizontal economic 
ties. This including the establishment and further development of multi- 
branch corporations (the largest of them in capitalist countries having en- 
terprises in dozens of industries), joint ventures, associations or large-scale 
inter-company partnerships (often international), which, as a rule, were cre- 
ated to  provide joint ownership of advanced technology and have a strategic 
character. 
The consequences of a producer monopoly, or monopsony as in the 
USSR, were degradation of product quality, lack of competition as the basic 
stimulus to  scientific and technological progress, and infringement on con- 
sumers' rights to choice. 
Experience of inter-company ties abroad, revealed that about 80% of 
such ties were established within the framework of supply agreements and 
contracts. In most Western industries, particularly in such science-intensive 
ones as electronic engineering, machine-tool industry and the like, consumer 
influence was crucial in the development of ideas from the very start of a 
research-and-production cycle, which naturally yielded better development 
results and oriented the supplier to  the consumer. This was an example of 
a demand driven system. In some science-intensive industries in the USA 
of the 1980s 60% to 80% of innovations were introduced in response to  cus- 
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tomers' direct participation.12 Under Soviet conditions, however, producer 
monopoly and the absence of consumer choice inevitably led to the preserva- 
tion of old products or to only slight modifications, subsequently imposing 
poor-quality components on the manufacture of final products, naturally 
impairing quality as well. Essentially, this let the producer free of any real 
incentives. 
Competition in the world arena acquired new features in the 1980s. 
It became world-wide and more fierce, particularly in fields with a prime 
emphasis on the scientific and technological sphere. Large leading firms 
were competing in all directions on a vast number of items. Some estimates 
revealed that over 70% of U.S. industrial output met with competition in 
other countries. Thus, the following conclusions could be drawn: 
(a) market relations were of a dynamic character; 
(b) large firms resorting to different strategies of vertical and horizontal 
integration and diversification sought an optimal "branch bag" which, 
as a rule, included base technologies mastered by a given firm; 
(c) "global branches" possessed an oligopolistic structure (i.e., one with few 
leading producers of similar goods). 
An illustration for the aforesaid has been the level of concentration of 
industrial RDT&E programs. Five leading RDT&E companies in the USA 
accounted for 23% of all industrial RDT&E programs; the corresponding 
figure in Japan was 18%. This level was fairly high in certain industries; for 
example, 78% in the steel industry and 69% in the automobile industry in 
Japan, 96% in the automobile industry and 70% in the chemical industry in 
the USA. However, the most science-intensive industries were not simultane- 
ously the most monopolized ones. For example, the five leading companies in 
pharmaceutical, electronic and instrument-making industries in Japan car- 
ried out less than 60% of all RDT&E programs in these industries. In the 
USA the corresponding figure was less than 65%. 
The monopolization of Soviet science by ministries and departments, its 
orientation to serving departmental interests, and unequal relations resulted 
in a situation when over 70% of science expenditure and two-thirds of the 
nation's scientists were concentrated in corresponding industries, while over 
80% of all innovations were used at only one or two enterprises, as some 
surveys showed.13 Such a situation virtually deprived science of its essential 
12uControl of innovation process in capitalist form," Moscow, IMEMO under the USSR 
Academy of Sciences, 1985, p. 109 (in Russian). 
"Innovation Process Structure, Moscow, VNIISI, 1981, p. 16 (in Russian). 
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rights, blocked channels of technology exchange, limited the mass spread of 
novelties, and generally hindered scientific and technological progress. The 
realization of scientific and technological achievements was further hindered 
by the fact that enterprises had very loose links with branch science. Dis- 
parities in sources of financing, planning and interests of branch science 
and industry gave rise t o  the notorious problems of implementing results of 
RDT&E. 
Major firms in capitalist countries were undisputed leaders of scientific 
and technological progress. The organization of RDT&E in these firms was, 
however, fundamentally different both in form and content from that of en- 
terprises in the Soviet Union. The former had access to  a multi-link RDT&E 
organization serving both their long-term objectives, diversification strategy, 
and mastery of new products in numerous branches. Provided for this pur- 
pose were: RDT&E head laboratories and centers engaged in functional 
research; centers rendering services in key directions of the activity of cor- 
porations; and, laboratories engaged in applied research and development in 
branches oriented to  manufacture particular kinds of products. Thus, every- 
day activity of large firms was separated from their long-term operation. 
As regards the introduction of innovations, an additional distinguishing 
feature of large capitalist firms in their multi-branch character, permitted: 
(a) making full use of the advantages of the scientific, technological and 
production experience gained in the main sphere of activity with a cor- 
responding transfer to  cooperating spheres; 
(b) making a complex "branch bag" of products with an inter-firm transfer 
of capital, labor, specialists, technology, and knowledge and financing of 
new directions of activity due to mature, developed production yielding 
steady profits; 
(c) breaking into highly profitable science-intensive industries and the ser- 
vice sector to  modernize obsolete basic production capacities. 
Large companies have undoubtedly been the prime movers of scientific 
and technological progress. At the same time, the role of small firms in 
innovation considerably increased, especially in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s 
in the USA, over 15,000 firms were engaged in various kinds of research 
and technical activity; moreover, their number was constantly growing. In 
spite of substantially smaller proportions of RDT&E funds in small firms (in 
the early 1980s capital outlays per scientist or engineer were on the average 
about 60,000 dollars in firms having less than 1,000 employees and 117,000 
dollars in larger companies), the efficiency of their research and technical 
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activity was often higher than in large corporations. Small firms produced 
twice as many innovations per employee as large firms. Over the whole post- 
war period, small businesses produced about half of all American industrial 
novelties and a predominant part of radical inventions. In many instances, 
small firms had certain advantages due to their mobility, special management 
culture, creative psychological climate, and a flexible RDT&E expenditure 
structure. 
The role of small businesses in the realization of scientific and techno- 
logical achievements should not, however, be overestimated. It is important 
that, in close cooperation with big business, small business enabled rational 
distribution of resources, scientific and technical potential, creation of an 
optimal economic structure for RDT&E conditions, and took a substantial 
share of the risk inherent in any innovation activity. It is also meaningful 
that only a reasonable combination of small cooperating firms such as en- 
gineering and consulting, broker (intermediary), leasing, venture, and other 
firms may yield a stable economic effect. For example, in the U.S. manufac- 
turing industry, large enterprises constituted 7% and small enterprises 92% 
of the total number.14 
Global experience in the organization of branch science and its produc- 
tion links has also revealed the presence of different mechanisms and organi- 
zational forms. First, a substantial portion of applied science has been con- 
centrated in large companies, as stated above. Second, about 15% of state 
RDT&E expenditure (for example, in the USA) were distributed through 
research centers, institutions and laboratories of ministries and departments 
engaged, as a rule, in fundamental research and subsequently transferring 
their development results to  firms for commercialization. Third, institutions 
under large industrial associations of producers focus on certain research 
operations. Fourth, universities (for example, drawing two-thirds of their fi- 
nancial resources from the state in the USA) played a major role in industrial 
research. Universities performed over 50% of fundamental science investiga- 
tions directly affecting innovations in American companies.15 As a matter 
of fact, universities often became "incubatorsn of new high-technology firms, 
centers of inter-company partnerships and research parks (in 1987 there were 
39 of them in the USA and 36 in Great Britain) uniting the efforts of many 
firms. In Western Europe alone, the number of these centers and parts in- 
"Scientific and Technological Progress: Problems and Solutions, No. 3, 1988, 
pp. 4 5  (in Russian). 
15America's Competitive Crisis. Confronting the New Reality., Washington, 
1987, p. 38. 
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creased five-fold in the 1980s.16 Relations between business and universities 
were also characterized by the fact that industrial research is financed not 
from the state budget but by interested firms in numerous nations. Ac- 
cess t o  university science became a matter causing fairly strong competition 
between firms. 
These points illustrated the very dynamic and flexible economic struc- 
ture of the leading companies in the capitalist world, and also the great 
variety of organizational forms and economic mechanisms facilitating a suf- 
ficiently effective exchange of ideas, knowledge, experience and technologies. 
It was in sharp contrast t o  the structure in the former Soviet Union. 
The absence of market conditions in the Soviet economy together with 
the obsolete branch and industrial structure unresponsive to  innovations, led 
t o  another principal drawback: more specifically, immobility of production 
and resource factors. International experience showed that  this particular 
issue became one of the key conditions inhibiting new innovations and sci- 
entific and technological achievements. 
Let us consider three key factors-capital, labor (primarily highly skilled 
scientists and specialists), and information. 
In the Soviet Union, the problems associated with the absence of a func- 
tioning capital market, including venture capital, was only timidly put for- 
ward by a number of reform economists. In the West, however, the venture 
capital market was rapidly expanding in the 1980s (increasing dozens of times 
t o  exceed 25 billion dollars in the USA alone). It became a key instrument 
for innovation-type growth. For the past 10 years, about 10 million venture 
dollars were on the average allocated for each small innovating firm in the 
USA. In addition, a great variety of sources of funds was especially typical of 
the American system of financing new science-intensive firms. These sources 
were combined a t  specific stages of the operating cycle of a new science- 
intensive firm. They included personal savings of businessmen, different 
funds and informal investors, private investment and insurance companies, 
and assets of innovation banks. It was of fundamental importance that  all 
these sources were readily accessible. At the same time, competition was 
taking place in the financing sphere as well. If one financier was unwilling 
t o  render aid, the innovator could apply for support from another financier. 
For example, active investors in the USA included 100,000 people annually 
in the 1980s; participating in venture financing as informal investors were 
about 150,000 well-to-do American families and about 550 leading venture 
I6S. woods, Western Europe: Technology and h t u r e ,  London, 1987, p. 51. 
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capital firms. In other capitalist countries these figures are not so great due 
t o  specific conditions and traditions of forming a venture capital market. 
Nevertheless, there was a constant increase in the 1980s elsewhere as well. 
The importance of venture capital for expediting scientific and technological 
progress and increasing competitiveness was more understandable consider- 
ing the desire of Western Europe t o  set up a common capital market and to  
establish large international venture funds. Specifically high mobility of cap- 
ital and a sound credit and financial system guaranteed rapid and effective 
combination of innovators with new ideas and sponsors with money. 
A capitalist economy demonstrated higher mobility of labor, particularly 
skilled scientists and specialists, as compared with the Soviet planned econ- 
omy. For example, in the  USA, research centers and many high-technology 
firms annually rotated 15-20% of their personnel and some 2% or 3% of 
specialists moved from universities t o  industry and back. 
A significant aspect of the process of internationalization of modern sci- 
ence and engineering was increasingly wide international cooperation in the 
field of research and exchange of scientists. With a view t o  promoting such 
cooperation, the  Japanese government, for example, adopted a special law 
back in 1986 "on governmental exchange of researchers" which substantially 
increased the  inflow of foreign scientists t o  Japan. 
Personnel policy in Soviet RDT&E, based on the principles of hierarchy, 
secrecy and autocracy, not only gave rise to  many problems connected with 
the stimulation of creative work, scientific growth and democratization of the 
scientific sector, but also created conditions in which many skilled persons 
were.not attracted by the  sphere of scientific and technological progress. Of 
course, the very fact that  many creative persons left science for new types of 
organizations was even considered a positive development if taken separately. 
Such a situation fully conformed t o  world-wide tendencies. Another factor 
important here, namely, the fact that  the existing Soviet organizations in this 
sphere failed t o  provide sufficient incentives for creative persons hindered the  
realization of their ideas and did not allow talents t o  be revealed t o  a full 
measure. However, these particular organizations continued as "fashion- 
setters" and chief performers of research and technical work in the last years 
of the USSR. 
A paramount feature of the Soviet command system was mass secrecy 
under which great limitations were imposed on the mobility of skilled per- 
sonnel and transfer of information and technology, particularly from the 
military t o  the civil sphere. Conversely, wide discussions on the problems of 
secrecy in the USA led t o  a conclusion that  unjustified adoption of tougher 
52 Responsiveness of Soviet Economy 
measures would slow continuous modernization of the American economy 
and inflict more harm than even a few spies. 
Indeed, under modern conditions not merely the transfer of information, 
technology, or know-how mattered, but also regular discussions of novelties, 
value of business involvement, elaboration of a common concept of utilization 
of new technology, and manufacture of new products or their improvement. 
This was essentially a mutual training process. Secrecy and bans under- 
mined this vital aspect of cooperation. Countries which stood t o  gain most 
were those where in determining key technological directions and subsequent 
development and realization of solutions a minimum number of secrecy reg- 
ulations allowed extensive dialogue and an exchange of opinions between 
industrial and trading firms, research institutions and state analysts, both 
nationally and internationally. 
Referring specifically t o  computer-aided data  transmission, the creation 
of nation-wide and local networks would expedite research-and-production 
processes, make accessible reliable information for decision-making, and help 
those interested in their rivals' deeds follow advanced scientific and technical 
ideas. According t o  Soviet estimates, there were over 3,000 public data  and 
knowledge bases in the USA available in the 1980s." In the USSR, there 
were only departmental and special-purpose data  and knowledge bases. 
The  functioning of a developed information market necessitated a wide 
network of information services for the public, including everyday, educa- 
tional and special information. The  library of Harvard University was known 
t o  receive 106,000 periodicals. The premier Soviet library concerned with 
natural sciences and serving 250 institutes under the USSR Academy of Sci- 
ences received merely 4,000 scientific periodicals in an equivalent period.18 A 
mandatory condition for supplying information t o  the public was computer- 
aided transmission of scientific and educational information and develop- 
ment of openness, including the sphere in which vital s tate decisions are 
made. Computerization was naturally essential for dissemination of infor- 
mation. Unfortunately, these were neglected topics under central planning, 
and subject to  the influence of only an elite few. 
''ME & MO No. 3, 1989, p. 48 (in Russian). 
"Scientific and Technological Progress: Problems and Solutions, No. 24, 1988, 
p. 4 (in Russian). 
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Economic Culture 
The extended domination of the command-and-administer system led to  the 
formation of a special Soviet economic culture characterized by high depen- 
dence on ideology and politics, low innovative capacity, poorly developed 
values regulating transformation activity in the sphere of economy such as 
creative work, success, risk, and so forth. However, the system simultane- 
ously promoted seemingly converse values such as stability, balance, unifor- 
mity, subordinated position of science with respect t o  production, etc.; the 
latter d u e s  being cultivated by a substantial part of state and economic 
machinery, and also by many heads of research and technical institutions in 
the USSR. Only the consideration of the cultural factors would permit ade- 
quate explanation of the deceleration or acceleration effects in an analysis of 
the Soviet economic system and illuminate reasons for the unresponsiveness 
of the Soviet economy to innovations. 
One of the distinguished features of the Soviet economic culture directly 
influencing scientific and technological progress was the destruction of the 
enterprising and innovating spirit and the blocking of its revival. To begin 
with, the command-and-administer system distorted ideologically and polit- 
ically the very notion of entrepreneurship, linking it with exploitation, class 
parasitism, and profit hunting in the West and with criminal and immoral 
activities in the USSR. 
Notwithstanding, entrepreneurship has been a form of organizational 
and economically creative activity undertaken not only by bourgeois but 
predominantly by a fairly wide strata of working people, managers and spe- 
cialists in Western nations. In the USA, about 10% of the labor force were 
entrepreneurs, i.e. conducted business independently; in the late 1980s the 
corresponding figure was as high as 40% for specialists in science-intensive 
spheres. Entrepreneurship as economic management meant: first, an entre- 
preneur's considerable freedom regarding the choice of economic activity, its 
planning, organization and control, i.e. administrative independence; second, 
ownership rights concerning products and returns, including profit; third, 
capitalization of returns, i.e. use (in part or in full) for investment purposes; 
fourth, the possibility of choosing administrative and economic solutions, 
protection against monopoly dictate. Stated differently, entrepreneurship 
was a common feature of all progressing economic systems. The role of self- 
governing management was greater in more developed economic systems. 
The domination of the command system in the USSR caused tremendous 
damage to  the country's creative enterprising potential and to the "motivat- 
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ingn factor of its growth. Special emphasis was placed on four directions of 
undermining enterprising, moral and civil principles by the command-and- 
administer system. 
First, the Soviet system was responsible for physical, moral and social 
Uweedingn of the bulk of the most enterprising managers and specialists 
as a result of repressions, the established system of selection and placing 
of personnel and evaluation of their activity, criminal cultivation of class 
orientation and principles, creation of a socio-psychological atmosphere of 
obedience, intolerance and fear. Second, the command-and-administer sys- 
tem not only eliminated the entrepreneur but blocked the broad masses of 
working people from engaging in entrepreneurial activity through total reg- 
ulation of "everything in the worldn using initially the "top has it" principle 
and then the ube as i t  is" principle. Over and over again, the command- 
and-administer system was described as organically alien to  independent eco- 
nomic and other quests, unplanned initiative, unpredicted creative efforts, 
and the freedom needed for all this. Third, the inability to  amass absolute 
control of all the economic processes, caused the command-and-administer 
system to designate their delegalization through an extensive instruction net- 
work, thus contributing to rapid growth of a "shadow" economy. According 
to  estimates of the research institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the USSR and NIZI of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, over 20 
million people were active in the "shadow" economy illegally manufacturing 
products worth tens of billions of rubles in the late 1980s. Finally, the use 
of ideological regulators of economic development and the existing system of 
planning and evaluation of the results of scientific and technological progress 
led to  unprecedented 'paper" entrepreneurship in the form of upward distor- 
tion of results achieved, fancy projects, craving for "demonstration effects," 
and so on. Moreover, the life of the nomenclatura became a prestigious arena 
for applying enterprising abilities. 
Therefore, there was every reason to assert that the enterprising spirit 
of Soviet economy was generally degraded as the available enterprising ini- 
tiative took a wrong course. 
All this created an exceedingly unfavorable social background for scien- 
tific and technological progress in the USSR. There would be no innovations 
without enthusiasts and entrepreneurs. Negative factors increased dispro- 
portionately, such as low general standards of workmen (9 years of training 
as compared with 13-14 years in leading capitalist countries), poor discipline 
and low responsibility, high common apathy and indifference, and a public 
atmosphere of inadequacy. Numerous sociological studies showed that only 
A. I. Ageev and D. V. Kouzin 55 
25% to  33% of employees worked as hard as their potential. Incidentally, the 
pessimism factor turned out to  be one of the major obstacles to  innovations 
in the USSR along with red tape and inefficient state regulation. The nation 
additionally suffered at  the hands of distorted communist educational tradi- 
tions that were not intended to raise creative personalities and continued to  
waste the country's cultural heritage. 
At the same time, leading capitalist countries turned their primary at- 
tention to such umetaeconomic" factors as increasing entrepreneurship and 
innovation and integrating this theme in education. The results swayed mass 
consciousness towards attractive images of an active, healthy and enterpris- 
ing personality, creation of an optimistic public atmosphere, enrichment of 
the motivation and economic environment by restoring national culture, and 
more. For example, up to 180 billion dollars were, on average, spent on 
education in the mid-1980s in the USA each year. In the USSR, the corre- 
sponding figure was less than 40 billion rubles even considering propaganda 
expenses and utterly different material and technical supply system. 
Technological Incornpat ibility 
The command system caused grave technological incompatibility of the So- 
viet economy with technological standards of the leading capitalist countries. 
International research-and-production cooperation had become a necessary 
condition for technological progress in any country. Decades of "socialist 
construction" resulted in serious economic, technological, political and cul- 
tural barriers which became increasingly difficult to  overcome on the way 
to such progress. A short-sighted, poorly coordinated and vulnerable strat- 
egy waichosen regarding participation in world scientific and technological 
progress. 
On the one hand, there was orientation to  technical and economic autar- 
chy. On the other hand, foreign novelties were borrowed intensively in an 
open or secret way disregarding the fact that, firstly, some of them were not 
advanced and lacked compatibility even with each other and, secondly, their 
introduction took place in conditions of the aforementioned unresponsiveness 
of the Soviet economy to such innovations, which eventually did not increase 
efficiency. On the contrary, there was sheer waste of means and resources 
in certain instances. Neither of the above factors stimulated the use of 
domestic innovations. So, autarchic tendencies coupled with monopoly of 
the foreign economic department limited scientific and technical contacts of 
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enterprises with foreign business and hindered the inflow of new technology, 
information, and ideas. Moreover, primarily due to political and ideological 
considerations preference was given to cooperation with the countries of 
the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), which could 
not provide the necessary inflow of technology to the USSR at a desirable 
quality level. Special emphasis should have been placed on resolving the 
functional unpreparedness of many officials participating in external contacts 
(lack of computer knowledge, language barriers, poor knowledge of ethics, 
international business etiquette, etc.). 
Conclusions 
The Soviet Union needed a well elaborated, deeply thought-out and scien- 
tifically substantiated strategy of increasing national competitiveness and 
providing economic security. Its key element should have been the creation 
of conditions for stimulating scientific and technological progress and in- 
creasing its effect in the national economy. A swift wide-scale technological 
breakthrough was hardly to be expected in the grave economic situation 
when the nation was facing an increasing burden of food and financial prob- 
lems. However, it was a must a t  that time to lay a foundation for those 
transformations which would eventually put the country out of the then 
existing technological and economic crisis. 
There could have been a number of apparent key directions: 
1. A gradual change from a monopoly market to a market characterized 
by high internal and external competition. The following was necessary to 
ensure internal competition: 
(a) a lesser degree of monopolization of the economy, legislative steps to stop 
excessive concentration of production and centralization of functions, in- 
troduction of anti-monopoly measures, abolition of the existing branch 
ministries but preservation of economic ties established for decades be- 
tween enterprises. 
(b) forms of different types and size should have been at the focus of decision- 
making center in the sphere of economic management and scientific and 
technological progress. They should have had actual economic inde- 
pendence and equal starting conditions as well as freedoms to dispose 
of available resources, to set up their own research base, to conclude 
agreements and contracts, and to set up amalgamations, partnerships 
and associations. The largest of them should have been established as 
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multi-branch diversified corporations. They should have competed with 
other rival structures (a multitude of small and medium firms, their 
associations and foreign corporations); 
(c) transition to a full-value market was impossible without: sale and pur- 
chase of production factors; formation of capital, technology, ideas, secu- 
rities and other markets; mobility of labor, particularly skilled personnel; 
(d) close attention should have been paid to the problem or reorganizing 
Soviet science, increasing its independence and diversifying sources of 
its financing and ties with industry. Certain aspects of foreign experi- 
ence mentioned above would have been of use here, particularly those 
regarding branch science and its deregulation, contractual relations, and 
self-organization of research teams. 
The following was necessary to ensure external competition: 
(a) it was essential to stimulate the creation of a system enabling firms 
to monitor the world technological level of manufactured products and 
to know the position and strategies of principal competitors, including 
the assortment and quality of their goods. All firms should have mas- 
tered the methods and techniques of business reconnaissance, counter- 
reconnaissance, and marketing, without which it remained impossible to 
attain a leading position in technology; 
(b) no hopes could be pinned on a major breakthrough to the external mar- 
ket under conditions of very fierce global competition in the sphere of 
advanced technology. Therefore, it would have been expedient to care- 
fully work out a strategy of filling in certain market gaps (more specif- 
ically, by forming transitional structures and joint ventures, including 
those abroad) regarding technologies in which the USSR had leading 
positions. In this case, one of the key issues would have been the pro- 
tection of intellectual property. Much importance is attached to this 
question in developed countries in conditions of simultaneously increas- 
ing international competition and cooperation; 
(c) joint ventures and foreign enterprises on Soviet territory should have 
been used both as a channel of obtaining advanced technology, experi- 
ence and capital from the West and as a means of exerting pressure on 
domestic producers; 
(d) there was a need for a much more extensive program of training spe- 
cialists, beginning with students, in marketing, modern competition, 
international business and finance, and control over innovations abroad; 
and, 
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(e) strategic partnerships with foreign firms were desirable to fill in certain 
technological and product gaps on the world market. 
2. The functions of an economic management center should have been 
drastically changed. 
First of all, it was necessary to drastically change the entire system 
of planning and economic regulation, which had weak ties with scientific 
and technological progress, was tough and inflexible, separated science from 
industry, and limited the rights of economic entities to creative work, initia- 
tive and choice, without which competitiveness, scientific and technological 
progress were impossible. 
Thus, the center of the planning process at the macro level should have 
incorporated the vision of a future economic structure, scientific and techni- 
cal priority, and creation of differential regulation conditions for different in- 
dustries depending on their strategic character, potential, stage of operating 
cycle, foreign economic orientation, etc., with a view to attaining structural 
balance for different parameters. Two further key components of centralized 
planning should have been complex programs and state orders (contracts), 
which were not formal and distorted ones, but free, effective and stimulating 
all partners. 
Indeed, the center of scientific and technical planning in industry should 
have been the firms themselves. They would choose, according to their 
interests, the structure and sources of RDT&E and financing, participate 
in state programs and contracts, and cooperate between each other and 
with state bodies. The state apparatus would regulate the relation between 
competitiveness and cooperation, creating tax and other privileges for firms 
actively engaged in RDT&E. 
These suggestions were made at a time when the Soviet Union and its 
scientific and technological (S&T) community still existed as a whole. The 
modifications of political borders over the last years make the need for re- 
structuring the R&D sector no less important. In fact, the importance and 
potential value of the inherited share of the former Soviet S&T sector gives 
the recommendations made here new significance for the successor Republics; 
first and foremost, Russia itself. 
Technological Assessment 
Problems in the Transition 
to a Market Economy 
G. Miken'n1 and 0. Kozlova2 
Under conditions characteristic of the Soviet centrally-managed system, 
economic evaluation was practically non-existent until the mid-1970s. Prof- 
itability rates or simple rate of return calculations were occasionally applied 
in measuring the efficiency of capital investments, but these indicators were 
not integrated in the decision-making process and were merely relegated t o  
appear in different reports. Decisions were essentially made on only the ba- 
sis of physical and technical characteristics of projects. Thus, the lack of 
financial and economic criteria of efficiency resulted in the situation when 
decisions whether a project should be implemented or not were biased due 
t o  the focus on political and ideological considerations. 
Subsequently, project resources were determined on the basis of esti- 
mated costs. In most cases these figures defined a t  the preliminary stage 
were t o  be only a small proportion of the actual amount spent during the im- 
plementation of the project. Techniques t o  determine comparative efficiency 
were chiefly utilized in choosing the technical options for implementation of 
the project. 
With the introduction of economic incentives in business activity (end of 
1960s-beginning 1970s) a need for feasibility studies for each project became 
apparent. However, economic independence of enterprises was limited. The 
economic accountability principle, in fact, served the main system of man- 
'Director, Center for Research of Development. 
'Ministry of Science and Technological Policy. 
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agement based on the planning indicators that  were prescribed in the central- 
ized manner. The rigidly centralized pricing system using expenditure-based 
methodology also survived. Under such conditions, the economic effect of 
technological changes (i.e., introduction of new technology) could not be 
adequately demonstrated by changing values of the indicators reflecting en- 
terprises' business activity. 
In order t o  measure such effects, a single state methodology was intro- 
duced in 1977. Thus, an additional system of economic indicators respon- 
sive t o  the introduction of new technology was created. These indicators 
were used not only for feasibility studies, but also for providing material 
incentives (bonuses) t o  creators and manufacturers of new technology. 
In addition, a supplementary system of economic indicators was oriented 
towards a more global approach (i.e., a t  the national level) which made i t  
closer t o  the principles of the optimal functioning of the economy. However, 
i t  was the very supplementary nature of this system that  did not permit i t  t o  
overcome its differences with the main system of economic indicators of the 
centralized plan. Deeply-rooted deformations in all major ratios of the main 
system could not be overcome by any calculations, no matter how highly- 
skilled they may have been. Only transformation of the economic system 
itself, into an efficient market economy could have facilitated a change in 
evaluating new technology so as t o  ensure objective results. 
In the USSR, the state strategy for scientific and technological devel- 
opment has been aimed a t  achieving international superiority in a number 
of spheres of human knowledge and has been basically determined by non- 
economic reasons. Therefore, more attention was paid t o  financial support 
of large-scale technological programmes, but not to  creating a favorable eco- 
nomic climate for innovations and technological changes. 
The reorientation of Soviet economic policy towards real market relations 
presuppose introducing methods of technological assessment. 
The globally most common system of investment project assessment and 
selection is based upon financial analysis of investment alternatives with the 
help of formalized methods of comparing results and expenditures. The dis- 
counting methodology is widely implemented t o  analyze such problems. It 
appears t o  be connected with a growing tendency for companies t o  intro- 
duce large-scale innovations in which the technological change directly and 
indirectly influences profitability in ways not always adequatley revealed in 
simple models concerning resource saving. 
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In the late 1980s in the USSR, up-to-date methods of assessment and 
selection of technological progress were already in use.3 However, the objec- 
tification of such assessments, as well as stimulation of the process of mas- 
tering and realizing innovations remained problematic. The development 
of innovation for commercialization were impeded due to the lack of a real 
innovation policy, that would finally make production and manufacturing 
receptive to different kinds of scientific and technological innovations. 
In order to solve this problem it  was undoubtedly tempting to  use the 
experience of well-developed countries and instruct a system of tax and amor- 
tization benefits, loans and credits, and subsidies. Such factors should have 
induced independent enterprises to create, master and use innovations in the 
priority areas designated by the state. 
Nevertheless, before implementing this approach, it was necessary to 
analyze whether such a system would function under the existing Soviet 
economic structure, price level, wage level, and level of taxation. The appli- 
cability of such an approach was dependent on institutional base for objective 
assessment of technology effectiveness for the national economy on the level 
of each particular self-supporting enterprise. 
When using the method of discounted cash flow for assessment of new 
technology effectiveness, many local examples showed that the results of 
the assessments contradicted actual world tendencies regarding technological 
development. That, however, did not prove the method to be defective, 
but resulted in distorting all cost correlations. In order to analyze this 
phenomenon we studied the results concerning the "Industry" branch (see 
'These were the recommended methods for complex assessment of effectiveness of ac- 
tions aimed at  speeding up technological progress adopted by the State Committee of 
Science and Technology and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 
The assessment basis was discounted to a present value of future financial means of the 
enterprise, aimed at  forming different funds and also dividend payments that were to be 
obtained as a result of business activities using technological advantages of the particular 
enterprise in question. 
When assessing investment in state property, the national economic approach was to 
be followed. That meant the use of unified principles to determine the discount rate, the 
use of national economic norms for natural resources payment, and also other norms and 
standards under the existing legislation, including profit tax from enterprises for state and 
local budgets. 
Hereinafter, the amount of enterprise financial means allocated to create different funds, 
and also dividend payments will be called financial results of the enterprise activities for 
a year, shown by the sum left on bank accounts after investment operations, achieved 
profits, amortization, tax collection, fulfillment of financial obligations, that correspond to 
the customary term used in Western methodology named cash flow. 
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Table  1. Basic data to  assess the economic effect of traditional technology 
- ~ 
on "Industryn branch performance. 
Traditional 
Item Unit technology 
1. Result based on cost evaluation (volume of 
gross output in real prices of 
enterprises plus balance of sales tax) bln.rb1. 862.5 
2. Expenditures: 
2.1. Onetime expenditures (average 
yearly cost of assets (total)) bln.rbl. 972.9 
including: 
average yearly cost of fixed assets bln.rb1. 778.3 
2.2. Current expenses bln.rbl. 698.6 
including: 
material expenses (considering 
amortization for capitalized repairs) bln.rb1. 585.5 
wages (including payment 
for social insurance and labor resources) bln.rb1. 113.1 
3. Period of calculation - 20 years 
4. Rate of return - 0,1175 
Table 1). Statistics from 1986 are taken as the basis. The economic effect 
of technology use was calculated under the conditions that the present fixed 
assets of the branch served for 20 years, which is the average amortization 
norm, and that the results and current expenses did not change during the 
calcuation period. Followingly, we calculated the economic effect of the 
"Industryn branch fixed assets over their useful life under the conditions of 
technological and economic stability. 
The result was a positive economic effect of 337.2 billion rubles, with a 
pay-back period equal to  approximately 10 years. In each year of the calcu- 
lated period, the "Industry" branch contributed approximately 122.7 billion 
rubles as sales tax, profit deductions (including fixed assets), income tax, 
allocations to  social insurance and payment for labor resources to  the state 
budget, plus 141.6 billion rubles of amortization deductions of enterprises. 
One of the most important trends of scientific and technological devel- 
opment has been the automation of production. According to statistics, it 
can double labor productivity, while simultaneously reducing the productiv- 
ity of fixed capital 1.6 times. The calculated economic effect based on the 
altered technological and economic data (see Table 2), while accommodating 
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the new conditions and assuming constant gross output for the "Industry" 
branch, was 1.8 times less that when using traditional technology. Annual 
transfers to  central management bodies declined, and the branch profits did 
not compensate for lost central investments. 
Based on these calculations, the use of new technology (in this particular 
caseautomation)  was not profitable both from the local and global points 
of view. The use of economic stimuli (tax, preferences, subsidies, rate of 
interest, etc.) would, under the prevailing conditions, not improve the situ- 
ation. Enterprise managers would be inclined to  be more risk averse due to 
the comparative non-profitability of this kind of technology, leading to ad- 
verse selection (in favor of traditional technology) and further losses to  the 
state budget. In addition, the innovation potential would decline throughout 
the national economy as a whole. 
Therefore, in order to  create an economy receptive to  technological 
progress a primary step would focus on the necessity to  reform the basic 
cost correlations in public (state) p rod~c t ion .~  That would naturally result 
in changing economic figures for all branches of national economy, including 
the cost structure. 
We would like to  show how this affects our assessment of "Industry" 
branch performance. For this purpose we require new basic data (see Ta- 
ble 3), from which we subsequently determine the extent of the economic 
effect depending on first traditional technology, and second on technology 
based on automation. 
As a result, the financial indicators of industrial performance for the 20 
year .period, not considering the time factor (even after 10% property tax 
introduced for enterprises), will be 1.5 times higher with automation than 
with continued use of traditional technology. Under the old price, wage 
and tax systems, new technology appeared to  be 3 times worse than the 
traditional one. Calculations revealed that changes in price structure and 
level, and wages structure and level would cause an increase in the economic 
effect in industry utilizing traditional technology 1.5 times; while automation 
would result in three-fold growth. Consequently, new technology is predicted 
to  be 1.4 times more effective than the traditional. This result, in addition 
to  the introduction of new regulations for relations of enterprises with local 
and state budgets, and non-deduction of amortization payments from the 
'We needthe doubling of prices for fuel and power, and in food industry doubling 
of wages fund with 14% deductions to the social insurance fund; enterprise income will 
be subject to sales tax and amortization deductions for renovation, and a property tax 
corresponding to 25% of company income tax. 
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Table 2. Basic data to  assess the economic effect of automated production 
on "Industry" branch performance. 
Technology 
based on 
Item Unit automation 
1. Result based on cost evaluation (volume of 
gross output in real prices of 
enterprises) bln.rb1. 862.5 
2. Expenditures: 
2.1. O n e t i m e  expenditures (average bln.rbl. 1510 
yearly cost o f  assets (total)) (778.3 x 1.6+265) 
including: 
average yearly cost of fixed assets bln.rb1. 1245.0 
2.2. Current expenses bln.rbl. 657.2 
including: 
omaterial expenses (considering 
amortization for capitalized repairs) bln.rb1. 600.6 
owages (including payment 
for social insurance and labor resources) bln.rb1. 56.6 
3. Period of calculation - 20 years 
4. Rate of return - 0.1175 
enterprise balance considerably improves self-financing conditions for their 
performance and makes new technology more profitable than the traditional 
one (see Table 4). 
As previously mentioned, discounted cash flow is the indicator custom- 
arily used in international practice t o  assess large scale projects. Our cal- 
culations showed that under the existing Soviet-type economic conditions 
using either traditional techology or technology based on automation was 
non-profitable for the "Industry" branch. However, new (altered) economic 
indices regarding public (state) production would cause the discounted finan- 
cial stream to  be positive for both variants based on branch performance. 
Its level was estimated a t  1.5 times higher when automation used in favor 
of traditional technology. 
A certain key measure had been taken by the Soviet Government to  re- 
form cost correlations. It consisted of a changed price structure and level, 
tax system with stable wages, and a special system of compensation al- 
lowance. However, as our calculations revealed, such changes did not facili- 
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Table 3. Basic data  t o  calculate the economic effect from uIndustryn branch 
performance accounting for changes in cost correlations of public production. 
Technology 
Traditional based on 
Item Unit technology automation 
1. Result based on cost evaluation (vol. 
of gross output in real prices of 
enterprises equal to industrial prices) bln.rb1. 1080 1080 
2. Expenditures: 
2.1. O n e t i m e  expenditures (average 
yearly cost o f  assets (total)) bln.rbl. 972.9 1510 
including: 
average yearly cost of fixed assets bln.rb1. 778.0 1225 
2.2. Current expenses bln.rbl. 904.0 817.5 
including: 
material expenses (considering 
amortization for capitalized repairs) bln.rb1. 701.0 716.0 
*wages (including payment 
for social insurance) bln.rb1. 203.0 101.5 
3. Period of calculation - 20 years 
4. Rate of return - 0.1175 
ta te  a solution t o  the problem of making the economy receptive t o  techno- 
logical progress. 
The economic effect of automation in the UIndustryn branch was 1.2 
times less under the assumed conditions, compared t o  traditional technology, 
and they both (with due regard for time factor) do not meet the demands 
t o  secure branch performance (see Table 5). This indicates that  the internal 
rate of effectiveness for traditional and new technology was lower than the 
rate of effectiveness in the national economy, and, correspondingly, could not 
provide concordance between self-financing and national economy interests. 
Furthermore, the results showed that industrial enterprises on the whole 
could not meet the interest payments a t  the assumed rate of interest for 
middle- and long-term loans. However, doubling wages combined with a 
25% reduction in the profits tax would have improved repayment ability. 
So, under the Soviet structure of costs i t  was impossible t o  make self- 
supporting enterprises receptive t o  those technological progress achievements 
(Unew technologiesn) that  were profitable for any foreign company. Due 
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Table 4. Self-financing indices for "Industryn branch performance (billion 
rubles). 
ignoring cost regarding cost 
correlations correlations 
in public in public 
production production 
trad. tech. trad. tech. 
Indices tech. auto. tech. auto. 
1. Taxable Profit 112.3 119.0 133.3 202.1 
2. Profit deductions with 
due regard for fixed 
assets (company income 
tax) 62.0 65.0 33.0 50.5 
3. Payment for labor 
resources 10.7 5.4 
4. Property tax 
4.1 5% of fixed assets 38.9 62.0 
4.2 10% of main fixed assets - 77.8 124.0 
5. After-tax profit (net profit) 
5.1 [(I)-(2)-(3)-(4.111 39.6 48.6 61.1 89.6 
5.2 [(I)-(2)-(3)-(4.2)] 39.6 48.6 22.2 27.6 
6. Enterprise deductions 
for creating different funds: 
6.1 (5.1) + amortization share 
for renovation, non-deductible 58.6 78.8 98.9 150.0 
6.2 (5.2) + amortization for 
renovation, non-deductible 58.6 78.8 60.0 88.0 
7. Financial results of industrial 
performance for 20 years 
(ignoring the time factor) 
7.1 (6.1) x 20 as one-time 
expenses 199.1 66.0 100.5 149.0 
7.2 (6.2) x 20 as one-time 
expenses 199.1 66.0 227.0 250.0 
8. Financial results of industrial 
performance for 20 years (with 
due regard for time factor) 
[{(6)+(4)+ funds payments)/ 
rate of return-onetime 
expenses] -337.2 -619.8 199.9 294.3 
Note: trad. tech. = traditional technology 
tech. auto. = technology based on automation 
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Table 5. Results of "Industryn branch performance in  realizing t he  Soviet 
- 
Government Program (billion rubles). 
with with 
Government Alternative 
Program Programa 
trad. tech. trad. tech. 
Indices tech. auto. tech. auto. 
1. Taxable Profit 204.9 227.6 149.6 213.3 
2. Company income tax 112.5 125.2 37.4 53.3 
3. Property tax 71.7 79.7 
3.1 10% of fixed assets 77.8 124.0 
3.2 5% of fixed assets 38.9 63.0 
4. After-tax profit (net profit) 
4.1 [(I)-(2)-(3)-(4. I)] 133.0 147.9 34.4 39.0 
4.2 [(I)-(2)-(3)-(4.2)] 133.0 147.9 73.3 98.0 
5. Price raise compensation 20.5 10.3 
6. Enterprise deductions to  
create different funds (*) 
6.1 ((4.1) + amortization share 
for renovation, non-deductible} (5) 142.9 186.2 72.4 100.0 
6.2 ((4.2) + amortization for 
renovation, non-deductible} (5) 142.9 186.2 111.3 158.8 
7. Financial results of industrial 
performance for 20 years 
(ignoring the time factor) 
[{(6)+(3)}/rate of return- 
one-time expenses] 0 -303.0 57.0 -8.0 
aWith due regard for price changes in line with the Program, doubling wages, 25% growth 
in profit tax, and introduction of a property tax. 
* Payment for natural and labor resources not included. 
Note: trad. tech. = traditional technology 
tech. auto. = technology based on automation 
to t h e  then existing cost correlations, new technology became entirely in- 
effective for self-supporting enterprises; in  fact,  t he  new technology resulted 
i n  profits reduction, not  growth. This  was t he  reasoning behind t h e  long en- 
dured practice of "forcingn new, unprofitable technology, o n  t h e  enterprises, 
whereas foreign companies searched for t he  most desireable innovations. In 
t he  Soviet Union, t h e  basic grounds for introducing new technology were 
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mostly technological (including military) priorities, which were not the ob- 
ject of this study. 
What were the basic distortions in cost correlations resulting in the 
contradictory situation present in the USSR? 
Firstly, economic results achieved by using any technology was finally 
reflected by changes in the general consumption fund. For a number of years, 
retail prices for consumer goods were kept artificially low. In addition, prices 
for production factors were changed from time to  time (always positively) 
and were themselves quasi-arbitrarily increased, also on the pretense of new 
technology introduction. This resulted in price distortions, that may be ex- 
post interpreted as minimally lowering prices for consumer goods relative to 
prices for factors of production. 
Secondly, new technology efficiency was determined by the economic po- 
tential that could have been achieved relative to the actual production, pri- 
marily on a labor-saving basis. Namely, labor-saving technological progress. 
Comparatively high prices for new technology (compared to final results) and 
extremely low wages for labor that could be substituted by this technology, 
made its purchase appear non-profitable by enterprise managers. Only with 
wages doubling (compared to fixed capital prices), would new technology 
have proven to  be profitable in Soviet enterprises. A similar situation ex- 
isted in resource-saving (especially for energy-saving technologies). That is, 
only if prices for fuel and power (oil, gas, coal, power) would have increased 
two-fold would the economic policy of Soviet self-supporting enterprises have 
gradually corresponded to world standards. 
Thirdly, international practice has shown that the price of new technol- 
ogy declines with time due to  increasingly rapid diffusion and wide-spread 
application. This phenomena has facilitated production to  remain profitable 
although profit margins continued to be narrowed. For example, the mass 
spread of personal computers over the last ten years has seen the techno- 
logical level grow 3 times, while the market prices dropped 10 times. The 
distorted price system and the underdeveloped market in the USSR caused 
prices for such products to  be 30 and more times higher than world market 
prices. Yet, despite this additional (excess) profit, none was re-invested into 
the promotion and development of such a profitable business, but rather 
diverted into the state budget. Even after limits to  the super-profit were 
introduced, the magnitude of the deductions were to continue, not directly 
but indirectly. 
These have been the most vivid elements of the Soviet economic system 
that created obstacles for economy to be receptive to technological progress, 
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and additionally t o  newly organized enterprises that  could have improved 
the results of public production. The fact that the economy was ineffective 
and unreceptive t o  innovations could have been explained by the general 
institutional structure of economy. Considerable time is needed t o  improve 
it. 
I t  is not enough t o  carry out formalized privatization of enterprises and 
adopt legislative acts on demonopolization, freedom of enterprising, creation 
of joint stock companies, or restructuring credit and the banking system. 
Non-stop operation of various markets has become a necessity: these might 
include a stock market, bond market, labor market, capital market, and still 
others. 
Technological Assessment Problems 
National 
Innovation Systems: A 
Retrospective on a Study 
Richard R. Nelson1 
What is the Study About? 
In this essay I will describe a large comparative study of national innovation 
systems that has just been completed, tell something of what motivated the 
study and how it  was organized and undertaken, and highlight some of the 
more interesting findings. This is a difficult task, for the project was not 
only large but also complex. 
The heart of the project consisted of studies of 15 countries, includ- 
ing all of the prominent large market oriented industrialized ones, several 
smaller high income countries, and a number of newly industrializing states. 
The studies were carefully designed, developed, and written to  illuminate 
the institutions and mechanisms supporting technical innovation in the vari- 
ous countries, the similarities and differences across countries and how these 
came to  be, and to  permit a t  least preliminary discussion of how the differ- 
ences seemed to  matter. No other project has come remotely close t o  treat- 
ing the range of countries considered here. Moreover, many of the individual 
studies stand as major contributions in their own right to  the understanding 
of the innovation systems of particular countries, going far beyond anything 
written on those countries before. To describe and summarize in compact 
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form what came out of the project simply is impossible. I must pick and 
choose and hint. 
The project was undertaken t o  try t o  throw some light on a very com- 
plicated and important set of issues. The slowdown of growth since the 
early 1970s in all of the advanced industrial nations, the rise of Japan as a 
major economic and technological power, the relative decline of the United 
States, and widespread concerns in Europe about being behind both, has 
led t o  a rash of writing and new policy departures concerned with support- 
ing the technical innovative powers of national firms. At the same time the 
enhanced technical sophistication of Korea, Taiwan, and other newly indus- 
trialized countries (NICs) has broadened the range of nations whose firms 
are competitive players in fields which used t o  be the preserve of only a few, 
and led other nations who today have a weak manufacturing sector t o  won- 
der how they might emulate the performance of the successful NICs. There 
clearly is a new spirit of what might be called Utechno-nationalismn in the  
air, combining a strong belief that  the technological capabilities of a nation's 
firms are a key source of their competitive performance, with the belief that  
these capabilities are in a sense national, and can be built by national action. 
It is this climate that  has given rise t o  the current strong interest in 
national innovation systems, their similarities and differences, and in the ex- 
tent and manner that  these differences explain variation in national economic 
performance. There now may be more awareness and research about such 
national differences than on any other area where comparative institutional 
analysis would seem interesting and illuminating. 
The project on which I report here was born of this intellectual climate, 
and came out of a belief on the part of the participants that  much of the 
writing and argument were somewhat hyped, and rather haphazard. More, 
many of the allegedly comparative studies in fact had concentrated on one 
country-in recent times usually Japan-with the comparison with other 
countries largely implicit. The actual comparative studies tended t o  be of 
two or a very small group of countries. This limitation struck the project 
participants as particularly serious in view of the absence of a well articu- 
lated and verified analytic framework linking institutional arrangements t o  
technological and economic performance. In the absence of such a framework 
there were (and are) only weak constraints on the inclinations of analysts t o  
draw possibly spurious causal links between differences in institutional struc- 
tures that  clearly are there, and differences in performance which clearly are 
there also. Different authors have focused on different things and made dif- 
ferent kinds of arguments about why this feature or that  was an important 
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factor behind strong or weak performance. A broadening of a set of countries 
considered simultaneously seemed t o  us an important way t o  tighten these 
constraints by enlarging the number of "points" that a causal theory had t o  
"fit ." 
The way I have been putting the matter clearly signals that  the orien- 
tation of this project has been t o  carefully describe and compare, and try 
t o  understand, rather than t o  theorize first and then attempt t o  prove or 
calibrate the theory. However, a comparative study like this requires, a t  the 
least, some agreement on basic terms and concepts. 
There is, first of all, the concept of a national innovation system itself. 
Each of the terms can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and there is the 
question of whether, in a world where technology and business are increas- 
ingly transnational, the concept as a whole makes much sense. 
Consider the term "innovation." In this study we, the participants, 
interpret the term rather broadly, to  encompass the processes by which firms 
master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing processes 
that are new t o  them, whether or not they are new t o  the universe, or 
even t o  the nation. We do so for several reasons. First, the activities, and 
investments associated with becoming the leader in the introduction of a new 
product or process, and those associated with staying near the head of the 
pack, or catching up, are much less sharply distinguishable than commonly 
is presumed. Second, much of the interest in innovative capability is tied t o  
concern about economic performance, and here it is certainly the broader 
concept rather than the narrower one (the determinants of being first) that 
matters. This means that  our orientation is not limited t o  the behavior of 
firms a t  the world's technology forefront, or t o  institutions doing the most 
advanced scientific research, although in some countries the focus is here, but 
is more broadly on the factors influencing national technological capabilities. 
Then there is the term "system." While t o  some the word connotes 
something that  is consciously designed and built, this is far from the ori- 
entation here. Rather the concept here is of a set of institutions whose 
interactions determine the innovative performance, in the sense above, of 
national firms. There is no presumption that the system was, in some sense, 
consciously designed, or even that  the set of institutions involved works to- 
gether smoothly and coherently. Rather, the "systems" concept is that  of 
a set of institutional actors that, together, play the major role in influenc- 
ing innovative performance. The broad concept of innovation that  we have 
adopted has forced us t o  consider much more than simply the actors doing 
research and development. Indeed, a problem with the broader definition of 
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innovation is that it provides no sharp guide to  just what should be included 
in the innovation system, and what can be left out. More on this later. 
Finally, there is the concept of "nationaln system. On the one hand, the 
concept may be too broad. The system of institutions supporting techni- 
cal innovation in one field, say pharmaceuticals, may have very little over- 
lap with the system of institutions supporting innovations in another field, 
say aircraft. On the other hand, in many fields of technology, including 
both pharmaceuticals and aircraft, a number of the institutions are or act 
transnational. Indeed, for many of the participants in this study, one of the 
key interests was in exploring whether, and if so in what ways, the concept 
of a "national" system made any sense nowadays. National governments act 
as if i t  did. However, that presumption, and the reality, may not be aligned. 
The studies in this project are unified by at least broad agreement on the 
definitional and conceptual issues discussed above. They also were guided 
by certain common understandings of the way technical advance proceeds, 
and the key processes and institutional actors involved, that are now widely 
shared among scholars of technical advance. In a way these understandings 
do provide a common analytic framework, not wide enough to  encompass all 
of the variables and relationships that likely are important, not sharp enough 
to  tightly guide empirical work, but broad enough and pointed enough to  
provide a common structure in which one can have some confidence. 
In particular, our inquiry was strongly shaped by our shared understand- 
ings about the complex intertwining of science and technology that marks 
the modern world. In the first place, we take the position that technology 
at  any time needs to  be recognized as consisting of both a set of specific 
designs and practices, and a body of generic knowledge that surrounds these 
and provides understanding of how things work, key variables affecting per- 
formance, the nature of how things work, the nature of currently binding 
constraints, and promising approaches to pushing these back. In most fields 
of technology a considerable portion of generic understanding stems from 
operating and design experience with products and machines and their com- 
ponents, and generalizations reflecting on these. Thus consider a mechanic's 
guide, or the general knowledge of potters, or steel makers. 
However, over the last century science has played an increasing role 
in the understandings related to  technology. Indeed most modern fields of 
technology today have associated with them formal scientific or engineer- 
ing disciplines like metallurgy, computer science, and chemical engineering. 
These kinds of disciplines are basically about technological understanding, 
and reflect attempts to  make that understanding more scientific. An impor- 
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tant consequence has been that, nowadays, formal academic training in the 
various applied sciences and engineering disciplines has become virtually a 
prerequisite for understanding a technology. 
The intertwining of science and technology which began to  occur a cen- 
tury ago led t o  the rise of the industrial research laboratory as the dominant 
locus of technological innovation, first in the chemical and electrical indus- 
tries, and then more broadly. These facilities, dedicated t o  advancing tech- 
nology, and staffed by academically trained scientists and engineers, were 
closely tied t o  individual business enterprises. 
It is important t o  understand that not all of the activities and invest- 
ments made by firms in innovating are conducted in R&D laboratories, or 
get counted as R&D . The extent t o  which they do varies from industry to  
industry. Where firms are small, or where firms are engaged in designing 
products to order for individual customers, much of the innovative work may 
not be counted as R&D. Nonetheless, while not always counted as R&D, and 
while often drawing extensively on external sources like universities and gov- 
ernment laboratories, in most industries the lion's share of innovative effort 
is made by the firms themselves. 
There are several reasons. First, after technology has been around for a 
period of time, in order to  orient innovative work fruitfully one needs detailed 
knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses and areas where improvements 
would yield high payoffs, and this knowledge tends to  reside with those who 
use the technology, generally firms and their customers and suppliers. Sec- 
ond, profiting from innovation in many cases requires the coordination of 
R&D, production, and marketing, which tends to proceed much more effec- 
tively within an organization that itself does all of these. These arguments 
hold whether one defines the innovation concept narrowly, as the introduc- 
tion of a product or process that is truly new, or whether one defines it 
broadly as we do in the study, as the introduction of something that is new 
to the firm. Thus, all of the country studies paid a considerable amount of 
attention to  the activities and investments being undertaken by firms. 
The other two institutional actors with which all of the country stud- 
ies were concerned are universities (and scientific and technical educational 
structures more generally), and governments and their policies as these in- 
fluence industrial innovation. University and kindred institutions play two 
different kinds of roles in modern industrial innovation systems. They are 
the place where scientists and engineers who go into industry get their formal 
training. And in most (but not all) countries they are the locus of a consider- 
able amount of research in the disciplines that are associated with particular 
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technologies. To a much greater extent than commonly realized, university 
research programs are not undifferentiated parts of a national innovation 
system broadly defined, but rather are keyed into particularly technologies 
and particular industries. University training, and research, that supports 
technical innovation in farming and the food processing industries simply is 
very different than university teaching and research that supports the elec- 
tronic industries. Thus, a major question in this study was how the research 
and teaching orientation of a nation's universities reflected, or molded, the 
industries where technological innovation was important in the nation. 
And, of course, the individual country studies looked closely at  the range 
of government programs and policies bearing on industrial innovation. As 
is the case with the activities of universities, many government programs 
are focussed specifically on particular technologies or industries, and these 
obviously were of central interest. However, as noted in my earlier discussion 
of the meaning of an "innovation system," given the broad way we are using 
the term innovation, innovative performance can not be cleanly separated 
from economic performance and competitiveness more broadly. Thus, in 
many cases the examination of government policies bearing on industrial 
innovation had to  get into things like monetary and trade policies. 
In designing the study the participants faced a quandary. From the dis- 
cussion above it is obvious that a very wide range of factors influence the 
innovative performance of a nation's industries. The desire for compara- 
bility across the studies seemed to call for a rather elaborate list of things 
all country studies would cover. Yet it was apparent that the most inter- 
esting features of a country's innovation system varied significantly across 
countries, and we wanted to  illuminate these. Limits on resources and space 
foreclosed doing both. Our compromise involved two strategic decisions. 
First, we agreed on the limited list of features all country studies were to 
cover, e.g., the allocation of R&D activity and the sources of its funding, 
the characteristics of firms and the important industries, the roles of uni- 
versities, and the government policies expressly aimed to  spur and mold 
industrial innovation. Beyond these the authors were encouraged to pick 
out and highlight what they thought were the most important and interest- 
ing characteristics of their country. But second, considerable effort was put 
into identifying the kinds of comparisons-similarities or differences-that 
seemed most interesting and important to  make. In general these did not 
involve comparisons across all countries, but rather among a small group 
where for various reasons comparison was apt. 
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The overall project covered three sets of countries where we thought in- 
group comparisons would be most interesting. The first group consisted of six 
large high income countries-the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom. The second group consisted of four small high income 
countries, with a strong agricultural or resources base-Denmark, Sweden, 
Canada, and Australia. Finally, included in the set were five lower income 
countries-Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel. While we were 
interested in the similarities and differences across groups, a considerable 
amount of thought and effort went into laying out within group comparisons. 
As I said at  the offset, it is impossible to  summarize what came out of this 
study; I can only give some highlights and a flavor. In the following section 
I highlight some of the key similarities and differences across countries, and 
our assessments about what lies behind the differences. Then I report our 
tentative judgements on what distinguishes systems where firms are strong 
and innovative from systems where they are not; most of us believe that this 
has somewhat less to do with aggressive "technology policies" than current 
fashion might have one believe. Indeed, many of us believe that the current 
focus of discussion Uhigh tech" industries may exaggerate the importance to 
a nation of having strong national firms in those fields. An important reason 
is that firms in these industries are increasingly going transnational, which 
brings me to my next topic: what remains of national systems in a world 
where business and technology are increasingly transnational? I conclude by 
reflecting on the acrimonious aspects of national technology policies. 
Country Differences and What Lies Behind Them 
To compare means to identify similarities as well as differences. Certainly the 
broad view of technical innovation which I laid out above and which guided 
this study implies certain commonalities. That view applies to  economies in 
which profit oriented firms are the principal providers of goods and services, 
and where central planning and control is weak. These conditions hold in all 
of the countries in our set, although in some a certain portion of industry is 
nationalized, and in some governments do try to mold the shape of industrial 
development in a t  least a few economic sectors. In all of the countries in 
our set, the bulk of education, including university education, is conducted 
in public institutions. In all, the government is presumed to have major 
responsibility for the funding of basic research, although there are major 
differences across countries regarding how much of that they do, and where 
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basic research is mostly carried out. F'rom one point of view, what is most 
striking about the country comparisons is the amount of basic similarity. 
Had the old Soviet Union been included in the set, or China, or Nigeria, the 
matter would have been different. But, as i t  is, the differences across our 
set of countries must be understood as differences of individuals of the same 
species. 
Within our group of countries, i t  would appear that  t o  a considerable 
extent the differences in the innovation systems reflect differences in eco- 
nomic and political circumstances and priorities. First of all, size and the 
degree of affluence matter a lot. Countries with large affluent populations 
can provide a market for a wide range of manufacturing industries and may 
engage in other activities that  "small" countries cannot pursue, a t  least 
with any chance of success, and their innovation systems will reflect this. 
Low income countries tend t o  differ from high income ones in the kinds of 
economic activities in which they can have comparative advantage, and in 
internal demand patterns, and these differences profoundly shape the nature 
of technical innovation that  is relevant. 
The threefold division of our countries into large high income industrial 
nations, small high income countries, and low income countries thus turned 
out t o  be a useful first cut analytic separation. By and large the economies 
in the first group had a significantly larger fraction of their economies in R 
and D intensive industry, like aerospace, electronics, and chemical products, 
which require large sales to  be economic, than economies in the second and 
third groups. There are some anomalies, a t  the surface a t  least. Thus 
Sweden in the second group and Israel and Korea in the third have higher 
R&D t o  GNP ratios than several of the countries in the first group. Some of 
the mystery disappears when Israel's ambitious military R&D is recognized, 
and Sweden's and Korea's strong presence in several R&D and intensive 
industries that  live largely through export. Both of the latter two countries 
also have strong defense programs this also undoubtedly affected their R&D 
intensities. There are certain interesting similarities of countries in different 
groups-Japan and Korea for example. However, by and large there were 
strong intra-group similarities, and strong inter-group differences. Thus the 
U.S. and Japan look much less different than advertised, once one brings 
Australia and Israel into the comparison set. And much of the U.S.-Japan 
difference can be seen t o  reside in differences in their resource bases and 
defence policies. 
Whether or not a country had rich natural resources or ample farming 
land clearly is another important variable influencing the shape of i ts  inno- 
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vation system. It turns out that all our "small" high income countries also 
were well endowed in this respect. Among the large high income countries 
the U.S. was far and away the best endowed here. Countries that possess 
resources and good farm land face a different set of opportunities and con- 
straints than countries without these assets. 
Countries that lack them must import resources and farm products, 
which forces their economies towards export-oriented manufacturing, and 
an innovation system that supports this. One sees this strikingly in the 
cases of Germany, Japan, and Korea. On the other hand, countries with 
a rich resource base can support relatively high living standards with farm 
products and resources and the affiliated industries providing exports to  pay 
for imported manufactured goods. The countries that have been able to  do 
this-Denmark, Canada, and Australia stand out in our set-have devel- 
oped significant publicly supported R&D programs to  back these industries. 
So also has the United States. While effective agriculture and resource ex- 
ploitation does require R&D, compared with Uhigh tech" industry the R&D 
intensity here is low. 
The discussion above suggests that, to  some extent a t  least, a nation's 
innovation system is shaped by factors like size and resource endowments 
that affect comparative advantage at  a basic level. But it also is true that 
a nation's innovation system tends to reflect conscious decisions to  develop 
and sustain economic strength in certain areas, that is, it builds and shapes 
comparative advantage. 
Some of the project members were surprised to  find in how many of our 
countries national security concerns had been important in shaping innova- 
tion systems. 
In the first place, among high income countries defense R&D accounts for 
the lion's share of the differences among the countries in government funding 
of industrial R&D, and the presence of large military programs thus explains 
why government industrial R&D spending in the U.S., and the U.K. and 
France, is so much greater than in Japan and Germany. In the second place, 
the industries from which the military procures tend to be R&D intensive, 
whether the firms are selling to the military or to  civilians. The study of 
Japan shows clearly that the present industrial structure was largely put 
in place during an era when national security concerns were strong. This 
structure, now oriented to  civilian products, is one of the reasons for Japan's 
high R&D intensity. It is possible that, to  some extent, this argument also 
holds for Germany. 
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Interestingly, every one of the low income countries in our study has been 
influenced by national security concerns, or a military government, or both. 
Thus much of high tech industry in Israel is largely oriented towards the 
military. The broad economic policies, industrial structures, and innovation 
systems of Korea and Taiwan were molded in good part by their felt need 
to have a capable military establishment. The pockets of "high tech" atop 
the basically backward Brazilian and Argentine economies clearly reflect the 
ambitions of their military elites. 
As noted, all of the countries in our set are, basically, ones in which firms 
are mostly expected to fend for themselves in markets that are, to a consid- 
erable extent, competitive. However, all are marked by significant pockets 
of government overview, funding, and protection. In our countries with big 
military procurement programs, the defense industries are the largest such 
pocket. However, in many of our countries government support and protec- 
tion extends into space, electric power, telecommunications, and other areas 
of civilian "high tech." While by and large these extensions are most signif- 
icant in the big high income countries, Canada has large public programs in 
electric power and telecommunications, and so does Sweden. 
There clearly are significant differences across the nations regarding be- 
liefs about which kind of a role government should play in shaping industrial 
development. The role of military concerns clearly is a powerful variable in- 
fluencing this. But a relatively active government also is associated with 
"late" development, along the lines put forth by Alexander Gerschenkron, 
(1962). Aside from the arena of national security and related areas, Britain 
and the U.S. are marked by restrained government. On the other hand all 
of our low income late developing countries have quite active governments. 
However, there certainly are exceptions to this rule. France's Etatism goes 
way back in history, and while Italy is a late developer except during the 
Fascist era her government has been weak. 
The above discussion suggests that one ought to see considerable conti- 
nuity in a nation's innovation system, at least to the extent that the basic 
national objectives and conditions have a continuity. Although this proposi- 
tion clearly has only limited bearing on the countries in our set that only were 
formed or gained independence in recent years-Israel, Taiwan, Korea--even 
here one can see a certain consistency within these nation's short histories. 
All of these countries have experienced dramatic improvements in living stan- 
dards since the 1950s, and their industrial structure has changed markedly. 
Their innovation systems have changed as well, but as our authors tell the 
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story, in all of these countries today's institutional structures supporting 
innovation clearly show their origins in those of 30 years ago. 
For countries with longer histories, the institutional continuity is strik- 
ing, a t  least to  the study authors. Thus one can see many of the same things 
in 1990 in France, Germany, and Japan, that were there in 1890, and this 
despite the enormous advances in living standards and shifts in industrial 
structure all  have experienced, and the total defeat of the latter two nations 
in World War I1 and the stripping away of their military. Britain of 1990 
continues many the institutional characteristics of Britain in 1890, although 
they seemed to  work better then than now. 
Indeed, in this author's eyes, of the countries with long histories the one 
that has changed most institutionally is the U.S. The governmental roles in 
funding university research, and defense R&D, that came into place only 
after World War 11, had little precedent prior to  the War, and profoundly 
changed the nature of the innovation system. 
What is Required for Effective Innovative Perfor- 
mance? 
We have defined innovation broadly so that the term basically stands for 
what is required of firms if they are to  stay competitive in industries where 
technological advance is important. Such industries span a large share of 
manufacturing, many service sectors such as air transport, telecommuni- 
cations, and medical care, and important areas of agriculture and mining. 
Staying competitive means different things in different national contexts. 
For firms located in high wage countries, being competitive may require 
having a significantly more attractive product or a better production pro- 
cess than firms in low wage countries. For the latter, being competitive may 
not require being at  the forefront. Indeed much innovation in low income 
countries involves the learning of foreign technology, its diffusion, and per- 
haps its adaption to  local circumstances of demand or production. But in 
either kind of country, if technological advance in the industry is significant, 
staying competitive requires continuing innovation. 
We, the group that has produced the country studies, think we can 
discern several basic features that are common to effective innovative per- 
formance, and which are lacking or attenuated in countries where innovation 
arguably has been weak. First, the firms in the industry were highly compe- 
tent in what mattered to  be competitive in their lines of business. Generally 
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this involved competence in product design and production, but usually also 
effective overall management, ability to assess consumer needs, links into 
upstream and downstream markets, etc. In most cases, significant invest- 
ments lay behind these firm capabilities. All this enabled firms to  master 
the relevant technologies and other practices needed to  compete and to stay 
up with or lead with new developments. 
This observation does contain a hint of tautology, but is better regarded 
as confirmation of a point stressed above, that the bulk of the effort in in- 
novation needs to  be done by the firms themselves. While they may draw 
on outside developments, significant internal effort and skill is needed to  
complement and implement these. One cannot read the studies of Japan, 
Germany, Italy, Korea, Taiwan, all arguably countfles where firms have dis- 
played strong performance in certain industries, without being impressed by 
the authors' description of the firms. On the other hand, one is impressed 
the other way by the authors' commentary on the weaknesses of firms in 
certain industries in Britain, France, Australia, Argentina, and Israel. 
Being strong did not necessarily mean that firms were large. Economists 
have long understood that while in some industries a firm has to be large 
in order to be a capable innovator, in other industries this is not the case. 
Many of the strong Italian, Taiwanese, and Danish firms are relatively small. 
Nor does it mean that the firms spend heavily on formal R&D. In some fields 
like electronics generally it did, a t  least for firms in our first two groups of 
countries; however in Korea and Taiwan electronics firms were often doing 
well with technical efforts mostly oriented towards "reverse engineering." 
The Italian textile industry is strong on fashion and design, and are highly 
innovative in these respects, but little of that work is accounted as R&D. 
Nor does i t  imply that the firms were not benefiting from publicly funded 
R&D programs, or favored procurement status. However, as our authors 
describe it, the bulk of the inputs and direction for innovative activity were 
coming from the firms themselves. 
While our concept of a strong firm entails the ability to compete, in 
all of our cases becoming strong involved actually being exposed to  strong 
competition and so do being forced to  compete. As Michael Porter (1990) has 
noted, in a number of cases the firms faced strong rivals in their own country. 
Thus the Japanese auto and electronics companies compete strongly with 
each other, American pharmaceutical companies compete and so do Italian 
clothing producers. However, it is not a t  all clear that this generalization 
holds for small countries, where there may be only one or a few national 
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firms as Ericson in Sweden and Northern Telecom in Canada. For these 
firms most of their competition is with foreign rivals. 
Porter (1990) and Bengt-Ake Lundvall (1988) have proposed that firms 
in industries where a country is strong tend to have strong interactive link- 
ages with their upstream suppliers, who also are national firms. Our studies 
show many cases where this proposition is verified. The supplier networks 
of Japanese automobile firms, and the upstream-downstream connections in 
Danish agricultural product processing, are good examples. The coopera- 
tion of Italian textile producers with each other and with their equipment 
suppliers is another. However, there are a number of examples where the 
proposition does not seem to hold. Pharmaceutical companies, strong in 
Germany and the U.S., do not seem generally to have any particularly strong 
supplier connections, international or national. In aircraft production, the 
producers of components and sub-components increasingly are located in 
countries other than that of the system designer and assembler. 
A similar observation obtains regarding the proposed importance of a 
demanding set of home market customers. In many cases this holds. But 
in small countries or for industries that from their start have been export 
oriented, the main customer discipline may come from foreign customers. 
While "strong firms" are the key, that only pushes the question back 
a stage. Under what conditions do strong firms arise? As the discussion 
above suggests, to some extent the answer is "spontaneously." However, our 
studies do indicate strongly that aspects of the national background in which 
firms operate matter greatly. 
One important feature distinguishing countries that were sustaining 
competitive and innovative firms was education and training systems that 
provide these firms with a flow of people with the requisite knowledge and 
skills. For industries where university-trained engineers and scientists were 
needed, this does not simply mean that the universities provide training in 
these fields, but also that they consciously train their students with an eye 
to industry needs. The contrast here between the U.S., and Germany on 
the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, is quite sharp, at  least 
as the authors of our studies draw the picture. Indeed these studies sug- 
gest strongly that a principal reason why the former two countries surged 
ahead of the latter two, around the turn of the century, in the science based 
industries emerging then is that their university systems were much more 
responsive to  the training needs of industry. 
While strength in "high tech" depends on the availability of university 
trained people, industry more generally requires a supply of literate, numeri- 
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cally competent people in a wide range of functions outside of R&D, who are 
trained t o  industry demands either by the firms themselves (as in Japan) 
or in external training systems linked t o  firms (as in several German and 
Swedish industries). Countries differed in the extent t o  which their public 
education and training systems combined with private training t o  prcvide 
this supply, and the differences mattered. Thus among high income countries 
Germany, Japan, and Sweden came through much stronger in this respect 
than Britain and Australia. Among developing countries the contrast is 
equally sharp between Korea and Taiwan on the one hand, and Brazil on 
the other. 
The examples of Korea and Taiwan, and the other Asian "tigers," can 
be read as remarkably successful cases of education led growth. As the 
authors tell the story, the ability of firms in these countries t o  move quickly 
from the relatively simple products they produced in the 1950s and 1960s 
t o  the much more complex and technologically sophisticated products they 
produced successfully in the 1980s was made possible by the availability of 
a young domestic workforce that  had received the schooling necessary for 
the new jobs. On the other hand, the cases of Argentina and Israel suggest 
that the availability of an educated workforce is not enough by itself. The 
economic incentives facing firms must be such as t o  compel them t o  mind 
the market and t o  take advantage of the presence of a skilled work force t o  
compete effectively with their rivals. 
Another factor that  seems t o  differentiate countries where firms were 
effectively innovative from those where they were not is the package of fis- 
cal, monetary, and trade policies. By and large where these combined to  
make exporting attractive for firms, firms have been drawn t o  innovate and 
compete. Where they have made exporting difficult or unattractive, firms 
have hunkered down in their home markets, and when in trouble called for 
protection. As I shall indicate later, in some cases a t  the same time as firms 
were competing abroad, they were working within a rather protected home 
market, so the argument is not a simple one for "free trade." Rather, i t  
is that  export incentives matter significantly because for most countries if 
firms do not compete on world markets they do not compete strongly. Up 
until recently the U.S. possibly was an exception to  this rule. The U.S. mar- 
ket was large enough to  support considerable competition among domestic 
firms, which kept them on their toes and innovative. No other country could 
afford the luxury of not forcing their firms t o  compete on world markets. 
Now the U.S. cannot either. 
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Of course much of the current interest in national systems of innovation 
reflects a belief that  the innovative prowess of national firms is determined 
t o  a considerable extent by government policies. Above I have identified 
two features of the national environment in which firms live that  seem t o  
affect their ability and incentives t o  innovate profoundly, and which are 
central responsibilities of government in all of the countries in our sample: 
the education of the work force and the macro-economic climate. But what 
of government policies and programs more directly targeted a t  technological 
advance? This is where much of the contemporary interest is focussed. How 
effective have been these kinds of policies? 
In assessing this question in the light of the fifteen country systems 
studied in this project, one strong impression is the wide range of policies 
targeted a t  technological advance. Thus in recent years, government policies 
towards industrial mergers and aquisitions, inter-firm agreements and joint 
ventures, and allowable industry wide activities, often have been strongly 
influenced by beliefs about the effects of such policies on innovative per- 
formance. Many countries (and the E.C.) now are encouraging firms to  
c ~ o p e r a t e  in R&D of various sorts. Similarly, in recent years a number of 
governments have worked t o  restructure or augment financial institutions 
with the goal of fostering industrial innovation; thus several have tried t o  
establish their analogue to  the Uventure capital" market that  exists in the 
U.S. As suggested, these policies are a very diverse lot and differ from coun- 
try t o  country. Our case studies do provide scattered evidence on them, but, 
simply because they are so diverse, I cannot see any strong generalizations 
that can be drawn. 
Of course, our country study authors were primed t o  look a t  government 
programs directly supporting R&D, and here I think the evidence collected 
is more systematic. It seems useful t o  distinguish between government pro- 
grams that  largely provide funds for university research or for research in 
government or other laboratories not tied t o  particular business firms, and 
government programs that directly support R&D done in firms. I consider 
each in turn. 
Scholars of innovation have now understood that ,  in many sectors, pub- 
licly supported research a t  universities and in public laboratories is an im- 
portant part of the sectoral innovation system. A substantial share of the 
funding of such institutions goes into fields directly connected with techno- 
logical or industrial needs-fields like agronomy, pathology, computer sci- 
ence, materials science, chemical and electrical engineering. 
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Do our country studies support the proposition that strong research at 
universities or public laboratories aids a country's firms in innovation, defin- 
ing that term broadly as we have? Not surprisingly, the answer seems to  
differ from field to  field, and to  be sensitive to  the mechanisms in place to  
mold and facilitate interactions with industry. All the countries that are 
strong and innovative in fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals have strong 
university research in chemistry and the biomedical sciences. A strong agri- 
culture, and a strong farm product processing industry, is associated in all 
of our cases with significant research going on relevant to  these fields in na- 
tional universities, or other types of public research institutions dedicated to 
these industries. In contrast, Argentine agriculture is surprisingly weak, de- 
spite favorable natural endowments. The author of the study of Argentina 
lays the blame on Argentina's failure to  develop an adequate agricultural 
research system. 
Where countries have strong electronics firms, for the most part there 
is some strong research in university departments of electrical engineering, 
and this would appear t o  include Japan. Government laboratories have been 
important sources of new electronic product designs later taken over by firms 
in Taiwan. On the other hand, university research does not seem of much 
importance to  technical advance in automobiles and aerospace. 
Where universities or public laboratories do seem to be helping national 
firms, one tends to  see either direct interactions between particular firms 
and particular faculty members or research teams, as through consulting ar- 
rangements, or mechanisms that tie university or public laboratory programs 
to groups of firms. Thus in the U.S. agricultural experimentation stations 
do research of relevance to  farmers, and seed producers, and have close in- 
teractions with them. Various German universities have programs designed 
to help machinery producers. Taiwan's electronics industry is closely linked 
to  government laboratories. In all of these cases, the relationships between 
the university or government labs and the industry are not appropriately de- 
scribed as the universities or public laboratories simply doing research of rel- 
evance to the industry in question. The connections were much broader and 
closer than that, involving information dissemination, and problem solving. 
Universities and industry were co-partners in a technological community. 
While not important in all industries, a strong case can be made that such 
technology and industry oriented public programs have made a big difference 
in many fields. 
These programs are far less visible than government programs that di- 
rectly support industrial R&D, and the latter also tend to involve far more 
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money. Countries differ significantly in the extent to  which the government 
directly funds industrial R&D. And while most of such programs tend to  be 
concentrated on a narrow range of "high techn industries, programs of this 
sort vary significantly and have been put in place for different reasons. 
I noted above that, in most of our countries, military R&D accounts for 
by far the largest portion of government funding of industrial R&D. Ana- 
lysts have been divided as t o  whether military R&D and procurement has 
been a help, or a hinderance, t o  the commercial competitiveness of national 
industry. Of the major industrial nations, the U.S. spends by far the largest 
share of industrial R&D on military projects. A strong case can be made 
that  in the 1960s this helped the American electronics and aircraft indus- 
tries t o  come to  dominate commercial markets, but that since the late 1960s 
there has been little "~pi l lover .~  Britain has the second largest of the defense 
R&D budgets among our set of nations, but most of the companies receiving 
R&D contracts have shown little capability to  crack into non-military mar- 
kets. The same can be said for most of the French companies. While until 
recently civilian commercial spillover seldom has been a central objective 
of military R&D, except in the sense that i t  was recognized that  selling on 
civilian markets could reduce the public costs of sustaining a strong military 
procurement base, i t  is interesting to  try t o  understand where military R&D 
did lend civilian market strength and where i t  did not. 
Analysis of the U.S. experience suggests that civilian strength is lent 
when military R&D programs are opening up a broad new generic technol- 
ogy, as contrasted with focusing virtually exclusively on procuring particular 
new pieces of fancy hardware wanted by the military. Increasingly the U.S. 
military effort has shifted from the former, to  the latter. A much smaller 
share of military R&D now goes into research and exploratory development 
than during the 19606, and a larger share into highly specialized systems 
development. And the efforts of the other countries in our set who have 
invested significantly in military R&D-Britain, France, and Israel-have 
from the beginning focused largely on the latter. 
Space programs and nuclear power programs have much in common 
with military R&D and procurement. They tend to  involve the same kind of 
government agency leadership in determining what is done. They too tend 
t o  be concentrated on large scale systems developments. Spillover outside 
the field has been quite limited. 
Government programs in support of company R&D in telecommunica- 
tions, other civilian electronics, and aircraft may overlap the technical fields 
supported by military and space programs, and in some cases the support 
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may go t o  the same companies. These programs also tend to  involve the 
same blend of industrial R&D support, and protection from foreign com- 
petition. However, there are several important differences. One is that ,  
compared with military R&D, the public funds almost invariably are much 
smaller. Indeed programs like Eureka, Esprit, Jessi, Fifth Generation, and 
Sematech, are small relative t o  industry funding in the targeted areas. Sec- 
ond, the firms themselves usually have a major say regarding the way the 
public monies are spent, and the projects are subject to  far less detailed 
public management and overview than are defense projects. Third, these 
programs are targeted t o  firms and products in civilian markets, and while 
their home base may be protected through import restriction or preferential 
procurement, the hope is that  the firms ultimately will be able t o  stand on 
their own. 
Thus while they involve a commitment t o  high R&D spending, otherwise 
these programs have much in common with other "infant industry" protec- 
tion programs, many of which have grown up for reasons with no particular 
connections with national security, or a belief in the importance of "high 
tech," but simply because of the desire of a government t o  preserve or create 
a "national" industry. Infant industry protection, subsidy, and government 
guidance are policies that  have been around for a long long time. They 
mark French policy since Colbert. During the 19th century and through 
World War I1 the U.S. was protectionist. The Japanese and Korean steel 
and auto industries, which were highly protected up until the 1980s, are 
more contemporary examples. 
Do the infants ever grow up? Some do and some do not. The Japanese 
auto and electronics companies and the Korean Chaebol based enterprises 
are well known examples of presently strong firms that  grew up in a protected 
market, but i t  also should be recognized that  the American computer and 
semiconductor industries grew up with their market shielded from foreign 
competition and with their R&D funded t o  a considerable extent by the De- 
partment of Defense. After a period of such shelter and support, these firms 
came t o  dominate the world's commercial markets. Airbus may be another 
successful example. On the other hand, the country studies in this project 
give many examples of protected and subsidized industries which never have 
got to  a stage where the firms can compete on their own. France's electron- 
ics industry is a striking example, but so also are the import-substituting 
industries of Argentina and Brazil. 
What lies behind the differences? If I were t o  make a bet i t  is that  the 
differences reside in two things. First, the education and training systems 
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which in some cases did and in others didn't provide the protected firms 
with the  strong skills they needed to  make i t  on their own. Second, a t  
least in today's world, the  extent t o  which economic conditions, including 
government policies, provide strong incentives for the firms t o  quickly start  
trying t o  compete on world markets, as contrasted with hunkering down in 
their protected enclave. 
The  picture of government policies supporting industrial innovation that  
I have been presenting highlights the diversity of such policies and programs, 
and their generally fragmented n a t u r e s o m e  supporting research and other 
activities aimed t o  help industry in universities or public laboratories, others 
connected with defense or space or nuclear power, still others aimed directly 
a t  supporting or protecting certain industries or industry groups. This is 
the picture I draw from the country studies of this project. These studies 
play down the existence of active coherent industrial policies more broadly. 
The interpretation they present of the industrial policies of nations widely 
believed t o  have them is closer t o  that  of modern day infant industry protec- 
tion with some R&D subsidy, than t o  a well structured and thought through 
general policy. 
Some readers will dispute this conclusion, arguing that  the failure of 
the  studies in this project of countries well known t o  have active coherent 
industrial policies t o  highlight them and their successes reflects a serious 
misjudgment of the authors. The authors of those studies respond by arguing 
that ,  in fact, government policies in their countries are highly decentralized, 
and by pointing, the  case of Airbus an exception, t o  the very small fraction 
of industry R&D accounted for by government programs. 
The skeptics rejoin that, while the policies did not involve massive public 
monies, they had a lot of leverage on private decisions and investments. The 
authors respond that  government leverage has been exaggerated and that  
where strong policies have been executed, they as often lead t o  failure as t o  
success. This clearly is the position taken by our Japanese authors on MITI. 
Without a more fine grained understanding of technological innovation than 
we now have, there is no way of resolving this debate in a way that  will 
persuade all people. 
The Dispute over "High Tech" Policies 
Above I stressed that  the bulk of government R&D support, particularly 
support of industrial R&D, goes into uhigh tech," a portion of i t  through 
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programs expressly designed to  lend their firms a commercial edge. Where 
these latter programs exist, they tend to  be complemented by various forms 
of protection and, sometimes, export subsidy. They are motivated and justi- 
fied by the argument that if an economy does not have considerable strength 
in "high techn it will be disadvantaged relative to  countries that do. 
But does this seem to be the case? The logic of the case and the evidence 
supporting it are not totally compelling. 
For a firm or industry to  be competitive in a high wage country certainly 
requires that i t  make effective use of skills, and technological and manage- 
rial sophistication, that are not readily available in low wage countries. The 
"high tech," high R&D intensity industries are of this sort, but there are 
many others as well. The definition of "high" tech used by statistical agen- 
cies is directly tied to  R&D intensity. However, we have stressed that an 
industry can be characterized by considerable innovation and not have a 
high R&D intensity. If firms are relatively small, or if there is significant de- 
sign work aimed at  particular customers or market niches, while considerable 
innovation may be going on, the firms may not report much R&D. 
Further, while national programs have tended to  focus on areas like semi- 
conductors, computers, and new materials, where technical advance clearly 
is dramatic, much of the economic value created by these advances occurs 
downstream, in the industries and activities that incorporate these new prod- 
ucts into their own processes and products-automobiles, industrial machin- 
ery, financial services, shipping. To do this effectively often involves signifi- 
cant innovation and creative innovation here may generate major competitive 
advantage, but not much in the way of large scale formal R&D may be in- 
volved. On the other hand, it can be argued that active government policies 
often can be more effective when aimed to  help an industry take advantage 
of new upstream technologies than when oriented towards subsidizing major 
breakthroughs. A large portion of the clearly effective public programs dis- 
cussed in the various country studies of this project were or are focussed on 
bringing an industry up to  world practice (this certainly characterizes many 
of the successful Japanese programs) or to  spread knowledge about new de- 
velopments (American agriculture and several of the government programs 
in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden). 
Of course, the lure of "high techn to countries that know they must be 
highly innovative if they are to  compete with lower wage countries is not 
based solely on statistical illusion. The discussion above acknowledges the 
special place of innovation in semiconductors, computers, new materials and 
the like in the contemporary pattern of industrial innovation more broadly. 
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Advances in these fields provide the building blocks, the key opportunities, 
for technical innovation in a wide range of downstream industries, from high 
speed trains to  cellular telephones to  commercial banking. Many observers 
noting this have proposed that a nation that wants its firms to  be strong 
over the coming years in the downstream industries had better not let foreign 
firms control the key upstream technologies. This argument is prevalent in 
some newly developing countries, like Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan, as well as 
today's high income ones. 
Another argument seems to square the circle. It is that a nation needs to  
have strength in the downstream industries in order to  provide a market for 
the key component industries. Thus, nations are supporting firms working 
on high definition T.V. and telecommunications, partly on the argument that 
if absent on the home market a nation's semiconductor and computer firms 
will be disadvantaged. Similarly, public support of aerospace is justified 
partly on alleged stimulation to  upstream technology. 
Put more generally, the argument is that "high techn industries gener- 
ate unusually large "externalities," which flow to national downstream firms. 
This possibility is one of those modelled in what has come to be called the 
"new trade theoryn (see e.g., Krugman, 1987) which has developed a col- 
lection of arguments which support subsidy or protection as a means of 
gaining real national advantage. The fact that these industries are natu- 
ral oligopolies who, in equilibrium, likely will support higher than average 
profits or wages, is another "new trade theory" argument sometimes used to 
rationalize protection or subsidy, on the grounds that subsidy now will yield 
high .returns later. 
The authors of our country studies clearly have different, and perhaps 
mixed, minds about this matter. There is a certain plaintiveness expressed 
in the studies of the major European countries that, while doing well in some 
other areas, national firms are not doing well in these critical "high tech" 
fields. The authors of the studies of Australia and Canada, on the other 
hand, seem to regard electronics envy as silly and expensive fadism. 
While our country studies cannot resolve the issues, they can at least 
bring to  attention three matters that ought to give pause to  the zealots. In 
the first place, there does not seem to be strong empirical support for the 
proposition that national economies are broadly advantaged if their firms 
are especially strong in high tech, and disadvantaged if they are not. Thus 
the United States continues to  be strong (and a major net exporter) in a 
wide range of "high technology" R&D intensive industries, but its economic 
growth has been lagging badly for nearly 20 years. Italy has very limited 
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capacity in these industries, but its overall productivity and income levels 
have been growing briskly for many years. One can argue that F'rance has 
had broad economic success more despite her efforts to  nurture and subsidize 
her high technology industries than because of them. Japan is strong in 
DRAMS, but also in automobile production which accounts for much more 
employment and export value, and her efficiency in producing cars seems to  
have little to  do with "high tech." And Canada, Australia, Denmark, and 
the United States all continue to  be strongly competitive in industries based 
on agriculture or natural resources. 
Also, as we have noted, the record of national policies expressly aimed to  
help high tech industries through support of industrial R&D and protection 
is very uneven. Indeed, the strongest positive examples occurred long ago, 
when the U.S. government provided broad support for advances in electronics 
and aircraft, and the American edge here has not proved to  be durable. 
Other successful cases are largely "infant industry" cases (e.g., Japanese 
electronics during the 1960s and 1970s, and Korea during the early 1980s) 
where, as the companies became strong, the active and protective role of 
government diminished. Airbus may (or may not) be a contemporary success 
story. However, by and large the success record is not very good. 
More, and of crucial importance, firms and projects in the aircraft and 
electronics industries are rapidly becoming transnational. Partly this is be- 
cause of a need to  share very high up-front R&D costs, which can be met by 
joining with other firms. Traditional intra-national rivalries tend to  make 
firms look for foreign partners. And this tendency, of course, is increased to  
the extent that governments try t o  keep the products of foreign firms out of 
domestic markets and to  channel subsidy to  national firms. Unless the home 
market is very rich and the subsidies very high, firms have strong incentives 
to  somehow form links with other firms so that they have a chance a t  other 
markets. 
Today, there probably is no other matter which so forces one to  step 
back, and consider the contemporary meaning of a "national innovation 
system." To what extent are there really "innovation systems," and to  the 
extent that there are, in what ways are they defined by nation states? 
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What Remains National About Innovation Sys- 
tems? 
There obviously are a number of difficulties with the concept of a "national 
innovation system." In the first place, unless one defines innovation very 
narrowly and cuts the institutional fabric to that narrow definition, and we 
did neither, it is inevitable that analysis of innovation in a country some- 
times would get drawn into discussion of labor markets, financial systems, 
monetary, fiscal and trade policies, etc. One cannot draw a line neatly 
around those aspects of a nation's institutional structure that are concerned 
predominantly with innovation in a narrow sense excluding everything else, 
and still tell a coherent story about innovation in a broad sense. Nonethe- 
less, most of our authors were able to tell a pretty coherent story about 
innovation in their country focusing largely on institutions and mechanisms 
that fit the narrow definition, with discussion of country institutions more 
broadly serving largely as a frame. 
Second, the term suggests much more uniformity and connectedness 
within a nation than is the case. Thus, one can discuss Canadian agriculture 
pretty independently of Canadian telecommunications. R&D and innovation 
in the American pharmaceutical industry and R&D of aircraft by American 
companies have little in common. And yet, one cannot read the studies of 
Japan, Germany, France, Korea, Argentina, and Israel, to  name just a few, 
without coming away with the strong feeling that nationhood matters have 
a persuasive influence. In all these cases, a distinctive national character 
pervades the firms, the educational system, the law, the politics, and the 
government, all of which have been shaped by a shared historical experience 
and culture. 
I believe that most of us would square these somewhat divergent ob- 
servations as follows. If one focuses narrowly on what we have defined as 
"innovation systems" these tend to  be sectorally specific. However, if one 
broadens the focus the factors that make for commonality across sections 
within a country, the wider set of institutions referred to above comes into 
view, and these largely define the factors that make for commonality across 
sectors within a country. 
From the start of this project we recognized that borders around nations 
are porous, and increasingly so. Indeed, one of the questions that motivated 
this study was whether or not the concept of national innovation systems 
made sense anymore. I suspect that many of us come out on this as follows. 
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It is a safe bet that there will be increasing internationalization of these 
aspects of technology that are reasonably well understood scientifically. Ef- 
forts on the part of nations, and firms, to  keep new understandings won 
in research and development privy increasingly will be futile. Among firms 
with the requisite scientific and technical people, the competitive edge will 
depend on the details of design, of production process, of firm strategy and 
organization, upstream- downstream connections, etc. Today, this is quite 
clearly the case in fields like semiconductors, aircraft, computers and auto- 
mobiles. In these fields, there are no broad technological secrets possessed 
by individual countries or particular firms. On the other hand, strong firms 
have a good deal of firm specific know-how and capability. 
It is also a good bet that differences across firms stamped into them by 
national policies, histories, and cultures, will diminish in importance. Partly 
that will be because the world is becoming much more unified culturally, for 
better or for worse. Partly it will be because firm managers and scholars of 
management increasingly are paying attention to  how firms in other coun- 
tries are organized and managed. And cross-country inter-firm connections 
are likely to  grow in importance. Firms in industries where there are large 
up front R&D design and production engineering costs increasingly are forg- 
ing alliances with firms in other countries, to  share some of the costs, and 
to  get over government-made market barriers. The establishment of branch 
plants in protected countries or regions is another mechanism. Thus, in- 
creasingly, the attempts of national governments t o  define and support a 
national industry will be frustrated because of internationalization. 
What will remain of unational systems?" The firms that reside in the 
country, for one thing, but people and governments will have to  get used to  
dealing with plants whose headquarters are abroad. The countries of Europe 
have been struggling with this matter for some time, and many of the Latin 
American countries, too. The U.S. is now having to  try to  deal with this, and 
Japan and Korea are beginning too. As yet, no large country seems to have 
made its peace with the problem, however. While in most countries, resident 
firms will be largely national, the presence of Uforeign" firms in important 
industries is something that nations will have to  learn to cope with better. 
We noted earlier the striking continuity of a nation's basic institutions 
bearing on industrial innovation. A good example is national education 
systems, which sometimes seem never to  change in their basics. While top 
level scientists and engineers may be highly mobile, and some high level 
students will continue to  take training abroad, below the Ph.D. level, by 
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and large, countries will be stuck with their nationals who are trained at 
home. 
The nations' systems of university research and public laboratories will 
continue to be, largely, national, particularly the programs that are specifi- 
cally keyed to advancing technology or otherwise facilitating technical pro- 
gress in industry, and with built in mechanisms for interacting with industry. 
These programs will have to work with foreign branch firms as well as do- 
mestic ones in certain fields. But the notion that universities and public 
laboratories basically provide "public goods" and that therefore there are 
no advantages to firms that have close formal links simply does not fit the 
facts in many industries. 
The nation's other public infrastructure, and laws, its financial insti- 
tutions, its fiscal, monetary and trade policies, and its general economic 
ambiance, still will be a major influence on economic activity, including 
innovating, and these are very durable. For large high income countries at 
least, the lion's share of private investment will continue to be domestic, and 
constrained by domestic savings. And nations will continue to have their own 
distinctive views of the appropriate relationships between government and 
business. 
And these will strongly influence a nation's policies bearing explicitly 
on science and technology. From the evidence in this study, these must 
be understood as an agglomeration of policies directed towards different 
national objectives, each with a somewhat special domain in terms of the 
fields and the institutions most affected, rather than as a coherent package. 
All can hope that there will be a significant diminution of defense pro- 
grams, but it is a safe bet that military R&D will continue to account for 
the lion's share of government industrial R&D spending in the U.S., France, 
Britain, and Israel. It is likely, however, that there will be little commercial 
"spillover." 
Outside of defense and space, a nation's programs of R&D support will 
in all likelihood continue to reflect both the needs of industry and broad at- 
titudes towards what government should be doing and how. While there will 
be exceptions particularly when a defense connection is argued, the United 
States will continue to resist programs that directly fund industrial R&D, 
but will use the universities as the base for a variety of programs includ- 
ing some directly targeted at certain technologies and industries. European 
countries are likely to  make much more use of programs that directly sup- 
port civil industrial R&D, either in individual firms, or in industry wide 
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research organizations. And in Japan, France, and various other countries, 
government agencies and high tech firms will continue t o  be quite close. 
The Diversity of National Systems: Do We Need 
Some Standards Regarding What is Fair? 
At the present time nations seem t o  be conscious as never before of their 
"innovation systems" and how they differ from those of their peers. This 
consciousness of differences is leading in two very different directions. 
On the one hand, i t  is leading t o  attempts on the part of nations t o  adopt 
aspects of other systems that they see as lending them strength. However, 
the experimentation is far from systematic, and i t  is highly influenced by 
perceptions that  may have little contact with reality. Thus, the U.S. and 
the European countries (and the E.C.) have been loosening laws that  restrict 
interfirm R&D cooperation, and establishing programs to  encourage and 
subsidize i t  in some areas. If the chapter on Japan has got it right, this 
may be somewhat ironic in view of the argument that  the role in Japan's 
rapid post war growth of cooperative R&D among firms in the same line of 
business probably has been exaggerated, and in any case is diminishing. 
The LDCs are looking, with good reason, to  Korea and Taiwan for mod- 
els. But, aside from their strong support of education, high levels of invest- 
ment in plant and equipment, and their pressure on firms t o  go for exports, 
these two countries have quite different innovation systems. In one, Taiwan, 
government research laboratories have been an important source of industrial 
technology; in the other, Korea, apparently they have not, a t  least until re- 
cently. Korea has encouraged the growth of large industrial conglomerates, 
and resisted foreign ownership; Taiwan has not especially encouraged the 
growth of large firms and has admitted foreign firms selectively. But both 
have been successful in building an innovative competitive manufacturing 
industry based on foreign created technologies and other low income nations 
are sensibly trying t o  learn from their experience. 
While today attempts a t  emulation are a t  a peak, they are nothing new. 
The study of Japan shows how earlier in the century the Japanese tried t o  
pick and choose from European and American experience, and came out 
with something quite different. The American's earlier tried t o  adopt the 
German university system, and actually built a very different one. 
At the same time, perceptions of differences are leading nations t o  de- 
clare certain aspects of their rival's systems as illegitimate. Prominent Amer- 
Richard R. Nelson 9 7 
icans have expressed the opinion that MITI support and guidance of key 
Japanese industries, together with the special connections between Japanese 
firms and their customers and their sources of finance, amount to an un- 
fair system, involving subsidy and dumping as well as protection. Similar 
complaints have been lodged against Eureka and Airbus. The Europeans 
complain about Japan, and about U.S. programs like the SDI claiming that 
such large scale government R&D support, while aimed at a military target, 
is sure to build commercial advantages, and that that requires response on 
their part. The Japanese make similar complaints, but particularly about 
the import barriers being imposed by other countries. Some have gone so far 
as to argue that presently there is a war between competing national inno- 
vation systems that only can be resolved if there are new accepted standards 
regarding what is fair and what is not (see e.g., Ostry, 1990). Otherwise, 
nations will have to adopt the norm of managed trade in high technology 
products. 
These two aspects of the current concern about differences in national 
innovation systems-attempts at emulation, and expressions of hostility- 
are opposite sides of the same coin. They reflect a combination of beliefs 
that a nations performance in "high tech" is vital to its broader economic 
performance and security, real uncertainty regarding just how to achieve 
high performance, and lack of agreed upon criteria for judging what are 
legitimate and illegitimate government policies. 
In my view, which may not be shared by all of my colleagues, the current 
bru ha ha seems somewhat hysterical. There is little more reason to get upset 
over .inter-country differences in the government's role in the support and 
protection in "high techn than about other areas where government policies 
differ sharply. For one thing, governments' anguish that their economies are 
fated to be surely disadvantaged if they do not have a "high techn industry 
of their own probably is unwarranted. For another, beliefs that strength 
in high tech is due largely to promotional government policies seem grossly 
exaggerated. 
At the same time, the studies in this project show that the institu- 
tional structures supporting technical innovation are complex and varie- 
gated. Technology and science interact in intricate ways. Both private for 
profit and public institutions play roles in virtually all arenas of technologi- 
cal advance and the efficient division of labor is not obvious. Simple minded 
arguments that private enterprise is what does industrial innovation and 
public institutions have little useful role in it are, simple minded. 
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In this area, it is not totally clear what one should call subsidy or pro- 
tection, as contrasted with legitimate public spending or coordination or 
regulation. 
Economists are wont to  draw the line in terms of whether or not govern- 
ment spending or regulation or guidance can be justified by market failure 
arguments. If so, while public action may give advantage t o  a particular na- 
tional industry, such support can be argued t o  increase economic efficiency. 
If not, i t  is considered naked subsidy or protection, and is not to  be con- 
doned. Thus, while international trade theorists long have known that  a 
nation could enhance the well being of its own citizens vis-a-vis those in 
other countries by selected naked subsidy or protection, the  argument was 
that, under the theory then in vogue, for nations taken as a group, this was 
a negative sum game. 
But the problem with this line of argument here is that  "market failure" 
is ubiquitous in the activities associated with industrial innovation, and thus 
subsidy or protection or guidance could be efficiency enhancing; hence the 
game of active industrial policy need not be negative sum. What has come 
t o  be called "the new trade theoryn recognizes some of this, nervously. If 
there are large "up front" R&D costs, or significant learning through doing or 
using, or major externalities in certain activities like research and training, 
the simple arguments that  free trade is "Pareto Optimal" (in the  parlance 
of economists) falls apart.  
Of course "market failure" is greater in certain activities than in others. 
Also, government competence and incentives are more likely t o  lead to  pro- 
ductive programs in certain arenas than in others. Further, i t  is apparent 
that  competitive protection and subsidy among nations can get beyond any 
level conceivably justified on grounds of "efficiency." It is in the interest of 
all nations t o  reign in such tendencies. 
However, i t  seems unlikely that  simple rules-for example that  govern- 
ment support of R&D on public sector needs and for "basicn research is 
efficient and fair and direct support of industrial R&D aimed t o  develop 
products for a civilian market is both inefficient and unfair-will carry the 
discussion very far. This argument certainly can be used t o  attack Airbus. 
But Europeans rejoin that  government help was needed to  overcome the 
huge headstart American companies had won in large part as a spillover 
from military R&D, and can be justified economically both on infant indus- 
try grounds, and as a policy t o  avoid the development of a one company world 
monopoly. And what of government support for telecommunications R&D 
where telecommunications is a government service? Americans are prone 
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t o  argue that telecommunications should be privatized, but there surely is 
limited agreement on that. One can try, and with some hope of success, to  
open government procurement t o  bids from foreign firms. However, what 
t o  one eye is blockage to  competition in public procurement to  another is a 
valuable close relationship between customer and steady supplier. 
Nor are there clean lines separating "basic research" from applied. No 
one seems to  object to  government support for research on the causes of can- 
cer (although a breakthrough here may give the firms with close contact with 
the research a major advantage in coming up with a proprietary product). 
But what about research to  advance agricultural productivity? To improve 
crops growing in a particular national soil and climate? Research on su- 
perconductivity, or on surface phenomena in semiconductors, conducted in 
universities? Conducted in an industry cooperative research organization? 
In a particular firm? 
The argument about whether government funding of certain kinds of 
R&D is appropriate and efficient or unfair subsidy of course gets intertwined 
with arguments about protection, and about constraints in direct foreign 
investments. Here countries clearly disagree regarding what they regard as 
appropriate. The disagreements can be discussed, and agreements negoti- 
ated. However, it does not seem to me that the question of whether or not 
a protected industry is "high tech" changes the nature of the discussion, or 
the stakes, that much. 
All this is no argument against trying to  establish some norms and rules 
regarding government policies bearing on industrial innovation, and in cer- 
tain areas aiming for uniform or a t  least comparable policies. However, it 
is an argument against one nation or another getting self righteous that its 
ways are efficient, fair, and quite justified, and the policies of other nations 
are not. And it is an argument against the belief that agreeing on ground 
rules will be simple, if only the advice of economists is heeded. 
And finally, it is an argument against trying to  impose too much uni- 
formity. Countries differ in their traditions, ideologies, and beliefs about 
appropriate roles for government, and they will guard the differences they 
think matter. A central reason why this project was undertaken was, by ex- 
panding the set of countries considered, and by trying to  enable comparisons 
where these seemed most interesting, to  try to  tease out what features of 
national systems seemed systematically to  enhance innovation performance, 
and what features seemed useless or worse. My colleagues and I like to  be- 
lieve that we have learned a good deal. But there still is a lot of room for 
informed differences of opinion. 
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Given that there is, i t  is not simply inappropriate for one group or 
another to  argue for its preferred uniformity. While (as this project testifies) 
it is not easy to tease out signal from noise, potentially we all can learn from 
each other about what seems to  be effective and what is not. 
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National Innovation Systems 
The Changing Structure of 
U. S. Industrial Research: 
Implications for R&D 
Organization in the Russian 
Federation 
David C. Moweryl 
Abstract 
This paper surveys the historical development and current status of indus- 
trial R&D in the U.S., in order to examine the factors affecting the location 
of R&D within industrial firms and the relationship between intra-firm R&D 
and research activities external to the firm, and to draw some implications 
for the reorganization of the Russian Federation's network of independent 
research institutes. As I note in my conclusions, the weight of historical and 
contemporary evidence suggests that externally performed R&D is likely to 
prove most effective as a complement, rather than a substitute, for research 
activities within the firm. The need for close links between manufactur- 
ing practice and technology development, the "tacitn character of much of 
the knowledge incorporated into industrial technology, and the difficulties 
in transmitting this knowledge across organizational boundaries all suggest 
that the contributions of contract or external research to industrial technol- 
'Haas School of Business Administration, University of California, USA. 
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ogy development will be greatest when this research is parallelled by R&D 
activities within the firm. 
Introduction 
An issue of enduring interest in the historical development of the U.S. and 
other industrial economies concerns the dimensions and causes of change in 
the boundaries of manufacturing firms. In market-based economies, what 
factors determine which activities are carried out within the "nonmarket" of 
the firm and which ones are subject to market control? Alfred Chandler's pi- 
oneering work (1977,1991) argued that the modern U.S. economic landscape 
reflects an expansion of the boundaries of the firm in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. The realm of managerial control and planning grew rela- 
tive to that of contract and market-based transactions within the U.S. firms 
that expanded to enormous size in the early 20th century. Paradoxically, 
the 20th-century economic development of the United States expanded non- 
market methods for the coordination and organization of many transactions. 
The extension of their boundaries served to spur growth and diversification 
within these firms, in a manner first pointed out by Penrose (1959). 
Among the activities undertaken within their boundaries by these ex- 
panding firms was industrial research. Despite the arguments of Stigler 
(1956) that over time, industrial research would become an activity car- 
ried out by independent firms that conducted research on a contractual, 
for-profit basis,2 U.S. industrial research grew most rapidly within the firm 
during much of this century. Since 1940, however, the privately financed 
U.S. industrial R&D complex has been supplemented by a large, publicly fi- 
nanced R&D investment in both public and private sector research facilities. 
The modern U.S. R&D system is a complex mix of publicly and privately 
funded R&D in both the public and private sectors. In recent years, large 
U.S. firms have begun to explore new opportunities to link their in-house 
research activities with government laboratories and other external sources 
of research. These efforts have received governmental encouragement from 
- 
'". ..with the growth of research, new firms will emerge to provide specialized facilities 
for small firms. It is only to be expected that, when a new kind of research develops, at first 
it will be conducted chiefly as an ancillary activity by existing firms.. . . We may expect the 
rapid expansion of the specialized research laboratory, selling its services generally. The 
specialized laboratories need not be in the least inferior to 'captive' laboratoriesn (Stigler, 
1956, p. 281). A more skeptical view of the role of the independent research organization 
may be found in Baldwin (1962). 
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federal legislation to accelerate "technology transfer" from publicly financed 
laboratories, many of which were originally established for defense purposes, 
to private industry. 
This paper surveys the historical development and current status of in- 
dustrial R&D in the U.S., in order to examine the factors affecting the loca- 
tion of R&D within industrial firms and the relationship between intra-firm 
R&D and research activities external to the firm. Do the historical develop- 
ment or current trends of structural change in the U.S. R&D system provide 
guidance for restructuring the R&D system of the Russian Federation? Cer- 
tainly, the U.S. historical experience suggests that a purely market-based 
organizational structure is infeasible for a nation's R&D system. Instead, 
the U.S. and other industrial economies all maintain R&D systems in which 
the public sector plays a key role. Moreover, even the industrially financed 
portion of these economies' R&D systems operates largely within the *non- 
market" portion of the private sector. 
The weight of historical and contemporary evidence suggests that ex- 
ternally performed R&D is likely to prove most effective as a complement, 
rather than a substitute, for research activities within the firm. The need 
for close links between manufacturing practice and technology development, 
the "tacit" character of much of the knowledge incorporated into industrial 
technology, and the difficulties in transmitting this knowledge across organi- 
zational boundaries all suggest that the contributions of contract or external 
research to industrial technology development will be greatest when this re- 
search is parallelled by R&D activities within the firm. 
The Growth of U.S. Industrial Research 
The expansion of the American economy during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries combined with innovations in transportation, com- 
munications, and production technologies to yield manufacturing operations 
of unprecedented scale. The materials analysis and quality control labora- 
tories that were established within many of these factories were among the 
first industrial employers of scientists and research personnel. Over time, 
these plant-level laboratories expanded and were supplemented by central 
laboratories devoted to longer-term re~earch .~  
'Lewis argues that 'Testing and analysis have continued to be of major importance 
in the industrial application of science down to the present time.. .The significance of 
such work in providing employment for scientists, however, gradually declined in a rel- 
106 Implications for R&D Organization 
The expansion of industrial research within the American firm was close- 
ly linked as both cause and effect with the reorganization of the American 
corporation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Techni- 
cally trained managers, a strong central office staff able to focus on strategic, 
rather than operating, decisions, and the integration within the firm of func- 
tions such as marketing, all were associated with the growth of R&D within 
the firm. In-house research was better able to combine the heterogeneous 
inputs necessary for commercially successful innovation, to use and increase 
the stock of firm-specific knowledge gleaned from marketing and production 
personnel, and to exploit the fact that manufacturing and the acquisition of 
certain forms of technical knowledge were closely linked. 
But in-house R&D by no means eliminated the importance of sources 
of industrial technology external to the firm. The in-house research labo- 
ratories of many large U.S. firms devoted a significant part of their efforts 
to monitoring the environment for opportunities for the acquisition of new 
technologies, often through the purchase of the firms holding the patents 
for these technologies. For much of the pre-1940 period, Du Pont research 
focused on developing inventions acquired from external sources; nylon and 
neoprene were exceptions to this rule. Many of Du Pont's major product 
and process innovations were obtained by the firm during this period at 
an early point in their development, often on the advice of the central re- 
search laboratory (Mueller, 1962; Hounshell and Smith, 1989). The research 
facilities of AT&T, General Electric, and Eastman Kodak performed simi- 
lar monitoring roles during this period. In addition, many in-house R&D 
laboratories developed links with U.S. university research, especially in the 
publicly funded state universities (Hounshell and Smith, 1989; Thackray, 
1982; Swann, 1988). In many respects, these in-house industrial research 
laboratories functioned as critical sources of "absorptive capacity" (Cohen 
ative sense. Although the development of testing procedures and the determination of 
physical constants often required considerable ingenuity and imagination, routine testing 
itself tended to be monotonous and unattractive to highly trained personnel; in time it 
was increasingly assigned to non-professional employees and even handled by mechanical 
or electronic devices. Meanwhile, the efforts of industrial researchers came to be applied 
to an ever greater degree to eliminating production bottlenecks, exploring the merits of 
different processes, finding substitute raw materials from which goods could be turned out 
a t  lower coat, finding profitable uses for by-products, and improving the quality of various 
manufactured commodities." W.D. Lewis, "Industrial Research and Development," in M. 
Kranzberg and C. Pursell, (eds.), Technology in Western Civilization, Vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 622. 
David C. Mowery 107 
and Levinthal, 1989), enabling managers to  evaluate the quality of and com- 
mercial prospects for technologies and academic research outside the firm. 
Monitoring of the technological environment by in-house research lab- 
oratories was facilitated and the incentives for the establishment of these 
laboratories were increased by judicial decisions that strengthened protec- 
tion for intellectual property in the late nineteenth century. Federal court 
decisions in the 1890s upholding the validity of patents covering goods not 
in production increased the utility of large patent portfolios for defensive 
purposes. Stronger intellectual property protection expanded the appropri- 
ability of the returns from innovation and facilitated the development of a 
market for the acquisition and sale of patents. 
The Role of Intra-firm and Contract Research 
Industrial research in American manufacturing during the 1900-1940 period 
developed a dualistic structure. Employment of professional scientists and 
engineers grew rapidly within manufacturing concerns and in independent 
research firms not affiliated with a manufacturing enterprise. Between 1900 
and 1940, according to  data from the National Research Council, nearly 
350 independent laboratories were e~tabl ished.~ Employment of scientists 
and engineers within these independent organizations grew rapidly during 
this period. Total employment of scientists and engineers in independent 
research laboratories was 3,300 in 1940 and more than 5,000 by 1946. 
Contemporary observers and practitioners of industrial research hailed 
the growth of independent research laboratories as a development that would 
allow small firms without in-house laboratories to  reap the benefits of indus- 
trial research. The comments in 1916 of John J. Carty, the first director of 
the reorganized Bell Telephone Laboratories, are representative: 
Conditions today are such that without cooperation among themselves 
the small concerns cannot have the full benefits of industrial research, for 
no one among them is sufficiently strong to maintain the necessary staff 
and laboratories. Once the vital importance of this subject is appreciated 
by the small manufacturers many solutions of the problem will promptly 
appear. One of these is for the manufacturer to take his problem to one 
of the industrial research laboratories already established for the purpose 
of serving those who cannot afford a laboratory of their own. Other man- 
ufacturers doing the same, the financial encouragement received would 
'The source and nature of these data are discussed below. For additional analysis, see 
Mowery (1981, chap. 2). 
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enable the laboratories to  extend and improve their facilities so that each 
of the small manufacturers who patronized them would in the course of 
time have the benefit of an institution similar to  those maintained by our 
largest industrial concerns. (Carty, 1916, p. 512) 
The peculiar characteristics of R&D and commercial innovation never- 
theless appear t o  have hampered the sale of research services via contract. 
The supply of contract research was affected by a t  least two broad factors. 
The first is the degree t o  which specialization in the performance of research 
reduces costs per unit of research output-i.e., economies of scale in spe- 
cific types of research that  cannot be fully exploited by in-house research 
laboratories. Independent research organizations may be able t o  profitably 
specialize in research services characterized by declining unit costs. Exam- 
ples of these services include testing or measurement and calibration services 
that  rely on costly, specialized equipment. 
A second factor concerns the degree of interdependence between specific 
research activities and other manufacturing and non-manufacturing func- 
tions within the firm. Independent research laboratories are most effective 
in research activities characterized by low levels of interdependence with 
other activities within the manufacturing firm. Such interdependence has 
several dimensions (see Teece, 1988, for a more detailed discussion of these is- 
sues). The development of much industrial technology is an iterative process 
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) in which research, technology development, and 
even production activities interact; information from "downstream" activi- 
ties leads t o  the modification and improvement of products, processes, and 
the research agenda. These "feedback loops" and interactions are stronger 
when they take place within an organization, rather than when they must 
span organizational boundaries. These interactions also involve flows of in- 
formation and knowledge that  cannot be easily codified. Communicating 
such "tacit" information is difficult through documents or blueprints, and 
requires sustained, often informal interactions and (in many cases) relies on 
the transfer of researchers or production specialists among different func- 
tions within the firm (such personnel transfers are extensively employed by 
Japanese firms in their management of new product development; see Clark 
and Fujimoto, 1991). These types of communication and information ex- 
change will occur more easily within an organization rather than across orga- 
nizational boundaries. Finally, the nature of these information creation and 
exchange activities is such that  an independent research organization that  
does not also engage in production activities simply cannot gain access t o  
certain types of process- or product- specific, tacit information. Production 
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and the creation of much of the critical information for industrial technology 
development are joint activities; separating them among organizations may 
undercut their information-creating interaction. 
The ability of manufacturing firms to  exploit contract research may be 
undercut by two factors. A client firm requires substantial in-house exper- 
tise to  pose a feasible research problem to an independent laboratory, or 
to  evaluate and utilize the results of externally performed r e ~ e a r c h . ~  Con- 
tracting problems also limit the role of independent research organizations. 
The effectiveness of contracts in the provision of research is undermined by 
the uncertain nature of the research enterprise, the imperfect character of 
knowledge about a given project, and the thin market for specialized re- 
search services. These contractual difficulties are likely to  be greater for 
more technically complex, uncertain research projects. Assessment of the 
value of the results produced by an independent contractor also is difficult 
without complete revelation of these results; but revelation removes any in- 
centive for the client to pay for the research (see Arrow, 1962). The small 
number of suppliers of specialized research services means that opportunis- 
tic behavior by one or the other party to such a contractual agreement is 
likely.6 Finally, the difficulty of specifying all contingencies in a contract for 
uncertain, complex research projects will reduce firms' reliance on external 
providers for such research. 
These factors affected the relationship between U.S. independent and 
in-house research organizations in several ways. Consistent with the argu- 
'The argument that an in-house research facility enhances the ability of firms to exploit 
external research receives support from analyses of industrial research in other nations. 
Discussing the development of cooperative industrial research laboratories in Great Britain, 
Varcoe (1974) noted that "the relations [of the cooperative research facilities] with the 
industries and the extent to which the latter availed themselves in practice of the results 
were not the straightforward matters they were a t  first imagined to be. Smaller firms 
frequently had no one capable either of articulating research needs and putting them 
into scientifically meaningful terms or of understanding the concepts and terminology of 
technical literature and of relating these ideas to their own problems." (p. 30). Similarly, 
Caves and Uekusa (1976) note that Japanese firms invested heavily in research during the 
postwar period as a means of absorbing and modifying technologies from external sources: 
"Firms must maintain mme research capacity in order to know what technology is available 
for purchase or copy and they must generally modify and adapt foreign technology in 
putting i t  t o  use--& 1963 survey of Japanese manufacturers showed that  on average one- 
third of the respondents' expenditures on R&D went for this purpose" (p. 126). 
"Williamson (1981) argues, "That economic agents are simultaneously subject to 
bounded rationality and (at  least some) are given to opportunism does not by itself, 
however, vitiate autonomous trading. On the contrary, when effective ex ante and ex post 
competition can both be presumed, autonomous contracting will be efficacious" (p. 554). 
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ments made above, the growth of industrial research in the U.S. reduced the 
importance of independent research organizations. Table 1, drawn from the 
National Research Council surveys of industrial research, displays the pro- 
portion of total employment of research professionals in both in-house and 
independent research organizations accounted for by independent research 
organizations during 1921-46 (excluding the research laboratories of trade 
associations). Contract research laboratories accounted for a declining share 
of total scientific and engineering research employment in manufacturing and 
independent research laboratories during this period. 
Although employment in both forms of industrial research organization 
was growing rapidly during this period, employment growth for in-house 
research substantially outstripped that for the independent research orga- 
nizations. Equally important is the evidence that independent research or- 
ganizations primarily served firms that had in-house R&D laboratories. In 
other words, contract research functioned as a complement to, rather than 
as a substitute for, in-house R&D. Moreover, the independent research firms 
specialized in relatively simple, low-risk, "separable" research activities that 
involved less of the intensive exchange of know-how and tacit knowledge 
among different phases of the technology development process. 
More recent data also suggest a tendency for external R&D to  comple- 
ment the in-house R&D activities of U.S. firms. Data from recent National 
Science Foundation surveys of industrial R&D spending consistently show 
that the U.S. chemicals industry, one of the most R&D-intensive U.S. in- 
dustries, consistently allocates a larger share of industrially financed R&D 
spending to  external research than any other U.S. manufacturing indus- 
try. In 1975, when U.S. manufacturing spent 2.3% of industrially financed 
R&D on research at external organizations, the corresponding share for the 
chemicals industry was 3.8%. In 1976, these figures stood at  2.6% and 
4.0%, respectively, increasing to  3.8% and 6.9% by 1989.~ On the share of 
industrially financed R&D within each industry that is allocated to exter- 
nal research performers. The most research-intensive industries, especially 
chemicals, are consistently among the industries devoting the highest share 
of their internally financed R&D budget to external R&D performers. 
-- - 
'See National Science Foundation (1978), p. 20; National Science Foundation (1991), 
Table SD-5. 
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Table 1. Employment of scientific professionals in independent research 
organizations as a fraction of employment of scientific professionals in all 
in-house and independent research laboratories, 1921-1946. 
1921 1927 1933 1940 1946 
15.2% 12.9% 10.9% 8.7% 6.9% 
- - 
Source: Mowery (1981, chap. 2). 
The Changing Role of External Sources of R&D: 
University-Industry Research Relationships in the 
U.S. 
Nelson (1988, p. 325) described the industrial research laboratory as the 
"heartn of the U.S. national innovation system. This pillar of the U.S. 
research system, however, now is undergoing change. Faced with escalat- 
ing costs and intensified competitive pressures, many U.S. firms are moving 
away from the virtually exclusive reliance on intra-firm sources of technol- 
ogy that characterized the post- 1945 period. Alternatives include university- 
industry research partnerships, alliances or consortia with other domestic or 
foreign firms, and publicly sponsored cooperative research programs. Faced 
withspiralling R&D costs, greater demands to monitor a broader array of 
- 
scientific and engineering fields, and increased competitive pressure from 
other U.S. and foreign firms to get products to market rapidly, U.S. firms 
have had to develop research relationships with an array of external insti- 
tutions that could complement and enhance the payoff from their in-house 
R&D activities.' Such relationships provide lower-cost windows on emerging 
technologies, allow firms to detect emerging commercial opportunities more 
rapidly, and spread the risks of failure among a larger number of research 
performers and research budgets. 
Some of these alternatives and experiments represent a revival of inter- 
institutional research linkages that were strong before 1940 and were dis- 
'A recent OECD study quotes a Xerox Corporation research executive's description 
of the firm's investment in the  Center for Integrated Systems a t  Stanford University: 
"Xerox's contribution t o  CIS is very small compared t o  what we are investing internally 
in the  same kind of research. For little additional investment we enlarge our perspective 
by participating in a broad program of basic research. We envision opportunities for joint 
interaction with the university and with other companies, as well as the ability t o  recruit 
students. On  a per-dollar basis i t  should be a good investment." (Quoted in OECD, 
Industry and University: New Forms of Ceoperation and Communication, 
(Paris: OECD, 1984), p. 47). 
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placed by the upsurge of federal funding for research in universities and 
industry that followed U.S. entry into World War 11. Few of these contempo- 
rary experiments and initiatives are organized as strictly market-mediated, 
arms-length, contractual enterprises. Instead, one finds an array of "hybrid" 
forms of economic organization, blending elements of long-term investment, 
organizational links and managerial controls with market-based incentives 
and transactions. 
This wave of proposed or actual change has important implications for 
our conceptualization of the historic role of the in-house industrial research 
laboratory. Rosenberg (1982) argued that the industrial research laboratory 
strengthened the links among science, technology, and profit and made the 
scientific research agenda more responsive to economic factors. Recently, 
however, change in the competitive and technological environment has re- 
duced the capacity of the in-house industrial research laboratory within at  
least some U.S. firms to influence the direction of scientific research and 
thereby exploit linkages between basic and applied research. Does this ap- 
parent change imply a new role for in-house and external research laborato- 
ries? A brief discussion of university-industry research collaboration in the 
U.S. may shed some light on these issues. 
University-Industry Cooperation 
During the past decade, financial support from industry has established a 
number of research facilities on U.S. university campuses to conduct research 
with potential commercial value. Support for these initiatives has come from 
the federal government as well as private industry, as the National Science 
Foundation has funded the establishment of a number of engineering research 
centers on university campuses. The centers focus on engineering research 
that is often linked to engineering research with such traditional scientific 
disciplines as biology and physics, and have emphasized advanced computer 
applications. The financial structure of these centers also is novel, since it 
combines "seed-money" support from the federal government (as well, in 
many cases, as state and local governments) with major contributions from 
private corporations that are affiliated with the centers. 
Many of these new university-industry research facilities reflect the grow- 
ing importance of a multidisciplinary approach to important problems in 
both science and technology. Industry-supported multidisciplinary univer- 
sity research institutes provide an organizational "home" for the pursuit of 
this new cross-disciplinary research agenda. Moreover, these institutes can 
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train young scholars and prospective industrial researchers in new techniques 
and research perspectives. 
What benefits does U.S. industry obtain from collaboration with uni- 
versity researchers? By virtue of their mission as educational as well as 
research institutions, U.S. universities are important sources of industrial 
scientific and engineering personnel. Participants in university-industry col- 
laborations can utilize these ventures as "filtersn for hiring research person- 
nel, observing the performance of potential employees before making costly 
hiring commitments. Moreover, the importance of people as a critical chan- 
nel for the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge means that 
the hiring by firms of the graduates of these programs facilitates the trans- 
fer of knowledge and technology from university t o  industry. The rotation 
of industry personnel through university research facilities serves a similar 
function. Interestingly, this source of industrial benefit need not rely on any 
"handoffn of specific research results by a university to  industry.g 
In most cases, university-industry research ventures, like other forms 
of external research, operate as complements to  the in-house R&D of par- 
ticipating firms. Federal government support for NSF engineering centers 
and other university-industry collaborative research centers builds on ear- 
lier NSF experiments in this area. The University-Industry Cooperative 
Research Centers Program began in 1973 as an experiment designed "to 
determine if federal cost-sharing during a 5-year period would enable the 
creation of industry-funded permanent cooperative research centers." (Na- 
tional Science Foundation, 1979, p. v). Cooperative research centers would 
improve the innovative performance of their client industries, NSF argued, 
by tapping the research expertise of universities. Of the three experimental 
programs established within the NSF program, however, only the one serving 
a relatively research-intensive client industry (the MIT Polymer Processing 
program, which included Eastman Kodak, General Motors, and Xerox Cor- 
poration among its participants) survived the cessation of public funding 
in 1978 (the other two programs, which respectively conducted research in 
'Gray and Gidley's survey of NSF university-industry research centers found that 9he  
benefits seen [by industry respondents] se most likely to accrue to companies were improved 
research projects in the company (mean, 2.60; l=scarcely likely, 4=almost certain) and 
better personnel recruitment (mean, 2.54). Patentable products (1.62) and commercialized 
products (1.75) were Been as benefits which were 'somewhat' to 'scarcely likely' to accrue 
through Center participation." (1986, p. 29). Once again, the most commonly mentioned 
sources of benefit hinge on the presence within a participant firm of an R&D facility. 
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energy conservation technologies for the New England region and in tech- 
nologies for the furniture industry, both were terminated). 
The results of this NSF experiment suggest that as in the case with 
independent, for-profit contract research institutes, university research was 
most effective as a complement to the in-house R&D activities of client firms. 
The NSF evaluation of the program noted that: 
The nature of the industrial participation in the cooperative research 
efforts varies widely. At one extreme are large companies with substantial 
research activities such as General Motors, Xerox, and Kodak, and at the 
other extreme is a small construction firm participating in the NEEDS 
[New England Energy Development Systems] solar technology center at 
Dartmouth. The more substantial participation has come from the large 
research-oriented companies that can understand and use the research out- 
puts of the cooperative efforts. Companies with little research background, 
such as the utilities and furniture companies, are traditionally conservative 
with respect to new technology and are traditionally dependent on their 
suppliers for whatever changes they adopt. (National Science Foundation, 
1979, p. 30). 
The successful exploitation of university-industry research collaborations 
for these purposes virtually requires that a participating firm maintain some 
in-house research capability. Indeed, successful absorption of the results of 
university research frequently requires that a participant firm maintain a 
"shadow," parallel research project within its in-house laboratories (such 
"shadow" projects also appear to improve technology absorption by partic- 
ipants in non-university research consortia). 
Technology Transfer Policies and the U.S. National 
Laboratories 
Publicly funded U.S. research laboratories, often referred to  as the "na- 
tional laboratories," are another potentially significant source of industrial 
technology external to  the firm. The U.S. has more than 700 federal labo- 
ratories, with a total budget of $21 billion in fiscal 1990. Table 2 displays 
the sources and levels of funding for the U.S. national laboratory system. 
Most of the laboratories support the missions of their funding agencies. The 
largest share of federal laboratory spending is defense-related. The Defense 
Department accounts for 49% of total federal expenditures on laboratories, 
and the Energy Department accounts for 21%. Nearly one-half of the labora- 
tory expenditures of the Department of Energy support laboratories whose 
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Table  2. Federal budget expenditures on laboratories, fiscal 1991 (millions). 
Total Intramural External 
Department of Defense $10,212 $8,988 $ 1,224 
Department of Energy 4,443 427 4,016 
NASA 3,278 2,573 705 
Health & Human Services 1,940 1,879 61 
(National Institutes 
of Health) (1,463) (1,402) (61) 
Agriculture Dept. 777 7 76 1 
National Science Fdn. 299 187 112 
Total $20.949 $14.830 $6.119 
- - 
a'External" laboratory expenditures include funds allocated to GOCO (Government- 
owned, contractor-operated) laboratories. 
Source: National Science Foundation (1991), Table C 9 .  
primary mission is research on nuclear weapons; most of the remainder sup- 
ports basic research in nuclear and elementary particle physics. The Energy 
Department funds roughly five times as much work within its laboratories 
on defense and basic physics research as it does on applied energy-related 
research. 
The federal laboratories vary in size, staff quality, and objectives. The 
system includes single-office facilities employing a handful of researchers, as 
well as large research facilities with several hundred staff, such as Brookhaven 
National Laboratory. Most federal laboratories, however, are staffed by no 
more' than 5-10 employees, and often are self-contained organizations, lo- 
cated within an agency or university. Many of these laboratories were estab- 
lished as a result of the demands for defense-related technology and research 
during 1940-90, and are operated by the Defense Department or the De- 
partment of Energy. They include several large facilities devoted primarily 
to  research on nuclear weapons, a number of facilities concerned with high- 
energy physics research, and a few facilities that pursue a more diverse re- 
search agenda. Another large laboratory system is operated by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
A few laboratories (e.g., the National Institute for Standards and Tech- 
nology) pursue research that is closely related to  commercial technology 
development, but most focus on research that supports their parent agency 
missions, and perform research that is far removed from commercial appli- 
cations. Some federal laboratories provide access to research facilities or 
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equipment that is far too expensive for any single firm to maintain. Ex- 
amples include the synchotron light source at Brookhaven (used by more 
than 80 U.S. universities, 23 U.S. firms, 14 other government laboratories, 
and 22 foreign institutions in 1989) and the Combustion Research Facility 
a t  Sandia National Laboratories, which provides specialized laser detectors 
and computers to  study the combustion behavior of fuels. Users of this 
facility include Conoco, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Exxon, Mobil, Un- 
ocal, Combustion Engineering, and AT&T, all of which finance substantial 
in-house R&D facilities as well. 
The federal laboratory system includes government-owned contractor- 
operated (GOCO) and government-owned government operated (GOGO) 
laboratories. GO CO laboratories are operated by contractors, often univer- 
sities or private firms, and funded by federal monies. GOGO laboratories 
are, as their name suggests, staffed by civil servants. GOGO laboratories 
have in the past faced serious obstacles to  developing technologies for in- 
dustrial application. These problems reflect the fact that they are subject 
t o  civil service personnel guidelines and practices that reduce flexibility in 
hiring staff and in bringing private sector scientists, engineers, and managers 
into their research facilities. GOGO laboratories also are subject to  the full 
array of federal procurement regulations, which often impedes the formation 
of links with private industry. 
GOCO laboratories, on the other hand, have often been more responsive 
to  the demands of technology transfer and industry- laboratory cooperation. 
Their exemption from federal civil service guidelines gives them greater flex- 
ibility in personnel hiring and rotation, and enables GOCO laboratories to  
develop more highly qualified technical staff. Other administrative practices 
that limit the flexibility of GOGO laboratories do not apply t o  many GOCO 
laboratories. As a result, much of the experimentation with new methods of 
technology transfer and linking with private firms is taking place in GOCO 
laboratories. Most of the Energy Department laboratories and federally 
funded R&D centers (FFRDCs) supported by DOE funds are GOCOs. 
Policies to Promote Technology Transfer and Collaboration 
with Industry 
During the 1980s, U.S. government officials became increasingly concerned 
with the economic returns to public research and technology investments, 
and this concern naturally extended to  the federal national laboratories. 
More recent change in the international political and military environment 
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has intensified demands to utilize the complex of defense-related research 
installations (as well as the overall defense-related R&D budget) to support 
research on commercial technologies. These pressures have spawned a series 
of federal statutes and policies that were intended to improve the commer- 
cial technological payoff from the large public investment in the national 
laboratories. These initiatives assumed three general forms: (a) strength- 
ening intellectual property rights protection for technologies developed by 
national laboratories and liberalizing the terms on which these technolo- 
gies can be licensed to private firms and nonprofit institutions; (b) mandat- 
ing the establishment of offices for the management of technology transfer 
within each laboratory; and (c) permitting the negotiation of "cooperative 
research and development agreements" (CRADAs) between laboratories and 
private firms. With the possible exception of the mandate for negotiation of 
CRADAs, these initiatives assumed that the (rumored) wealth of technol- 
ogy within the national laboratories would flow rapidly to the private sector, 
once provisions were established for licensing these technologies. 
Examples of Laboratory-Industry Collaboration 
Many recent experiments in laboratory-industry collaboration involve En- 
ergy Department laboratories, most of which are GOCOs. An ambitious 
multi-laboratory cooperative effort in high-temperature superconductivity 
that involves Argonne, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos National Laboratories 
began in 1988. The three laboratories jointly or individually negotiated 20 
CRADAs with private firms during the first year of operation of the project. 
In an effort to accelerate these negotiations, the Energy Department exper- 
imented with the use of a standard contract for all of the CRADAs. This 
experiment was a mixed success, as many firms requested revisions in the 
model contract's terms. The treatment of intellectual property rights also 
departed from Energy Department policy in being unusually generous to- 
ward industry. 
A significant share of the program budget for this project is devoted to 
technology transfer, in contrast to many previous efforts by national labora- 
tories (see below). Moreover, the program is committed to spending funds 
only on projects in which industry has expressed a strong interest, thereby 
involving industry specialists in the formation of the research agenda. The 
cooperative research activities also cover the entirety of the R&D cycle, from 
basic research through product development, in an effort to exploit the mul- 
tiple loops of interaction, feedback, and learning among phases of this cycle 
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that typify successful technology development projects (Kline and Rosen- 
berg, 1986). By avoiding a situation in which basic research results are 
"thrown over the wall" t o  industry, this approach may also contribute to  
effective transfer of results and technologies. 
Another experiment in industry-laboratory collaboration is based a t  the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and uses "startup" firms as a vehicle for 
commercializing laboratory technologies (according to  the Department of 
Energy, 87 startups were formed during 1985-87 to  commercialize technolo- 
gies initially developed in Energy Department laboratories).1° The Ten- 
nessee Innovation Center was formed in 1985, with an initial budget of $3.5 
million from the laboratory's operator, Martin Marietta Energy Systems. 
The Center provides a range of services to  entrepreneurs seeking to  commer- 
cialize Oak Ridge-developed technologies, including office space, laboratory 
facilities, and business planning assistance. The Center also makes small 
investments in the startups. 
Another example of laboratory collaboration with industry does not 
center on the transfer from laboratory to industry of a technology, but in- 
stead concerns the procurement relationship between laboratories and high- 
technology industries. Cray Research Corporation, a pioneering developer 
and producer of supercomputers, worked closely with Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in developing its first machines. Los Alamos was interested in 
Cray 's supercomputers for use in designing nuclear warheads, and worked 
closely with the firm in testing prototypes and improving designs. Los 
Alamos did not perform significant R&D on the Cray supercomputer, but 
funded its development and functioned as an expert "lead user" (von Hip- 
pel, 1989), improving the design of the machine. Several person-years of Los 
Alamos staff time refined the Cray designs before the release of a commer- 
cial supercomputer. Once a commercial supercomputer was perfected, Los 
Alamos aided the survival of Cray by ordering the first commercial machine. 
By 1989, Los Alamos had purchased 14 Cray supercomputers. 
A number of collaborative projects also are being studied or are under- 
way within several military-oriented Energy Department laboratories. These 
projects typically focus on technologies with significant potential for both 
military and civilian applications. Sandia National Laboratories is working 
with a group of firms to  improve the quality of specialty alloys, in a program 
budgeted at  $2 million in federal funds and $4.75 in industry funds for the 
- 
'OUnfortunately, no information is available on the number of these startups that either 
survived or succeeded in reaching the market with their technologies. 
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1989-94 period. By 1994, the entire budget for the program is to  be cov- 
ered by industry sources. A second program, the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology Initiative, will receive $2 million in federal funds over four years. 
Evaluation 
Like other recent experiments in federal technology policy, most of the effects 
of the policy shifts and initiatives of the 1980s affecting federal laboratories 
have yet t o  manifest themselves in improved technological or competitive 
performance. Nevertheless, some evidence is available on the operation of 
these initiatives and on the validity of the assumptions on which they are 
based. 
Beginning with the crudest indicators of success, the number of suc- 
cessfully commercialized technologies that emerge from federal laboratories, 
recent initiatives have had virtually no effect. During fiscal 1989, 297 fed- 
eral laboratories surveyed by the Congressional General Accounting Office 
(GAO; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991) produced only $6.3 million in 
royalties and 676 patents, a rather modest return on the laboratories' annual 
operating budget of $21 billion (needless t o  say, this budget supports nu- 
merous activities other than the creation of patentable technologies). These 
results reflect the slow response of many federal laboratories t o  the statu- 
tory and other policy changes of the 1980s. A Congressional investigation of 
federal laboratories' technology transfer programs concluded that  these ac- 
tivities were "under-staffed, under-directed, and only marginally focused." 
(Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1990, pp. 1-2). Of the 
297 laboratories surveyed by the GAO in 1991, 31% had not yet received 
guidance from their parent agencies on steps t o  implement the Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986, and 156 laboratory directors still lacked authority t o  
participate in CRADAs. The GAO study concluded that the Act's "...major 
provisions still have not been fully implemented." (1991, p. 11). A similar 
conclusion was noted in a 1989 report by the Defense Department Inspec- 
tor General, which concluded that neither the letter nor the spirit of the 
Congressional technology transfer laws of the 1980s had been implemented 
effectively by DoD laboratories (U.S. Department of Defense, 1989). 
A portion of this unimpressive performance reflects the fact that the pol- 
icy changes of the 1980s were not a t  all selective, and assumed that all federal 
laboratories were equally well-positioned t o  work with industry. Needless t o  
say, this assumption is likely t o  prove false-the vast diversity of this network 
of research laboratories guarantees that not all laboratories will be equally 
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a t  tractive or effective sources of industrially relevant technologies. Moreover, 
Congress assigned a technology transfer "mission" t o  all laboratories, but in 
most cases did little or nothing t o  alter the specific missions or charters of 
individual laboratories. Most importantly, funding levels and patterns were 
not shifted t o  support research in industrially relevant technologies or t o  
support technology transfer activities. 
Most of the federal initiatives t o  improve the contributions of the federal 
laboratories t o  national innovative performance have attempted t o  remove 
the putative impediments t o  technology transfer from federal laboratories t o  
industry. Yet, even if these policies are thoroughly and speedily implemented 
within all of the more than 700 federal laboratories (and there is abundant 
evidence that  they have not been), the ultimate payoff from these policies 
may well prove modest. Most federal laboratory R&D is irrelevant t o  in- 
dustrial R&D or technology, and industrial demand for federal laboratories' 
technology therefore is small. Many of the federal laboratories, after all, 
were founded t o  serve a clearly identified customer-the federal government, 
especially the military services. Many of these laboratories have worked ef- 
fectively t o  develop and transfer important mission-related technologies t o  
their governmental customers. 
But the federal government manifestly is not the customer for most 
civilian technology development activities within the federal laboratories, 
and federal policymakers rarely have the detailed knowledge of industry 
conditions or needs t o  plan research strategies t o  meet industry needs. The 
potential contribution of the federal laboratories t o  industrial technology 
development is reduced still further by the basic research focus of many 
federal laboratories and the remaining restrictions on technology disclosure 
and transfer that  are imposed by national security considerations. 
Much of the Congressional and Executive branch effort t o  improve tech- 
nology transfer from the federal laboratories has been driven by a "super- 
market model" of technology transfer, which assumes that  these laboratories 
have extensive inventories of new, industrially relevant and commercially 
profitable technologies "on the shelf," awaiting only a well-informed shopper 
t o  obtain and realize a profit from them. The laboratories' contribution t o  
industrial technology development is impeded by much more than obstacles 
t o  technology transfer-it also reflects a lack of industrially relevant technol- 
ogy t o  transfer. Over an extended period of time, the federal policies of the 
1980s may facilitate collaboration between industry and federal laboratories 
that  can support learning about the needs and capabilities of one another. 
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But this will take time and it will yield a significant return for only a few 
laboratories. 
Conclusions 
The organization and management of industrial R&D cannot rely solely on 
market mechanisms. The historical and contemporary evidence from the 
U.S. economy suggests that contract research, along with other types of 
R&D performed outside of the firm, are likely to  be most effective when 
they complement in-house R&D activities. The reasons for this comple- 
mentary relationship reflect the complexity of the processes of intra-firm 
knowledge creation, transmission, and implementation, as well as the limits 
of conventional intellectual property rights and contracts to  govern transac- 
tions whose outcomes are uncertain, difficult to value, subject to  important 
market imperfections. For this and other reasons, industrial research in the 
U.S. and other capitalist economies has been largely a non-market activity, 
located within the industrial firm and subject to organizational, rather than 
market, governance. 
In the postwar U.S., as in most industrial economies, government plays 
an important role in funding and performing R&D in the public and private 
sectors. Moreover, the recent experience of the U.S. national laboratories 
suggests that the process of converting laboratories from defense-oriented to  
civilian research will be a gradual and complex one, and is likely once again 
to prove most beneficial to private firms with in-house R&D facilities. 
This review of aspects of the development and current structure of the 
U.S. research system suggests that any restructuring of the R&D system of 
the Russian Federation must preserve a role for government in the fund- 
ing and performance of R&D. In addition, the wholesale conversion of the 
Russian Federation's network of research institutes into contract research 
organizations is likely to  prove infeasible. Nonetheless, the current structure 
of the U.S. and other nations' industrial R&D systems is changing in ways 
that may increase the importance of R&D organizations, like the Federa- 
tion's research institutes, that are external to  the manufacturing enterprise. 
The key challenge is to  create complementarities between the activities of 
free-standing research institutes and the intra-firm R&D efforts of Russian 
and other industrial enterprises. 
122 Implications for R&D Organization 
A number of more specific implications of this discussion for the orga- 
nization of industrial R&D in the transition to  a market economy may be 
briefly summarized: 
1. Independent research institutes are likely to prove most effective as com- 
plements to, rather than as substitutes for, in-house R&D activities. Ef- 
forts a t  reorganization of these institutes should include steps t o  build up 
integrated R&D laboratories within manufacturing organizations. The 
recent experience of U.S. and other industrial nations' firms suggests that  
external sources of research and technology may now have a more im- 
portant role t o  play in industrial innovation, as a part of a larger system 
that  includes a robust network of R&D facilities within manufacturing 
firms. Without the development of "absorptive capacityn in their client 
firms, however, technology transfer from the research institutes t o  client 
firms will remain extremely difficult. As the recent agreement between 
Sun Microsystems of the U.S. and a leading Russian computer science 
institute suggests, however, a t  least some of the firms with in-house 
R&D that are served by independent Russian research institutes might 
be foreign enterprises. 
2. The secondment or movement of people between wsearch institutes and 
manufacturing organirations should receive a high priority in efforts to 
improve technology transfer, to develop embryonic in-house R&D fa- 
cilities within manufacturing organizations, and to inform the research 
agenda of research institutes. Technology transfer between external re- 
search performers and the firm is one of the most enduring problems in 
the organization of contract and other types of independent research or- 
ganizations to  serve industry. Solutions t o  these problems should receive 
a high priority in any efforts t o  reorganize Russian independent research 
institutes. A portion of the staff of selected research institutes might be 
transferred t o  employment in manufacturing organizations, with their 
salaries supported through some declining matching funding from pub- 
lic sources. These individuals could form the core of in-house R&D 
laboratories that  would be closely linked with a "parentn independent 
research institute.I1 An alternative or additional policy would rotate 
employees from client manufacturing organizations t o  the research in- 
"Care must be taken to  ensure that any such personnel transfers involve high-quality 
employees of research institutes, rather than serving as a convenient means of eliminating 
less productive staff. This problem has plagued many U.S. research consortia (see Mowery 
and Roeenberg, 1989). 
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stitute on a regular basis for lengthy stays (6-18 months), and transfer 
research institute employees to a group of "clientn manufacturing firms. 
3. The mission of transferring technology from independent research in- 
stitutes to industrial firms requires recognition as an activity endowed 
with significant resources and close links to the research activities of 
the independent research institutes. This point follows closely on the 
preceding argument. Technology transfer between an independent re- 
search laboratory and a manufacturing firm or other client is a resource- 
intensive, knowledge-intensive enterprise, requiring sustained interaction 
between client and research institute, and well-established links within 
the research institute between individuals or organizations in charge of 
research and those in charge of transferring research results. An im- 
portant failure in the recent U.S. federal government experiments with 
improving the transfer of technology from the "national laboratoriesn 
is the failure to allocate resources to this specific task and to recognize 
it as an explicit part of laboratory missions (one error follows from the 
other). 
4. Strengthening the role of the Russian Federation's independent research 
institutes as performers of contract research requires that well-defined 
laws and regulations for commercial contracts and intellectual property 
be developed. The development of both contract and in-house industrial 
R&D in the U.S. relied for their development on a well-defined system 
of intellectual property rights and contract law. 
5. Wherever possible, Russian independent research institutes should be 
linked with university programs for the training of scientists and engi- 
neers. An important institutional strength of U.S. universities, and a fac- 
tor that makes them attractive sources of external research for U.S. and 
foreign industrial firms, is their production of trained scientific and engi- 
neering personnel along with research. If Russian independent research 
institutes can expand their role in graduate education, an important 
channel for technology transfer and interaction between manufacturing 
industry and independent research institutes could be established. 
6. Selectivity and ezperimentation should be important components of any 
new policies for Russia's independent research institutes. If the recent 
experience of the U.S. national laboratories is any guide (and there are 
striking parallels between these U.S. institutes and many Russian re- 
search organizations), no single policy is likely to be realistic or effective 
for all research institutes. The diversity in mission, talent, and orga- 
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nizational structure is too great for any inflexible general policy t o  be 
effective. 
7. The demand of independent research institutes for high-technology cap- 
ital goods is a potentially important source of domestic R&D and tech- 
nology for new firms in emerging industries. As the discussion of the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory pointed out and as other accounts have 
noted, an extremely important source of federal government support for 
high-technology industries during the postwar period has been procure- 
ment. Both the military services and the extensive network of national 
laboratories influenced the growth of new domestic industries through 
their substantial purchases from entrepreneurial new firms. 
8. Independent research institutes are potentially important sources of new 
firms, as well as new technologies, and steps should be taken to encour- 
age the "spinofl" of new firms from these organizations. A number of 
the U.S. national laboratories appear t o  have served as important "incu- 
bators" for new, high-technology firms, typically involving the departure 
of a few employees t o  found a firm. Such "spinoff" companies may be 
an important channel for the commercialization of the technological as- 
sets of independent research institutes. Steps t o  encourage their forma- 
tion include the development of better capital markets and intellectual 
property systems, as well as flexible provisions for leaves of absence or 
sabbaticals from employment in research institutes. 
David C. M o w e y  125 
References 
Carty, J.J., "The Relation of Pure Science to Industrial Research," Science, 1916, 
511-517. 
Chandler, A.D., Jr., T h e  Visible Hand,  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1977. 
Chandler, A.D., Jr., Scale a n d  Scope, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991. 
Clark, K.B., and T. Fujimoto, P r o d u c t  Development  Performance,  Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991. 
Cohen, W.M., and D. Levinthal, "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of 
R&D," Economic Journal, 1989. 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Technology Transfer  Obstacles in Federal  Laboratories: Key  Agen- 
cies Respond  to Subcommi t t ee  Survey, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1990. 
Gray, D., and T .  Gidley, Evaluation of t h e  N S F  Universi ty/Industry Co- 
opera t ive  Research Centers: Descriptive a n d  Correlat ive Findings 
f rom t h e  1983  S t ruc tu re /Ou tcome  Surveys, Raleigh, N.C.: Department 
of Psychology and Center for Communications and Signal Processing, North 
Carolina State University, 1986. 
Kline, S.J., and N. Rosenberg, "An Overview of Innovation," in R. Landau and N. 
Rosenberg, (eds.), T h e  Positive S u m  Strategy,  Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 1986. 
Mowery, D.C., "Survey of Technology Policy," forthcoming in P. Stoneman, (ed.), 
Handbook  of Innovat ion a n d  Technological Change,  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Mowery, D.C., T h e  Emergence  a n d  G r o w t h  of Indus t r ia l  Research in U.S. 
Manufacturing,  1899-1946, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univer- 
sity, 1981. 
Mowery, D.C., and N. Rosenberg, Technology a n d  t h e  Pu r su i t  of Economic 
Growth ,  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
National Science Foundation, Research a n d  Development  in Industry,  1976, 
National Science Foundation, 1978. 
National Science Foundation, A n  Analysis of t h e  National  Science Foun- 
dation's Universi ty-Industry Cooperat ive Research Cen te r s  Experi-  
ment, Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1979. 
National Science Foundation, Federal  Funds  for  R&D: Fiscal Years 1989, 
1990, a n d  1991 Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1991a. 
National Science Foundation, Selected D a t a  on Research and Development  
in Indus t ry :  1989 National Science Foundation, 1991 b. 
Nelson, R.R., "Institutions Supporting Technical Change in the United States," in 
Dosi, et al., (eds.), Technical Change  a n d  Economic Theory, London: 
Frances Pinter, 1988. 
126 Implications for R&D Organization 
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Making  Things  Better :  Com- 
pe t ing  in Manufacturing,  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1990. 
Penrose, E., The T h e o r y  of  the G r o w t h  of  t h e  F i rm,  London: Blackwell, 1959. 
Stigler, G.J., "Industrial Organization and Economic Progress," in L.D. White, 
(ed.), The S t a t e  o f  the Social Sciences, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1956. 
Swann, J.P., Academic Scientists and t h e  Pharmaceut ica l  Industry,  Balti- 
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 
Teece, D.J., "Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm," in G. Dosi, C. 
Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete, (eds.), Technical Change  
a n d  Economic Theory,  London: Pinter, 1988. 
Thackray, A., "University-Industry Connections and Research: An Historical Per- 
spective," in National Science Board, University-Industry Research  Rela- 
tionships: Selected Studies, Washington, D.C.: National Science Founda- 
tion, 1982. 
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report on the Au- 
dit of the DoD Domestic Technology Transfer Program, Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 1989. 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Diffusing Innovations: Implement ing  the 
Technology Transfer  Ac t  of  1986, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1991. 
Part I1 
Special Cases for Science 
and Technology Policy in 
the Transition to a Market 
Economy 

The Survivability of the 
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Example of the Computer 
and Software Industries 
Leonid P. Malkov' 
A General Problem of Survivability 
The Initial Problem 
Before the topic of this paper is indulged upon, an introduction to  the general 
problems facing Soviet R&D is a prerequisite. The initial enigma of the 
R&D sphere is not so much the prospects of survivability of the system 
under present conditions but rather the actual emergence of such a powerful 
intellectual potential in the Soviet state. Foreigners may take this situation 
as given due to  the lack of knowledge concerning the counteracting factors. 
Though far from being a full list of factors, the following were instrumen- 
tal in preventing the USSR from becoming an even more powerful scientific 
and technical power: 
1. The hostility of the authorities and oficial ideology regarding the intel- 
lectuals. V.I. Lenin made extremely critical statements with respect to  
'Deputy Director, Joint Venture "Paragraph". 
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this social group. Furthermore, the integration in a social class was 
denied t o  the intellectuals in the scheme of the division of society into 
classes according t o  the canonical variant of the doctrine. Thus, this 
group was conferred the often disdainful social status of a "stratum." 
2. The repeated manifestations of hostility by the authorities in practice, 
scandalously achieved in multiple ways ranging from persecution to the 
eztermination of the most educated people during various periods of So- 
viet history. The  first clear sign of this antagonism were the deportation 
of the most active intellectuals in 1922. The attitude toward the social 
group as a whole, rather than toward individual persons, manifested 
itself as a rule in these actions. 
3. The pressure of the Soviet communist ideology took a position incom- 
parably higher than that of any science. Evidence of this gloomy phe- 
nomenon were all sorts of campaigns against scientific free-thought with 
the purpose of subordinating it to  a single theory selected as an officially 
adopted (frequently, perfectly false) one. The most profound examples 
have been in the  struggles against genetics and cybernetics. Yet, there 
exist multiple individual examples in practically every sphere of science 
(probably except pure mathematics): in history, economics, geography, 
study of literature, and so forth. 
4. The presence of a number of purely Soviet restrictions pertaining to the 
participation and promotion of talented youth in the sciences. The diffi- 
culties were probably even higher recently than compared with more dis- 
tant  times (even in the 17th century, in the times of M.V. Lomonossov). 
The  most widely known restrictions were based on the national princi- 
ple, but probably even a more significant was the factor of obligatory 
acquisition of the right t o  a permanent residence which restricted the 
opportunity t o  live in big scientific centers for those who had not a cor- 
responding right acquired by birth, marriage or by means of exceptions 
implemented in a complicated manner. 
5. The isolation of the Soviet scientific community from the events taking 
place elsewhere in the world. The attitude here was the same as in the 
case of the ordinary citizens. But, while there i t  was a violation of hu- 
man rights, in the case of intellectuals i t  additionally undermined the 
roots of labor productivity and efficiency. There were even difficulties 
in obtaining the necessary literature, t o  say nothing of personal com- 
munication so necessary for scientists. Suffice i t  t o  say that  only three 
years ago, a researcher from an academic economic institute needed spe- 
Leonid P. Malkov 131 
cial permission to  obtain access to  the Business Week magazine in the 
central library of Moscow. 
6 .  The slightly scornful attitude to the work of intellectuals which frequently 
resulted in obligations to attend insignificant and non-scientific recep- 
tions forced participation in agricultural work, and still other assign- 
ments that repeatedly revealed the subordinate position of the scientist 
and his/her dependence upon the authorities. 
7. The task of authorities establishing total control over all structures in 
the society and over scientific structures in particular. As a result, an 
enormously inefficient organizational structure of science existed in the 
form of large, very inflexible, and conservative research institutes as a 
rule. 
8. The totally rigid and conservative system of scientific relations combined 
with shortages of goods. This was particularly noticeable in the shortage 
of scientific magazines and publishers. The possibilities for rapid scien- 
tific communication and promotion of talented people were extremely 
limited. 
The list of factors that prevented a normal development of the R&D 
system in the USSR may be continued for some time. However, the issues 
are beginning to  crystallize and we may state the first problem at  this point. 
Problem 1 
How could it come to pass that despite the enormous number of factors 
which hindered the development of the Soviet R&D system, a vast potential 
had been formed that in fact surpassed the R&D structures in even the most 
developed countries such as the USA and Japan based on various selected 
parameters, e.g., the number of researchers. 
A Proposed Solution 
The origin of the answer is based on the attempt of a more careful reconstruc- 
tion and analysis of the aforementioned arguments concerning the obstacles 
to a normal development of the R&D sector. The factors mentioned as- 
sume that a R&D sector of powerful potential, if created in a country with 
such conditions, cannot be efficient. Consequently, rational reasoning might 
imply that it should not have been created in the first place, or, if after 
the establishment its futility was recognized one ought immediately to  have 
halted investment in further development. 
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This point is, in fact, a key to  the answer. The paradox arises while 
attempting t o  draw a rational economic conclusion. Nevertheless, the real 
practice was not a t  all based on rational economic principles and did not 
pursue such objects. 
For many years, the actual economic policy in the USSR was based on 
the following grounds: 
(1) The ideology-Science has, for some reason, found itself on the So- 
viet Leadership's list of prestigious ideological "toys" and the pride in the 
number of researchers has found itself of equal rank t o  the pride of the tons 
of steel smelted or the length of channels dug. The ideological aspect precip- 
itated incentives for the development of science not t o  depend on qualitative 
achievement but rather t o  be based on simple quantitative objectives. Suf- 
fice i t  t o  say that  an entire department within the planning apparatus was 
dedicated t o  determining the number of researchers, post-graduate students, 
etc., required in the national economy. 
Under the supply-driven central planning, the actual effectiveness of the 
R&D sector was not of great importance in assessing the well-being of the 
national economy; just as the use of smelted steel and created channels was 
essentially insignificant in appraising economic success. 
Today i t  seems a real mystery how science has shifted from being a 
persecuted activity t o  a position of official pride. The explanation for an 
ideological phenomenon apparently should also be an ideological one. A 
probable reason may have stemmed from the feared but fond desire t o  borrow 
scientific and technical progress from the West. 
(2) Political survivability-For a long time, the Soviet political leaders 
made policies on the basis of a seriously assumed real danger of military 
aggression against the USSR. After the Caribbean crisis and the change 
of leadership in 1964 in particular, the military-industrial complex (MIC) 
acquired a great influence. The importance of science was implicit in the 
military expansion and caused the MIC t o  become the lobbyer for the R&D 
sector and a premier employer of scientific personnel. The efficiency of work 
was not generally assessed and subsequently taken into account. On the 
contrary, a decrease in efficiency was compensated by a further expansion of 
the inputs in the  sector. 
A paradoxical system of relationships emerged: the inefficiency was a 
reason not for reducing the sector but, on the contrary, for its enhancement. 
(3) The inertia of past decisions-The Soviet economy proved t o  be 
extremely inertial. The lack or weakness of the economic motives for the 
development and change was surely part of the predicament. The necessity 
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of resorting to extra economic stimuli, e.g., to an ideological substantiation 
of reforms, relegated the role of precedent in guiding on-going activities to 
a secondary one. Parameters regarding the science and technology sector 
that were taken into account while forming national economic plans were 
external (with respect to  the results of scientific work) parameters one could 
easily increase, i.e., quantity, employment, investments, and others. The 
impossibility of considering the actual return from science within the frame- 
work of macro-economic planning led to the readiness of the state to provide 
incentives for the development of science even under the conditions of its 
appalling inefficiency, and without any change in its functioning conditions. 
(4) The ambitions-Even during the most difficult historical periods, 
the pretentiousness of the Soviet leadership was very high. The principle 
t o  umatch and surpass America," which unfolded in very different periods 
during the development of the Soviet economy with remarkable stability, 
has revealing implications. All standard comparisons of Soviet development, 
growth, achievement, and status were carried out essentially only in contrast 
with the USA. The more modest experiences and levels of other countries 
were all but ignored. However, the backwardness and lack of information 
on the situation in other countries did contribute to  this phenomena. For 
a considerable portion of the analysts, realizing the actual level of develop- 
ment of the USSR proved to  be a sad discovery of the epoch of "glasnost" 
and transformed to  an irrational pessimism which was closer to the reck- 
less optimism of the existing past than to a sober estimate of the existing 
situation. In any case, the ambition "to be at the level of the USA" in a 
number of areas (including the defense sector) ensured the maintenance of 
the extremely inefficient R&D system for many years to come. Again, this 
motive was also a non-economic one, just as the previous ones were. 
Thus, the main reason for the emergence and existence of a R&D sector 
of power potential is explained by the fact that, until only very recently, the 
economic policy in the USSR was based not on economic but on political 
and ideological aims. 
The Main Problem (Mystery, Secret) with the R&D Sector in 
the USSR 
Until the formal demise of the USSR and still today, the R&D sector in this 
area continues to  be plagued by growing difficulties. Let us consider some 
forms of manifestation of these difficulties. 
Survivability of the Russian R&D Sector 
(1) First flow out of sector-This feature has been characterized by an 
outflow of a great number of the best specialists from this sector into the 
private business sphere. The independent (private) business in the former 
USSR is just germinating, and it reveals the impact the former state R&D 
sector workers now in private business. However, this business has not yet 
gained sufficient means to  carry out serious independent research. On the 
other hand, since the level of exploitation of developments created in the 
previous period is very low, many specialists now have an opportunity to  
initiate the production of new products which will eventually be developed 
in the private sector. The lack of a clear legislation and legal practice regard- 
ing disputes on intellectual property has contributed t o  such opportunities 
because state organizations find it difficult to  lay claims concerning the use 
of their intellectual property. 
This tendency has become most apparent in the area of soft-ware pro- 
gramming where the majority of products now sold in the private sector 
emerged as a result of developments carried out in the previous period within 
the framework of state organizations. 
The present situation pertaining to  R&D within the private sector resem- 
bles the situation within the private sector in the agriculture; small personal 
plots of an area which equals approximately 1% of the total for the coun- 
try produce a significant percentage of gross output disproportionate to  the 
quantity of inputs of many leading products. But the private sector is not 
merely more efficient with this respect. It uses additional types of resources 
not used in the state sector; often engaging in unofficial commercial opera- 
tions. The present success of the non-state sector is largely connected with 
the utilization of the accumulated stock of knowledge and products previ- 
ously created in state institutions. Yet the key to  the success lies not in a 
mass commercialization by order from the authorities, but by market-style 
demand impulses perceived in the private sector. As long as the flow out of 
the state sector continues this will remain an influential force in the econ- 
omy. Already now state institutions are compelled to  be more energetic in 
the defense of their intellectual property, potentially limiting the access for 
the private sector in the near future. 
(2) Second flow out of sector-In this case the reference is to  the flow of 
the specialists which leave the country. Amongst the hundreds of thousands 
of people who emigrated in recent years, this flow of specialists amounts to  
tens of thousands of them. This rate will only increase after the law on 
entering and leaving the former USSR comes to  effect after 1 January 1993. 
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Theoretically, the specialists that have gone abroad may contribute to  
a greater integration of the emerging post-Soviet R&D sector into world 
economic structures. But in practice, this phenomena has not proven t o  be 
very promising. 
(9) The dificulties in financing within the framework of the state budget 
in connection with the budget deficit-This tendency is particularly visible 
within the framework of conversion and reduction of allocations for the de- 
fense sector. A considerable part of the Soviet R&D sector belonged t o  the 
defense complex. Although the conversion of R&D is undoubtedly easier 
than that  of industrial production, i t  is only so in an initial stage and soon 
stumbles across numerous problems. 
(4) International competition-Many products developed and produced 
in the USSR in the absence of any competition from the international market 
due t o  a policy of the hyper-protectionism have become uncompetitive by 
present standards. Personal computers are the most obvious and impressive 
example of such a situation. Accordingly, the reaction has led t o  a reduction 
of production accompanied by a subsequent decline in R&D. Now in Rus- 
sia, i t  seems plausible that  this industry will not recover from the damage 
inflicted by imported goods. The possibilities t o  create new, competitive 
products in the future will also be extremely limited. 
So, while the state budget deficit limits the potential of government 
financial support for R&D, the rise in international competition requires 
more domestic investment in R&D in the computer industry. The onus and 
burden will be on private enterprise and finally carried by the consumers. 
Thus, R&D in the computer industry is in a most difficult predicament 
and the perspectives are even more sombre. This situation generates the 
next problem of fundamental importance in considering the R&D sector as 
a whole. 
Problem 2 
How is i t  possible that  the Soviet R&D sector, which had been in a satis- 
factory (from the viewpoint of survivability) condition in previous decades, 
literally came t o  the brink of almost complete destruction within just a few 
short years? How can one explain both the vitality and the weakness? 
An attempt is made in the following sections t o  answer this question on 
the basis of a description of what may be considered t o  be the main method 
of obtaining results with Soviet R&D and an explanation of the relevance of 
economic conditions. 
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A Key Aspect of Development in the Soviet R&D Sector: 
Copying Foreign Examples 
The complex conditions regarding the functioning of Soviet science have been 
described above. In light of the obstacles, it is remarkable that  significant 
results of highest international calibre were attained in specific fields. 
Par t  of the explanation lies in one of the key ways of development of 
the R&D sector in the former USSR. Namely, the "borrowingn of critical 
achievements from the experience of the most developed industrialized West- 
ern countries. 
The  example of the Soviet computer industry reveals two main ways of 
such copying. The first one was simply the adaptation of foreign knowledge 
t o  Soviet manufacturing conditions. This was particularly engaged in con- 
cerning the replication of computer equipment. Practically every computer 
created in the USSR has a so-called prototype, i.e., a model for copying 
chosen from among Western products. 
The second method of copying Western achievements was direct bor- 
rowing without any agreement of the original authors or inventors. This 
was essentially focussed in the sphere of soft ware programming. The use of 
American software was initially not concealed, but even stressed. So, when 
the decision was made t o  replicate the IBM 360 computer series as Soviet 
E C  series machines in the 1970s, one of the arguments in favor of such an 
action was the potential utilization of the extensive accumulated resources 
of software then available for these machines in the USA. Direct copying 
of these programs without any agreement on legal issues was rampant dur- 
ing this period. An Act of the U.S. Congress in 1980 set guidelines for the 
copyrights for software. This, however, did not deter Soviet counterfeiters. 
Big groups were occupied with adapting Western software for all types of 
computers. These then appeared on the Soviet market under other names. 
Western ideas and methods always had a decisive influence on the  com- 
puter industry in the USSR. An unfamiliar example: Zelenograd, an  elec- 
tronic industry center near Moscow, was built according t o  a memorandum 
two American engineers conveyed t o  Communist Party Leader N.S. Khrush- 
chov in the late 1950s. 
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Aborted (Interrupted) Technological Cycles 
Eventually, the method of copying Western technologies proved to  be in- 
sufficiently effective. The abstract scheme based on the experience of the 
computer industry may be referred to  as an "aborted technological cycle." 
The essence of this phenomenon consists of: 
1. Due to various factors associated with the R&D inefficiency in the USSR, 
the life cycle of the copied product was longer in the USSR than that of 
the original product in Western countries. Suffice i t  to compare the IBM 
360 series machines and their analogue "EC Ryad-1." In particular, the 
period of launching the product into serial production also proved to  be 
longer in the USSR. 
2. As a result, a remarkable situation arose. An introduction of completely 
new models in Western countries saw these coming to  the eve of their 
useful life just as their Soviet imitation appeared on the market in the 
USSR. 
3. Consequently, the revision of a current model came to  an end in the 
USSR and discussion commenced regarding the necessity to  immedi- 
ately initiate the development of a more advanced version. Political 
reasons also stood behind this sequence of events due to the lure of sub- 
stantial central budget allocations that could be received again and for 
an extended period. Thus, the research life became increasingly stable 
and subject t o  less change. A disaster for market responsiveness. 
4. Finally, the new project was destined to  be poorly prepared because the 
previous work had not been completed. Yet, the same scheme repeated 
new product after new product. Each technological cycle was extended 
time after time, and was artificially aborted at  some moment. 
Such relationships were an amplifier of the Soviet R&D system's inefficiency. 
One of the additional circumstances that made the Soviet R&D sector 
so inefficient causing it to  even experience difficulties when copying was the 
extremely vague idea of the real level of development of Western hardware 
that the overwhelming majority of the specialists possessed. They have prac- 
tically never been abroad and had almost no personal contacts with foreign 
specialists. This is why, according to a tradition which emerged as far back 
as in the times spying for military secrets, special professionals and not or- 
dinary scientists were commissioned to search and find Western products t o  
copy. Probably, some bright examples convinced the representatives of the 
communist administration that the copying method was efficient. Now, offi- 
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cial data have been revealed that apparently demonstrate the use of "special 
services" in the task of rapid creation of an atomic bomb in the USSR. 
In practice, such productive examples were sooner an exception than the 
rule, but there has probably been no possibility to strictly assess the level 
of efficiency of such a paradigm of technological development because of the 
secrecy associated with it all. 
The Japanese experience shows that the paradigm of copying can in 
principle be useful and efficient, and an acceleration of technological devel- 
opment from an inferior level can occur. Then, a transition to  the paradigm 
of internally motivated technological development must follow to secure suc- 
cessive advances. 
It follows from that said above that two paradigms of technological de- 
velopment can be distinguished: 
that of internally motivated technological development and 
that of copying foreign technological development. 
In the countries that successfully realized the latter phenomena (such 
as Japan), a gradual displacement of stereotypes was associated with a re- 
placement with the stereotypes associated with the other paradigm in the 
process of technological change. 
In the former USSR, real technological progress has been severely ham- 
pered as a result of such phenomena as aborted technological cycles. Now, 
under the new economic conditions during the crisis, the stereotypes of tech- 
nological development must be completely changed, generating an extraor- 
dinary instability which threatens the greater part of the post-Soviet R&D 
sector. 
New Patterns of Changes in the Russian R&D Sec- 
tor (Case Study: Eight Shifts in the Russian Soft- 
ware Industry) 
The initial point of comparison is an unspecified moment before the economic 
reforms in the former USSR. Depending on the point of view, this may be 
1985 for some and 1988 for others. The potential disagreement concerning 
the dates has no bearing on the following comparisons which are based on 
qualitative characteristics. 
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From Contracts Towards a Software Market 
Indeed, all countries with a long existing software industry have undergone 
such an evolution. In the USSR, such an evolution recurs in an almost 
"pure" form. The emergence of a vast market for personal computers (PCs) 
has led to  the development of a great number of successful and rapidly grow- 
ing firms purely dealing in software. An important distinction from what 
was taking place in other countries consists not only in a delay in time (of 
7 to  10 years), but also in the connection between the level of "marketness" 
and the ownership forms. All conventional enterprises subject to  contract 
programming or on-site development of unique programs were naturally and 
remain primarily state enterprises. On the contrary, the overwhelming ma- 
jority of young firms intuitively patterning their behavior on new market 
methods and stereotypes belong to  the non-state sector. These conditions 
give a quite natural process an unwarranted political and ideological color. 
Present conditions in which success in software programming is mea- 
sured by the size of financial returns and by the number of copies sold make 
the measures of performance from the relatively recent past already seem 
extremely antiquated. In these times in the former Soviet Union even just a 
few (2-3) introductions were perceived as an important success. 
From Uncontrolled Software Replication Via the Black Market 
to a Civilized Software Market 
The general tendency described above, however, represents the shifts taking 
place in the sphere of programming in the USSR too vaguely. 
The emergence of demand for PC software in Russia did not denote 
that a corresponding supply immediately emerged in a market form. On the 
contrary, the problem of satisfying the demand was solved by using meth- 
ods of "getting," not buying, just as in the spirit of tradition of the deficit 
economy which had prevailed in the country for decades before. In practice, 
this meant that software distribution was generally taking place outside the 
bounds of the formal economy and was realized by means of copying ac- 
cording the "3Es" principle: "everything by everybody for everybody." The 
overwhelming majority of such operations did not pursue any commercial 
interest and did show signs of improved consumer service. The attitude 
toward programs could be compared with the attitude to  the "samizdat" 
Literature, that is, free distribution and boasting with possession was rather 
a valor than a violation of some written or unwritten norms. 
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Ironically, this tradition was often overlapped with the state policy of ne- 
glecting intellectual property of Western companies. The idea of free copying 
of software was not a bit hidden and even paraded. For instance, the Soviet 
authorities openly stated the advantage of copying IBM 360 series machines 
due to the subsequent opportunity to  use the vast resources of software cre- 
ated for the prototypes. An opportune extenuating circumstance from the 
Soviet view was the fact that legal protection of software was finally con- 
solidated in the USA only in 1988, in an amendment to  the copyright law 
adopted by the U.S. Congress. 
Another factor stimulating free copying of software during the so-called 
"stagnation" years was the extreme difficulty to  establish new ventures in 
order to  react flexibly to  changes in demand. The conventional state en- 
terprises bound by plans commanded from the top levels of the political 
hierarchy eventually became incapable of developing market activities. 
The initial market reaction to  the demand for PC software was not 
the emergence of normal enterprises that could have satisfied this demand. 
On the contrary (and this is a general Russian tendency and typical of the 
nation's economic development), the first reaction was the emergence of a 
software "black market." This should not imply illegal dealings. Rather, the 
softwaremainly from the West-merely began to  be offered in an informal 
manner for money. Such offers, however, were most frequently disguised 
as training services, documentation assignment or product Russianization 
(adaptation to  Russian language use), making the scale of such business hard 
to  assess. Some justification for these activities resulted from the absence of 
Western companies' products on the Russian market or only sporadic sales 
thereof solely for hard currency. This is why no legal alternative existed, 
and the demand was truly high. 
The following stage of development which is presently underway charac- 
terizes the appearance of actual, formally organized market structures acting 
within the bounds of law and market morals and norms. Basic initiators of 
these changes are big Western companies that have started sales of their 
popular products in Russia for rubles using dealer and distributor networks 
acting in accordance with the international practice. 
From Primitive to Industrial Work in Software Distribution 
and Development 
Even software sales that began in a market fashion and in relatively large 
numbers were of rather primitive character early on. The sale of a pro- 
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gram in Russia initially meant a mere copying of the program text for the 
user. Market features reflected even in the name "software package" were 
not implemented. Only today, are necessary market attributes appearing 
for products which have undergone certain approbation for demand. The 
following features must be included in such attributes: 
a availability of documentation and normal packaging; 
a accessibility t o  a hot-line for on-line consulting of legal software users, 
even if only for minimal maintenance problems; 
a active and mass advertising for the most prospective products facilitating 
visibility and acquaintance with potential users. 
In this case, Western software companies are again those that  initiate 
the development of industrial relations in software programming in Russia. 
The companies establish corresponding norms of market behavior via their 
dealers in Russia. 
We consider the progress of industrial relations in the sphere of software 
sales to  develop sooner and more actively than that  in the sphere of soft- 
ware development. In the latter instance, industrial relations consist of the 
organization and division of labor between groups and individual workers. 
This is an incomparably difficult task because i t  requires daily efforts, not 
those valid for a single occasion only. The shift in this area appears t o  be in 
a preparatory stage. 
From Autarchy (and Originality) to Dealer's Job 
The previously recounted appearance of American companies that  organize 
sales of their software products of high-quality and international popularity 
is considered as an independent shift on the present Russian market. Until 
quite recently, there was practically no legal relationship with them. Legal 
sales took place only with respect t o  products developed within Russia. Very 
rarely did their level approach that  of Western quality standards. 
The author's notion of the future of a software industry in Russia in- 
cludes, in particular, the idea that  Western packages will prevail in the sector 
of programs distributed on the market. This should not imply, of course, 
that  the Russian software industry will disintegrate because products will 
chiefly be sold via subtle domestic firms and a considerable share of the 
income will remain in the country. It should be noted that  this share will 
constantly grow and now already seems t o  exceed the income of this branch 
in the premarket period. 
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However, the major American software companies are already active on 
the Russian market and sell the majority if not all their packages for rubles. 
This is true for Microsoft (MS-Word, MS-DOS, etc.), Borland (language 
compilers, Paradox 3.5), Lotus (Lotus 1-2-3), Ashton-Tate (Framework, d- 
Base), Symantech (Norton Commander, Q&A, etc.), Nantucket (Clipper). 
The list could go on and on. 
Russian companies that  will be able t o  find prominent or sufficiently ac- 
tive Western partners will possess particular competitive advantages. Based 
on this understanding, many of them are purposefully in search of such 
partners. As a result, certain competition arises already for privileged pres- 
tigious connections, and Western companies have the opportunity t o  sort 
and choose. This is why a series of Western firms have already changed 
their partners in Russia or the status of their relationship with them. Fol- 
lowing this tendency, a successive allocation of potential Russian partners 
between Western companies is now occurring. 
From Research Institutes and Algorithm and Program Funds 
to Firms 
The concept of the firm as it is known in market economies did not exist 
a t  all for a long time in the conventional Russian economic system. The 
idea of an enterprise as a half-independent economic entity subordinate t o  
higher organizations in all key issues served as the substitute. New economic 
structures could emerge only with tremendous effort, while the established 
ones remained. Organizations were classified by the type of activities, and 
an expansion of the sphere of activity was not easy by any stretch of the 
imagination. The main problem was, in fact, the inefficiency of the initial 
partition into the spheres of activity. Therefore, software programming was 
concentrated in research institutes which had very limited possibilities t o  
distribute their results. In addition t o  the institutes, a system of algorithm 
and program funds especially for software distribution software had been 
created. The separation of developers from sales had been carried out not 
on the basis of division of labor but as the creation of a new independent 
structure. As a result, the developer (neither an individual nor an organi- 
zation) typically received nothing from the distribution of his program and 
was consequently in no way interested in its quality. 
This extremely artificial economic construction started t o  decay with the 
beginning of the Soviet reforms. The process became visible in those cases 
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when qualified programmers moved from traditional state enterprises to  the 
firms acting according to  internationally accepted market principles. 
The Status of Programmers: From Anonymity to Prominence 
While programming safely resided in research institutes and design offices, 
the programmers were in the same precarious position as the rest of post- 
Soviet science. They possessed a mediocre status. The programmers had no 
advantages for promotion within the conventional hierarchies. The opportu- 
nities of other manifestations of success were also quite limited; for instance, 
publication and distribution of new programs and related literature were 
restricted. 
However, with the appearance of independent software firms and mass 
sales of software, the programmers' status has apparently gained extraor- 
dinary relevance. The idea of the status has, in itself, changed. Whereas 
earlier it seriously depended on position and rank, the new market conditions 
of today have made the total level of income and the number of copies sold 
the deciding factors. The modern status has endowed programmers with 
particular advantages as compared to  many other intellectual professions 
where there is no possibility to readily produce and distribute the results of 
labor in large quantities. 
Although programmers' incomes are, on average, surely lower than those 
of commercial purchasers and retailers in the computer business, it is cer- 
tainly higher than the average for other intellectual professions. Unfortu- 
nately, accurate statistics are still outstanding. 
Another side of the prestige is personal fame. Since computer use has 
become daily occurrence, more and more people have become software users. 
While until only quite recently there had been practically no renown Rus- 
sian programmers. Yet, today, one can expect a greater individualization of 
the Russian programming which allows identification with the authors and 
developers of software, and, in particular, because of the appearance of a 
great number of computer magazines read not only by programmers. 
Suffice i t  to  mention a few names: A.Pazhitnov, the author of the world- 
wide known game Tetris; E.Vesselov, the author of the most popular Russian 
text editor, Lexicon, and the widely known integrated package Master; and, 
Books on programming by V.Figurnov that have sold hundreds of thousands 
of copies. 
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From GOST to  a Market Standard 
Those who handed over programs to algorithm and program funds remem- 
ber that it was impossible t o  force a programmer t o  develop a good product 
for no particular reason. Thus, various GOSTs (state standards) were im- 
plemented as a tool that was to  regulate the programmer with respect to  the 
order of registering materials, the requirements of the documentation, and 
so forth. 
All these strict measures have been useful in creating unique programs 
for use in industry and the defense sector. But from the standpoint of benefit 
for the mass civilian user, it  has often been useless t o  say the least. 
Now, no GOSTs are taken into account while developing and introducing 
new programs on the Russian market. Their part is now played by market 
standards, and the motive to  follow them is the wish t o  increase competi- 
tiveness, rather than a constraint dictated from above. When, for instance, 
a few firms start t o  release products in packages together with high-quality 
documentation, such a form of sales quickly becomes a standard. In fact, 
the market standard is a production or technical solution predominating on 
the market as a result of buyers' preferences. 
Market standards are well known in developed countries. Their basic 
features include: 
A market standard emerges only after a period of production, the fi- 
nal choice being made out by consumers. Market standards have been 
overdue, in Russia. Under the previous Soviet system it was impos- 
sible t o  start the production of almost any product without its pre- 
standardization. The state wanted to  "protect" the consumer from the 
low quality of production and other effects of competitive market. 
The adoption of a market standard is carried out voluntarily, not because 
of legislative requirements. It should provide a great degree of freedom 
and satisfaction for all participants in the economic relationship. 
The market standard, though predominating, is not the only one present 
on the market. There are some competitive products as a rule which en- 
sure diversity and guarantee permanent progress. In addition, some ba- 
sic standards will always be set by the government, primarily for health 
and environmental reasons. 
One can give a very characteristic and even symbolic example in the 
Russian software industry. The officially adopted coding of Cyrillic symbols 
(symbols of the Russian alphabet), the so-called basic code page, proved 
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t o  be practically perfectly unusable. Instead, the so-called alternative code 
page became a market standard. 
IBM compatible PCs have become even more of a standard in Russia 
than in the USA. Macintosh type machines, on the contrary, are an extraor- 
dinarily rare sight in Russia. 
From Many Programs in a Small Number of Copies to a Few 
Predominating Packages (Mostly Imported) 
Software products were published in extremely small numbers of copies in the 
recent past. According t o  a poll carried out by the GKNT (State Committee 
for Science and Technology), the software publishing factor was lower than 
2 in the early 80s. This indicates that the majority of programs were used 
on one machine only. The lack of normal market stimuli and sales system 
stimulated the appearance of a number of primitive programs executing often 
similar functions not in the most efficient way. 
Normal market relations will radically change this situation. A relatively 
small number of products, such that the profit compensates the high cost 
of advertising, maintenance and development, will dominate on the market. 
This process, clearly seen in the USA, is only beginning in Russia. With 
the beginning of sales of Western packages for rubles in Russia, there can 
be no doubt that  American packages will predominate in almost all sectors. 
Exceptions will be relatively rare. One of these may be Lexicon (supplied 
together with the spell-check Ortodox), which has quite good chances in the 
class of simple text editors. In general, all spell-checkers on the Russian 
market will most likely be of home origin. But in basic product categories, 
the competition for the Russian market will in all probability be led by 
American firms. In the class of spreadsheets, i t  will be a battle between 
Microsoft Lotus 1-2-3, Excel, and Borland Quatro-Pro. From the two most 
popular text processors in the world, Microsoft Word and Wordperfect, both 
are available in Russia in localized versions. So Russia has become the place 
for fierce market competition between major American companies. 
Survivability of the Russian R&D Sector 
Scientific and Production 
Projects as a Method of 
Structural Reorganization in 
the Russian Economy 
In accordance with the Program of deepening of economic reforms for 
the period until 1995-1996, the Government of the Russian Federation (RF) 
considers conversion to  be one of the priorities of structural policy at  the 
present stage of the economic reorganization. During the course of struc- 
tural reorganization, the demilitarization of the economy should be secured, 
and also pseudo-ineffective resources should be involved in economic activ- 
ity and help from a new export base. The Russian Government has chosen 
to  pursue an active, balanced strategy to  procure structural reorganization 
while simultaneously not standing in the way of the developing market rela- 
tions, and partially guiding the pursued reforms to maintain social-political 
stability. 
Proceeding from the government's strategic approach, the main aims of 
conversion are to preserve precious elements of industrial production, per- 
sonnel, and innovation potentials of the defense sector and to  utilize these in 
the modernization and reorganization of the whole Russian economy. Such 
a policy could facilitate a rise of the technology standard in civil branches 
and in the social sector, the development of the export base and import- 
substituting branches of industry, and simultaneous curtail military produc- 
'Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Russia. 
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tion to minimum levels that would still guarantee national security but with 
respect to the new geo-political and strategical realities. 
What is necessary so that the most technologically developed part of 
Russian industry, enterprises and institutions of the defense complex, could 
play a leadership role as locomotives of the structural reorganization of the 
whole Russian economy? 
Obviously, the conceptions of stabilization and growth of the economy 
under real commercial conditions should be based on steady, solvent demand 
and real investment possibilities. Such demands and possibilities can be 
found abroad. Consequently, the Russian economy must immediately adopt 
the conditions of the world market. This thesis determines chief foreign 
economic priorities, logic, and the doctrine, and also the direction and the 
main substance of corresponding reorganizations and mechanisms that are 
presently being created. 
If the level of Russian exports is to  correspond to that of our once great 
Super Power, and Russia is to  achieve an appropriate position in the sys- 
tem of international specialization and division of labor, then the entire 
economic structure must be modernized, stressing the export of industrial 
products, goods and services of high technology, science-intensive products 
and also consecutively curbing the officially uncontrollable export of strate- 
gic raw material resources and cheap foreign purchases. In other words, it is 
a matter of capitalization of export earnings and the mobilization of other 
financial sources and investments in state projects for the purpose of promot- 
ing export-oriented manufacturing of high technology and science-intensive 
products. 
The formation of priorities for foreign economic relations regarding po- 
tential medium-term structural shifts could be based on the following prin- 
ciples: 
1 .  Export for the sake of the export development, or to  be more precise, the 
capitalization of currency earnings from raw materials exports to de- 
velop industrial export potential. The main objectives of capitalization 
during the initial stage are the support and development of traditional 
export branches, and the simultaneous development of large-scale export 
of services: freight, foreign motor-vehicle servicing, ecological services, 
ordered scientific research in the field of physics and earth sciences, devel- 
opment of program devices, and so forth. In future, the policy emphasis 
may shift to the development of less traditional directions of the export, 
namely: science and information (with a large inherent part of value 
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added), services and unique knowledge accumulated in Russia. The lat 
ter is presently being sold in fragments a t  dumping prices, particularly 
in the field of materials, geology, and several others. Furthermore, Rus- 
sia has substantial proven expertise to offer in international geological 
works, the development of an industrial fleet, and in the formation of 
large enterprises that are prepared to fulfill contracts concerning special 
tasks as raising sunken vessels, underwater research, floating enterprises, 
etc. 
Russian initiatives to  realize more global projects could influence its 
potential exports. The financial difficulties of international organizations 
will require rationalization measures of one kind or another. Russia 
could take advantage of these events and increase its export by offering 
to provide the international organizations with a wide spectrum of high 
technology services a t  very reasonable cost and the subsequent usage of 
unique equipment, procedures, scientific and technological information 
accumulated in the Russian defense complex. This would be of particular 
interest in ecological diagnostics, rescue and special tasks, medicine, etc. 
2 .  "Macro-marketing* of the technological integration of regions with for- 
eign partners. One of the most important elements of the doctrine of in- 
ternational economic activity is an interaction of development programs 
of different regions of the country. In this connection, it is very impor- 
tant to  prepare programs that would effectively utilize scientific and pro- 
ductive potential of defense enterprises within the framework of conver- 
sion in such regions as the Urals, Volga, Volgo-Vyatsky, North-Western, 
Central-Chernozyom, Sout h-European, and West-Siberian. Regional 
Structures, responsible for foreign economic activity and conversion re- 
organization could, in close cooperation with the bodies of the central 
agency, elaborate information packages concerning possibilities for de- 
fense enterprises and the most promising directions that might attract 
foreign and domestic investments. Such packages could include offers 
to develop nationwide and interstate infrastructure, to optimize indus- 
trial cooperation and sales of products within the framework of state 
and interregional development programs of industrial export. Such cor- 
responding work has already begun in a number of regions and it is very 
encouraging that foreign business circles have taken an active interest 
and are participating in informational inspection of defense enterprises 
and on macro-marketing of their products on an international level. 
3. The support of transregional and transnational cooperation. The realiza- 
tion of large-scale scientific and industrial projects must serve as a base 
150 Scientific and Production Projects 
for the reestablishment of sound economic ties within the framework of 
interregional and international cooperation and collaboration on a prin- 
cipally new basis. The chief trouble of today's Russian economy-the 
rupture of the formerly existing industrial connections among traditional 
partners-is stipulated by the fact that such connections were of a direc- 
tive and not economic nature reflecting the branch principle of forming 
and managing a socialist economy. The integration of enterprises on a 
technological base, from the extraction and manufacture of raw mate- 
rials to  the realization of find products, oriented on the existence of a 
true market and a true purchaser, facilitates the creation of a new cor- 
porative principle for Russia regarding the reconstruction of connections 
with neighboring foreign states, with the former CMEA-partners, and, 
finally, with new partners from the more distant foreign states. 
International division of labor is founded on basic economic principles. 
As a result, the trade of completed and semi-manufactured products play 
an important role in this division. Long technological chains penetrate nu- 
merous countries, forming the skeleton of transnational corporations. These 
corporations are constantly considering what is most profitable, and where 
one should transport semi-manufactures to  complete the next technological 
operation. In addition, corporate organization accomplishes that every link 
of a chain attains maximum economic effectiveness in relation to  the quality 
of products. In Russia, the major portion of a technological chain is com- 
pleted within the framework of one and the same branch of industry. Broad 
interbranch links usually put enterprises in a spot, because of unreliability 
and poor quality of deliveries "to the side." Technological chains are dam- 
aged by poor quality and by surplus costs, the result of the manufacturers' 
monopolistic positions. Only with the help of the "vitamins" of the interna- 
tional competition is it possible to  normalize the Umetabolism" of Russian 
economy. 
However, a real danger exists in the process of establishing such links. 
Russian health, safety, and environment may be a t  risk if the approach to 
induce the shifts in economy is predominated by foreign partners. The influ- 
ence of the latter could cause the relocation to Russian soil of potentially dan- 
gerous enterprises including nuclear power stations, enterprises recycling or 
disposing radioactive waste, and chemical and extractive (nature-intensive) 
industry with simplified technologies. One proven method of avoidance 
would call on independent, international examinations in the course of the 
development of complex international scientific-and-production projects. 
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Conversion is not an isolated program. It is a necessary element in a 
grand plan. It is a so-called macro-marketing move. Nonetheless, neither in 
Russia nor abroad is there an administrative body that could comprehend 
the whole complex of relations (including foreign economic) and possible 
reactions of the Russian economy to concrete management changes. The 
national economic point of view and interaction with other programs and 
problems of the present are additionally complicated by the social-political 
aspect in this period. 
It is impossible to  put into effect the market mechanism of mastering 
high technologies in the framework of realization of scientific and production 
projects without attracting adequate infrastructure of developers of such 
projects. In market economies such roles are assumed by different innovation 
structures having special venture capital. These structures do not presently 
exist in Russia. We consider it to  be possible and necessary to  involve our 
foreign partners in such an actkity, and we are ready to  provide every kind 
of organizational, informational and technological support. 
We are absolutely aware of the fact that the limitations on free access 
and information have nothing to  do with the assurance of the national secu- 
rity of Russia. The substitution of tasks of national and economic security 
by a more narrow circle of tasks of state security, unauthoritative rights of 
departments on forming information streams, redundant secrets, and con- 
stant misrepresentation of economic, scientific and technological informa- 
tion hinder the creation of cooperative links among manufacturers inside 
Russia. The consequent obstacles to  forming effective foreign economic rela- 
tions leads to  large-scale blunders in investment, scientific and technological 
policy. The lack of a legal system regarding information usage, like with 
goods, results in activities such as practically free distribution of scientific 
and technological information. 
Under these conditions, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, 
through the information support of foreign participants on the elaboration 
of joint scientific and production projects will strive to  secure a civilized 
information policy aimed at  achieving equality and mutual benefits for all 
participants. 
Nowadqs, a number of large industrial and bank corporations and even 
more small and middle-sized American industrial firms strive to  invest their 
capital in the conversion of the Russian defense industry and its scientific and 
technical potential. The most perspective field of international cooperation 
is different forms of foreign capital usage in the field of the defense com- 
plex, and related scientific and technological achievements (applied R&D, 
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research & development accomplishments and marketing) for their target in 
civilian usage oriented on the domestic and world market. In other words, 
it is necessary to use the possibilities of emulation and copying of the ex- 
isting scientific and technological military complex to  produce competitive 
civil products. Presently, a developed innovational potential, which can ini- 
tiate rapid technological advance in the renewal of a civil machine-building, 
is concentrated in the defense complex (systems of automated designing, 
trial stands, equipment, instruments, etc.). Immediate application of this 
potential in civil machine-building is held up by administrative barriers and 
technological dissonance. The most perspective way for overcoming this con- 
tradiction is with the employment of foreign capital, in particular, through 
performing joint applied trial-designs and marketing. 
In our opinion, the most perspective fields of foreign capital usage are 
the following: 
the usage of powerful main potential of isotope industry (centrifuge) for 
obtaining high-clear materials; primarily for electronics, as well as for 
the electro-technical industry; 
reorientation of the technological potential of rocket- and radio-chemis- 
try to development of science-intensive chemistry of small tonnage (cat- 
alysts, activators, etc.); 
the usage of the machine-building potential of the nuclear and space 
industry for manufacturing a wide spectrum of technological equipment 
and devices required by the chemical industry; 
international marketing of a wide spectrum of helicopters for their fur- 
ther purpose-oriented operational development and replication; 
large-scale cooperation in the field of manufacturing of civilian airplanes 
on the basis of domestically produced glider constructions with a set of 
engines and managing and navigation systems, in response to  interna- 
tional demands; 
the usage of composites, ceramics, special alloys and a wide spectrum 
of consolidating and protective covers for manufacturing important ma- 
chine devices (primarily engines), ensuring a multiple rise of the relia- 
bility of the whole construction; 
the acceleration of work concerning the civilian uses of laser technology 
(the metalloconstruction cutting, ecology, medicine); 
design and manufacturing of equipment for the usage of non-traditional 
energy sources (including autonomous) and power-accumulating sys- 
tems. 
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For the grading of the list of the perspective directions of foreign capital 
usage, it is necessary to organize extensive non-administrative, scientific- 
technological and economic reviews. 
Russia is becoming more attractive for capital investment, also from 
abroad. This might be particularly so if the foreign investments are allo- 
cated within the framework of programs of technical help and assistance 
to the conversion of the Russian defense complex. The fulfillment of inter- 
national reviews for investment and the working out of concrete scientific- 
and-production projects will form the real prerequisites of the effective and 
mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and its foreign partners in 
the future. 
Scientific and Production Projects 
Development of Soviet 
Regional Scientific Centers: 
A Case Study of Obninskl 
B.D. Yurlov,* A. P. Somkin3, G.Z. Sklyar, I. V. Gonnov4 
Characteristics of R&D Resources of the Town 
The town of Obninsk was formed as a "town of science" according t o  the 
state programmes specifically conceived t o  solve the problems of nuclear 
power engineering and other questions concerning this field of science. 
Obninsk is both geographically and demographically very compact. Its 
radius is no more than 1.5 kilometers and there are approximately 100,000 
inhabitants. The concentration of scientific personnel (1,300 Doctors and 
Candidates of Science) and scientific and research institutes (13) is also very 
high. In addition, a dense network of educational organizations (15 schools, 
one institute of higher education, one polytechnic secondary school, two mu- 
sic schools, one art  school, one gymnasia, a "Humanitarian Center," three 
- - 
'This paper was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, numer- 
ous references refer to institutes, committees and organizations by their former All-Union 
name. While some have disintegrated, most of those mentioned in this paper continue 
to exist, but under a different but comparable designation under the present Russian 
government. 
'Head of Department, Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Technology Policy, 
Russia. 
3 ~ e a d  of Laboratory, Physics-Energy Institute, Obninsk. 
'Deputy Director, Central Institute for Re-Training, Obninsk. 
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specialized secondary institutions, and a large-scale system of further train- 
ing and improvement of professional skills) has been established. Together, 
these factor for the keystones of a favorable R&D environment. 
More than 4,000 people work in scientific institutions which belong to 
various ministries; including the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and 
Industry (Technologia branch scientific-production organization), the Min- 
istry of the Aviation Industry, the Ministry of the Chemistry and Oil-refining 
Industry of the USSR, the USSR State Committee of Hydro-Meteorology 
(Taifun scientific-production organization), the USSR State Committee of 
Public Education, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the State Commis- 
sion of the USSR Council of Ministers on Foodstuffs and Purchases. This 
town concentrates considerable scientific and technical potential in differ- 
ent fields of atomic power engineering, medical and agricultural radiology, 
theoretical and practical elaboration of problems concerning ecology and 
environmental protection. 
The qualification of Obninsk institutes has changed significantly during 
last five years: the number of Doctors of Sciences has increased from 140 
in 1985 to 173 in 1990, the number of Candidates of Sciences has increased 
from 1,020 to  1,155. This tendency has not been affected by staff reduction 
or by the possibility to work in cooperatives or small enterprises where wages 
are considerably higher now. 
The institutes of the town perform important R&D in various fields. 
These include: 
1. Institute of Physics and Power Engineering: conducts R&D on nuclear- 
power engineering plants with different objectives (reactors on fast neu- 
trons, power engineering for distant regions, and others). The range 
of R&D activities pass from the stage of conceptualization, projecting, 
experimental perfection of systems, starting up, and operation. 
2. Scientific and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry named after 
L.Y. Karpov (Affiliate): investigates materials for modern technologies, 
including those aimed at protecting nature. Utilization in different in- 
dustrial branches, such as chemistry, construction materials, microelec- 
tronics, electro-technic, and public health care. There is a possibility to  
apply the results of the institute's work in electronics, space apparatus 
construction, medical industry, and chemistry. 
3. Technologia Branch Scientific-Production Organization: elaboration of 
materials, and technologies for manufacturing goods of ceramics, glass, 
composites with polymer, and ceramic matrix for the aviation industry. 
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The consequences of Technologia's efforts are utilized in automobile, 
agricul t u r d  and machine-building industries, and to  some extent in nu- 
clear power engineering and in chemistry. The applied R&D is conducted 
in cooperation with the institutions of the USSR Ministry of Automobile 
and Agricultural Machinery and the USSR Ministry of Chemistry. 
4. Scientific and Research Institute of Medical Radiology of the  Academy of 
Medical Sciences of the USSR: studies the fundamental basis of ionizing 
and non-ionizing radiation effects on biological objects and humans, as 
well as working out new methods of curing and preventing of radiation- 
related diseases, reviewing medical and biological circumstances of the 
Chernobyl Atomic Power Station disaster, new methods of complex ra- 
diation cures of malignant tumors, and other radiation therapy. 
5. Taifun Scientific-Production Organization: explores new methods of bio- 
sphere estimation, physical and mathematical models of migration and 
transformation of pollution elements in the atmosphere, soil, and water; 
as well as the influence of chemicals on ecological systems and the cre- 
ation of geoinformation computer systems performing information sup- 
ply for monitoring. 
The  apparatus plant of Signal (the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power 
Engineering and Industry) and the above mentioned experimental scientific 
institutions form the modern production base Obninsk. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of employment in the town, revealing the bias in favor of scien- 
tific rather than industrial production. 
The USSR Council of Ministers thrice (1973, 1980, 1985) adopted the 
Decrees on the development of Obninsk municipal economy. The above- 
mentioned Decrees made it possible to  combine the resources of different 
ministries and departments for town construction purposes. Obninsk con- 
struction was under the supervision of the Physics and Power Engineering 
Institute (which played the role of a general contractor) by a single developer, 
the Obninsk department of construction, an affiliate of the USSR Ministry 
of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry. The fact that  the town is su- 
pervised by the high-priority USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering 
and Industry allows the resolution of problems concerning socio-economic 
development in the town, satisfaction of the requirements of the consumer 
market and also generous development of the experimental base of the R&D 
institutions. 
In spite of a high concentration of scientific and research organizations 
in the town, their interdepartmental dissociation precluded any significant 
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scientific and technological cooperation during a number of years. As state 
enterprises became more independent some signs of a tendency cooperation 
between organizations of the town slowly appeared. For instance, coopera- 
tion between the Physics and Power Engineering Institute and the affiliate of 
the Scientific and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry facilitated the 
establishment of the technetsia manufactured generators which are used for 
diagnosing malignant tumors in a number of medical centers of the country. 
This reduced the imports of technetsia generators. Curing patients with ma- 
lignant tumors using the BR-10 neutron reactor pencil of rays method was 
implemented in the Physics and Power Engineering Institute. The experts 
from the Physics and Power Engineering Institute and of Taifun Scientific- 
Production Organization work together on the problems concerning the rem- 
edying of the Chernobyl disaster circumstances. 
The Science and Research Institute of Medical Radiology of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences of the USSR (the State Registrar for more than 500,000 
people injured in the Chernobyl disaster) participates in an international 
program of the World Health Organization (WHO) on research concern- 
ing the medical effects of the Chernobyl disaster. In order t o  ensure the 
completion of this program Obninsk is considering the establishment of the 
International Center on Radiation and Medical Problems with affiliates in 
Bryansk, Belarus, and in the Ukraine. The government of Japan has subsi- 
dized the program with 20 million US dollars for the period of 1991-1995, 
particularly for pilot projects related t o  the research. The WHO is studying 
the possibility t o  expand the entire program with an additional financial in- 
jection of 180 million US dollars t o  begin work in such directions as oncology, 
psychological and genetic effects. 
The complex program of the RSFSR on scientific study concerning the 
Chernobyl disaster has been elaborated. The program will be fulfilled by the 
association of scientific institutions in Obninsk which have highly qualified 
personnel in different branches of radiology. This association is represented 
by the All-Union Scientific and Research Institute of Agricultural Radiology, 
the Scientific and Research Institute of Medical Radiology of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences of the USSR, the Physics and Power Engineering Insti- 
tute, the Institute of Atomic Power Engineering, and the Central Institute 
of Improvement of Professional Skills. This complex program is an  integral 
part of "The state p q m m  of the RSFSR on ameliomtion of the Chernobyl 
disaster circumstances for 1991-1 995. " This program is coordinated with 
'The State Union-Republican p q m m  of urgent measures for 1990-1992," 
and there are some positions which were amended t o  the Union-Republican 
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program, such as radiation and anthropogenetic pollution effects on humans. 
This program also identifies urgent measures for 1991-1992 which are con- 
nected with the problem of relocating the population of the polluted regions 
of the RSFSR and also other questions such as personnel training and im- 
provement of skills of salvage workers at Chernobyl. 
The total value of R&D in 1991-1995 is budgeted at  175 million rubles, 
including 80 million rubles of urgent measures in 1991-1992. Presently, the 
RSFSR Council of Ministers are deliberating about the complex program 
financing. 
The suggestion to  establish a scientific and research center with the title 
"Physical and Chemical Problems of the Emergency Situations" has been 
studied. It was suggested t o  create such center as an affiliate of Scientific 
and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry. Within three years, such 
a center will facilitate the improvement of methodogical, material, and tech- 
nical base of specialized research departments including; manufacturing of 
progressive cloths for overalls, isolation materials, neutralization of spray 
containers and miasmata, emergency readiness of water-plants and equip- 
ment, securing ionized radiation in the field, polymer sorbents for extraction 
of oil products from water, and many others. The position of the Center 
must be defined in the departmental hierarchy that will, from its budget, 
finance 40% of the Center's expenditures for three years (6.5 million rubles 
per year) with the remaining 60% to be earned on a contractual basis. The 
prospective total value of work of the Center can amount to 16 million rou- 
bles in the first three years of operation. 
Considering the available scientific and personnel potential of the town, 
there appears a necessity to further transform the Institute of Atomic Power 
Engineering into the higher educational institution as a State Technical Uni- 
versity. An expert commission, consisting of the leading scientists of Ob- 
ninsk, elaborated a proposal for transforming the Institute of Atomic Power 
Engineering into a University and establishing new faculties in addition to  
the existing physics and power engineering faculties in the medical-biological, 
ecological, radiation, materials for space apparatus construction, humanities 
fields. 
The Obninsk Department of International Conversion Fund was estab- 
lished in lieu of realizing the proposed conversion in the town. These will 
be integrated into the complex strategy for the transition of the defence in- 
dustry to manufacturing civilian goods and as a solution to economic and 
social problems. The Obninsk Department Program is intended to  promote 
the spin-off of R&D results in such directions as: non-traditional power- 
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engineering, production of isotopes and implementing of reactor technologies, 
new non-metallic materials and their technologies, ecology, manufacturing of 
electronic equipment, machine-building for diary industry, and organization 
and improvement of professional skills. 
As international experience shows, small enterprise activity is very im- 
portant for demonopolization of the economy, competition and innovation. 
At the same time, i t  is necessary to avoid the collapse of efficient large organi- 
zations. In restructuring R&D organizations, we proceed from the necessity 
to  promote cooperation within the groups of large and small enterprises and 
between these two groups. At present, 240 small enterprises and 274 coop- 
eratives with a total number of employees amounting to  6,000 people are 
registered in Obninsk. The overall revenue collected by small enterprises 
in 1990 amounted to  50 million rubles. 61 cooperatives (22.3% of the total 
number of cooperatives) are engaged in scientific and research activities and 
in developing computer programmes. Their income in 1990 amounted to  
17.2 million rubles (32% of the total income). For the moment it is very 
difficult to  estimate the efficiency of small enterprises because the majority 
of them are engaged in trade operations. The task now is to  promote their 
industrial innovation activity. 
Social and Demographic Structure of the Popula- 
tion in Obninsk 
The social structure of this science town is shown in Table 2 (six scientific and 
research institutes are listed for illustration), and the demographic structure 
is shown in Table 3. 
On average, directors of scientific and research institutes are 56 years 
old, and deputy directors are 54. As for the main categories of scientific 
positions (chiefs of departments and chiefs of laboratories) the structure is 
the following: chiefs of departments-68% are older than 50, and 11% are 
older than 60; chiefs of laboratories-55% are older than 50 and 7% are older 
than 60. Only 10% of chiefs of departments and 15% of chiefs of laboratories 
are between the ages 30 and 40. In some rare cases, people younger than 30 
occupy positions of chiefs of scientific departments. 
Only 7% of the total number of Candidates of Sciences are young sci- 
entists less than 33 years of age. The average age of people defending a 
Candidate thesis is 35-40, while the average age of Doctors of Sciences is 56. 
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Infrastructure of the Town 
A Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers allotted in 1986-1990 60 million 
rubles for investments in construction objects of municipal economy, trade, 
public catering, communications, health care, and cultural and welfare facil- 
ities in the town of Obninsk during the period 1986-1990. The amounts of 
allotted capital investments for construction projects in the town a t  the end 
of the twelfth five year-plan in 1985 are shown in Table 4. 
The main indices of the development of communication means, public 
automobile transport, trade and public health care are shown in Tables 5-8 
inclusive. 
Key Issues Facing Science and Technology in Ob- 
ninsk 
The main problem lies in the abrupt reduction of financing for fundamental 
R&D. Thus, financing for the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering 
amounts t o  65% of its capacity, the affiliate Scientific and Research Insti- 
tu te  of Physics and Chemistry is only financed t o  70% (the financing of 
fundamental work amounts to  lo%), the financing of Technologia Branch 
Scientific-Production Organization amounts to 80%. The financing of R&D 
in ceramics for engines of different purposes was reduced t o  a critical level. 
Some scientific institutes are financed a t  the same level as in 1990. This puts 
them in a difficult position due to the total increase of prices for services and 
the reductions in the state budget. The main cause of the existing situation 
is the reduction of financing in the field of atomic power engineering and 
defense industry in the absence of any state program on conversion. The  
potential returns from conversion are immense, but considerable initial in- 
vestment is required. Despite the difficulties with financing, truly productive 
projects are continuing. However, the most important fundamental research 
projects bumn (avia-space research) and Topaz (thermoemission transition 
of nuclear energy into electric energy) were downsized. This was done de- 
spite the fact tha t  the  work was conducted on a very high professional level 
and the results achieved were a valuable contributrion t o  the world scientific 
community. 
Table 9 shows the reduction of financing in fundamental science as com- 
pared with the total volume of scientific and research work of scientific and 
reserach institutions in Obninsk. 
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The  general tendency is that  applied sciences are not exempt from the 
present critical situation. The increase of wages in the Academy of Sciences 
became a disincentive for young specialists t o  enter industrial research insti- 
tutes. Also, the increase of wages for medical workers may, in the nearest 
future, cause an  outflow of specialists from medical science t o  practical public 
health care. 
Five research reactors and 17 stands are in the operation in the scientific 
and research institutes of the town. They presently still satisfy industrial 
safety standards. However, regarding the long-term exploitation of the  ex- 
perimental base, obsolescence must be compensated by rapid renovation. 
Modernization, and additional measures for the improvement of nuclear 
plant safety require substantial financing. It is necessary t o  analyze and 
t o  resolve the problems concerning further development of the  experimental 
reactor base of scientific and research institutes. 
Despite all efforts, the  level of the technical base has fallen behind mod- 
ern standards: the main courses were a lack of super-computers, and an 
inability t o  communicate with other centers. Information technologies are 
developing very slowly in Russia. The personnel training in post-graduate 
courses has deteriorated and, as for the competition, i t  is on the  same level 
or  even worse. The problem lies in the difficulty t o  choose candidates be- 
cause of a lack of accommodation and low wages. The analysis of the da ta  
in the twelfth five-year plan shows that  only 25% of those who finished post- 
graduate courses can defend their thesis in time. Only 15% of the  total 
number of Candidates' theses were defended by post-graduates. 
Social Problems of the Town 
The existing economic situation in Obninsk has become rather problematic; 
the town was integrated in All-Union structures and ties that  have been 
recently destroyed and now i t  is impossible t o  change everything a t  once. 
The  former Union, Russia, and the region refused t o  resolve the problems 
facing the town. At present, the provision of goods has become much worse, 
the deficit of consumer goods has been intensified, the volume of civilian 
construction has been reduced, the objects of municipal economy have not 
been put into operation in time, and so forth. These factors aggravate the 
social problems of the town, including those which have become socially 
significant, such as housing and employment problems. 
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The existing and lowering rates of construction accentuate the housing 
problem (see Table 10). The queue of those who need t o  improve their 
housing conditions is constantly growing. The housing problems in the town 
are depicted in Table 11. 
In 1987, a complex program for housing construction until the  year 2000 
was developed in Obninsk. The program envisages housing construction by 
a general contractor for the years of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth 
five-year plans corresponding t o  320,000, 380,000, 460,000 square meters 
respectively. The completion of the planned quantity of dwellings will prove 
t o  be very problematic as early as in the thirteenth five-year plan, as there 
was no confirmation about the available resources already in 1991. The 
volume of work fulfilled by the Obninsk department of construction will be 
reduced by a t  least 20%. 
Because of the abrupt reduction of centralized state deliveries, the prob- 
lem of securing supplies cannot be solved solely by the town's department 
of worker's supply which belongs t o  the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power 
Engineering and Industry. The manufacturing enterprises in the town do  
not produce sufficient consumer goods and services t o  meet the inhabitants' 
demand. Consequently, the residents must resort t o  barter operations which 
have become the basic form of transactions now. Additional supply can 
be secured via direct contacts with agricultural organizations or the fields 
owned by enterprises of the town. 
Due to  the sudden decline in financing for scientific and research insti- 
tutes, and the related lack of state orders for the institutes and industrial 
enterprises, the problem of potential unemployment was sure to  become a 
reality. The measures t o  prevent unemployment in the main branches of 
industry will be constructed as follows: 
creation of a da ta  base for labor resources in the town; 
creation of a municipal system for retraining personnel using existing 
centers; 
creation of funds for social protection and support using the assets of 
enterprises and the municipality; 
new job detection and creation; and, 
establishing additional working places in the existing enterprises and 
institutions of the town. 
The  maintenance of sufficient employment creation in such a little town 
as Obninsk will prove t o  be a very difficult problem. 
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Perspectives 
The perspectives for future R&D activities are different in different orga- 
nizations. For instance, in the Technologia Branch Scientific-Production 
Organization the R&D activity will become much less profitable than man- 
ufacturing consumer goods made of glass, composite materials, ceramics. 
Yet, leading experts of Taifun and Technologia Scientific-Production Orga- 
nizations and of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering consider 
their institutions to have very highly qualified personnel and experimental 
and production bases to fulfill research in a number of important fields. 
The institutes' activities could be significant and progressive if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
receipt of order to work out a complex project of Atomic power station 
or some projects (Institute of Physics and Power Engineering); 
40% financing from the state budget (Scientific and Research Institute 
of Physics and Chemistry, Technologia Branch Scientific-Production Or- 
ganization) 
restoration of the experimental base (creation of neutron accelerators, 
etc.) 
The optimistic outlook for Taifun Scientific-production Organization will 
be 10-15% staff reduction and retraining of a number of specialists, outflow 
of up to 40-80% of scientific personnel, and a 15-20 years setback. 
In the transition period, the demand for R&D will, without a doubt, de- 
cline. Self-finance and conversion in science now means "driving in nails with 
a microscope." The only task is to survive. If the measures on economic pro- 
tection are not adopted, then the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering 
may survive but all the best personnel and associated ideas that constituted 
a level of scientific achievement which out-paced the United Staes by 15-20 
years (that is, in the case of the creation of Topaz-a fully automatized and 
safety nuclear plant with thermoemission converter of energy) will be lost. 
The reduction of financing by both the state and enterprises causes enor- 
mous problems. In order to protect R&D institutes from bankruptcy a pre- 
cocious R&D policy is necessary a t  the state and enterprise levels. 
Changes in R&D organization 
The financing of applied sciences from the state budget has essentially ter- 
minated. Applied R&D must now be financed from the income gained by 
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the sale of its products. It is necessary to  organize research work in such a 
way that it could stimulate the labor productivity. This will require strong 
cooperation between R&D and production activities. In order for the latter 
to be achieved, designers and producers should work together in the same 
economically viable scientific and production organizations. The previously 
monstrous scientific and research institutes must be transformed into firm- 
like organizations, consisting of small economically and legally independent 
enterprises, performing and implementing R&D simultaneously. Another 
way (for instance, for the Scientific and Research Institute of Physics and 
Chemistry) to receive more or less protection is to  enter the Academy of 
Sciences. 
All in all, it would be both timely and reasonable to implement: 
competitive character of R&D finance, and allocation and distribution 
of state orders for R&D projects; 
contractual character of scientists' employment to  provide flexible con- 
ditions for research team formation; 
creation of conditions to  provide financial support for research work in 
a given prospective field, without any obligations of the collective to 
receive any concrete results during a fixed period of time; 
information distribution and discussion of R&D results; 
release of scientific institutes from non-R&D activities: i.e., housing con- 
struction, maintenance of pre-school institutions, maintenance of insti- 
tute transport, creation of municipal services of auxiliary character, and 
servicing other scientific institutions on a contractual basis; 
establishment of enterprises and joint ventures to initiate and engage in 
research programmes and the implementation of results; and, 
cooperation with foreign countries (Germany, Great Britain, USA, Italy 
and others) in establishing joint ventures for production and research. 
In the near future considerable financial means will be necessary for 
increasing wages, re-equipping the experimental basis, and for housing. 
International Cooperation 
The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering has extensive international 
relations in the following fields: 
physics of low and medium energies; 
physics and techniques of reactors working on quick neutrons; 
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hydrodynamics, heat exchange, etc. 
The closest potential commercial scientific and technical cooperation will 
be with Libya and India. There are also very good ties with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The Scientific and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry is the 
leading and largest institution specializing in radiation chemistry technology. 
The institute has registered considerable achievements in the fields of semi- 
conductors, modified polymer materials, and filtration techniques. Future 
perspectives can only be realized if initial financing is secured in advance. 
The Science and Research Institute of Medical Radiology was chosen as 
the base organization for creation of the International Center on Problems of 
Radiation Medicine. It actively engages in large-scale projects on a bilateral 
basis with the European Council, and Norwegian and other companies. 
There are considerable difficulties in Obninsk that prevent the organi- 
zation of international cooperation. Obninsk does not have the status of 
a so-called "open town," which is accompanied by a lack of high-standard 
hotels in town, inability to book the flight tickets and change passports, and 
a lack of good communication facilities (telex, telefax). 
Work of Soviet Scientists Abroad 
At present, a number of specialists from the Institute of Physics and Power 
Engineering work abroad on a contractual basis. 
In case the law on free exit is adopted the possibility for young talented 
scientists to go abroad will become reality. These circumstances will inher- 
ently cause the reduction of scientific potential not only of the town but 
of the country. The experts will leave, taking with them new technologies, 
methodologies and experience. Of course, the main incentives are financial 
and many of the more flexible younger generation will take advantage of the 
attractive Western offers. 
In Russia, the opinion still prevails that only people with very low moral- 
ity can leave their Motherland. In general, scientists will only go abroad to 
work for a fixed period of time and such a situation is quite normal in the 
world. On the other hand, considering the present economic situation in 
Russia, it would be extremely undesirable to  lose the most talented, ener- 
getic and innovative specialists for any period of time. It is necessary t o  
adopt organizational and economic measures that will induce each scien- 
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tist to apply his talent, experience, and ideas and ensure him or her the 
corresponding remuneration. 
Openness of the Town: Its Contribution to the 
Development of Science 
The new openness of the town must promote the development of contacts 
with the world scientific community, potentially making Obninsk an inter- 
national scientific center. This would require Obninsk to become the home 
of global scientific institutions (for instance, the world center of information 
with specialization in different branches of science). The openness could at- 
tract the necessary foreign capital, foreign science and technical experience, 
modern technologies and equipment, and experience of commercial organi- 
zations by establishing joint ventures, conducting symposia, and so forth. 
Openness is an indispensable condition for institutes and enterprises 
to function efficiently, and a powerful incentive to develop the town as a 
scientific center. These elements may together be a catalyst to generate an 
abrupt spurt in social and economic development of institutes, enterprises 
and residents of the town. 
However, alone this will be insufficient. The policies of the town should 
be considerably changed: for example, to defend commercial secrets and 
"know-how", and to prevent the outflow of scientific ideas to other firms 
and companies elsewhere. It is necessary to establish the previously absent 
exchange of information among organizations within Obninsk. 
New Forms of Organization of Scientific Commu- 
nity Life in Obninsk 
The continued existence of a scientific community can only proceed on a ba- 
sis of business and economic interests. The total social organization would, 
in the case of this town, be most favorable under conditions set by elaborat- 
ing complex programmes for a number of existing institutes (similar to the 
program for Chernobyl). 
According to the estimates of leading scientists, the shortcomings of a 
local scientific community activity are: weak mutual ties, practically not a 
single inter-institute creative collective, no cooperation on solution of scien- 
tific problems and general questions of life in the town. The peculiar char- 
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acteristics of Obninsk are departmental barriers and a natural economy. It 
is necessary to  stimulate the cooperation of scientific and research institutes 
in the search for solutions to  scientific and economic problems. 
A reasonable prerequisite would see the establishment of a municipal 
scientific and technological council a t  the initiative of one of the institutes. 
This council (or maybe some other organization) should be responsible for 
the following: 
which problems are being solved by the institutes; 
difficulties (theoretical, technical) which can be overcome with the help 
of other institutes on a contractual basis. 
The council should publish a bulletin accessible t o  every institute of the 
town. The bulletin would contain the information about the unsolved (or 
difficult t o  solve) problems and questions. Indeed, a so-called "Coordination 
council" did exist in the town until 1968 and it seems there may be renewed 
relevance for such a functional body in the name of saving the scientific 
potential of Obninsk. 
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Table 1. Distribution of employment in the Obninsk economy. 
Sector No. employed percent of total 
Science and science servicing 22,500 37.6 
Industry 7,400 12.4 
Construction 8,500 14.2 
Transport and communication 1,640 2.7 
Municipal and consumer services 1,550 2.6 
Trade 4,160 7.0 
Publich Health Care 2,760 4.6 
Education 1,360 2.3 
New forms of national economy 
(JVs, cooperatives, Joint Stock 
societies etc.) 6,000 10.0 
0 t her 9,870 16.5 
Total 59,820 100 
Note: 6056 people registered in town work in the country (10,1% of the the total 
number of employees). 
Table 2. Social structure of scientific and research institutes' employees in 
Obninsk. 
Scientific and Total number Of them: 
research institutes of employees men women 
I P P E  9723 5755 3968 
Technologia 4080 1675 2405 
Tai fun 1910 839 1071 
SRIMR 1881 53 1 1350 
Affiliate of SRIPC 1300 762 538 
AUSRIHM 1268 303 965 
Total: 20162 9865 10297 
Note: Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) 
Technologia Branch Scientific-Production Organization 
Taifun Scientific and Production Organization 
Scientific and Research Institute of Medical Radiology (SRIMR) 
Scientific and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry (Affiliate of SRIPC) 
All-Union Scientific and Research Institute of Hydro-Meteorology (AUSRIHM) 
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Table  3. Demographic structure of scientific and research institutes in 
Obninsk. 
Scientific and Total by age: 
research number of 41- 51- 
institutes employees 5 40 50 60 > 60 
IPPE 9723 4899 2067 2181 576 
Technologia 4080 2545 1275 176 84 
Taifun 1910 978 466 33 1 135 
SRIMR 1881 1197 427 233 24 
Affiliate of SRIPC 1300 526 385 346 43 
AUSRIHM 1268 757 34 1 146 24 
Total: 20162 10902 4961 3413 886 
(%) 100 54 25 17 4 
Note: Acronyms are defined in Table 2. 
Table 4. Capital investments in construction in Obninsk (mln.rbls.). 
1985 1989 
Capital investments 28.7 39.5 
including: 
construction of public entities 13.4 
housing construction 15.3 
Table 5. Main indices of communication development in Obninsk. 
1985 1989 
Number of post-offices 10.0 10.0 
Number of telephone-subscribers(thous.) 24.8 28.1 
Number of trunk-lines 287 325 
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Table 6. Main indices of passenger transportion in Obninsk. 
1985 1989 
Total number of buses 230 240 
of them: 
on municipal routes 86 84 
on intertown routes 27 36 
Avg. Length of bus-routes in town (km) 138 133 
Passengers per km of 
route per year 382.4 486.8 
Table 7. Trade indices in Obninsk. 
1985 1989 
Number of trade outlets 68 69 
Number of public catering 
establishments 
Floor area in retail shops (sq.m.) 193 184 
Inhabitants per public catering 
establishment 1004 
Table 8. Public health care in Obninsk. 
Number of polyclinics 5 5 
Total number of beds in hospitals 1095 1040 
Number of doctors of all specialities 
per 10,000 inhabitants 
Number of nurses and sanitary personnel 
per 10.000 inhabitants 116.5 112.7 
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Table 9. State Budget allocations for scientific activity in Obninsk. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
State financing as % of total 
budget for research projects 65 63 62 51 44 30-40 
Financing of fundamental 
science as % of total research 
budget 25 21 17 10 8 7 
Table 10. Completion of housing units (thousand of m2). 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Table 11. Housing problem in Obninsk. 
Number of families registered t o  
receive accommodation 12258 
Of them: 
live in communal flats 
live in hostels 
registered for more than 10 years 
Number of families received or 
improved accommodation in 1990 
Conditions for R&D in 
Higher Education 
Institutions in the United 
States and Russia: A 
Comparison 
Nadezhda Makamval 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War, recent events in Eastern Europe, and the disinte- 
gration of the Soviet Union moved international economic competitiveness 
t o  the center of the world stage. Today, access t o  natural resources is no 
longer the key t o  economic success and technology has proven t o  be more 
important. Competition on today's markets requires continual improvement 
and innovation. A country's ability to  secure its position in the new world 
order is only possible with a well-educated work force which is one key re- 
quirement for technological advance. Knowledge and people have become 
the main economic resources that determine the position of every developed 
and developing nation in the new world order. All of this requires a dedica- 
tion t o  both applied, and basic research, and cooperation in investigations 
between Academies of Science, Higher education institutions, and industry. 
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Therefore, the problems associated with the organization of R&D, such 
as financing, planning, cooperation between science, industry and academic 
organizations, utilization of R&D results, and forms of new technologies 
transfer from science to  industries are major topics of concern in Russia. 
For the purpose of the following analysis of the aforementioned concerns, 
one needs t o  define and compare the state of R&D in Russia with a certain 
pattern. First of all, it is necessary to choose a suitable systematic pattern 
of analysis. 
Types of Higher Education Institutions: Classifi- 
cation and R&D Activities 
Higher education systems in the world are based on diverse traditions re- 
garding the relationships between government and institutions of higher ed- 
ucation, the relationships between research and teaching, the links between 
higher education and graduate employment, and the organization and man- 
agement of the institutions. 
Most experts agree that only three different models of higher education 
formed the basis of higher education systems in West Europe and the rest 
of the world: 
1. The British, which underlined a firm educational process and training a 
broad mind; 
2. The German, which promoted a close link between research and teaching 
and supported the freedom of learning; and 
3. The French, which was particularly concerned with training specialists. 
However, there are many reasons to use the higher education institutes 
in the United States as a comparison, because, as T. R. McConnell said over 
thirty years ago: "there is no system of American higher education. It is 
safe to  say there never will be. Diversity of support, control, organization, 
aims, programs, and students will continue to be the most evident charac- 
teristics of post higher educations in this countryn (in Altbach, 1991). The 
distinctive characteristics of higher education in the United States are the 
diversity and decentralization of higher education which include the com- 
bination of several elements-the British undergraduate liberal arts college, 
the German research and graduate faculty, and the professional schools. Fur- 
thermore, not only differences exist between higher education schools in the 
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United States and in Russia, but also numerous common traits. These main 
distinctions and common traits are listed below: 
After World War 11, the higher education systems of the United States 
and the Soviet Union became the both open or hidden measures for 
assessing strengths and weaknesses of higher education in these nations 
and those with similar systems. The education system in the United 
States was partially a step ahead of the European model and partially 
a product of it. In Eastern Europe, the socialist countries were mainly 
influenced by the Soviet structure. 
The American system is guided by market forces rather than planning. 
Competition is intense among institutions-for students, high-quality 
faculty, and research support. Planning is carried out a t  the level of 
individual institutions and states rather than on a national basis other 
than some basic principles. The system is, in principle, linked with 
public institutions, although some state authorities include the private 
sector in their planning mechanisms. In Russia, the central planning 
mechanism was the sole organizational instrument and, only now, market 
forces begin t o  function. 
As i t  was already mentioned, the American university system is based 
on combinations of several elements. There exists a diversity of curricu- 
lum, standards, and degrees within as well as among institutes. Such 
diversity was not known in Russia. Indeed, there was and still exists 
high standardization of curricula, degrees, and bureaucratic control over 
the education process. New forms of the higher education institutes 
appeared only recently in Russia. 
A high share of the R&D financing in the United States is concentrated 
in the elite universities, closely connected with the government institu- 
tions responsible for the allocation of R&D funds. Also in Russia, R&D 
resources are concentrated in a few of the best universities and colleges 
and, as in the USA, these conduct also intensive military-oriented stud- 
ies. 
The comparison of R&D in higher education institutions is not only use- 
ful, but also necessary. Prior t o  the selection of several qualified institutions, 
one has t o  consider various types of higher education institutes in the United 
States and in Russia. 
Higher education institutes in the United States are not as easily clas- 
sified as institutions in many other countries. There are more than 3,000 
institutions of higher education in the United States (public and private) 
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which do not play equivalent roles in science and engineering (S&E) edu- 
cation and research. The schools range from two-year vocational oriented 
community or junior colleges to  four-year colleges and further to research 
universities with a full array of graduate and professional schools. The two- 
year colleges award associate degrees and are equivalent t o  the first two years 
a t  a four-year college or university. The latter two additionally offer graduate 
training at  the master's degree level. Universities boast a wide spectrum of 
special programs for various fields at the undergraduate and graduate levels, 
including the doctoral and post-doctoral study. Many, in addition, include 
professional schools such as medicine and law. Institutes of technology and 
polytechnical institutes are generally similar to universities, but they focus 
on science and engineering and do not have any law or medical departments. 
A widely used classification of colleges and universities has been devel- 
oped by the Carnegie Foundation for the advancement of Teaching (Carnegie 
1987). The Carnegie classification was conceived in 1970 and revised in 1976 
and 1987. The foundation's classification scheme is based on several factors, 
including: 
1. Amount of Federal support; 
2. Numbers and levels of degrees awarded; 
3. Number of programs awarding degrees; 
4. Belonging to  liberal arts institutions. 
In 1987, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 
using data gathered by the United States National Center for Education 
Statistics, classified the 3,389 degree-granting higher education institutions 
into categories based on the level of degree offered. There were roughly 1,800 
private and 1,500 public institutions, about 2,000 offered programs lasting 
four years or more, while 1,300 (900 of them public community colleges) 
offered two-year programs. 
There are more than 500 higher education institutes in Russia (57% 
of id institutes of the ex-USSR) in which about 3 million students attend 
courses (55% of all students of the ex-USSR) (CSAER, of the USSR 1986). 
This means that there are less than one-sixth as many institutions of higher 
education in Russia than in the United States, where only 25% as many 
students are trained and 20% as much instructional staff is employed as in 
the USA. 
The higher educational institutes in Russia are usually distinguished by 
technical, polytechnical, humanitarian, medical and pedagogical institutions, 
universities and military schools. They support programs which range from 
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four-years (usually humanitarian and some military), five-years (universities, 
polytechnical and some technical institutions) and six-years (medical and 
some technical institutions). Most of these institutions (including all those 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as all universities) additionally offer 
graduate training at  the master's degree level, and some of them a t  the 
doctoral level. 
In Russia, most higher education degrees are given in technical fields: 
about 36% of all degrees granted in Russia have been granted in engineering. 
These engineering graduates receive technical training in highly specialized 
engineering fields. This training differs from the general and theoretical en- 
gineering education taught in the United States where engineering principles 
can be applied widely to  new products and processes. 
There is no comparable system of classification in Russia to that of the 
Carnegie Foundation in the USA. The Russian classification which existed 
until today is linked to the subordination of the higher education institutes 
to some ministry. Before the disintegration of the USSR, Soviet institutes 
were subordinate to  either the All-Union Ministry of Education, or the re- 
spective Republic's Ministry of Education, or the industrial Branch Ministry, 
or a combination of these. The R&D funding pattern of higher education 
institutions reflecting such an organizational structure and financial support 
for the institu.tions of multiple subordination (for example, to the All-Union 
Ministry of Education and to  a Branch Ministry) was significantly higher. 
Statistical indicators depicting R&D activities in higher education es- 
tablishments in the United States and in Russia differ considerably. In the 
United States, the information about R&D fields has great significance. For 
example, there are such indicators as number and percentage of science and 
engineering fields in universities and colleges by total R&D volume and fields; 
federal and non-federal R&D expenditures at universities and colleges by 
field and source of funds; employment of scientists and engineers a t  universi- 
ties and colleges by fields and source of funds; percentage of recent doctorates 
in surveyed departments by field; and many others. There never were and are 
still no such indicators of R&D at  higher education institutes in Russia, yet 
the necessity for them is obvious. Another group of R&D indicators which 
are in the higher education statistics of the United States but not in Russia, 
characterize the collection procedures, staff, and operating expenditures in 
the libraries. 
More or less similar indicators characterize R&D expenditures a t  higher 
education institutions in the United States and in Russia and also expendi- 
tures for facilities and certain equipment by performers and sources. The key 
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sources of funds for R&D in the United States are the Federal government, 
the State and local governments, industry, and institutional funds. As a 
rule, the support for conducting R&D at American colleges and universities 
on the part of specific agencies (Ministry of Defense, Agriculture, NASA, 
NSF, etc.) are considered separately. The sources financing for R&D at  
higher education institutes in Russia are very limited: the state budget and 
contracts with firms, where the former has traditionally provided the lion's 
share. 
In order to characterize the facilities and certain equipment in US R&D, 
one usually uses the following indicators: capital fund expenditures by field, 
source of funds in current and constant dollars, and current fund expendi- 
tures for research equipment by field. The analogous indicators in Russia 
are: balanced cost of equipment a t  higher education institutes and current 
fund expenditures for research equipment. 
All these distinctions between R&D indicators certainly hampers the 
comparison between R&D at  higher education institutions in the United 
States and in Russia. In evaluating the aforementioned information the fol- 
lowing conclusion may be made: it is no simple process to  select adequate 
indicators and relevant higher education institutes in the United States and 
Russia for comparison. In addition, access t o  statistical information describ- 
ing Russian R&D activity in higher education institutes is rather limited 
(1986 is the last year). Also, this information is not always authentic. 
Upon surveying R&D performing higher education institutes that were 
subordinate to the All-Union Ministry of Education in 1986, sixteen of them 
were located within Russian territory: five universities (Voronezh State Uni- 
versity, Gorky State University, Irkutsk State University, Tomsk State Uni- 
versity, and Rostov State University), three polytechnic institutions (Gorky 
Polytechnic Institute, Saratov Polytechnic Institute, and Ural Polytechnic 
Institute), and eight institutions of different Branch Ministries in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (Leningrad Institute of Mining, Leningrad Institute 
of Light Industry, Leningrad Textile Institute, Moscow Radio Engineering 
Institute, Electronics and Automation Institute, Moscow Steel and Alloy 
Institute, Moscow Chemical Engineering Industry Institute, and Moscow 
Machine-Tool Production Institute). All are higher education institutes of a 
mid-rank. It was impossible to receive the information about the best insti- 
tutes in Russia. The usual reason was the subordination of these institutes 
to  military or closed ministries where the majority of research was confi- 
dential. As a result, R&D performed in these institutions remained mostly 
unpublished or published in restricted literature. 
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Statistics on R&D in universities and colleges in the United States usu- 
ally include the best fifty research universities and the best one hundred 
universities. Many are well known around the world for research excellence 
including, for example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, the University 
of Michigan, and Cornell University. In order to  make a meaningful compar- 
ison with the Russian roster, the last fifteen universities and S&E colleges 
among the top 100 universities and colleges in the United States were se- 
lected. MIT was added to  the list as a model of one of the best S&E higher 
educational institutes (see Table 1). 
The first step in the present comparison is an analysis of total financial 
support for R&D at  higher education institutions in the United States and 
in Russia by source of funds. 
Financial Support of R&D at Higher Education 
Institutions by Source of Funds (1970-1985) 
In the United States, nearly all academic research is carried out in small sub- 
set of the more than three thousand institutions of higher education. About 
25% of all federal funds for R&D go to  the top ten institutions and 40% go 
to  the top twenty. These percentages have remained virtually constant over 
the past two decades. 
Annual R&D expenditure at higher education institutions in the United 
States was estimated to  be slightly over $10 billion in the mid-1980s, about 
2.5% of gross national product. One of the important characteristics of 
American higher education is the diversity of sources from which colleges 
and universities derive their support. Government at all levels (federal, state 
and local) provide almost half the total. 
While public institutions derived about 60 percent of their revenue from 
government sources (almost half from state governments) and less than one- 
fourth from payments for instruction from students, private institutions 
present a very different pattern. The latter received less than one-fifth of 
their support from governmental sources (only 2.5% from state and local 
governments), but almost half from students in the form of payment for in- 
struction. The federal government has been the major funder of research in 
colleges and universities. In the fiscal year 1986, over two-thirds of univer- 
sity R&D budgets came from the federal government. Higher educational 
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schools spent only 12% of total R&D funds in the nation, but over half of 
the Federal funds for basic research. 
The pattern of growth in expenditures has been inflated during this 
period. Between 1972 and 1975, R&D expenditure (in constant dollars) 
increased at  an average annual rate of about 1%. F'rom 1975 through 1980, 
the average rate was 5%. After 1980, it levelled off and in 1983 growth was 
only about 1% above the 1980 level (refer to  Table 1). 
R&D expenditures a t  higher education institutions in Russia, as noted 
earlier, have only two sources that are usually reflected in statistical reports: 
financing from the state budget and non-state financing. Information about 
R&D expenditures a t  individual Russian higher education institutions be- 
tween 1970 and 1985 is not available, but, as already noted, more than half 
of the higher education institutes in the former Soviet Union are now in Rus- 
sia. Thus, we can use the data previously collected by the State Committee 
for Statistics (Goskomstat) for an analysis of the main tendencies. 
R&D expenditures a t  higher education institutions in the USSR were es- 
timated to  be slightly over 1.5 billion rubles per year in the mid-1980s, about 
0.2% of gross national product. At official exchange rates, this amounts to  
about 2 billion dollars (official exchange rates in the mid-1980s: 1 US dollar 
= 0.75 rubles). This is only one fifth of expenditures in the United States. 
At 1 US dollar equal to  5 rubles, which was the black market exchange rate 
a t  the time, USSR R&D expenditures were thirty-three times less than US 
expenditures. Expenditures from the state budget for R&D at  higher ed- 
ucation institutes within the borders of the Russian Republic were about 
180 million of rubles (or about 240 million US dollars a t  official rates and 
48 million a t  the black market rate), twenty times and one-hundred-fifteen 
times less respectively than in the United States. The expenditures from 
non-state sources in the USSR and in the United States were approximately 
equal. 
In the mid-1980s the Soviet higher education sector derived about 12% 
of its R&D revenues from state sources. The share of these sources decreased 
from 21% in 1970 to  12% in 1985, indicating that government was consis- 
tently economizing on higher education. The pattern of growth was not very 
strong during this period. Between 1970 and 1985, state R&D expenditures 
increased a t  an average annual rate of only about 4% (Table 1). 
Comparing R&D expenditures at the top sixteen higher education insti- 
tutions in the United States to  those in Russia as shown in Tables 2, and 3, 
the contrast between the level of financial support for R&D in these countries 
becomes even more obvious. Total R&D expenditures a t  the fifteen selected 
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universities and colleges in the United States (i.e., without the expenditures 
a t  MIT) were on average higher than at  the top sixteen higher education 
institutes in Russia by a factor of four (at the official rate of exchange) and 
by a factor of 34 at  the black market rate. The government support of R&D 
in the higher education sector of the United States (federal, state and lo- 
cal) was 14 or 99 times higher than state support in Russia depending on 
the exchange rate. In the USA, support from the Academy of Sciences and 
industry was 1.5 times and 10 times higher than in Russia respectively. 
An example of a higher education institute not subordinate in Russia 
to  the All-Union Ministry of Higher Education was the Moscow Institute of 
Radio and Electronics, seventh on the list in Table 3 by volume of total ex- 
penditures. This institution received markedly less state financing compared 
to  Russian institutes under direct Ministry of Higher Education authority 
or compared to  an institution of equivalent rank and status in the USA. For 
1986, Table 3 illustrates that state support for R&D in this institute was 
242,600 dollars (when 1 $ US = 0.75 rbls.) or 36,400 dollars (when 1 $ US 
= 5 rbls.). 
For the sake of comparison, we draw the reader's attention to  Table 2 
and the seventh ranked US institution selected in our sample by volume of 
expenditures: Mississippi State University. State support (federal, state, and 
local) was 156 times higher for this institute than for the Moscow Institute of 
Radio and Electronics (at the official exchange rate). The share of contribu- 
tions from Academy and industry in these institutions were approximately 
equal. 
Thus, we draw the conclusion that, in the mid-1980s, the R&D a t  uni- 
versities and colleges in the United States received an appreciably larger 
amount of the state financial support for R&D, than any higher education 
institutions in Russia. 
Due to  the absence of information concerning R&D expenditures of Rus- 
sian or former Soviet higher education institutes after 1985, the following 
reasoning is based on research and observation by the author. 
Today, the situation with R&D support has changed considerably: on 
the one hand, the expenditures from the State budget can not increase under 
present circumstances and the inflation effect will in fact cause the real value 
to decrease. On the other hand, financing through commercial contracts is 
increasing. This increase, however, is sometimes difficult to  recognize, be- 
cause the traditional methods of accounting elucidate the sources of expen- 
ditures not financed by the state. The new forms of financing are connected 
with a new commercial structure in Russia; namely, the so-called malm 
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predprejatie (the small enterprise). Maloe predprejatie affiliated with higher 
education institutions are organizations that include only a limited number 
of members (most of them are instructional staff of the higher education in- 
stitutes, only few post-graduate students and students), are self-accounting 
and offer various forms of activities, including R&D. Usually, there are sev- 
eral enterprises associated with higher education institutes. For the latter, 
this has become a chief source of funds for research and development. Unfor- 
tunately, due to the novelty of this economic organization, little information 
concerning the activities of such enterprises, has been collected. Indeed, even 
the methods to  accurately compile this information are yet to  be developed 
and implemented. 
Furthermore, financial support for R&D at scientific organizations (in- 
cluding higher education institutions) is to  some extent based on the char- 
acter of work (basic research, applied research, development), so we devote 
the next section to  review basic characteristics of R&D at  higher education 
institutes in the United States and Russia. 
The Mechanism for Financial Support of Basic and 
Applied Research 
For the purpose of analyzing the characteristics and funding of basic and 
applied research and development conducted in higher education institu- 
tions in the United States, the following definitions of the National Science 
Foundation are used (National Science Foundation, 1984). 
basic research has as its objective a fuller knowledge or understanding 
of the subject under study, without specific application in mind; 
applied research is directed toward gaining knowledge or understanding 
necessary for determining the means by which a recognized and specific 
need may be met; 
development is the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding 
gained from research directed toward the production of useful materi- 
als, devices, systems, or methods, including design and development of 
prototypes and processes. 
While total investment in R&D has grown significantly during the last 
decades in the United States, the relative emphasis on basic and applied re- 
search and development has remained rather stable since 1970: development 
has fluctuated between 63% and 69%, applied research between 21% and 
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24%, basic research between 9% and 14%. National Science Board, 1991). 
In 1989, private American firms performed 85% of development, followed by 
Federal in-house laboratories, which performed 11%. Firms also did most 
of the applied work (72%), while the academic sector and Federal in-house 
laboratories were each responsible for 12% of the total. 
Universities are known as the traditional home of basic science in the 
United States and accounted for half of all basic research performed in the 
nation in recent years. Only 18% of basic research was conducted by private 
enterprises and 12% by in-house Federal Government laboratories (Teich and 
Pace, 1986). 
Thus, industry has been dominant in both funding and performing de- 
velopment and applied research, the Federal Government dominated the 
funding of basic research, and research universities dominated the perfor- 
mance of basic research in the USA. Consequently, we can judge the scale 
of basic and applied research a t  higher education institutes in the United 
States, as in Russia, on the basis of R&D expenditures by source of funds. 
There was constant growth of total R&D expenditures a t  higher educa- 
tion institutions in the former USSR between 1970 and 1986, with the largest 
portion distributed in Russia. However, the spending on basic research did 
not change during this period. This was accompanied by a continual decline 
in expenditures on department investigations. 
The analysis of R&D expenditures by source of funds in the former USSR 
and in Russia, which was considered earlier, reveal that  basic research was 
not the major task in the 1980s and has not regained a prominent status 
in the R&D programs of higher education institutions in Russia (contrary 
t o  those in the United States). This phenomena has arisen despite the fact 
that  the conditions for basic research a t  higher education institutions is far 
better than a t  other scientific organizations in Russia. 
Equipment and Facilities 
Due t o  the significant role of capital expenditures on scientific equipment and 
facilities a t  higher education schools in the United States, i t  is interesting t o  
analyze their development. 
Capital expenditures from federal sources for R&D a t  higher education 
institutions in the United States declined steadily from 1972 t o  1986, re- 
covering thereafter. Nevertheless, in 1989 they had attained only the 1976 
level (refer t o  Table 4). This decline is sharply accentuated when inflation 
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is taken into account. While support from non-federal sources did increase, 
the growth rate was insufficient t o  compensate for the negative inflation- 
ary effect. Thus, in 1989, total capital expenditures were barely more than 
in 1980 (in constant dollars) and federal funding was down t o  one-third of 
i ts  1972 level in constant dollars (U.S. Department of Commerce multiple 
editions). 
The result of this decline in expenditure has been the growing obsoles- 
cence of research facilities and instrumentation in the United States higher 
education schools. The  magnitude is achieved due to  the continuous increase 
(above inflation) in the cost of sophisticated instrumentation (generally in 
the range $100,000 t o  $1 million range), and the relative decrease of funds 
available (at  all levels-federal, state, local and university) t o  purchase such 
equipment. 
The  cost of scientific equipment have increased four times since 1970 and 
a whole new range of technologies have become standard accoutrements in 
research laboratories over the past few years. One investigation found that  
the average age of university instruments was twice that  of instrumentation 
a t  quality industrial laboratories (Ibid). In addition, research equipment has 
been estimated t o  have a lifetime as short as three t o  eight years because 
advances in instrumentation due t o  internal research projects. As a conse- 
quence, the Departments of Defense and Energy, leading R&D performers 
in the nation, have also increased instrumentation funding. Higher educa- 
tion schools have begun t o  explore in-house methods of dealing with these 
issues, employing solutions such as creative debt financing, user charges, and 
limited partnerships. 
The information about capital expenditures and current fund expendi- 
tures for research equipment a t  higher education institutes in Russia does 
not exist. However, as noted earlier, the da ta  collected under the former 
Soviet higher education organization can be used as proxy in order t o  rec- 
ognize the main tendencies in Russia, where the majority of the All-Union 
institutes were located. 
There was constant growth in costs of equipment a t  the higher edu- 
cation institutes in the former USSR between 1970-1986, yet the yearly 
expenditures for equipment did not increase and even slightly declined be- 
tween 1983-1984 (refer to  Table 5). Thus, the renewal of capital funds was 
very slow. Several authors have noted that  the obsolescence of machines a t  
higher education institutions must t o  be guided by material production. In 
the 1980's, the average annual increase of equipment in the Soviet national 
economy was about 5%; a t  the higher education institutes the average an- 
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nual increase of equipment was between 2% and 4%, indicating that the 
renewal of capital equipment was even slower here than elsewhere in the 
economy. Consequently, the majority of higher education institutes lacked 
state-of-the-art equipment for research. An exception was the S&E higher 
education institutes of double subordination (the average annual increase of 
equipment in these institutions was 5%), but, as a rule, that which was more 
rapidly replaced was of less sophistication. 
In order to perform meaningful research and development accurately, 
efficiently and rapidly, electronic computer equipment is essential. Since 
1985, the growth rates for the utilization of computers increased: in 1984, 
the higher education institutes subordinated to  the All-Union Ministry of 
Education received 80 computers and, in 1985, already 263. One year later, 
there were 7,028 computers employed by the All-Union Ministry of Educa- 
tion in its institutions: 54% of these computers were at higher education 
institutes in Russia. Nevertheless, a quantity as this was clearly insufficient 
for 293,816 instruction staff, 42,837 undergraduate and 2,983,081 total stu- 
dents enrolled. According to the report for 1985, more than 70% of 6,765 
computers were older and near obsolete models (CSAER of the USSR, 1986). 
Information about contemporary computer security in Russian institu- 
tions of higher learning is absent. The situation now is consistently improv- 
ing, mainly due to the use of different forms of funding instruments including 
contracts and cooperative agreements. In fact, the cooperation is such that 
the computers and other equipment, which are the property of the maloe 
predprejatie, are usually used for R&D at  higher education institutes. 
Thus, the integration between higher education institutions, scientific 
organizations, and industry is of growing importance for today's Russia. 
Indeed, the primary motive is the joint exploitation of instrumentation and 
facilities, especially the newest and most expensive equipment. 
Integration of Academia, Industry, and Science 
There are different objectives behind an integration of higher education in- 
stitutes, industry, and scientific organizations in the United States and in 
Russia. The main purposes of this integration in the United States is to  im- 
prove their own and the nation's competitive positions, prevent stagnation, 
and discover new markets. The key to  such achievements is to  mobilize all 
scientific and technological resources, including higher education institutions 
which still possess untapped reserves, whose contribution can be increased 
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by adopting appropriate policies. Indeed, universities in the United States 
contribute to the structural revitalization of the national economy by as- 
sisting small and medium enterprises as well as by generating entirely new 
high-technology businesses. 
In recent years, considerable attention has focused on university-industry 
research cooperation in the United States. Industrial firms have sought ways 
to  augment their basic research portfolios and their innovative capabilities 
and higher education institutes have explored new sources of research fund- 
ing. A variety of cooperative R&D arrangements, particularly in emerging 
areas such as biotechnology, have increased the importance of university re- 
search (primarily long-range basic research which industry is reluctant to 
support in its own laboratories) to  meeting industrial needs, as well as in- 
dustry's broader need to  keep track of current developments in all fields of 
S&E (facilitated by contacts with university researchers) in order to  remain 
at  the forefront of technological competitiveness. 
While industrial funding is not expected to  be a substitute for federal 
support of university research, the growing relationships are widely regarded 
as significant and mutually beneficial. Many universities have actively sought 
the enhancement of existing relationships and the establishment of new ones, 
while industrial firms have begun competing with one another to develop 
connections to  the top universities, and the federal government has set up 
programs and otherwise sought to encourage the trend. The new arrange- 
ments have raised new questions concerning federal and institutional poli- 
cies relating to academic freedom, protection of intellectual property (such 
as patents and copyrights), anti-trust regulations and technology transfer 
(refer to  R. Stankiewicz's recent work (1985) for more details). 
In Russia, one of the main purposes for the aforementioned integration 
was a direct external economic lever to  improve the recruitment and training 
of students and the method in which they are employed after graduation. 
Integration can lead to  mutual economic dependence between higher educa- 
tion institutes on the one hand and the research institutes (both academic 
and industrial) on the other. But, it is necessary to note that the most pro- 
found current incentive for integration and mobilization of all scientific and 
technological resources is to  secure the survival of science in Russia during 
the transitionary period and thereafter. 
Unfortunately, the post-Soviet scientific community has been and con- 
tinues to  be plagued by a low level of interaction between higher education 
institutes and industry as a result of the lack of crucial links between sci- 
ence, technology and production over decades of communist rule. Additional 
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problems arise as a consequence of the organizational disparity between uni- 
versities and industry. Therefore, it seems inevitable that higher education 
institutions must and will undergo a variety of institutional adjustments. 
Many of the organizational experiments now taking place at the higher ed- 
ucation institutes/industry interface can be viewed as precursors of more 
fundamental changes to  be expected. 
Finally, it is not realistic to  expect that further strengthening of the 
relations between industry and higher education institutes will be based pri- 
marily on greater financial support because the future additions t o  industry- 
funded programs for the United States, Russia, or every country with a 
substantial R&D sector are likely to  have a relatively narrow focus. Most 
industrial sectors are under increasingly vigorous competitive pressure, sub- 
sequently forcing them to concentrate on higher return/lower risk R&D in- 
vestments. But the cost and complexity of modern research is such that 
no one single country has the resources to  do it all (in the electronic in- 
dustry the current generation of memory chips requires an investment of 
between $100 and $300 million to  set up a manufacturing plant, but by the 
end of the decade the cost will be about $1 billion). Apart from this, re- 
cent developments have indicated that finance and capital markets, much 
of manufacturing, and almost all of the higher technology business have be- 
come globalized. The globalization of high technology business is changing 
the interaction between industry and higher education institutes, causing 
the higher education institutes to  become more international also.2 
Main Conclusions 
This comparison of R&D at  higher education institutions revealed that the 
conditions for R&D in these countries, particularly the financial support, is 
still far more state-dominated in Russia than in the USA. Also a product 
of different levels of economic development in this countries, these circum- 
stances mainly stem from distinct government policies regarding the aca- 
demic sector in the United States and in Russia. 
'While support for universities in different countries by non-national based corpora- 
tions is growing, the universities and institutions of higher education, nevertheless remain 
essentially national institutions in spite of rapid globalization of the world. Not one is com- 
pletely and solely supported by the global community and the financial base of the higher 
education institutes are as yet not international. Even more so, i t  is  often aggressively 
national. There are many reasons for this 'agg~ession,~ and so long as higher education 
institutes funding remains national, their progress toward the globalization will be limited. 
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The American university is the traditional home of basic science. The 
traditional home of Russian basic science are the Academy of Sciences and 
some selected academic institutions. In Russia, the main purpose of the 
higher education institutions and universities is the training of specialists. 
Thus, the state financial support of R&D at  the higher education institutes 
in the United States is incomparably higher than in Russia. The financial 
support of R&D from non-governmental sources are approximately equal in 
relative terms. 
There was a decline of capital expenditures a t  higher education insti- 
tutes in the mid-1980s both in the United States and in Russia. This decline 
has resulted in the growing obsolescence of research facilities and instru- 
mentation in these countries. The median age of instrumentation in higher 
education institutes in Russia and the United States was several times more 
than the average age in industry. In order to  compensate for such growing 
deficiencies in the United States as in Russia (though with a definite lag), 
efforts are being undertaken to  more actively promote the integration be- 
tween higher education institutes, scientific organizations and industry. In 
Russia, low levels of interaction between higher education institutes and in- 
dustry are the result of a lack of mutual objectives and motivation between 
science technology, and production. In the United States, several authors 
also report a low level of such interaction, which sooner is the consequence 
of the organizational disparity between universities and industry. 
Despite the positive efforts, negative tendencies continue to  arise in 
higher education institutions in Russia: for example, the low and declin- 
ing levels of government financing, poor capital funds, old-fashioned forms 
of organization and occupational training, and still others. Now these prob- 
lems begin to convert into a crisis of higher education system in Russia. 
Consequently, higher education institutes in Russia are far form the stan- 
dards of these in the USA with respect to  finance, equipment, information 
networks, and organization of education programs. This makes the process 
of the former's integration in the world high education network very dif- 
ficult. Nevertheless, foreign support of R&D in some Russian universities, 
colleges, and institutes with high scientific potential can be promising. R&D 
expenditures in Russia are very low compared to  those in Western industri- 
alized countries and the qualification of scholars is rather high; an indication 
that investments in Russian R&D performed at higher education institutions 
could be quite efficient, productive, and generate a high rate of return. 
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Table 1. R&D Expenditures at higher education institutions in the USA 
and USSR by year and source of funds. 
USA, 1970-1983 (millions of US $): 
Year Total Federal State & Industry Institutional 
gov't. local gov'ts. Funds 
1970 2335 1647 219 61 243 
1971 2500 1724 255 70 2 74 
1972 2630 1795 269 74 305 
1973 2884 1985 295 84 318 
1974 3023 2032 307 96 370 
1975 3409 2288 332 113 417 
1976 3729 2512 364 123 446 
1977 4067 2726 374 139 514 
1978 4625 3059 414 170 623 
1979 5361 3595 470 194 728 
1980 6060 4094 494 237 827 
1981 6818 4559 548 29 1 974 
1982 7261 4749 593 330 1088 
1983 7745 4960 599 3 70 1231 
Source: National Science Foundation, 1984. 
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Table 1. Continuation 
USSR, 1970-1985 (millions): 
Year Tot a1 State budget "Commemial" 
contracts 
rubles $ US rubles $ US rubles $ US 
1970 487 649 102 136 385 513 
1971 563 750 110 147 452 602 
1972 66 1 88 1 125 167 536 714 
1973 734 979 135 180 599 798 
1974 823 1098 140 1897 683 911 
1975 895 1194 141 189 753 911 
1976 975 1300 146 195 829 1105 
1977 1019 1359 146 195 8 72 1163 
1978 1102 1469 157 209 944 1259 
1979 1165 1553 161 215 1004 1339 
1980 1245 1661 164 219 1080 1441 
1981 1301 1735 163 218 1183 1577 
1982 1374 1832 169 226 1205 1606 
1983 1457 1943 178 238 1279 1705 
1984 1489 1986 185 246 1304 1739 
1985 1544 2058 186 248 1357 1810 
Source: Reports of RLD at higher education institutions subordinated to the All-Union 
Ministry of Education, 1986. 
Note: exchange rate (1 dollar = 0.75 ruble). 
3 Table 2. R&D expenditures a t  selected higher education institutions in the United States, by source of 
ru funds. $ 
Institut. Total Federal State & Industry Academic Other % 
Institutions category Gov't local insti- sources 
of the USA, 1989 gov't tutions 
% 
n 
h- 
thousands of US dollars 
Total 1,080,503 552,886 88,915 84,932 2 246,625 79,614 g 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology private 287,157 215,140 3,211 39,650 6,692 22,464 
Alaska-Fairbanks University public 56,701 26,659 2,101 3,039 21,869 3,033 
Clernson University public 56,699 12,484 16,245 3,849 22,486 1,635 
Florida State University public 55,245 24,897 1,566 832 25,449 2,501 
Washington State University public 55,173 22,697 2,268 2,258 22,945 5,005 
University of Oklahoma public 53,956 1,702 3,502 1,991 24,226 7,667 
Auburn University-all campuses public 53,814 15,179 1,357 4,111 17,667 3,287 
Mississippi State University public 53,670 17,694 20,334 3,886 5,416 6,340 
Oklahoma State University public 53,655 14,116 1,853 1,645 34,613 1,428 
Georgetown University private 53,597 37,351 217 4,370 8,278 3,381 
University of 
California-Riverside public 53,213 15,584 2,441 1,094 31,449 2,645 
University of New Mexico public 52,970 23,934 5,660 2,496 11,732 9,148 
Tufts University private 50,424 40,771 773 8,010 847 23 
University of California- 
Santa Barbara public 50,067 39,227 1,036 2,645 4,878 2,281 
Kansas State University of 
Agric. & Applied Sciences public 47,302 15,951 21,133 1,790 6,384 2,044 
University of Texas-Health 
Science Center Houston public 46,860 29,500 5,668 3,266 1,694 6,732 
CL Source: Science bt Engineering Indicators, 1991. (O 
CL 
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Table 3. R&D expenditures at selected higher education institutions in 
Russia, by source of funds. 
Total Govern't Academy 
Institutions Institut. insti- 
Russia, 1986 category tutions 
thousands of rubles 
Tornsk State University public 19,206 6,033 13,174 
3,841" 1,206" 2,634" 
25,608~ 8,044b 17,565~ 
Leningrad Textile Institute public 17,670 1,842 15,828 
3,534" 368" 3,165" 
23,560~ 2,45ab 21,104~ 
Gorky State University public 15,556 5,549 10,008 
3,111" 1,109" 2,001" 
20,741b 7,39ab 13,344b 
Ural Polytechnic Institute public 14,748 2,263 12,486 
2,949" 452" 2,497" 
19,664~ 3,017~ 16,648~ 
Rostov State University public 14,549 5,616 8,933 
2,909" 1,123" 1,786" 
19,398~ 7,48ab 11,910~ 
Moscow Institute of Steel public 8,876 1,924 6,952 
& Alloy 1,775" 384" 1,390" 
11,834~ 2,565b 9,26gb 
Moscow Institute of Radio public 8,288 182 8,105 
& Electronics 1,657" 36" 1,621" 
11,050~ 242b 10,806~ 
Gorky Polytechnic Institute public 8,044 287 7,827 
1,608" 57" 1,565" 
10,725~ 382b 10,436~ 
Saratov Polytechnic Institute public 8,005 400 7,604 
1,601" 80" 1,520" 
10,673~ 533b 10,138~ 
Irkutsk State University public 7,908 3,615 4,293 
1,581' 723" 858" 
10.544~ 4.820~ 5.724b 
'Thouaanda of dollara according to the black market exchange rate of 1 8 = 5 rubles; 
'~houaanda of dollara according to the official exchange rate of 1 $ = 0.75 rubles. 
Source: Reporta of R&D at Higher Education Inatitutea Subordinated to the All-Union 
Miniatry of Higher Education. 
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Table 3. Continuation. 
Total Govern't Acacemic 
Institutions Institut. insti- 
Russia, 1986 category tutions 
thousands of rubles 
Voronezh State University public 6,232 999 5,233 
Leningrad Minning Institute public 6,037 950 5,125 
1,207" 190" 1,025" 
8,049~ 1,266~ 6,833b 
Moscow Textile Institute public 5,195 827 4,368 
1,039" 165" 873" 
6,926b 1,102~ 5,824b 
Leningrad Institute of Textile public 3,740 272 3,468 
& Light Industry 748" 54" 693" 
4,986b 362b 4,624b 
Moscow Institute of Chemical public 3,181 326 2,855 
& Mechanical Engineering 636" 65" 571" 
4,241b 434b 3,806~ 
Moscow Institute of Machine public 3,066 368 3,434 
Tool-making 613" 73" 686" 
4,088~ 490b 4,578b 
OThousands of dollars according to the black market exchange rate of 1 $ = 5 rubles; 
b~houaands of dollars according to the official exhcnage rate of 1 $ = 0.75 rubles. 
Source: Reports of RLD at Higher Education Institues Subordinated to the All-Union 
Ministry of Higher Education. 
Table 4. Capital expenditure, current fund expenditures for research equipment and instructional staff at 
higher education institutions in the United States, 1976-1989. 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Thousands of $ US % 
Capital Expenditures a t  F? 
higher education institutes 1,646,920 1,431,650 888,250 925,870 932,302 1,023,037 964,596 b 
Current fund expenditures for 9 3 
research equipment na na na na na 281,521 270,433 9 
Instructional staff na 812,000 809,000 823,000 846,000 865,000 865,000 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
3 
0, 
b. 
Thousands of $ US 3 
Capital Expenditures a t  
higher education institutes 1,047,421 1,085,709 1,096,266 1,304,256 1,471,715 1,607,184 1,650,365 5 
Current fund expenditures for 2 
research equipment 269,846 316,403 388,344 438,304 446,678 474,775 468,821 h 
Instructional staff na na na na na na na c 0 
Sources: NSB, 1991 and US Dept of Commerce, multiple issues. g. 
0 
3 
Table 5. Balance cost of equipment,  current fund expenditure for research equipment and  instructional staff 3 
a t  higher education institutions in  Russia, 1976-1989. R 2F 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 % 
Thousands of Rubles 
Balance cost of equipment a t  5 ?P 
higher education institutes 1,768,738 na 2,284,239 na na na 3,541,590 5 
BMX 353,747 na 456,847 na na na 708,318 g 
OX 2,358,317 na 3,045,652 na na na 498,875 
Current fund expenditures for 
research equipment 42,449" na 54,821" na na na 14 1,333 
BMX 8,489 na 10,964 na na na 28,266 
OX 56,598 na 73,094 na na na 188,444 
Instructional staff 257,488 251,517 269,300 272,790 276,281 283,404 285,885 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Thousands of Rubles 
Balance cost of equipment a t  
higher education institutes 3,819,710 3,962,228 4,306,788 na na n a na 
BMX 763,942 792,445 861,357 na na n a na 
OX 5,305,152 5,015,478 4,894,077 na na na na 
Current fund expenditures for 
research equipment 66,355 57,850 113,292 na  na  na na 
BMX 13,271 11,570 22,658 na na na na 
OX 88,473 77,133 151,056 na na na n a 
Instructional staff 297,527 295,724 293,816 na na na na 
Source: Ibid. 
Legend: na not available 
C estimation 
BMX thousands of dollars black market exchange rate: IS = 5 rubles 
OX thousands of dollars official exchange rate: 1.9 = 0,75 rubles 
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Part I11 
On Fundamentals for 
Restructuring R&D in the 
Transit ion Process 

R&D Organizations in 
Russia: Freedom- S hock 
Leonid Kosalsl 
This paper contains an analysis of the social-economic situation in state 
R&D organizations (RDO) of R ~ s s i a . ~  At present, these organizations are 
undergoing a specific stage of "freedom-shock." The rapid trend towards 
liberalization of life in Russia has been accompanied by government policies 
that include drastic decreases in State demand for scientific projects. As a 
consequence, it has become clear that many research institutes are not ready 
for economic freedom. They were not able to  adapt to  the changing demand 
for experimentation and consultation on the part of state enterprises, and 
to  the new demand from the gradually emerging private sector. As it turns 
out, managers of scientific organizations were unprepared and unable to  lure 
new customers for their developments, to  modify the inner structure of their 
institutes, to alter the methods of financing their work, and to  create new 
incentives for their personnel. 
According to  my observations, a downward trend regarding the situation 
of RDO became noticeable as early as 1989-1990. As state budget allocations 
began to  decline, RDO personnel sought funds via alternative means that 
simultaneously lead to  promotions and rapid career advances. Unfortunately, 
there was no prompt reaction to this situation on the part of RDO managers. 
Remuneration and opportunities for the young specialists in state academic 
R&D were paltry compared to the coveted offers in private business. The 
'Candidate of Economics (sociology), leading researcher, International Centre for Re- 
search on Economic Transformation (ICRET), Russia. 
'This work was a part of the research project 'RkD Management in the Transition 
to Market Economy (Co-leaders: Dr. S. Glaziev, Russia, and Dr. R. Levin, USA) at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. 
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decrease of financial assistance form the state constantly intensified shortages 
of quality personnel, equipment, instruments, reagents, and so forth, driving 
a considerable part of Russian RDO into a state of freedom shock. Certainly 
this shock was variable in its gravity, allowing some RDOs t o  recover from 
it. However, their numbers are few thus far. Moreover, a latent process of 
decay began in many RDOs-a portion of qualified staff has left and the 
majority of those who remained started using their organization solely as 
a place of registration. The people continue to  be formally employed in 
their institutes, but in reality they actually either work on contracts for 
commercial organizations, conduct private business, or simply keep their 
jobs until retirement due t o  the old-age pension entitlement. 
At the same time, many RDOs have initiated changes. Within these 
new structures, new firms involved in spreading and disseminating R&D 
results and consulting began t o  appear. The transformation of the internal 
organization often resulted in the dismissal of unproductive workers. 
This report is devoted t o  a description of how Russian RDOs actually 
endure the freedom shock. The background study was empirically based 
on a sociological survey encompassing 21 institutes in Moscow, Novosibirsk, 
Voronej, and Vladimir; in these institutes 565 managers of units (divisions, 
laboratories), directors and their deputies were surveyed. The investigation 
has covered representatives of physical, mat hematical, chemical, biological, 
geological, technical, agricultural, and medical sciences. Approximately 25% 
of the surveyed people were employed in military RDOs, the others in insti- 
tutes concerned with civilian R&D. The survey was conducted in academic 
institutes and in industrial research organizations. Both large and small 
research institutes were selected; among these were organizations in a com- 
paratively reasonable social and economic situation as well as others on the 
brink of collapse. 
Social and Economic Situation in RDOs 
The situation in RDOs was investigated on the basis of the question: "What 
is the situation in your Institute?" The replies were distributed as follows: 
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The situation is good 2% 
The situation is difficult, but the main research 
potential has been retained 82% 
The research potential is lost, the 
organization has actually collapsed 14% 
0 t her 2% 
Total 100% 
Thus, only about 15% of the surveyed research units are in the situa- 
tion of actual disintegration. The majority indicated that despite present 
difficulties, the main research potential has been retained. 
The situation varies by regions. The most difficult (reflected by the 
evaluations of the respondents) situation was observed in Vladimir where the 
inquiry was carried out among department leaders of institutes in a research 
town specializing in military related projects. In this case, no respondent 
evaluated the situation of his institute as good and as many as 44% have 
indicated that the organization has actually collapsed (as compared with an 
average of 3-4% of the respondents in the civilian RDOs). 
The military R&D sector proved to  be in the most critical position -the 
share of decaying research units was more than 10 times that in the civilian 
R&D sector. This did not occur by chance. A key part of the cause has been 
the secrecy and accompanying isolation of military R&D; until recently, insti- 
tutes with a defense profile were prohibited to have foreign visitors and were 
isolated from the penetration of whatever changes happened elsewhere in the 
country. After the events of August 1991 the situation changed dramatically. 
Due t o  a sharp reduction of military orders, the privileged specific financing 
and material supplies for defense-related R&D were canceled. Consequently, 
the military has suffered most at the hands of freedom shock. 
Vexatious working conditions for scientists are particularly typical for 
the present situation in R&D institutes. This is clear from the survey replies 
to  the question: UHow are the work conditions and what specifically is lack- 
ing?": 
Good conditions, everything is available 12% 
Lack of machinery, equipment, instruments 69% 
Housing space is lacking for employees 30% 
Shortage of finances 7% 
Lack of information, literature 1% 
Everything is lacking 2% 
Note: The respondents could give more than one answer, therefore the total is not 100%. 
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The managers also critically evaluate not only working conditions in 
their units but also people's attitude towards their work. They have pointed 
out that the personnel's attitude towards work is: 
good 15% 
varies: 
partially good, partially bad 50% 
bad 35% 
Moreover, by evaluations the attitudes of the people surveyed towards 
their work has, on the whole, changed for the worse during the liberalization 
of the Russian economy over the last 5 to  6 years. The attitude changes 
have been as follows: 
attitude improved 34 % 
attitude worsened 38% 
attitude unchanged 28% 
At the same time, according to the opinion of the institute managers the 
quality of the research products developed in their institutes has on average 
changed for the better over the last 5 to 6 years. The responses with respect 
to research product quality indicated: 
improvement 33% 
retrogression 26% 
unchanged 41% 
Thus, a paradoxical situation has arisen. Although the respondents' at- 
titude toward their work has deteriorated, the products of their efforts have 
not necessarily suffered as a result. This paradox can be explained by the 
effect of a social mechanism compensating consequences of the worsening of 
workers' attitudes towards labor. As a matter of fact, people ensuring the 
high quality of institute work have partially compensated the deficiencies in 
the work of their badly working colleagues by doing it over again, fulfilling 
some part of the others' functions, etc. This type of compensation is possi- 
ble until the people with high quality of work are predominant in the unit. 
Despite the prevailing decline in attitude towards labor, there is no imme- 
diate negative effect on the results of the work. The potential deficiencies 
will with all probability arise, though with some lag. Evidently, in the re- 
search institutes surveyed, the accumulation of a critical mass of employees 
with a detrimental attitude towards work has not yet taken place and, for 
the time being, the deficiencies in their work are still compensated by those 
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with a positive attitude towards labor and high quality work. However, if 
the declining trend in R&D employees' attitudes continue, then a critical 
mass of bad workers may be accumulated and it will be no longer possible to  
compensate their low quality work. Subsequently, a sudden spasmodic drop 
of quality in research products will take place. 
This type of social competition may take place in stable R&D units that 
scientists formed, based on common goals and values and striving for the 
achievement of best results. Respondents' assessments of their R&D units 
were of the following character: 
Stable 64% 
Stable nucleus, remainder fluctuating 18% 
Completely unstable, proceeding with disintegration 18% 
Thus, about two-thirds of the units in the examined group were con- 
sidered stable by respondents. The others are unstable. What were the 
dynamics influencing the stability among the units of varying types during 
the last year of transition? In order to determine this, we asked managers 
about how many research workers entered and left their units during the 
last year. We also asked that their responses be given separately for highly 
qualified staff and junior employees. 
As is seen from Table 1, the unstable R&D collectives have been launched 
on a path of rapid disintegration. If this rapid tempo is maintained in the 
future, then these units will cease to  exist in 1 to  3 years or perhaps earlier. 
And, this refers to  about one-third of all units surveyed. 
According to respondents' assessments, a portion of the scientific workers 
would like to  work abroad-40%. The share of young academics with this 
goal number is 1.5 times more at 60%. The desire to  go abroad to work is 
particularly noticeable amongst scientific workers in collapsing R&D units 
(see Table 2). This trend, however, is also visible among the employees of 
the stable R&D collectives as well: more than one-third of all the highly 
qualified workers and more than a half of the young ones. 
In our investigation the questionnaire was amended in order to  determine 
employees' motivation to  leave their R&D units. 
The managers' impressions were as follows: 
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Low salaries 69% 
Instability of the organization 19% 
No promise for the future 16% 
Absence of housing and other social facilities 9% 
Conflicts with administration 3% 
The employees can not cope with their work 2% 
The employees no longer wish to work in science 2% 
Clearly, the main motive for leaving was low payment of scientific work- 
ers. Indeed, their average salary (based on survey results) was about 500 
rubles a month at the beginning of 1992, which is 1.5 to 2 times lower than 
in industry. Other important motives influencing relocation, the instability 
of scientific organizations and absence of future perspectives for the employ- 
ees. These are motives directly related to the disintegration of scientific 
organizations. 
In an average Russian RDO there are now usually 30-40 scientific sepa- 
rate institutes, each consisting of 15-20 scientific workers. In spite of reason- 
able stability at the individual institute level, many of the scientific collec- 
tives are disintegrating. And, due to the pyramid effect, one fading collective 
symbolizes the abandonment of a multiple number of individual institutes. 
The decay process of established organizations and individual units is 
the inevitable social cost of the attempt to establish a market system in 
Russia. 
Business Experience of RDO 
In considering the problems of "science" and "market," three central issues 
stand out. Firstly, and most crucial, the sharp decrease of State budget 
allocations. The second issue follows directly from the first and refers to the 
necessity of RDOs to look for additional financial resources elsewhere in the 
economy. The third issue is focussed on the use of new opportunities by the 
R&D institutes as offered to them by the new state rehabilitation policy. 
The situation arising due to these circumstances is evaluated using so-called 
"market" terminology (such terms as "demand," "competition," etc.). In 
this case, however, i t  has only relative character considering its application 
to the present conditions of economic life in Russia. 
Nowadays, Russian RDOs find themselves in a "quasi market situation." 
No longer do any strict state guarantees exist that secure adequate demand 
for their scientific products. The post-Soviet R&D institutes of today are 
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forced to  search for real customers and enter into contract agreements as 
done elsewhere in the world where market economics prevail. T h e  survival 
of Russian R&D organizations now depends a great deal on the availability 
of real customers for their research products. 
This conclusion was founded on replies to  the questionnaire inquiry: 
"Are there customers available for research products of your institute 
(unit)?" The R&D managers responded as follows: 
No customers available 20% 
Customers available 80% 
The optimistic overall result is somewhat deceiving when the regions are 
viewed individually as in Table 3. The optimal situation is in Moscow, where 
the managers have pointed out that a generous stock of customers exist for 
the products of their R&D units. The worst situation is in Vladimir, where 
customer availability ranks 23 percentage points lower than in Moscow. Re- 
calling the particular specialization of R&D institutes in the field of military 
developments in Vladimir, the situation at the moment of the survey was 
not as catastrophical as one may have expected. 
Setting up a market system in the field of research and development 
envisages the presence of competition for the customers' attention. Our 
questionnaire asked whether the managers of the institutes have felt such 
competition? The responses listed in Table 4 imply that such competition 
actually takes place in the Russian research and development sector, albeit 
variably among the scientific centers. 
The strongest competition was visible also where the greatest number 
of potential customers had been recorded; namely, in Moscow. Vladimir, 
which had registered a lack of expected customers, was also confronted with 
the weakest competitive conditions. Nevertheless, the majority of the people 
surveyed were of the opinion that competition is present between institutes 
for customers within the country as well as abroad. In fact, domestically 
speaking, the managers indicated the presence of an average of three com- 
peting R&D institutions. 
still, i t  would be premature to  speak seriously about the availability 
of real market competition in the field of research and development a t  the 
time of this survey. Presently, one can only reflect on an anticipation of 
competition. As a matter of fact, all the RDO are state-owned and will 
continue to  be formerly bound by multiple instructions in their economic 
activities. Those RDOs are protected from bankruptcy even in the event of 
an unsuccessful search for customers. And, if ever such a state RDO is t o  be 
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liquidated, then the reasons will rather be administrative and political than 
economic. 
The above-mentioned lack of true competition is especially accurate a t  
the international level. In the replies depicted in Table 4, Russian R&D 
managers were aware of very few foreign firms that  might be interested 
in acquiring research results. Due t o  this relatively small pool, which could 
increase significantly with the progressive integration of Russian R&D in the 
global scientific community facilitated through improved communication and 
information systems, there exists some wrangling for the still small group 
of foreign potential customers. However, this is still far from market style 
competition. 
Although there is little real market competition in the field of research 
and development for the moment, just the anticipation of competitive forces 
has proven t o  flush out more new customers than was the case where compe- 
tition was avoided. R&D managers and institutes facing competition made 
greater efforts to  find customers and were rewarded (see Table 5). The num- 
ber of those who found new customers is 1.5 times higher among the ones 
enduring the competition. 
In order t o  operate more or less successfully under market conditions, 
any organization must study the demand for its products and its dynamics. 
In an effort t o  determine whether this was in fact happening in the RDOs 
surveyed, the managers were asked: "Have you studied the demand for the 
- 
products of your research organization?" It turned out that  demand was 
studied by 53% of the respondents, while 47% have not given i t  any thought. 
Thus, the majority of managers did investigate the possibilities of marketing 
their product in a more consumer oriented fashion. These R&D managers 
have realized that  the survival of their organizations will depend on t h e  
visibility and demand-determined character of their research results. Such 
factors are instrumental in determining the demand. In the market analysis 
regarding the products of their R&D institutes, managers expected demand 
to: 
remain unchanged 21% 
increase 37% 
decrease 34% 
collapse 8% 
The expectations of managers should not be considered pessimistic, par- 
ticularly in lieu of the anticipated difficulties associated with the overall 
national transition t o  a market economy. Indeed, more than a half of the 
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respondents expected the demand for their products t o  either increase or a t  
least remain unchanged. 
The interest of R&D institute managers in the demand for scientific 
goods and their expectations of possible changes in that  demand were consid- 
erably variable depending on the scientific center, as portrayed in Table 6. In 
Moscow, leaders of R&D institutes were most actively studying the demand 
for their products. Recall, that  this was also the city where competition was 
perceived t o  be greatest. Both Moscow and Novosibirsk respondents were 
most optimistic about possible changes in the demand for scientific products. 
The leaders of scientific units in Vladimir were most pessimistic and showed 
least interest in analyzing potential demand for their research products. The 
pessimism and limited interest of Vladimir managers were the result of very 
recent and unanticipated information concerning a radical decrease in mili- 
tary orders. In addition, the situation regarding conversion of the military 
RDOs must, as yet, be clearly defined. Presently, uncertainty exists with 
respect t o  whether state budget funds will be available for this process. 
Thus the  majority of RDO managers have some experience working with- 
out  state support when they have been left to  their own resorts. Most of 
them, a t  least a t  the  theoretical level, are reasonably familiar with the def- 
initions of "demand," Ucompetition," "marketing," and Ubankruptcy," al- 
though none of these managers have ever been subject to  bankruptcy pro- 
cedures or an  education in marketing rules as they are known in today's 
market economies. 
The  process of liberalizing the economy and society of Russia began 
in Moscow. Consequently, managers of R&D organizations in Moscow are 
most experienced in business life. The liberalization process reached the 
so-called military towns later than other places; that  is, the towns where 
modern weapons and defense equipment were designed and produced. Until 
recently, these towns were largely insulated from economic changes that  
effected the  rest of the  nation. They enjoyed priority status. For this reason, 
the mentality in military RDOs now resembles the stereotype of leaders 
in civil institutes 2 to  3 years ago. However, the rate of transformation 
in the country now is far more dramatic than i t  was only several years 
ago. In addition t o  the problems facing their specific sector, i t  has become 
increasingly troublesome for the leaders of the military RDOs t o  plunge into 
the modern economic and social reality of Russia without the experience 
of activities on the "Soviet market," which the civil leaders have already 
acquired. 
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An analysis of the business experience of RDOs is testimony to the  fact 
that  the  established organizational and economic forms of their activities 
have become outdated. The most common type of such an organization 
was a state scientific research institute employing an average of 700-800 
people and subordinate t o  a Branch Ministry or the Academy of Sciences. 
A latent process of disintegration of these institutes, the degradation of 
the system of state management, as well as the appearance of a non-state 
research organizations sector, compels managers of existing RDOs t o  search 
for ways t o  revive their institutes. 
Attempts at Revival 
The principal changes in RDOs are likely t o  follow two paths: 
1. The changes in relations with the Ministries. The main issue revolves 
around whether and, if so, t o  what degree the RDOs should remain 
subordinate t o  the respective Ministries. 
2. The change in the  economic status of a research institute. The poten- 
tial alternatives are: t o  maintain a single organization, t o  split up into 
several independent institutes, t o  remain a state-owned organization, or  
t o  establish a non-state research firm. 
A free rational choice of a type of subordination for an RDO envisages 
estimating positive and negative implications of the existing type, compar- 
ison with others, and a final decision based on such a comparison. The 
R&D managers' impressions regarding the implications of subordination was 
tested by posing the question: "What are the positive and negative sides of 
the existing subordination of your RDO?" As is seen from the assessments 
of managers presented in Table 7 the disadvantages in the existing subor- 
dination system predominate. Nevertheless, the responses also indicated 
the presence of positive factors resulting from a formal association with a 
Ministry, such as guarantees for financing research projects, salaries, and 
material and technical supplies. 
The conclusion to  be drawn due t o  the predominance of negative points 
over positive ones as a consequence of subordination is statistically sup- 
ported by the replies t o  the survey question; "Should your RDO change its 
subordination?" The responses were distributed as follows: 
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Preserve existing subordination 43% 
Transfer to  a different Ministry 5% 
RDO must become independent 52% 
At the same time the managers have no illusions about the consequences 
of leaving the safe refuge of the Ministry. Although this decision can resolve 
numerous present issues, the majority of R&D managers realized that some 
problems will be aggravated and new difficulties will be provoked. This is 
clear from the following replies to  the question: "What difficulties are ahead 
for your organization if it becomes independent?" 
Financial situation will be aggravated 59% 
Difficulties regarding the material and technical supplies 
for research and experimentation 48% 
Redundancy of some divisions and the dismissal of many 
workers on the grounds of redundancy 47% 
Cancellation of research projects which do not produce results 
for immediate practical applications 33% 
Loss of customers 13% 
Internal conflicts 12% 
Weakening international contacts 8% 
The RDOs have long been integrated in the Ministerial hierarchy in one 
manner or another. It is difficult to  predict how a research institute will fare 
on the open market, separated from most of the structural and organizational 
ties that had traditionally secured its livelihood. The managers were asked 
their opinion with respect to  the possible consequences for a R&D institute 
once it had broken its ministerial ties and whether this would improve or 
aggravate the performance and vitality of individual RDOs. The managers 
indicated: 
The institute will improve its position 31% 
Nothing will change 13% 
The situation will deteriorate 38% 
The institute will disintegrate 18% 
Thus, the opinions of the leaders diverge. While slightly less than a half 
believe their Institute will not worsen its position, 56% expect the contrary 
to  take placeleaving the Ministry will aggravate the situation. 
Despite the expected difficulties, the managers appear determined to  
initiate changes. They want to  change both the RDO subordination to  Min- 
istries and the economic status of their organizations. This is the conclusion 
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one can draw from the replies to the question: "Is it necessary to change 
the economic status of your RDO? If yes, then how?" The detailed answers 
were as follows: 
Nothing should be changed 26% 
Create an enterprise division for high technology within 
the RDO to implement the results of RDO projects 
Transform the RDO into a joint stock company 
Divide the RDO into several organizations 
Merge the RDO with an industrial production enterprise 
Sell the RDO to a foreign firm 
Combine the RDO with a University 
Transform the RDO into a private organization 
The managers' plans to  transform their organizations are rather radi- 
cal; 75% of them think it necessary to change the economic status of their 
organization. The potential changes are directed towards production and 
commercial activities, i.e., setting up a production plant within the institute, 
transformation of the institute into a joint stock company, and so forth. The 
implementation of these plans may lead to the reorientation of a considerable 
portion of the RDOs from pure scientific research to solely commercial or a 
combination of scientific and commercial activities. During this process, the 
loss of some scientific potential is inevitable. However, such reorientation is, 
on the whole, positive. In principle, it can improve the creative and intellec- 
tual potential of newly arising Russian business, making it more receptive 
to  technological innovations. And, finally, such reorientation may accelerate 
the development of a real market economy. 
Potential Entrepreneurs 
If ever a market for research and development is to be established in Russia, 
then a wide strata of entrepreneurs must be activated. However, it is ques- 
tionable whether the present social basis is appropriate for the formation 
of such a strata. Uncertainty also exists regarding the availability of capa- 
ble persons willing to participate in entrepreneurship connected with science 
and the practical realization of scientific ideas? 
Considering the possible magnitude of these obstacles, it is in the interest 
of a successful transition to a market economy that we determine the man- 
agers' willingness to  initiate entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, managers 
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were asked the question: "Would you like to establish a private research 
organization?" The answers revealed that 26% of the respondents wished to 
set up a private firm. If one cans assume this assessment to be correct and 
combines it with the fact that the number of scientific units in the RDOs of 
Russia number about 50,000, then the quantity of potential entrepreneurs 
solely from the available managers could constitute over 12,000. In principle, 
this quantity of entrepreneurs would be sufficient for the initial formation of 
a market for research and development and competition in the marketing of 
scientific products would be established. 
The aims to be pursued by the owners of the newly created research are, 
however, very important firms as are the reasons they chose to start their 
own businesses. In order to ascertain their actual intentions, managers were 
asked the following question: "Why would you like to establish your own 
firm?" The responses were distributed as follows: 
Improve the personal standard of living 80% 
Create a strong research group 63% 
Make developments useful for the production 49% 
Obtain a significant scientific result 42% 
Establish contacts with western firms 34% 
Attain commercial success 30% 
Achieve personal independence 24% 
Acquire the opportunity to make important decisions 11% 
Establish a private research 4% 
It is striking that the motive of achieving personal independence by 
establishing one's own firm was one of the more infrequent answers. The 
most popular objective reiterated was the keen desire to improve one's well- 
being, At the same time, commercial success was revealed as a relatively 
less important motive. The major intentions of R&D managers, if they 
were given the opportunity to establish firms, were admiral and less profit 
oriented. A strong desire among specialists calls for achieving meaningful 
scientific results for the benefit of improving production. This is, to a large 
extent, the product of traditional discipline and scientific aversion to market 
directives. 
Based on these motives, it is possible that a market will be formed where 
the agents will operate not so much for the sake of profit-seeking but rather 
for a small and stable income. The R&D specialists will be striving to find 
important sponsors while simultaneously demonstrating a low inclination to 
take risks. 
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Indeed, such conduct is quite natural a t  present. The living standard of 
scientists is not high and the risk of failure in starting one's own business 
is very high. Thus, by respondents' estimations, the present probability of 
success in the attempt to  establish a private firm is only 28%. I t  is obvious 
that with so low chances for success, very few will be willing to  start their 
own business. 
However, the mere fact of the availability of such plans among a consid- 
erable part of the respondents provides sufficient grounds t o  suppose that 
there is a social basis for creating a market for research and development. 
Yet, the query arises with respect to  who constitutes this group of poten- 
tial entrepreneurs. According to  our analysis, the potentid entrepreneurs 
do not differ from "state science supporters" according t o  any particular 
features as age, work period appointment, or formal scientific achievements. 
Nonetheless, they do differ regarding their systems of values or, to  be more 
precise, regarding more pronounced aims concerning the existence of their 
organizations. Thus, only 33% of the potential entrepreneurs believe that  
their organization must retain the existing subordination, while the corre- 
sponding number among the "state science supporters" is 44%. The former 
are more optimistic about the prospects for their RDO's future upon leav- 
ing the existing subordination: 41% of potential entrepreneurs think that 
their organization will improve its position compared to  only 27% of the 
"supporters of state science" with the same opinion. 
The preceding points elucidate R&D managers' desires and expectations 
with respect to  establishing private research and development enterprises free 
from direct state intervention. As a logical epilogue, our survey concluded 
by inquiring about the nature of the conditions that must be present for the 
managers t o  undertake the still very risky process of establishing a private 
research firm. Their responses were as follows: 
Guarantees for private property on behalf of the State 60% 
The transfer of some part of the property belonging to  
the RDO into the private ownership 52% 
Renting some part of the RDO property 38% 
The possibility to  obtain an inexpensive credit 37% 
The most important condition has institutional character and envisages 
a change in the governmental attitude towards private property. Nowadays, 
this attitude on the part of higher authorities is not clearly defined. The 
government's attitude towards private property is more or less positive but 
that  of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation was, so far, rather 
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indefinite and contradictory. In addition, the attitudes of local authorities 
were still more reserved. Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect the radical 
implementation of Russian R&D managers' plans to establish private firms 
before the aut horitiea' attitudes towards private property is not changed, 
unified, and predictable. 
Conclusion 
Today, Russian RDOs find themselves in a state of freedom-shock. They 
endure a massive burden of economic and social problems. A latent de- 
cay process is going on in many institutes. While the number of scientists 
completely breaking out of the scientific community remains fairly low, the 
inflow of young people to  RDOs has abruptly decreased. 
These processes are the social cost of the liberalization of the economy 
and political life in Russia. In addition, the inherited functions and struc- 
tures of research organizations do not correspond to  the requirements of a 
free society and deregulated economy. Therefore, this shock is inevitable 
during the transition process towards a liberated modern society. 
However, the freedom-shock is slowly passing. New (for Russia) types 
of scientific research organizations are beginning to appear; the state RDO 
are looking for new forms and directions of activities. A social basis for 
the market economy in the field of R&D is being created. If social stability 
is achieved and retained, the freedom-shock may completely disappear in 
a few years. In the process, a scientific community corresponding to  the 
requirements of a modern society will have been created. 
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Table 1. Dynamics of employment of scientific workers in R&D units of 
various types (in percent). 
Net change including 
Type of units in staff Highly qualified Junior 
(S) . employees employees 
Stable -7 -4 -3 
Stable nucleus -31 -12 -10 
Disintegrating -26 -14 -4 
Note: S = (9) x loo%, where Sn = number of newly employed; 
S1 = number of those who left; 
Sp = total personnel in the R&D unit. 
Table 2. R&D Managers' assessments of the desire among scientific em- 
ployees t o  work abroad (in percent). 
Persons wishing to  work abroad among 
Type of units Highly qualified employees Junior employees 
Stable 3 7 54 
Stable nucleus 40 68 
Disintegrating 50 70 
Table 3. Potential customers for research products in selected Russian cities 
(in percent). 
Cities Customers available Not available 
Moscow 95 5 
Novosibirsk 86 14 
Voronej 78 22 
Vladimir 72 28 
Table 4. Presence of competition for customers in selected Russian cities 
(in percent). 
Cities 
Competition for customers: 
domestically abroad 
ves no ves no 
Moscow 76 24 68 32 
Novosibirsk 67 33 69 3 1 
Voronej 69 31 6 1 39 
Vladimir 50 50 23 7 7 
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Table 5. Influence of competition on the success of finding new domestic 
customers for R&D results in Russia (in percent).' 
Availability of Domestic Appearance of No new 
Customers new customers customers 
With competition availability 74 26 
Without competition 55 45 
*R&D managers' replies recorded in response to the question: "Have you found new 
customers during the last years?" 
Table 0.  R&D managers investigating the dynamics of demand for R&D 
results in selected Russian scientific centers (in percent). 
Those of which: % expecting demand 
Scientific studying 1 not to to in- to de- 
Novosibirsk 55 
Voronej 54 
Vladimir 4 7 
Centers demand 
Moscow 64 
change crease crease collapse 
2 1 4 7 3 1 1 
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Table 7. Managers' assessments of implications regarding the existing sub- 
ordination of their RDO (in percent).' 
Positive implications: 
Stable financing 3 7 
Guaranteed employment 23 
Guaranteed material and technical supplies 22 
Relative independence from a customer and current 
requirements of production 
Representation of the interests of the organization 
directly t o  the Government 
Social facilities and other fringe benefits (privileges) 
for the workers 9 
Negative implications: 
Impossible to  reward employees according 
t o  performance 4 7 
Appointment of directors from above 28 
Large financial payments t o  Ministry 28 
Impossible t o  rationally reorganize the 
management of the RDO 
Regulation of the choice of research topics from above 22 
Limitations for establishing non-state structures 
within the RDO 
*Managers could give more than one answer. 
Privatization Policy and the 
Potential Effects on R&D 
Organization 
Alezandr Kazakou' 
The law concerning privatization was adopted in the Russian Federation 
in July 1991. However, until January 1992 privatization was implemented 
in practice only on an extremely limited scale. This can be explained by a 
number of factors. 
The major problem was the existence of property sharing. This proved t o  
be a crucial obstacle t o  the determination of whether an  enterprise belonged 
t o  federal, regional, or  municipal authorities. The issue remained unsolved 
for a prolonged period. 
Furthermore, after the law had already been adopted, there was no clear 
conception of the local nature of its implementation. The process of pri- 
vatization was more and more lost in idle talk. In turn, this caused the 
stagnation of the  process t o  create a legislative and legal basis for privatiza- 
tion. Until January 1992, the process of establishment and development of 
an  organizational infrastructure for privatization was extremely lethargic. 
With the adoption of the "Principle Provisions for the Programme of 
Privatization" by the Government of Russia, one of basic deterrents t o  rapid 
privatization processes has been removed. Major legislative acts and con- 
ventional documents, which regulate the sequence and procedure applicable 
for these processes, have been introduced. Since February 1992, the  center 
authority and responsibility for privatization procedures have been shifted 
'Head of Chief Directorate on Organization of Territorial Committees, Committee for 
Management for State-Owned Property of the RFR, Russia. 
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t o  the  regional level, making i t  yet even closer t o  practical organizational 
moves. 
I t  is worth mentioning that ,  on the whole, the privatization policy of the 
Russian Government is supported by local authorities. Sessions of 69 Re- 
gional and Territorial Soviets have adopted local programs of privatization, 
which essentially have no contradictions to  the conception laid out  in the 
official Principle Pmvisions for the Programme of Privatization. In other 
regions, local programs have been tested in labor teams and a t  sessions of 
local Soviets t o  be subsequently discussed a t  regional sessions in the nearest 
future. After month-long, active disputes, the decision of the Tomskyi Re- 
gional Soviet regarding a suspension of the "Principle Provisions. . . " powers 
on the territory of the region was rejected by the subsequent session. 
The  regional programs differ from the governmental program chiefly due 
t o  the absence of an  opportunity t o  accomplish the compulsory tasks stip- 
ulated in the latter. For instance, in only 2 out of 69 programs approved 
by local authorities will the income management from privatization be a 
regional responsibility. In the remaining cases, the appointed property man- 
agement committees consider these as too difficult, unrealistic, and beyond 
their means. This conclusion is confirmed by the analysis of recent finan- 
cial receipts obtained from privatization. Out of eight billion rubles planned 
for the first quarter of 1992, only 414 million rubles have been received in 
January-February. However, the funds received in March are expected t o  
be twice as much (850 million rubles). 
In practice, the process of privatization has been modified over time. 
Originally, objects were sold on the basis of developed legislative documents. 
In fact, the right t o  rent or lease objects t o  enterprises was sold, which sub- 
sequently have the right to  buy t o  objects outright. This may be explained 
by the fact that  the employees of these enterprises are entitled t o  net profits 
which are quite significant in many cases as a result of the price rise and are 
often sufficient for acquiring property even within the first year of the lease. 
The  most active sales took place in January and February 1992 in the  
Ekaterinburgskaya, Rostovskaya, Kaluzhskaya, and some other regions. The  
participants in privatization (primarily emp1oyees)were most active in the 
Nizheorodskaya, Ekaterinburgskaya, Vladimirskaya, Samarkaya, Permskaya, 
and some other regions. The  proficiency of the privatization process and the 
willingness of the population t o  participate is explained mainly by sufficient 
preparation of the proper regional committees for a process of wide-scale 
privatization. 
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In general, the privatization concept included in legislative and standard 
documents of the Government have been confirmed as the correct direction 
t o  follow. At the same time, the analysis of the socio-economic and po- 
litical situation requires considerable acceleration of the implementation of 
personal privatization accounts and other simplified ways of a voucher-type 
distribution of titles among the citizens of Russia. 
At present, the success of the governmental privatization policy depends 
on factors related t o  time. The 'Principle Pmuisions for Programme of 
Pn'uatization" and the subsequent legal documents have appeared a t  a criti- 
cal moment in the transition t o  a market economy. Any further delay would 
result in a return t o  a state in which privatization becomes lost in an idle ver- 
bal struggle between the central government and regional and branch trade 
unions. The privatization policy of the Government is carefully followed by 
political opponents. Its weaknesses and contradictions in its implementation 
may provoke social conflicts. 
However, the necessity for rapid application is accompanied by various 
dangers because of a permanent inflow of official clarifications, which often 
change rules of the game. Such a situation is unavoidable if the participants 
of the process loose the correct direction. The true privatization must also 
be accelerated due t o  its influence on the associated fiscal problems. For 
this reason, i t  is necessary t o  resolve a number of essential and practical 
problems that  continue t o  obstruct privatization. 
In 1992, most enterprises will become private by means of the  transfor- 
mation into open-type joint-stock companies. Irrespective t o  the preferences 
t o  be granted for staff members, this method of privatization may be too 
complicated for the present legislation even if preferences are granted in- 
dividually. In conformance with the Law on Property, the net profit of a 
state-owned enterprise may be used by its employees and similarly, in the 
case of a joint-stock company the employees may expect a share of net profit 
proportional to  their stocks in the  common property. It is also necessary 
t o  clarify a mortgage-mode for the  operation of state-run enterprises, a pri- 
vatization policy with respect t o  the leased enterprises, and t o  ensure the 
coordination of legislative acts as a whole. 
The  privatization of large industrial facilities, which have complex in- 
ternal structures, is another problem. It is necessary t o  fix rules for the 
determination of limits of complex facilities for potential privatization. In 
order t o  specify preferences for the employees of such facilities, i t  is nec- 
essary t o  determine "limits" of ownership for their employees. There are 
also problems concerning the privatization of enterprises that  were estab- 
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lished as joint-ventures of state-owned enterprises, and further problems of 
the privatization for the employees of those enterprises. 
When usmall" objects are subject to  privatization, it is necessary t o  
ensure no contradiction of distinctive norms of privatization with respect 
to  the general trends of the privatization policy. Any correction of this 
policy when only a single buyer is acceptable, which is aimed at  preventing 
bankruptcy, can be added together with a strict control mechanism t o  avoid 
breaches of trust. Such breaches are possible in this case and may cause 
social and political troubles, not to  mention increased opposition t o  the 
privatization process. 
At this time, it is necessary to  prepare a financial infrastructure for 
privatization, as well as institutions and means of selling stocks in order 
to  prevent a slowdown of privatization in the second stage of the  process. 
Furthermore, it is necessary t o  create a clear system of informational support 
t o  control and monitor privatization. This would include: 
arrangingasystemofmeaningfulstatistics,and 
ensuring wide access t o  information provided by the property commit- 
tees. 
The management of R&D, both a t  the privatized and to-be-privatized 
enterprises can soon reap the  benefits of membership in an increasingly 
market-oriented economy. Nevertheless, the  change from state-ownership 
and all its associated security t o  private self-management will cause firm 
managers t o  review the values of various segments of their enterprise. As we 
now know, R&D had a very special position in the past. Therefore, a sector 
of the economy which had even been insulated and isolated from Soviet-style 
market transactions will be forced t o  delve into the rigors of market life with 
the rest of the enterprises as a result of the extensive state privatization 
program. 
Changes in Russian Science 
Administration Policy: The 
First Steps 
Aleksei E. Levin,' 
Since the fall of 1991, Russian science administration and policy have 
undergone important transformations. Far-reaching changes have been made 
in the agencies responsible for the administration of science and higher edu- 
cation. In particular, a Russian Academy of Sciences has been created and 
new Russian science policy-making agencies have been set up. 
Among the changes that followed the attempted coup in Moscow in 
August 1991 was a major reorganization of the state agencies responsible for 
the administration of science and higher education. On 20 November 1991, 
Russia, the largest of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, ceased 
financing some eighty central agencie~.~ As a result, the structures of science 
administration, as well as those of defense-related research and development, 
have begun to disintegrate rapidly; some laboratories, including those of even 
the best research institutes, are often unable to procure some of the most 
basic materials, such as high-quality spirits for the conservation of biological 
specimens.3 On 21 November 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued 
'Research Associate, University of Maryland, USA 
2For example, about half of the main and one-third of the subsidiary research institutes 
subordinated to government ministries reportedly received budgetary financing to the end 
of 1991 (Radikal, No. 40, 1991, p. 3). 
'In October 1991, the Institute of General and Inorganic Chemistry of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences did not have nitric acid and oxygen cylinders (information received by 
the author from Professor Sergei Dembovsky). Shortages such as  these have been caused 
to some extent by the disorganized state of industry and the procurement systems and 
thus cannot be regarded simply as an outcome of the recent political changes in Russia. 
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a decree restoring the Russian Academy of Sciences and paving the way 
for the dissolution of its USSR counterpart, which had existed since 1925. 
Important changes have also occurred in two science policy-making agencies: 
the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the Russian 
State Committee for Science and Higher Education. 
The Soviet versus the Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
The first steps toward formally establishing a Russian Academy of Sciences 
were taken in January 1990 .~  Subsequently, the Yeltsin government used 
the idea of a Russian Academy as a political weapon in its confrontations 
with the central government. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's 
decree from 23 August 1990 granted full autonomy to  the USSR Academy 
of Sciences and gave the Academy exclusive ownership rights t o  the state 
property that had previously been at  its disposal. The decree, however, was 
not fully recognized by the Russian Supreme Soviet, which insisted on the 
Republic's right to  manage, among other things, the Academy's land, build- 
ings, and collections. In February 199 1, when the political confrontation 
between the Kremlin and Russia's White House was much in evidence, the 
Russian parliament gave the green light for the establishment of a Russian 
Academy of Sciences. On 25 March, the Presidium of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet approved the creation of a special body, the Central Organizational 
Committee, whose task was to work out the organizational structure of the 
new institution; it also appointed Academician Yurii Osipov as the chairman 
of the committee. 
On July 17, the Central Organizational Committee approved the reg- 
ulations for the initial elections to  the Academy.' Later, the committee 
assumed some additional prerogatives that it had not been formally granted 
by the Russian parliament; and it began virtually to  function as the interim 
ruling body of the future Russian Academy of Sciences. It appointed twelve 
regional committees to  organize and supervise the elections and published 
'See Aleksei E. Levin, "Soviet Science: Towards a Civil Society," Report on the USSR, 
No. 44, 1990. For a history of the bizarre bureaucratic and public games that preceded 
the establishment of a Russian Academy, see V.P. Fedotov's article in EKO, No. 8, 1991, 
pp. 55-61. 
'~oisk,  No. 33, 1991, p. 4. 
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the list of candidates running in the e l e ~ t i o n s . ~  The regional committees 
were given the right t o  appoint 70% of the electors; 20% were appointed by 
the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the remaining 10% by the Central Or- 
ganizational Committee itself. In early December 1991, the electors met in 
Moscow t o  vote in the two rounds of elections. The final vote took place on 6 
December; thirty-nine candidates were elected full members of the Academy 
and 108 corresponding members. Among the latter was chairman of the 
Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov. No fewer than twenty-one of 
the thirty-nine newly elected full members live in Moscow, despite the stated 
intention of the Central Organizational Committee t o  overcome the alleged 
monopoly of the "metropolitan" scientific community. 
Immediately after the failure of the August coup, the Russian govern- 
ment began taking over important central institutions, particularly the fi- 
nancial ones. The leadership of the USSR Academy of Sciences found itself 
in a rather awkward position since it definitely could not afford to  alienate 
Yeltsin and his associates and thereby risk losing budgetary financing by 
the Russian treasury. On 17 September 1991, in an apparent attempt to  
avdd  a direct confrontation with the Russian leadership, the Presidium of 
the Academy voted in favor of abolishing its All-Union status and reinstat- 
ing i ts  former name, the Russian Academy of Sciences, by which i t  had been 
known from 1917 to  1925.' Only one day earlier, the USSR State Coun- 
cil had passed a non-binding resolution aimed a t  ensuring that the sciences 
were funded jointly by the republics. This move was preceded by a meeting 
between Gorbachev and the president and vice presidents of the Academy 
on 12 September 1991.' Apparently, the resolution was a symbolic, albeit 
well-meant gesture; but the problem of jointly funding scientific research was 
still not solved. 
The decision taken by the Academy's Presidium on 17 September seemed 
to  reflect grave doubts among members of the Academy about that  insti- 
tution's chances of survival without the direct patronage of Russia. After 
Gorbachev had met with the leaders of the Academy on 23 September (the 
second such meeting within one month) and had repeated his pledge to  se- 
cure adequate funding for the sciences, the Presidium decided on 1 October 
t o  recommend the preservation of the All-Union Academy of Sciences as a 
body of elite scientists modeled partly on the European Academy (which was 
61bid., No. 44, 1991, pp. 3-4, and 13; and No. 45, 1991, p. 2. 
'lzvestiya, 18 September 1991, p. 1. 
 bid., 17 September 1991, p. 2. 
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established as a "joint venture" involving twenty-four countries) and partly 
on the US National Academy of Sciences. The resolutions adopted on 17 
September and 1 October were finally approved by the Academy's General 
Assembly on 10 October 1991.' 
Also a t  the 1 October meeting, the Presidium yielded to  demands by the 
influential Voters' Club of the Academy and other reform-minded scientists. 
I t  approved the plans to  convene a conference of the Academy's research 
employees, the first ever in the history of the institution. On 13 November it 
was announced that the conference would take place in Moscow from 10 to  
12 December and that  a wide variety of problems would be discussed, such as 
organizing and financing research in Russia, social protection for scientists, 
laying the legal foundations for the activities of research institutions, and 
the migration of scientists. I t  was also announced that the delegates to  
the conference would be democratically elected at  the Academy's research 
institutes in the proportion of one delegate per 100 research employees. 
Even before the General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences had 
adopted the resolutions mentioned above on 10 October, the Academy's lead- 
ership met with Khasbulatov and proposed that its newly elected members 
be invited to  participate in the December session of the Academy on an equal 
footing with the other members. This "integrated" general assembly would 
then adopt the charter of the new "unified" Russian Academy of Sciences 
(drafted by a specially appointed Conciliation Commission headed by the 
Academicians Yurii Osip'yan and Yurii Osipov), define the Academy's struc- 
ture, and elect its ruling bodies. The proposal, reportedly endorsed by Khas- 
bulatov and Yeltsin, aimed to  establish a restructured Russian Academy of 
Sciences by 1992 in which membership would be elected more democratically 
and research employees would have more say in management affairs. In ad- 
dition, the December conference of research employees was seen to constitute 
an initial step toward the first All-Russian Congress of Scientists. Both ideas 
(the restructuring of the All-Union Academy of Sciences under the aegis of 
Russia and the holding of the congress) were finally given Yeltsin's official 
blessing in the Russian president's programmatic address t o  the Congress of 
People's Deputies on 28 October 1991. The next day, Yeltsin met with the 
chairman and other leaders of the USSR Academy of Sciences and personally 
'Poisk, No. 42, 1991, pp. 1 and 4-5. 
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pledged that  Russia would provide its newly restructured, unified Academy 
with sufficient funds.1° 
It is still unclear how the  problem of the continuing existence of some 
formerly All-Union academic structures will eventually be solved, and in- 
deed, whether i t  will be solved a t  all. On 11 October, the  presidents of 
all republican academies, including those of the independent Baltic States, 
participated in a session of the Council of Presidents of the Academies of 
Sciences, which was also attended by the President of the USSR Academy 
of Sciences, Yurii Marchuk." 
At the session, i t  was decided t o  establish a special committee charged 
with drawing up a document on the creation of a new interrepublican Aca- 
demic institution as well as with drafting its charter. If ever created, this 
institution is unlikely to  have research institutes of its own but will possibly 
be affiliated with some large research centers whose activities are deemed by 
the new sovereign states t o  be mutually beneficial. 
In 1990 and 1991, all the republican academies of sciences gained full 
financial and administrative independence from the USSR Academy. Begin- 
ning in 1992, they were t o  be funded predominantly by their own states. 
Even in 1991, some 80% of their financial resources came from the central 
government via the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. Al- 
though the leaders of the republican academies seem genuinely interested in 
establishing some international framework for future cooperation, the final 
decision on whether to  go ahead with the creation of a new interrepubli- 
can academic institution is likely to be determined mainly by political and 
economic factors. The  same applies to  a planned interrepublican agency 
responsible for administrating funds for the sciences. 
The 1991 budget of the USSR Academy of Sciences was some 10% larger 
than that  for 1990; but owing to  the fact that  the average costs of scientific 
research increased by 120%,12 the  Academy made a loss in real terms. In 
1991, the Academy's total revenues amounted t o  2.5 billion rubles: 1.4 billion 
received in budgetary allocations, 450 million in capital investments, and 
'OInformation received by the author from the Vice President of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences Oleg Nefedov. 
"Information received by the author from the Director of the Staff of the Council of 
Presidents. of the academies of Sciences, Professor Sergei Gubin. The council was estab 
lished after the presidents of all fifteen Academies of Sciences (the USSR Academy and 
fourteen republican Academies) had signed an agreement on cooperation in September 
1990. 
12~nformation received by the author from the Vice President of the USSR Academy. 
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200 million earned on a contractual basis. However, in 1991 the Academy's 
budget deficit totaled 200 million rubles.13 Some of its largest institutes, such 
as the Institute for Space Research and the Institute of Physical Chemistry, 
were facing a financial crisis. To make matters worse, the Academy received 
no hard currency for purchasing foreign equipment. 
The Academy's financial prospects for 1992 continued t o  be uncertain, 
although the Russian leadership promised that  its budgetary allocations will 
be more or less equal t o  those of 1990 in real terms. A national foundation 
for funding scientific research, announced in Gorbachev's decree "On the 
Status of the  USSR Academy of Sciences" of 23 August 1990, had still not 
been established by the time the Soviet president lost his political power, and 
the formal abolition of the USSR on 31 December 1991 made the creation 
of the  foundation rather unlikely. The Russian authorities reportedly drew 
up plans to  create a similar body for Russia, which was regarded as a much- 
needed Russian analogue t o  the National Science Foundation in the United 
States. I t  was reported that  the Russian agency would initially be subordi- 
nate t o  be newly created Russian Ministry for Science, Higher Education, 
and Technological Policy, but eventually i t  was expected t o  be granted an 
autonomous status.14 
New Science Policy Agencies 
Before the August 1991 coup, both the Soviet Union and Russia had their 
own state agencies in charge of science policy: the USSR State Committee 
for Science and Technology, chaired by Academician Nikolai Laverov, and 
the Russian State Committee for Science and Higher Education, chaired by 
Professor Nikolai Malyshev. After the coup and the resignation of Valentin 
Pavlov's government, Laverov lost his chairmanship of the USSR State Com- 
mittee and the  Yeltsin administration began taking over different central 
agencies. For its part, the USSR State Committee reacted promptly t o  
the change in the political situation: on 10 September 1991 its leadership 
appealed t o  the Russian government t o  transfer the committee t o  Russian 
jurisdiction.15 The transfer was announced in a special decree issued by the  
131nformation received by the author from the Director of the Main Planning and E c e  
nomic Directorate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Konoshenko. See also 
Konoshenko'e interview with Poisk, No. 47, 1991, pp. 1 and 3. 
"Ibid., Nos. 47 and 50, 1991, pp. 5 and 1, respectively. 
15Radikd, No. 39, 1991, p. 1. 
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Russian Council of Ministers in October.16 As a result, Malyshev moved t o  
Laverov's spacious office and preparations began for the merging of the two 
committees. By 1 November 1991, it looked as if no further changes would 
take place; moreover, the future of the Russian State Committee appeared 
quite secure. 
However, within less than a week, Yeltsin had decided to  re-organize his 
administration. In accordance with his decrees of 6 November, the Russian 
State Committee for Science and Higher Education was abolished and re- 
placed by a newly estabLished Ministry of Science and Technological Policy.' 
For several days Malyshev's fate seemed to  be hanging in the balance; but in 
the end, he was appointed t o  the newly created post of Russian State Coun- 
cillor for Science and Higher Education. Rather a strange position under 
the circumstances, since the Russian State Council did not survive Yeltsin's 
reorganization. Boris Saltykov, formerly the deputy director of the Analyt- 
ical Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was appointed t o  head the 
new ministry. At first, there were some doubts about which ministry would 
be in charge of Russian universities and other higher education schools, but 
on 11 November 1991 the Committee for Science and Public Education of 
the Russian Supreme Soviet and the leaders of the new Russian government 
decided t o  give the new ministry full responsibility for higher education as 
we11.18 This agency, which was promptly renamed the Ministry for Science, 
Higher Education, and Technological Policy, is staffed mainly by the person- 
nel from the former USSR and Russian State Committees as well as from 
the Russian Ministry of Education. The ministry will reportedly employ a 
total of 1,200 officials. 
Saltykov, a specialist in economic forecasting and the economic sector 
of scientific and technological research and development, was born in 1940 
and graduated from the Moscow Physico-Technical Institute in 1964. Sub- 
- 
sequently, he spent three years in the graduate school of Serguei Korolev's 
missile research center in Podlipki (then called NII-88, now the Central Re- 
search Institute of Machine Building). After completing his graduate studies, 
he worked a t  the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences in Moscow and a t  the Institute for Economic Forecast- 
ing. Saltykov belongs t o  the same group of market-oriented economists as 
the former Russian deputy prime ministers, Egor Gaidar and Aleksandr 
16Poisk, No. 44, 1991, p. 2. 
"Kommersant, No. 43, 1991, p. 25. 
"Information received by the author from Academician Yurii Ryzhov. See also Poisk, 
No. 47, 1991, p. 5. 
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Shokhin. In fact, i t  was Gaidar who proposed that Saltykov be offered the 
ministerial post .Ig 
Another noteworthy recent appointment was that of Anatolii Rakitov t o  
the newly created post of science and technology policy adviser t o  the presi- 
dent. Rakitov is a specialist in science philosophy and science policy as well 
as the head of two independent self-financing research centers, INFORAN 
and ISTINA. In the middle of November he had only two secretaries and a 
personal assistant, but i t  is likely that  the size of his staff will increase con- 
siderably. Malyshev's staff, on the other hand, will reportedly be reduced t o  
a bare minimum. 
Both Saltykov and Rakitov are likely to  exercise considerable influ- 
ence over Russian science policy. Malyshev is said t o  have been brought 
t o  Moscow by former Russian Prime Minister Ivan Siaev and thus is un- 
likely t o  have much influence over Yeltsin. In lengthy conversations with 
the author in November 1991, both Saltykov and Rakitov stressed that  the 
viability of Russian science policy would depend mainly on its ability to  en- 
courage marketable innovations, to  create conditions for the free exchange 
of information, and to  secure sufficient funding for the most productive and 
internationally respected branches of Russian science. Ratikov made i t  clear 
that  he would support the preservation of a strongly defense-oriented re- 
search and development program and the extensive exchange of technology 
between the civilian and military sectors for the economy. He also agreed 
with Saltykov that  the formulation of a viable Russian science policy would 
be a rather lengthy process but that  work should begin immediately. 
1991: The Final Developments 
On 21 November Yeltsin issued the long-awaited Decree No. 228 "On the 
Organization of the Russian Academy of S ~ i e n c e s . " ~ ~  This rather hastily 
prepared document, which was signed under exceptional  circumstance^,^^ 
stated that  the Russian Academy of Sciences should be restored as 'the 
supreme scientific body of Russia." The decree granted the Academy the 
right t o  self-management and gave i t  exclusive ownership rights to  all the 
191nformation received by the author from Saltykov. 
aOPoisk, No. 48, 1991, p. 1. 
"On 20 November financing of the USSR Academy of Sciences ceased in accordance with 
Yeltsin's decision to terminate the allocation of Russian budgetary funds to a number of 
All-Union agencies. The next day, when Yeltsin was about to leave Moscow for an official 
visit to  Germany, Velikhov caught him in time at the airport to secure his signature on 
the decree restoring the Russian Academy (see ibid., p. 3.). 
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state property in Russia that  had formerly been a t  the disposal of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences (for example, buildings, laboratory equipment, and 
research ships). The decree also ruled that  all full and corresponding mem- 
bers of the USSR Academy of Sciences as well as the members of the Rus- 
sian Academy (elected in December) would be made full and corresponding 
members (depending on their former status) of the new Russian Academy 
of Sciences. Yeltsin also granted the new Academy some financial privileges, 
including exemption from all taxes. These measures were t o  be subsequently 
approved by the Russian Supreme Soviet. 
The first conference of the Academy's scientists took place as planned 
from 10 t o  12 December 1991; that  is, several days after the elections t o  the 
Russian Academy had been held. The conference was co-chaired by Aca- 
demician Evgenii Velikhov and a member of the board of the Voters' Club, 
Aleksei Zakharov. The debates focused mainly on the draft charter of the 
Russian Academy submitted by the Conciliation Commission but reportedly 
drawn up by Academician Andrei Gonchar, a t  the time the secretary of the 
Department of M a t h e m a t i ~ s . ~ ~  The document stated that  corresponding 
members of the Academy would be permitted t o  participate in the proceed- 
ings of the General Assembly virtually on an equal footing with the full 
members; as indeed would the elected representatives of rank-and-file sci- 
entists who were t o  constitute as many as one-third of the delegates t o  the 
assembly sessions. 
These privileges evidently failed t o  impress the majority of the more 
radical delegates, who decided that  the draft charter should be altered t o  
state, among other things, that  50% of the delegates t o  the General Assembly 
should be rank-and-file scientists. The conference tentatively endorsed a 
document entitled "General Principles of the Organization and the Activities 
of the Research Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences," which had 
been drafted earlier.23 The decisions taken by the conference were submitted 
t o  the December session of the Academy's General Assembly. The General 
Assembly session took place on 16 December 1991 and was attended by 1,100 
full and corresponding members (including those newly elected) as well as 
some 280 representatives of rank-and-file scientists who, for the first time, 
were allowed t o  participate in the debates and elections. On 17 December, 
Osipov was elected the first president of the unified Russian Academy of 
Sciences in the first multicandidate presidential elections in the history of 
221nformation received by the author from Zakharov. 
2 3 ~ o r  aa early version of this document, see Poisk, No. 14, 1991, pp. 1 and 3. 
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the Academy. His principal competitor, Academician Velikhov, lost in the 
final round of voting. The same day, Yeltsin addressed the  assembly and 
promised once more that  Russia would fund its national academy. The 
assembly endorsed the charter submitted by the Conciliation Committee, 
but only for one year. A new position of first vice president was created, and 
Gonchar was elected t o  fill this post. Osip'yan was replaced by Aleksandr 
Andreev as vice president in charge of physical science and mathematics; and 
Vice Presidents Velikhov, Konstantin Frolov, Oleg Nefedov, and Laverov 
were reelected. Rem Petrov (biology) and Vladimir Kudryavtsev (social 
sciences), however, failed to  win a majority; they will remain in office until 
the next meeting of the General Assembly, scheduled for March. 
By the middle of December, Ratikov had completed a draft report on 
developing science in an  independent Russia. The draft, which was endorsed 
by Saltykov and then sent t o  Yeltsin for consideration and approval,24 pro- 
posed that  effective institutional and economic links be established between 
the hitherto separate branches of sciences; that  is "academic" science, "uni- 
versity" science, and "ministry" science. The last includes its mammoth 
military-targeted subbranch which, in 1990, consumed 75% of research and 
development's total budgetary  allocation^.^^ The draft also proposed abol- 
ishing all legal distinctions between these branches and creating a unified le- 
gal, financial, and managerial "operational space" for Russian science. The 
state would surrender its traditional role of sole supervisor of Russian re- 
search and would adopt a more modest position as one of its patrons. The 
document recommended laws that  would create a stable legal environment 
for scientific activity in R u s ~ i a : ~  and i t  introduced the concept of "domestic 
technology transfer," which could open channels between military and civil 
research and development. Finally, i t  proposed that  solid financial support 
be given only t o  the most internationally recognized, renowned areas of Rus- 
sian science and t o  those areas of applied and developmental science that  
might come up with innovative production techniques and products within 
two or three years. It remains t o  be seen how this document, which could 
become the pillar of future Russian science policy, will be put into practice. 
"Information received by the author from Ratikov on 21 December 1991. 
'5Poisk, No. 50, 1991, p. 3. 
''The proposed legislation seemed more or leas similar in design, if not in content, to 
the four draft laws on science policy prepared by the former USSR State Committee for 
Science and Technology by the end of 1990. These draft laws were never passed by the 
USSR Supreme Soviet (see Aleksei E. Levin, "New Draft Legislation on Science Policy in 
the USSR," Report on the USSR, No. 22, 1991.) 
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Conclusion 
Science in the former Soviet Union seems to be in a state of flux. The old 
centralized command administration is on the verge of extinction, while a 
new diversified and competitive science policy is about to emerge. New insti- 
tutions are being created, and new faces are appearing. Some ideas, however, 
are too radical to be realized under current conditions and are likely to  be 
put aside, despite the fact that they have a large number of advocates. For 
example, the idea of transforming the Academy of Sciences into an associ- 
ation (or associations) of virtually independent research centers, endorsed 
and strongly advocated by the Voter's Club, would hardly bring about that 
institution's liberation if immediately put into practice; indeed, it is much 
more likely that the Academy's successor (or successors) would be forced to 
deal with a large number of bureaucratic agencies. But Russian science is 
still very much alive and would benefit from a prompt and effective science 
policy. It remains to be seen whether the new reformist leaders of Russia are 
able to provide such a policy. Saltykov, in his address to the first conference 
of the Academy's scientists, reportedly made the following plea: "You have 
got your freedom, so do your best to find money."27 
"See Sdtykov'e interview with Izvestiya, 8 January 1992, p. 2. 
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Economic Reform Impact 
on Soviet R&D 
Serguei Glaziev, 
Abstract 
Transition from a centrally planned to a market economy includes the com- 
plete restructuring of research and development (R&D) organization. R&D 
institutions lose administrative and financial protection with the destruc- 
tion of ministries and state bodies responsible for R&D. Privatization of 
state enterprises, liberalization of labor and capital markets, and opening of 
the post-Soviet economy have changed the R&D environment in a radical 
way. The adaptation of R&D organization to these changes is not easy and 
involves the collapse of a large number of research institutes and scientific 
schools. At the same time, commercialization of R&D is taking place and 
new structures of R&D activity emerge. 
The paper includes three parts. The first describes basic features in R&D 
organization in a centrally planned economy. The second part includes an 
analysis of economic reform impacts on R&D performance. The third and 
final section describes changes in R&D organization since 1987 when the 
transition to a market economy in the former Soviet Union began. 
'Minister, Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation. 
The author is grateful to Dr. Motorygin for the useful comments and information he 
provided for this study. 
military-related industries received everything they needed to  conduct nec- 
essary research, while other industrial RIs usually suffered from a shortage 
of inputs and lack of finance. 
The Academy of Science is organized as a special ministry of science, 
ruled by a Presidium responsible to  several hundreds of academicians. The 
Academy's basic organizational routine, decision-making and resource-allo- 
cation procedures are similar t o  those in industrial ministries. The Presidium 
of the Academy played the same role for RIs of the Academy, as ministries 
did for industrial RIs. However, there was one important difference. Officials 
in resource allocation bodies of the Academy were appointed by and respon- 
sible t o  academicians who usually occupied posts of the directors of RIs in 
the Academy. Thus, the same people play key roles in all of R&D manage- 
ment, finance, and allocation of resources. This lead to  an over-concentration 
of power and control over R&D resources in the hands of small groups of 
academicians and suppressed any competition between scholars and RIs for 
financial and material resource support. As a result of this monopolistic or- 
ganization, a large part of Academy R&D is concentrated on obsolete topics 
and themes, which were usually protected by powerful lobbies in Academy 
management bodies. 
Higher education R&D was organized in a different manner. Research 
and development was considered a secondary activity of higher education 
establishments; in fact, their main task was educating students according 
to  more or less standard programs. Some favored universities and colleges 
preparing specialists for work in scientific and high-tech organizations having 
RIs of their own. However, most R&D is conducted by laboratories and 
faculties according to their R&D plans. 
Thus, a research institute managed by a director appointed by the corre- 
sponding higher authority was the basic unit of R&D organization in CPE. 
Each RI was part of central-planning hierarchy. Research institute activities 
were determined by plans received from the supervisory organization accom- 
panied by the necessary resources and finance. The latter were distributed 
according to  the priorities of the supervisory organization which, in turn, 
depended on priorities and established routines set from above. 
R&D management routines in a CPE was rather similar to  an industrial 
production organization. It was characterized by the absence of competition, 
supermonopolization, and bureaucratization. However, there was an impor- 
tant difference. There were no clear indicators of basic R&D performance 
such as volume of production in industry, Decisions in this situation were 
made according to personnel preferences of R&D bureaucrats, who usually 
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R&D in a Centrally Planned Economy 
R&D organization in a centrally planned economy (CPE) is set forth by its 
basic institutions where administrative control rules over economic activity. 
Three sectors of Russian R&D-industrial, academy and higher education 
science-mainly differ from each other by the type of supervising organiza- 
tion. Industrial R&D was managed by corresponding Ministries which have 
special departments and funds for this purpose. Academy R&D was man- 
aged by the  Presidium and Departments of the previously All-Union and 
Republican Academies of Science. Higher education R&D was managed by 
corresponding departments of the State Committee of Education and of Re- 
publican Ministries of higher education. R&D activity in different sectors 
is coordinated by the Science and Technologies Committee, corresponding 
department of the State Planning Committee, and the Military-Industrial 
Commission, which supervise the most important R&D programs and dis- 
tribute financial and material resources for them. Until 1987, the key role in 
this coordination was played by the  Science Department of the Communist 
Party Central Committee. 
Industrial R&D was conducted in production-administrative units 
(PAU), controlled by ministries and subordinated t o  central authorities. 
Each PAU consisted of state enterprises which resembled divisions of large 
corporations rather than independent firms. As a monopoly, PAU was nei- 
ther interested in profit maximization, nor in demand responsiveness in the 
markets, where they were the only suppliers. There was lack of incentives 
for innovations in this environment, where production was organized by sev- 
eral dozens of ministries-monopolies. Nevertheless, ministries were required 
to  maintain a technological level of production according t o  the prescribed 
state standards and demonstrate technological achievements before the  cen- 
tral authorities. For this purpose, these organizations not only have plants 
and factories, but also research institutes, design bureaus, and laboratories 
closely connected with industry. 
Industrial research institutes (RI) were financed from state budget 
sources via special funds supervised by corresponding ministries o r  state 
R&D programs. RIs also received additional funds by conducting contract 
research enterprises (this source became rather important after state en- 
terprises received the right t o  profit accumulation in 1987). Industrial RI 
had access t o  resources through Departments of Supply of corresponding 
Ministries. Finance and supply for a particular industrial RI was deter- 
mined by the position of the corresponding ministry. High-priority RIs of 
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had poor information about recent changes in world science. The absence of 
clear indicators of R&D performance resulted in the weak responsibilities of 
R&D managers under the centrally planned system (CPS). This lead to  the 
poor quality and over-concentration of resources in R&D. New directions of 
R&D were often suppressed because they undermined the privileged position 
of R&D managers in power. A typical example of this was the suppression 
of genetic and cybernetic sciences in 1950 in spite of the great successes of 
the soviet scholars in these new fields. 
There was no principle difference between basic and applied research 
organization. Most basic research was conducted in the research institutes 
of the Academy. The main difference between them and industrial research 
institutes was, perhaps, less strict labor discipline and more opportunities for 
the formation of R&D plans in the bargajning process with state authorities. 
Under the CPS, the Academy enjoyed privileged status and was financed 
directly from the state budget. RIs of the Academy also received additional 
funds by participating in various industrial programs financed by various 
ministries, the Science and Technology Committee, and contract R&D for 
industrial enterprises. Furthermore, Academy RIs had easy and guaranteed 
access to  necessary inputs via the special Department of Supply for the 
Academy, which had a priority position in the state supply system. 
An important feature of the CPS was strong inter-branch and inter- 
organization barriers that prevented information exchange between scien- 
tists in different organizations. Basic and applied research were separated 
from each other by organizational autarchy of industrial ministries and the 
Academies of Science. R&D plans of different institutes and organizations 
were coordinated by corresponding bodies in the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, the State Planning Committee, the Military-Industrial 
Commission, and the State Science and Technology Committee. However, 
the coordination was rather poor other than for military-industrial R&D that 
was managed according to  the interpretations of clear indicators and objec- 
tives. The organizational barriers between R&D in the Academy, higher 
education, and industry, as well as between different industries split the sci- 
entific community into different groups with weak communication between 
them. The barriers were maintained due to self-inflicted isolation of RIs, 
a strict system of ministerial and state secrecy, and by poor communica- 
tion channels. The result was duplication of efforts, bureaucratization, and 
quality and efficiency decline of research and development. 
The mechanism for R&D self-organization, typical of a market would 
prove ineffective in such an environment. It has been replaced by adminis- 
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trative control and resource allocation based on a bargaining process between 
RIs and their corresponding supervisory state management bodies. 
The mechanism for innovation diffusion in CPEs was different from the 
one functioning in a market economy. The main driving forces and fac- 
tors determining innovation diffusion in a market economy-competition, 
learning-by-doing, economies of scale, decreasing marginal profits with satu- 
ration of demand, etc.-were simply absent in the Soviet CPE. Introduction 
of innovations, resource redistribution, and new technology diffusion were 
decided in accordance to  priorities set by central authorities in state plans 
for economic development. In CPEs, most profits were transferred from 
enterprises to  the state budget and then returned to  industry with respect 
to  decisions made by the government and Gosplan under the pressure from 
ministries. The latter as well as individual enterprises had no possibility 
to  receive super-profits or other incentives for the introduction of innova- 
tions. These, innovations were usually introduced according to  the plans 
for new technology introduction, which had relatively low priority and were 
determined by production plans. 
The only exclusion to  this customary process was the defense industry, 
which tended to  face real competition. Besides, the top political authorities 
interested in the USSR's international prestige sporadically promoted radical 
innovation diffusion. The priority of defense tasks and the real competition 
in this sphere were the reasons for the high concentration of R&D resources 
in the military-industrial complex (MIC). Ministries and enterprises of the 
MIC, contrary to  civil branches of industry, were especially interested in in- 
novation introduction and growth in the level of technological achievement 
needed to  satisfy the demands of the Ministry of Defense. Inside the MIC, 
real competition existed between enterprises in their effort to  procure or- 
ders and, consequently, for survival under conditions of strict administrative 
control. This competition stimulated research and the introduction of inno- 
vations. Status, rewards, and the drive for the competitive edge attracted 
the best specialists and highly skilled workers to the MIC-only there they 
found demand for new technologies. 
The mechanism described above lead to  stratification of the Soviet econ- 
omy into two sectors with different technical levels. The priority sector, con- 
nected with the Defense Ministry and with prestigious projects, existed at  
the expense of the other part of the national economy. Unfortunately, the 
return flow of resources and modern technologies from a priority sector such 
as defense to the rest of the national economy was insignificant because civil 
PAU were not interested in implementing innovations that would change the 
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organizational and material supply routine. In addition, MIC branches were 
not interested in spin-off or any profitable use of technologies. This strat- 
ification prevented the technological development in the national economy 
and inevitably caused a decrease in economic efficiency. 
Another characteristic feature of the mechanism for technological change 
in a centrally planned economy was the approval of imitation rather than 
invention. The MIC technical development in the MIC was, in part, deter- 
mined by innovations in the industrial sector of the "potential enemy." These 
innovations would subsequently be introduced in centrally planned economy 
as the Soviet Union with a lag, and were limited to  defense branches. An- 
other incentive for innovations was estimation by top authorities that the 
technological lag was significant. These innovations primarily had the imi- 
tation character and were supported by the import of necessary equipment. 
Thus, the mechanism for R&D organization and technological change in 
a centrally planned economy was significantly different from that in a market 
economy. For decades R&D institutes in the USSR were part of the adminis- 
trative hierarchy and were protected by corresponding political institutions. 
The weakening and destruction of the latter during the reform process raised 
innumerous problems of R&D maintenance and support. Radical reform of 
the national economic management system involved corresponding changes 
in mechanisms of technological evolution as well as in the resource allocation. 
A delay in R&D restructuring may lead to the destruction of very sensitive 
scientific potential of the country. 
Economic Reform Impact on R&D Environment 
It is noteworthy that Perestroika, a plan to  force the centrally planned econ- 
omy to undergo systematic changes, began from the attempts to  accelerate 
economic growth and to  overcome the increasing technological gap between 
the Soviet and market economies. According to  our measurements, the av- 
erage technological gap in major industries increased from 10-15 years in 
the mid-1950s, to  20-30 years in the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1970s, it 
increased significantly, especially in the high-tech sector. Attempts to ac- 
celerate technological change between 1985 and 1987 were based on central 
planning methodology and were undertaken to reduce this gap. However, un- 
der the conditions accompanying the structural crisis, these attempts failed. 
Further deterioration, both of living standards and relative technical perfor- 
mance of the military industry, compelled central authorities to  change the 
system. However, distinct disproportions in technological structure within 
the Russian economy even increased during the next years of economic re- 
form. 
The most distinguishing feature of the structural changes in the successor 
Russian economy is their spontaneous, unmanageable character. None of 
the officially adopted programs of economic reform have been implemented. 
This is a result of the unrealistic character of the programs as well as of 
the government's inability t o  implement them. The present situation is 
characterized by accelerating inflation (which reached 19% a year in 1990 and 
170% only in April 1991 due t o  the price reform), drastic fall of production 
(which reached 10% in the first quarter of this year in comparison with 
the first quarter of the previous year), collapse of supply relations between 
enterprises and regions, deterioration of living standards, and increasing 
chms. 
In spite of the spontaneous character of the previous Soviet economic re- 
form, its guidelines were formed early. They included: growing independence 
and commercialization of state enterprises and local authorities, growth of 
commercial non-state sector, and the weakening of the state regulation. 
With the State enterprise (SE) law of 1987, the administrative responsi- 
bility of the Ministries was partly substituted by responsibility delegated t o  
employees' collectives, which received rights t o  make strategic decisions and 
control administration. These changes towards self-management lead t o  a 
decline of innovative activity in the state sector. Subsequently, the economic 
behavior of workers acquired dual character. They were simultaneously in- 
terested in wage increase and in labor intensity decreases. The introduc- 
tion of innovations was usually connected with changes in the distribution 
of responsibilities among the personnel and increased labor intensity. This 
conjured resistance of workers t o  the implementation of innovations. Under 
the conditions of self-management, the administration of SE had insufficient 
power t o  overcome the workers' resistance as long as SE still received enough 
revenues to  maintain wages a t  a satisfactory level. This was no surprise in 
lieu of the high monopolization of the Soviet economy. According t o  some 
estimates, 50% t o  66% of industrial products were produced by one or two 
enterprises. The weakening of state control and commercialization of SEs in 
this absence of competition did not stimulate innovation activity and lead 
t o  price increases simultaneous t o  decreases in production and quality. 
After the new Law concerning leasing and the Decree about establish- 
ment of joint stock companies, the commercialization of SEs took the form 
of a state directed transformation program converting enterprises into self- 
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management firms paying rent for leased property to the state. The govern- 
ment departments receiving these funds were primarily the corresponding 
ministry or other supervisory body, or joint stock companies whose shares 
were distributed between other state enterprises and institutions (ministries, 
local authorities, banks, workers' collectives, etc.). Usually, enterprises to- 
gether with ministries founded a commercial bank in the form of a joint 
stock company and used it later as a majority shareholder of transformed 
SE stocks. This cross-ownership structure became a typical form of sponta- 
neous privatization in the Soviet economy. 
Transforming state enterprises into joint stock companies enabled man- 
agers to more or less free their firms from state control. Increased freedom 
was accompanied by stricter budget constraints. However, the benefits of 
more opportunities considerably exceed the loss of state subsidies. Never- 
theless, both of these changes lead to the dilemma of declining R&D expen- 
ditures. Under this cross-ownership structure, managers of state enterprises 
received all rights of private entrepreneurs without any of the related respon- 
sibilities. The instability of this system stimulated managers in short-term 
profit-seeking behavior despite being on the verge of bankruptcy. Indeed, 
rather than reinvesting excess profits, irresponsible managers directed these 
resources to their own semi-private firms. Under these circumstances, man- 
agers of state enterprises lacked sufficient incentives to increase their effi- 
ciency and to invest in R&D. 
Spontaneous privatization encompassed not only industrial production, 
but R&D as well. Under the conditions inherited from the Soviet CPS, state 
research institutes and enterprises could not prohibit the imitation of their 
inventions by other firms. The turbulence and ambiguities of the transition 
period enticed private firms to  resort to industrial espionage; to use and sell 
inventions and know-how developed by state organizations. One of the most 
customary, wide-spread forms of industrial espionage was and continues to 
be the part-time employment of specialists from state enterprises, who had 
access to the necessary information. This mechanism to transfer new tech- 
nologies did not stimulate R&D itself, but rather only the transfer, and not 
the researchers themselves, but entrepreneurs selling the stolen intellectual 
products. Of course, free access to new technologies stimulated their diffu- 
sion. However, in the absence of clear ownership rights and with no system 
of royalties payments, it became increasingly unclear how to secure adequate 
financing for continued R&D in this new situation. 
Weakening state control over SEs was accompanied by the decline of 
the respective authorities' responsibilities concerning SEs' performance, in- 
cluding the support for industrial R&D. After the introduction of the new 
tax system in 1991, ministries lost the rights to  collect any part of SEs' 
profits. This destroyed the source of an important flow of state subsidies for 
industrial R&D. In the process of collecting part of SEs' profits, ministries re- 
distributed a portion into special industrial funds for science and technology 
development. With the introduction of the new tax system, these funds were 
abolished. They constituted approximately one-third of all industrial R&D 
funds. Their abolishment lead many industrial RIs into financial trouble. 
The collapse of the state budget system was another heavy blow for 
the R&D sector, especially for basic research concentrated in the Academy 
and MIC, both of which received in numerous state subsidies. The state 
budget revenues in the first quarter of 1991 were 70% less than forecasted; 
the state budget deficit a t  the end of the first quarter reached the amount 
expected for the whole year. This occurred for two main reasons. First, 
most of the Republics refused to pay their contributions to  the All-Union 
budget. In spite of continuing debate about the All-Union treaty, they had 
already spent a large share of the reserved funds on social programs of their 
own. Second, the tax revenues were much less than planned because of an 
extraordinary decrease in production. Thus, conventional sources of basic 
R&D expenditures were paralyzed, while new sources did not appear. Re- 
publics' governments spent their revenues on populist social programs, while 
research institutes suffered from a severe financial crisis. 
In this situation, state budget R&D expenditures decreased. This de- 
crease was especially dramatic in the military-industrial complex. Cuts in 
military expenditures were largely at  the expense of R&D. Expenditures for 
R&D in the MIC decreased from 15.3 billion rubles in 1989 to 13.2 in 1990 in 
nominal terms. Taking 19% inflation in 1990 into account, the real decrease 
amounted to  33%. In 1991, many research institutes in the MIC did not 
have enough contracts to  maintain wages of their staff at a sufficient level. 
The debilitating financial crisis in the state R&D sector caused a signif- 
icant brain-drain from the state research institutes to  the emerging private 
sector. By 1992, nearly 12% of Russian GNP was produced by the private 
sector. In spite of its still modest but growing share in GNP, the private sec- 
tor has played an important role in structural changes and growth prospects 
look promising. R&D in this sector was conducted by cooperatives and semi- 
private research units based on state property without clear property rights 
(secalled small enterprises, limited companies, etc.). The non-state sector 
conducted 13.5% of all R&D in 1991, a rapidly growing share. 
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Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to expect the automatic restruc- 
turing of technological change with the development of the commercial sec- 
tor in Russia. At least three prerequisites are necessary. First, mechanisms 
of market competition must be thoroughly formed. Second, recession of 
the speculation boom is necessary in order to make the introduction of in- 
novations profitable. Third, it is very important to promote the interest 
of entrepreneurs in the long-term development of production. All this re- 
quires time, during which a dramatic increase of innovational activity in 
the national economy can hardly be expected. More likely, one can expect 
a re-orientation of R&D resources towards incremental innovations because 
of the short-term orientation of collectively managed firms based on wage 
maximization. 
Reforms in R&D 
Marketization of R&D began with the adoption of the Government Decree 
On transformation of research organizations on the basis of complete self- 
accounting and sev-finance on 30 September 1987. According to this De- 
cree, state research institutes receive some autonomy with respect to the 
formation of R&D plans and access to different sources of finance. The min- 
isterial organizations and monopolies in R&D were abolished and prices of 
R&D products were liberalized. Though there were no changes in the prop- 
erty rights system, commercialization of research institutes took place and a 
R&D market appeared. Research institutes began to seek demand for their 
products and to adjust their R&D to the consumers' needs. The transfer 
of new technologies from the R&D sector to industry increased, as well as 
R&D expenditures of industrial enterprises. The share of contracts between 
industrial enterprises and research institutes of the total R&D expenditures 
of the latter increased from 30% to 70% in one year (1988) only. The number 
of these contracts increased 2-3 times and industrial R&D output increased 
1.64 times (1.43 times in constant prices). At the same time, the number of 
employees in R&D decreased by 4% to 18% in various industries and time 
required for R&D project realization decreased 1.2-1.5 times on average. 
This boom in industrial R&D was caused by several reasons. The first, 
and perhaps the most important, was the adjustment of R&D resources to  
real industrial demands. The second was the appearance of market incen- 
tives for productivity growth; research institutes received opportunities to 
distribute and accumulate profits according to individual enterprise policy. 
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Together with price liberalization, this stimulated the institutes to mobilize 
resources, to  increase output, and to  seek demand for their products and 
services. Research institutes also gained the opportunity to  increase wages 
in certain proportion to  an increase of output in order t o  stimulate labor 
productivity growth. Third, SEs still had soft budget constraints. With 
the 1987 Law on State Enterprise they also received the rights for profit 
distribution. At the same time, deregulation of SEs was accompanied by 
a decrease in their payments to the state budget as well as t o  supervisory 
organizations, and the new tax system had yet to  be introduced. SEs in 
several industries received privileges to  not pay to the state budget a t  d l .  
The SE savings, allocated to  investment and development purposes, sharply 
increased in this situation easing their potential for R&D financing. Fourth, 
lack of competition between research institutes and lack of experience in as- 
sessing the r e d  market values of new technologies induced prices of R&D 
products to  increase. In spite of the existence of officially adopted meth- 
ods for price calculation (based on the distribution of estimated profits from 
the utilization of R&D innovations between producer and consumer), actual 
prices were set in accordance to  the bargaining power of partners. Profitabil- 
ity of research conducted by RIs for SEs was 1.5-2 times higher than of the 
research conducted for state agencies. It is not surprising that the share of 
state bodies' orders in research institutes activities decreased by 40%, while 
the share of SEs' orders increased by 2-4 times. Nevertheless, according to  
official estimates, the increase in R&D output growth was not higher than 
8%. 
Another important source of innovation activity growth in 1988 was lib- 
eralization of entry into the R&D market. Since 1987, the establishment of 
various non-state enterprises in the R&D sector was permitted. They could 
be organized in the form of cooperatives, youth centers of science and tech- 
nology activity, and branches of non-profit social organizations. Since 1988, 
rapid growth of the non-state R&D sector commenced (refer to  Table 1). 
The typical role of a non-state R&D firm has been to  act as an interme- 
diate agent. It usually had only a small staff to  arrange contracts between 
R&D consumers and specialists who were to  conduct the research work. 
These specialists usually worked for such firms on a part-time basis, working 
simultaneously at  state enterprises or research institutes. The majority of 
non-state firms performed only intermediate services between organizations 
that order R&D and teams of individuals that conducted the requested R&D. 
This service mainly included the transfer of payments for R&D from the SEs 
to  individuals conducting the R&D. For these operations, non-state firms re- 
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ceived a commission which varied between 5% and 50% of the contract. The 
demand for such operations was caused by different regimes of wage con- 
trol in state and commercial sectors. SEs had rather limited opportunities 
in spending their funds, particularly on wage increases. By sub-contracting 
R&D to non-state firms, the SEs received much more freedom in spending 
their money. 
On average, a non-state R&D firm formed 50-100 temporary teams of 
specialists per year. For each person permanently employed in such a firm, 
there were from 2 persons in cooperatives to  120 persons in youth centers 
conducting research in temporary teams. More then 1.4 million contracts 
with people working in temporary teams were signed by January 1990. Even 
if we assume that some people were simultaneously working for several firms, 
this was a very high number in comparison with 1.5 million of registered 
R&D staff in the country. More than half the scholars in Russia worked in 
the non-state R&D sector by this time. Yet, the majority of them continued 
to be employed at their job in the state sector as well. 
Actually a large number of these non-state firms was organized on the 
basis of state enterprises and used their resources, equipment and workers 
for the fulfillment of the orders which they received from the same enter- 
prises. Usually, these private firms were established by the corresponding 
SEs' managers or by their friends and relatives. In fact, such firms consti- 
tuted a part of the state enterprise which was used to  transfer SE revenues 
into wages of its managers and specialists. The basic advantage of non- 
state firms was a low control over transactions of all kinds in comparison 
to  the state enterprises. In particular, firms in the private sector had many 
more opportunities to  convert money from bank accounts to  cash. On this 
basis, a mutually beneficial symbiosis of state enterprises and private firms 
emerged. Private firms gained access to  cheap resources through state enter- 
prises; and, state enterprises' managers, in turn, acquired new opportunities 
t o  redistribute income to salaries through private firms. Incidentally, the 
commission rate charged by non-state firms was similar to  the rate of the 
ruble exchange from SEs' accounts t o  cash. 
Another advantage in sub-contracting R&D projects to  non-state firms 
was t o  minimize various expenditures for the maintenance of state R&D in- 
stitutes. Members of non-state firms' temporary teams usually conducted 
their Kcommercial" research at  the state research institutes (where they are 
employed) using the equipment a t  no extra cost. In fact, these temporary 
teams Kprivatized" amortization costs, rented intermediate materials and 
services, and intellectual property of their "mother" state research insti- 
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tutes and enterprises. The latter had, of course, to  carry additional costs 
to  cover the expenditures of R&D which their employees conducted for non- 
state organizations. In this way, resources for R&D production were actually 
redistributed into wages and salaries. This situation was considered a posi- 
tive adjustment of R&D organization to  the changing economic environment. 
The symbiosis of state and private R&D organizations mentioned above, pro- 
vided opportunities to  maintain incomes of scholars a t  a sufficient level in 
order to  avoid their exit from the R&D sector. However, this did undermine 
the long-term growth of the organization where R&D is really performed. 
Thus, numerous cases existed in which new private firms were subsidized 
by SEs and could not have survived without access t o  their resources. These 
private firms do not compete with the state RIs, but seek their support 
and protection. However, there are some cases in which real competition 
did exist-for profits, financing, labor, material and information resources. 
Research institutes of the MIC, which suffer both from strict control by 
corresponding government bodies and from the cuts in the military budget, 
were very vulnerable under such competitive conditions. As a consequence, 
i t  was of little surprise to  record a significant brain drain from the MIC 
research institutes to  the non-state firms, together with information and 
know-how, since 1988. 
This brain drain from state research institutes was not only caused by 
larger incomes and wages in private sector. Since 1989, state regulation of 
R&D activity increased. The government was very concerned with wage 
increases in the R&D sector. In some design and research institutes the 
levels of some managers' wages increased 5 to  8 times after they received 
opportunities for price setting and profit distribution. Several cases were 
even discussed by the Council of Ministers. However, the average wage 
increase in industrial research institutes was 20%-30%, compared to  64% 
output and 130% profit growth. 
In an effort to  restrain the wage increases, government introduced several 
measures as a part of anti-inflation policy. These included: special tax on the 
wage increase and limits to  the wage increase, which were set in accordance 
with output increases since 1991. 
Restrictions on the wage increase were accompanied by the dramatic 
decrease of R&D expenditures in the state budget (see Table 2). This was 
particularly pronounced in the military-industrial complex as elaborated be- 
low. In the first quarter of 1991, the state expenditures for R&D were 25% 
less than planned because of the collapse of the state budget system. The 
prospects for the future were unclear and then still depended on the All- 
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Union Tmaty. As a result, enterprises became the main source of financing 
for R&D. This source was very unstable and sensitive to  the changes in 
national economic performance. Enterprises were primarily interested in in- 
cremental innovations with a short pay-back period. The growth of their 
share in R&D expenditures lead to  to a decrease in the share of basic re- 
search in research institutes activities. In 1988, basic R&D expenditures in 
industrial research institutes decreased by 50% and average R&D project 
expenditures decreased by 40%, while the share of enterprises' contributions 
towards industrial R&D increased from 51.2% to 66.4%. 
As alluded to  earlier, the increase of SEs' R&D expenditures in 1988 
could partially be explained by their soft budget constraints. Since 1989, 
budget constraints of the SEs' became much stricter; combined with their 
commercialization they became ineligible for most state subsidies. Local 
authorities began to  collect payments for land use, pollution, and so on. 
Since 1991, taxation of SEs' profits was introduced and all previous privileges 
were abolished. The main part of SEs' profits was subsequently collected 
via federal, republican and local taxes. Therefore, SEs' potential to  finance 
R&D decreased. Together with the introduction of strict wage regulation, 
this inevitably led to  the decrease of SEs' R&D expenditures. In 1989, these 
increased by only 25% (in comparison with 64% in 1988), in 1990 there was 
no growth at  all, and in 1991 they fell dramatically. 
A deterioration of SEs' financial situation was not the only reason for a 
decline in their R&D expenditures. Although it may initially be perceived 
as ironic, a further explanation for the reduced investment in R&D by SEs' 
lay in their acquisition of more opportunities for income distribution. These 
changes induced managers to  take SEs' expenditures more seriously. Under 
the pressure of workers, managers preferred to  increase wages rather than 
R&D expenditures. 
In order t o  prevent the mass bankruptcy of industrial research institutes, 
government decided to  form the special non-budget fund for R&D finance in 
each industry. Ministries and SE associations joined forces in establishing 
this fund based on production cost of a particular industry's output. The 
rate of this specific value-added tax was between 0.8% and 1.3% in differ- 
ent industries. Contributions of SEs to  this fund are considered production 
costs and excluded from taxation. These funds became the major source of 
financing for basic R&D projects in industrial research institutes and helped 
prevent the bankruptcies of numerous large industrial research institutes in 
1991 and 1992, when prices were liberalized and inflation increased dramat- 
ically. The revenues of these funds increased together with the growth of 
production costs due to  inflation. 
This, however, was not the case for the Academy of Science research in- 
stitutes which were financed by the Fund for Basic Research, a fixed subsidy 
from the state budget. Due t o  increasing financial chaos after price liberal- 
ization and collapse of the All-Union institution in 1992, i t  was impossible 
t o  plan the state budget for the whole year. The budget was formed for each 
quarter with a delay of 1-2 months. As a consequence, academic research 
institutes suffered considerably under uncertainty while awaiting subsidies 
that  were eventually transferred from the state budget with large delays. 
Due to  the rapid inflation, the real value of the subsidies depreciated enor- 
mously during the waiting period. The restrictive and uncertain financial 
policy conducted by the Ministry of Finance damaged the R&D resources in 
the Academy. Many academic research institutes were unable t o  pay wages 
for several months and lost their best researchers. 
The partial restructuring of the R&D financing system in 1991 was an in- 
termediate and insufficient solution for the problems relating to  the survival 
of the research institutes. However, it was the natural reaction of the overbu- 
reaucratic state R&D management system to  the increased instability. This 
reaction was directed towards the maintenance of the existing institutions 
of the R&D organization. For instance, the semi-obligatory contributions of 
SEs t o  the industrial R&D funds were considered as production costs and 
excluded from the taxation, while the expenditures of firms for their own in- 
house and outside R&D had t o  be deducted from profits. This system helped 
t o  maintain large R&D projects conducted by the leading industrial research 
institutes (as well as ministerial bureaucracy in charge of distributing subsi- 
dies from industrial R&D funds), but completely blocked R&D development 
of in-house and external character, not to  mention market-style transactions. 
The adaptation of R&D resources to  the market environment will require 
more radical restructuring of the R&D sector. 
Prospects for Restructuring Russian R&D 
Transition t o  a market economic system caused the destruction of the ba- 
sic institutions of Russian-type R&D organization inherited from the Soviet 
economy. These institutions were established by a central planning sys- 
tem based on resource allocation and could not adjust t o  a market environ- 
ment. The restructuring of R&D organization become inevitable. In the 
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early 1990s, this restructuring proceeded spontaneously and was followed by 
the waste of accumulated R&D resources and collapse of existing scientific 
schools and organizations. Six such major issues are described hereafter. 
First, commercialization and privatization of state enterprises destroyed 
ministries that were responsible for and coordinated channels of industrial 
R&D finance and resource supply. Deterioration and, in some cases, abol- 
ishment of industrial ministries powers revealed that market demand for 
R&D from enterprises was not sufficient to maintain industrial R&D at  the 
previous level. 
Second, substitution of the centrally planned system of resource dis- 
tribution with a market changed the whole system of the R&D financing 
and support. A large number of R&D organizations were concentrated on 
prestigious and military high-tech projects. High priority determined the 
sufficiency of their financial and resource supply. In fact, market demand for 
this R&D was very poor and did not adequately compensate the previous 
large scale government R&D programs. 
Third, democratization of decision-making procedures a t  all levels of 
state authorities undermined the power of Academy and military-industrial 
lobbies, which actually determined resource allocation decisions including is- 
sues concerning plans and funds for various R&D projects and organizations. 
For instance, after this democratization it became much more difficult to  re- 
ceive financing for prestigious expensive R&D projects. Members of new 
legislative bodies were deeply concerned about the sensibility of different 
R&D programs financed from the state budget. The new governmental and 
parliamentary authorities were no longer under the influence of the former 
academic nomenclature and various pressure, rent-seeking groups. 
Fourth, research institutes were organized like industrial enterprises and 
managed in a bureaucratic manner. Usually they are rather large with stan- 
dard inflexible linear organizational structures and multilevel hierarchies. 
The inertia of the management routine in research institutes was very high 
and adjustment to  market economic condition proved rather difficult. 
Fifth, R&D organization of the early 1990s was characterized by low 
managerial competence. A career in the bureaucratically-managed research 
institutes, which operated in a very stable and monopolistic environment, 
was mainly determined by personal relations. Separating the scientific com- 
munity with organizational and information barriers annulled any potential 
competition in the selection of people according to  their scientific achieve- 
ments. In addition, no possibilities existed to follow a purely scientific 
career-under the bureaucratic organization of R&D there were only ad- 
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ministrative channels for personnel growth. The scientific community was 
suppressed by an administrative management routine. In order to  be influ- 
ential, a scientist had t o  occupy some official position in the administrative 
hierarchy. The dominance of administrative success among the factors de- 
termining one's career in R&D, lead t o  the concentration of incompetent 
people a t  the highest and middle levels of the R&D hierarchy. Under cen- 
tral planning, these were the people who determined the flows of resources 
for R&D and controlled the information exchange channels between central 
authorities and the scientific community. At the 1991 level of R&D activity, 
managers in the state R&D sector had insufficient competence t o  manage 
research institutes in the new environment. These lead t o  the deterioration 
of the competitive position of state research institutes and t o  the exodus of 
specialists and resources t o  the non-state commercial sector and abroad. 
Sixth, transition to  the market required a radical change in criteria judg- 
ing R&D performance. The basic criteria was t o  be competitiveness of R&D 
products. These change the whole former paradigm of R&D organization 
which was oriented toward the fulfillment of directives and formal indica- 
tors determined by government authorities. In order to  meet this challenge, 
radical restructuring of R& D management became a necessity. 
In an effort t o  overcome the above mentioned problems and t o  prevent 
the collapse of R&D in the transition period, radical restructuring of R&D 
organization and of state science and technology policy is a fundamental 
step. This restructuring must include: reorganization of research institutes 
in the privatization process of state enterprises and destruction of ministries 
and other administrative supervising bodies, restructuring of the state sys- 
tem of R&D financing and support, introduction of appropriate intellectual 
property rights legislation and state innovation policy, and reform of the 
education system. Changes in R&D organization must be accompanied by 
corresponding changes in the demand for R&D products. New technology 
development and diffusion is determined by the institutional structure of 
the economy. Here, restructuring R&D organization is considered as a part 
of more broad changes, including demonopolization of industry, large-scale 
privatization, change of the state regulation system, reform of financial and 
banking system, and so forth. 
The basic problem of R&D restructuring in the transition to  market is 
t o  provide sufficient demand for R&D products. In the situation of super- 
monopolization of the Russian economy, transition t o  market does not pro- 
vide guaranteed stimulus for innovational activity. Privatization of SEs will, 
in fact, lead t o  increasing prices and declining production. Thus, demonopo- 
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lization and development of competition is the key prerequisite for successful 
R&D restructuring. 
Spontaneous privatization has commenced in 1989-1991 without any de- 
monopolization. Transformation of SEs into self-managed and cross-owned 
joint stock companies has been followed by the rebirth of organizational 
monopolies in the form of various corporations, associations, and others. 
Another drawback is the uncertainty concerning the property rights of the 
transformed SEs. Using other state enterprises and banks as shareholders 
of their enterprises, managers evade ministerial control, but do not obtain 
any new owner. Usually, after the transformation of SEs, the managers lose 
responsibility for the long-term development of the enterprise but receive op- 
portunities for current revenue distribution. As a result of this spontaneous 
privatization, short-term orientations toward consumption maximization be- 
come dominant, while innovation activity and demand for R&D decrease. 
Large-scale privatization started in the second half of 1992 with the 
transformation of SEs into joint-stock companies and changed the picture 
regarding the distribution of property rights. With time, these should be 
clarified, as well as the responsibilities of managers. Immediately following 
transformation they will be responsible to  the corresponding ministries and 
the State Property Fund, later to the trust companies which will hold shares 
on behalf of the state, and finally to  the private owners after privatization 
is complete. 
At the same time the privatization program for 1992 does not consider 
the technological and production structure of SEs. The industrial ministries 
were designed and behaved like large corporations optimizing their inter- 
nal structure according to  the environment. The present SEs are, in fact, 
more like parts of the large industrial production organizations than like 
independent firms. Their independent privatization can drastically increase 
the transaction costs in the economy and destroy the production of high 
value-added final goods. 
In order to provide favorable conditions for innovations the appropriate 
privatization program is necessary. It should provide a clear property rights 
system, which would determine the responsibility of managers regarding the 
long-term development of privatized enterprises. At the same time, privati- 
zation should not destroy the existing technological links between enterprises 
as well as information flows between enterprises and research institutes. It 
appears sensible t o  create vertically integrated corporations on the basis of 
the present agglomerations of SEs. Privatization of the latter can be opera- 
tionalized by selling or granting their shares to  responsible management in 
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corresponding holding, investment funds, or trust companies, which should 
play the role of institutional investors interested in the long-term develop- 
ment of "theirn firms. For this purpose, the share arrangements may be 
organized as mutual or state funds managed by private firms with strict 
government control over their profitability and portfolio structure. 
Research institutes cannot be privatized like enterprises. The form of 
each research institute's transformation should depend on its role in the 
industrial technological development. The so-called main research institutes 
responsible for technological development of the whole industry could remain 
in state ownership supervised by a corresponding Ministry, or they should 
be transformed into consortiums owned by firms interested in the relevant 
R&D performed a t  the particular institute. 
Research institutes, which are now part of scientific-production unions 
(NPO), should be transformed into the firms' R&D departments before the 
latter's privatization. On the basis of such NPO, several small high-tech firms 
can be organized in the process of privatization. Research institutes with 
no clear specialization, yet still conducting useful applied research, could be 
transformed into centers of contract R&D that will offer their equipment 
and space to  various research teams. In fact, many research institutes are 
already transformed in such way. 
Research institutes can also be transformed into self-managed organi- 
zations leased or owned by their employees or staff members, private insti- 
tutes, joint ventures, and still others. In some cases, these institutes can 
be transferred to  universities and colleges. The choice of an appropriate 
form should depend on the character of research activity (basic or applied 
research), prospects of self-finance, access to necessary inputs, level of re- 
search and quality of R&D resources, and importance for the technological 
development of particular industry. 
Transformation of industrial research institutes should be undertaken 
simultaneously with the privatization of corresponding industries. Trans- 
formation of the research institutes of the Academy of Science assumes the 
restructuring of the latter as a prerequisite. In order to  provide conditions 
for self-organization of the scientific community and normal scientific devel- 
opment, debureaucratization of the Academy is an absolute necessity. It 
should be transformed from the supervising management body into a set 
of service organizations offering various services for research institutes and 
scholars (information supply, publications, material supply, conference or- 
ganization, etc.). In the same way, the State bodies responsible for higher 
education should be transformed simultaneously with liberalization of the 
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higher education system. The present inefficient system of directing state 
subsidies to higher education establishments should be substituted by subsi- 
dies to students and diversification of sources for funding higher education. 
Transformation of research institutes in the process of privatization 
should be accompanied by a restructuring of the R&D financing system. 
The present flow of subsidies from the state budget to the research insti- 
tutes via their supervisory organizations (such as the Academy of Science 
or an industrial ministry) should be substituted by various foundations and 
management bodies with different tasks offering subsidies and R&D con- 
tracts to  all organizations and scholars on a competitive basis. The first 
steps have already been taken by the foundation responsible for the Basic 
Research Fund. It has been formed based on former state budget subsi- 
dies mainly used to finance basic research in the research institutes of the 
Academy. The main shortcoming regarding this organization lies in its solo 
position as the only Fund receiving substantial state subsidies for basic re- 
search while it is controlled by the Academy bureaucracy. Consequently, one 
can hardly expect real competition for grants from this fund. In order to 
overcome the supermonopolization in the organization of basic science, more 
funds of this kind, which expose the expertise of research scientists and the 
worthiness of grant allocation procedures, are a necessity for a functional 
R&D market. 
Such funds should also be established to  promote industrial R&D. The 
state support for industrial R&D is especially important in the transition 
period, when demand for R&D from firms is insufficient for reasons men- 
tioned earlier. The funds to  support industrial R&D can be organized on 
the basis of the already introduced special tax for financing R&D expen- 
ditures. In the present situation characterized by an instable and partially 
collapsing state budget as well as very high inflation, it appears sensible to 
introduce this tax as a law in order to procure reliable sources for R&D 
financing. Industrial funds financed by this tax should be independent of 
ministries' authority and should be managed by councils appointed by the 
President. These funds should finance R&D programs of national impor- 
tance, technology imports, and grants for scholars and subsidies for research 
institutes. 
Subsidies for research institutes will be necessary to  preserve them dur- 
ing the transition period for two reasons. Firstly, temporary state subsidies 
can protect accumulated R&D potential throughout the transformation pro- 
cess of the state financial system and enterprises adjustment. Secondly, such 
insulation mechanisms simply ease the transformation of the entire R&D sec- 
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tor. As already documented, the present private R&D sector is subsidized 
by the state financing channeled through state enterprises and research in- 
stitutes. The bankruptcy of the latter would undermine the existence of 
non-state R&D firms. The majority of them could not survive without in- 
direct support from the state organizations and access to  their resources. 
Some experts propose that this support should continue for a certain period 
to  secure growth of private R&D activity. When the latter become strong 
enough to  conduct independent research and to purchase R&D resources 
from state enterprises and research institutes in bankruptcy, subsidies to  the 
research institutes can be eliminiated. Some subsidies explicitly for basic re- 
search would be necessary in the future, but their share in R&D expenditures 
should decrease with the growing demand of private firms. 
Basic research has an open and international character. The develop- 
ment of international cooperation is crucial for the partial solution of the 
financial problems of Russian research institutes and for the integration of 
the Russian scientific community in the world. It is sensible to  allow and 
encourage Russian scholars to participate in competitions for grants from 
Western foundations. A part of the Western credits should be spent to  im- 
prove international communications channels and contacts for Russian schol- 
ars. This includes the development of telecommunication networks, supply 
of Russian research institutes with science and technical information from 
abroad, education and temporary work of scholars abroad (as well as foreign 
scholars in Russia), their participation at international conferences, and so 
forth. Joint R&D consortiums and research institutes is another form of for- 
eign finances for Russian R&D and integration of the Russian in the global 
scientific community. 
In future, state R&D expenditures should mainly be concentrated on 
programs of national importance. These programs can be financed by state 
authorities responsible for industrial development. Each program must have 
clear objectives, time schedule, and its own budget. Large programs could 
be adopted as a separate part of the state budget, while medium and small 
programs could be adopted as a part of the corresponding state bodies' 
budgets. Each program should be self-managed (by the state body, by a 
special administration, by a firm or consortium of firms, etc.). The type 
of management depends on the purpose of the program and the goals for 
its implementation. Use of funds allocated to  specific programs should be 
flexible: for example, for subsidies, grants, privileged credits, state orders 
for certain products manufacturing, and so forth. 
254 Economic Reform Impact 
During the transition period, state programs should remain an important 
instrument for resource allocation aimed at overcoming the structural crisis 
of the national economy and encouraging modernization. Technological di- 
versification in the Russian economy and the corresponding price structure 
has been the cause of inefficient resource allocation on the basis of short- 
term profit-seeking behavior which could become typical for private firms 
under continuing unstable economic conditions. State programs would be 
necessary t o  overcome the inertia of the obsolete economic structure and to  
initiate progressive technological changes. These programs would also be 
necessary for the conversion of enterprises in the military-industrial complex 
and their adjustment to  both internal and external market demand. Market 
disproportions in the Russian economy can not be overcome by liberalization 
alone. Active long-term industrial policy is necessary to  secure the recovery 
from structural crisis. 
The transformation from a simple dispersion-type to  a program-oriented 
type of planning presupposes radical restructuring of the state management 
system. The main problems of this restructuring are: shortage of resources, 
lack of competence, and inadequate structure of state bodies. The industrial 
ministries responsible for the production in corresponding industries should 
be substituted by functional ministries responsible for the development of 
the corresponding sectors of the national economy. 
With marketization of the economy, the share of R&D expenditures in 
state budget should decline, while the share of private firms should increase. 
State industrial policy should provide sufficient stimulus for enterprises t o  
undertake long-term investments and innovation activity. The basic require- 
ments herefore are economic stability and an adequate system of property 
rights. Taxation is also very important. In order to  promote long-term in- 
vestments, including R&D expenditures, the main burden should be carried 
by natural resources rents and property taxes. Investments and all kinds of 
R&D expenditures should not be taxed as production costs. Tax privileges 
for priority industries and services which cannot achieve sufficient profits 
immediately (like communications), could also be granted. Introduction of 
these principles would be impossible without restructuring the present tax- 
ation system which is based on the taxation of manufacturing value-added 
and consequently, suppress innovation activity. 
An important part of industrial policy during the transition period is 
foreign trade regulation. In spite of a comparatively high technological 
level in certain industries, the majority of Russian enterprises and prod- 
ucts are presently non-competitive on the world market. Russian managers 
have never been exposed to  the market or profit maximization. Quality re- 
quirements are of less importance than volume of production in a centrally 
planned economy. Competitiveness was never considered as something im- 
portant. For this reason, the imitation technique was widely used to  in- 
troduce new technologies. Together with poor quality, this has become the 
main obstacle for the export of Russian high-tech products. Time is needed 
in order to master these obstacles. Such a transition period requires the 
careful liberalization of import policy: too rapid and it may ruin the Rus- 
sian procedures and R&D resources, too slow and it will postpone foreign 
trade liberalization. A gradual long-term step-by-step process of reducing 
import tariffs should be implemented. 
A similar policy should be implemented regarding protection of intel- 
lectual property rights. Some kind of multi-step program of intellectual 
property rights regulation should be adopted long before its actual imple- 
mentation to  allow a sufficient adjustment period. 
These guidelines for restructuring Russian R&D organization need fur- 
ther elaboration. A special set of programs should be developed for R&D 
restructuring throughout the process of economic reform. 
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Table 1. R&D output by non-state organizations (billion rubles). 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991' 
R&D expenditures of 
different types of 
organizations 0.03 1.2 4.7 6.0 6.15 
including: 
Youth Research Centers 0.022 0.85 1.1 1.45 1.5 
Permanent Research Teams 
of All-Union Society of 
Inventors 0.07 0.1 0.15 0.15 
Permanent Research Teams 
of Union of Science and 
Engineers Society 0.12 0.35 0.5 0.5 
R&D cooperatives 0.008 0.17 3.15 3.9 4.0 
Table 2. Indicators of non-state R&D organizations activity. 
Number of Number of R&D Number of 
centers functioning expendi- employees 
(councils) Permanent tures in in Perma- 
empowered Research Permanent nent 
t o  create Teams Research Research 
Permanent (thousand* Teams Teams 
Research units) (million (thousand 
Teams (units) rubles) persons) 
Youth R&D Centers 
All-Union Society of Inventors 
1.01.89 55 4.7 70.8 25.0 
1.07.89 70 9.9 94.0 64.0 
1.01.90 100 15.0 110.5 82.0 
1.07.90 100 16.0 157.0' 58.0 
Union of Science and Engineers Society 
1.01.89 145 10.6 123.2 65.2 
1.07.89 267 16.9 189.6 96.0 
1 .O 1.90 451 38.0 349.0 273.0 
1.07.90 765 33.0 560.0 470.0 
R&D cooperatives 
1.01.89 2076 167.1 55.0 
1.07.89 5800 868.0 182.4 
1.01.90 10400 3151.3 321.5 
1.07.90 11300 2062.2 298.1 
*According to signed contracts. 
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Conclusions and 
Implications 

Implications and Prospects 
for R&D Management in 
the Transition to a Market 
Economy 
Christoph M. Schneider' 
Introduction 
With its large, educated population, more than adequate amount of scientists 
and engineers, and an abundance of resources, the status of the USSR as one 
of the world's greatest industrial powers would have appeared t o  be assured. 
However, this was not the case. 
A blending of economic and innovation theories has impressed on us 
that  the social manner of doing things should make all of us better off. 
Soviet-style socialism did not achieve this. In no such circumstance, did the 
central planning system prove that  i t  could achieve results superior to  those 
of other systems. In fact, the inadequacies of management techniques based 
on communist central planning principles have made the overall successes 
of capitalist market economies appear much more respectable had the  latter 
not such an opposite example t o  be compared with. 
However, the talk of mismanagement of research and development in the 
former Soviet Union or, rather, preceding management based on distorted 
economic signals leaves much room for improvement and future promise. 
'Economic Transition and Integration Project, IIASA, Laxenburg. 
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It d o w s  one to assume that a reorganization of R&D management under 
new conditions as part of the transition to  a market economy could lead to  
the blossoming of this sector. As a key element of economic growth, the 
appropriate style of investment in R&D could, in turn, act as a catalyst 
facilitating and aiding expansion and development benefiting domestic Rus- 
sian residents and influencing the status of the successor Republics (mainly 
Russia) of the former USSR in the international scientific, technological, and 
economic communities. 
History has proven time and time again that there is no future without 
a past. This is no less true in the field of research and development, or in the 
science and technology sector as a whole, than in any other area. Perhaps 
even more so, due to the value of an accumulated stock of knowledge in the 
propagation of new innovations. Throughout history and most accountable 
since the first industrial revolution of the 19th century, the impacts of new 
innovations have influenced the organization and development of society from 
technological, economic, and cultural perspectives. Countless major and 
minor challenges and opportunities have been afforded by developments in 
new technologies. The potential for new innovation lies in a long-standing 
commitment to  support domestic R&D that cultivates and secures national 
technological capabilities. 
The Soviet Union made such an historical investment. Successful sci- 
ence was part of cultural pride and identity; in fact, it was anchored in the 
ideology. Today, the USSR no longer exists, but, to  a large extent, its sci- 
ence and technology sector, which boasted one of if not the largest R&D 
establishment in the world in its time, lives on for the most part in the new 
Russian Federation. 
Already during Gorbachev's years of perestroika between 1985 and 1991 
in the USSR and even more so now in the modern Russia, which is undergo- 
ing remarkable changes in all spheres a t  the hands of courageous reformers, 
have efforts indicated a continuing importance of the role of scientific and 
technological development. Russia is faced by a dilemma in becoming part of 
the international S&T community where results and performance determine 
success: preserving the potential of the enormous S&T establishment (which 
may in truth be too large for its own good), while attempting to become more 
efficient and productive by rationalizing and letting the market determine 
what is needed. As it was, the system cannot and will not serve the needs of 
a modernizing market oriented economy. However, a scientific-research base 
is important to a modern economy. 
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The Importance of R&D: F'rom the Soviet Union 
to Russia 
F'rom the Scientific Perspective 
In the Soviet Union from Lenin to  Gorbachev, science and technology, in 
one form or another, were heralded as the universal remedy for all problems. 
It was to  make Soviets better off at home and the country's position more 
important internationally. S&T were considered to be the highest form of 
culture, the path t o  social prosperity; it was to serve the masses rather than 
be exploited for individual profit. The scientific community had fantastic di- 
mensions and enjoyed special status in ever sense of the word. The products 
of scientific endeavor were to  be the springboard t o  technological advance 
and economic growth superior to  that elsewhere, particularly in the Western 
capitalist countries. 
Previously, Soviet science could be proudest of its achievements in mil- 
itary and space technology. Unfortunately, both did little directly for con- 
sumer welfare, and even indirect spin-offs were extremely limited (though 
this should be no surprise if we are well informed about deficiency of defense 
R&D spin-offs in the West). The Soviet-style of R&D management culti- 
vated a progressively growing technological gap to  the West in many scien- 
tific fields despite the system's basic natural advantages. These included the 
capacity to mobilize resources to  achieve "mission-oriented" innovations, to 
train the labor force with the appropriate research and design skills, to ac- 
quire specific foreign technology, to theoretically avoid potential duplication 
with its centralized determination of innovation, its mandatory enforcement 
of introduction of innovation, and its centralized investment and materials 
allocation (Linz, 1992, p. 65). 
Decades of hearing that scientific and technological advance will cure 
socio-economic decay but perceiving and experiencing only sparing results, 
has made the Russian public skeptical of the actual recovery power of R&D 
investments for economic improvement. In addition, a premise gaining more 
recognition is that, in Russia today, the central government is acclaimed to  
be more progressive and reform oriented than the local authorities and of- 
ten (state) enterprises. This indicates that the Academy of Sciences, some 
industrial ministries, and special committees will carry much of the respon- 
sibility to  get a new style of R&D underway. Of course, they will partially 
be carried by past momentum and significantly by the hordes of scientific 
and engineering workers and equipment of yesterday. 
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Perestmika, by definition and in reality, facilitated the introduction of 
democratization of management and decentralization in existing scientific 
institutes (for better or worse) in an effort t o  restructure institutionalization 
and reorient motivation in the Academy of Sciences, industrial institutes, 
and government. Evidence from personal interviews with scientists gener- 
ally document their continuing belief that  scientific activity is value free. 
Hence, given the right political system and social foundations, and freedom 
t o  work without interference, their research naturally would produce great 
benefits for society (Josephson, 1992, p. 29). Russian policy-makers are now 
in the position to  grant the scientific profession such an environment. Some 
progress has been made and the first results are promising. One example 
has been that  the relative freedoms and flexibilities have seen the rebirth of 
independent professional organizations of scientific experts, more than a half 
century after the Communist Party wiped such groups out (ibid, p. 30). Such 
developments reveal that  characteristics of the Western scientific community 
can be successfully and rewardingly integrated during the reorganization of 
R&D management in Russia. 
The USSR was simply plagued by a central planning system that  was 
actually based on bargaining elements which distorted economic signals and 
lead to  a futile effort t o  implement the optimal plan due t o  the disguised 
void t o  reality-the "inefficiency hole." However, the advantages that  have 
become remnants of the former system can catapult Russian R&D and indus- 
trial potential t o  unexpected heights under the conditions characteristic of a 
new political and economic environment which the reformers are attempting 
t o  foster. 
Not only will Russian R&D rejoin the mainstream of the international 
scientific community, but also the country of Russia will rejoin on both 
economic and technological foundations. One crucial t o  the success of the 
other. 
Russian R&D has inadvertently been obliged t o  become a part of the 
global scientific and technology system at a time when many of the leading 
R&D nations are facing similar problems, though t o  a differing extent, t o  
those that  have arisen in the RFR's bid t o  create a market economy. In the 
West, budget deficits are burdening governments, forcing federal funding 
cutbacks wherever possible and S&T habitually falls victim in the process. 
Particularly, of course, fundamental science which is most strongly supported 
by the government in the West. In Russia, reduced funding in basic science 
could have a substantial human cost due t o  the large number of scientists and 
technicians employed in this branch. Of course, the accompanying increase in 
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freedom t o  change t o  a job in another institute, field, or completely different 
sector (as long as experience or education allows), which was previously 
unknown, may take up some of the slack. In fact, many persons may finally 
take the employment they wished t o  achieve with their education (where 
possible) rather than the position that was commonly determined for them. 
Additionally, R&D ingeneral but t o  a greater degree the applied side is 
being forced t o  earn its way in the world. So, what the Russians perceive 
as a result of becoming a market economy is a feature confronting Western 
applied science (though conventionally rather well-supported primarily by 
the private industrial sector anyway) in an effort to  make what appeared t o  
be a good system more cost effective. 
Partly as a result of simple necessity to  prevent the R&D sector from 
completely vanishing, the reorganization of R&D management in Russia 
began with more urgency after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. 
Russia, as the largest of the successor states, ceased financing more than 
eighty central agencies including structures of the former scientific commu- 
nity (Levin, 1992, p. 1). However, within a few months the Russian Academy 
of Sciences2 had been formed, replacing the Soviet counterpart, and a meta- 
morphosis and merging of the former USSR State Committee for Science, 
and Technology, the Russian State Committee for Science and Higher Ed- 
ucation, the Committee for Science and Public Education of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet, and the short-lived Ministry of Science and Technological 
Policy of the RFR into one unified agency, the Ministry for Science, Higher 
Education, and Technology Policy of the RFR. Thus, some of the adminis- 
trative changes have been embarked on, members of the Academy are elected 
in more democratic fashion, and funding mechanisms are guaranteed but not 
yet organized. Much is left t o  be done in the reorganization of R&D man- 
agement embodied in a new diversified and competitive science policy that  is 
emerging in the transition t o  a market economy, but a start has been made. 
From the Enterprise Perspective 
The changing economic environment in Russia, with reformulated institu- 
tional, organizational, and motivational structures, requires modifications of 
the existing innovation decision-making process. In an effort t o  integrate in 
the world economic system and produce goods of international standards for 
the domestic as well as foreign market, Russian managers face many new de- 
'AS it had originally been known from 1917 to  1925. 
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cisions; one of which is considering how to best allocate their R&D budgets. 
The price they can procure on the market and the diffusion of their product 
will determine their revenue from which the R&D budget is derived; this is 
characteristic of applied research in Western market economies. Under such 
conditions managers can finally truly evaluate rewards and risks of investing 
in and introducing innovations. 
Under Soviet-style research and technology management innovations 
were more imposed on enterprises from the hierarchial industrial/institu- 
tional system above them. Whenever possible enterprises balked in the face 
of changes due to the then ruling incentive measures. The gradual reduction 
in the magnitude of expected punishments for not meeting orders between 
1953 and 1982, lead to  a lack of discipline and enforcement (Ellman and 
Kontorovich, 1992, p. 10). Managers and directors of enterprises (whether 
these were research institutes responsible for producing innovations or facto- 
ries ordered to produce final products) had less motivation to reach output 
targets. Instead of punishment, superior levels of the hierarchy revised their 
targets downwards resulting in a cumulative brake on technological change. 
Yet, as the present reforms continue one of the major barriers to in- 
novation in the past is significantly shrinking in importance: namely, the 
supply of inputs to be utilized with the new technology. Under the old 
system a manager had to already mount considerable effort to secure the in- 
puts for the old-style of production, suggesting that the introduction of new 
techniques would have confronted him with a potentially double negative 
effect-loss of bonuses due to reduced output as a result of retooling, and 
forecasted difficulties in the supply of newly required inputs further imped- 
ing production. The former distribution system has mostly vanished now. 
A functional new one has yet to be developed. The doors to input supplies 
are open domestically and international to whoever can pay the price. 
Today, the enterprises have essentially two choices with respect to inno- 
vation. Either they innovate themselves, basing their decisions on consumer 
demand, supply conditions, costs of inputs and so on, or they may choose to 
imitate. However, the simple method of imitation utilized in the past will 
no longer be sufficient; products will have to be developed further by domes- 
tic (preferably in-house) R&D personnel to match the specific requirements 
of local demand. But, the enterprises cannot achieve these results during 
the transition on completely their own accord. A combination of market 
signals and government planning is needed to speed economic development 
and growth (OTA, 1992, p. 11). The latter, as the Soviet Union found out 
Christoph M. Schneider 267 
the hard way, cannot replace the advantages of the market and forces of 
competition. 
I t  is, however, now quite clear that free market principles based on per- 
fect (or even imperfect) competition provide sufficient incentives t o  invest 
in as much W D  as would be socially optimal for a whole nation. This 
is the argument used t o  justify government intervention. Examples from 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, nations that  all experienced exception- 
ally rapid growth, reveal the presence of state intervention to  alter but not 
destroy market signals. Protection of the domestic market and direct fund- 
ing of R&D were forms of intervention, as were policies t o  steer low-cost 
capital, preferential access t o  foreign exchange, assistance in negotiations 
with foreign companies for access to  technologies, and support of domestic 
technology development and implementation through a variety of fiscal in- 
centives (ibid, p. 10). Thus, numerous examples exist in how the Russian 
government can best utilize its domestic R&D potential while preserving the 
drive for entrepreneurship. 
~ur thermore,  should the enterprises prove t o  be duly successful, then 
their products will also be sold in the West, in turn influencing the market, 
prices, and i ndustri al organization there.3 Evidence from historical devel- 
opments in other nations, which have been resurrected from rather dismal 
situations t o  become economically and socially successful (i.e., Japan, Ger- 
many, some NICs), would tend t o  indicate that imitation will be the initially 
favored strategy a t  least for the immediate transitional phase. As world lev- 
els of quality and selection come within reach, supported by the very capable 
domestic R&D sector, the role of innovation will again substantially increase. 
Of course, the industrial structure will make a difference. 
Russia has inherited the industrial structure cultivated by decades of 
communist industrial policy. In general, i t  is one dominated by labor and 
- 
capital intensive industries, but recently there have been signs of a t  least a 
willingness t o  shift t o  more modern industries along the path of industrial 
evolution. Countries beginning much later than the USSR on the road t o  
industrialization like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have already gone 
through more shifts. They began also with labor and moved t o  capital 
3We are reminded of the shift of certain types of production to newly industrialized 
countries as in the cases of steel, chemicals, or automobiles. The specific advantages of 
these nations drew these manufacturing industries to their soil and have in a number of 
situations developed these further to become substantial exports of the resulting products 
themselves. Simultaneously, a reorientation is required in those more mature nations from 
which the manufacturing initiatives originally came. 
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intensive industries, moving primarily from light manufacturing and import 
substitution t o  heavy and chemical industries. However, these countries all 
went one additional step further than the USSR. They have moved into 
the knowledge intensive industries which have facilitated the production of 
products (i.e., computers) that have allowed the development of downstream 
industries and consequently promoted economic growth and development. 
Although much enterprise activity will be devoted to  satisfying the 
backed up demand resulting from decades of no selection, the enterprises 
will be joining the world at  the research and technology level on the one 
hand, and on the product level on the other hand. R&D based technological 
change (particularly production technology) and diffusion of that technology 
will contribute to  economic growth and the improvement of the standard of 
living, inevitably making Russian producers and consumers important ele- 
ments of the world economy. 
The International Aspect 
In our modern world, reality has come to prove that science and technology 
have become a world-wide phenomena. The process has been underway 
for some decades and international exchange and participation have been 
crucial to the successes of numerous nations that had to  climb back from 
serious economic and/or technological setbacks. The value of open borders 
to  scientific exchange, which includes the flow of experts, ideas, experiences, 
assistance, and supporting materials (such as computers), has been valuable 
as a catalyst for economic growth and development in the past. 
Russia was once no exception. Even as far back as Peter the Great and 
Catherine the Great in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively, 
were Swedish, Dutch, Danish, Prussian and many scholars and technicians 
of other nationalities invited to perform their craft in Russia, while Russians 
were sent to England and elsewhere for training and study. It was under 
communist rule in the twentieth century when the Soviet Union turned a cold 
shoulder to  the ever increasing multilateralization and internationalization 
of both basic and applied research efforts, not to mention development. 
Although the internationalization of research and development became 
significant enough after World War I1 to warrant more serious study, the 
real surge appeared in the 1980s and continues today. More and more in- 
ternational scientific associations and consortiums are being established in 
an effort to spread the risks and costs of research and development, to  gain 
from the pooling of scholars from disparate fields in different nations, and 
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t o  be assured a privilege to  the results of the cooperation. It has become in- 
creasingly difficult, costly, uncertain and less fashionable t o  ugo at it alone." 
In addition, the accompanying advantages of foreign direct investment 
and multinational corporations' activities are chief determinants in the ac- 
quisition of foreign technology. The significance of these elements increases 
when one considers that much of the newest and most protected Western 
technology was already being chiefly transferred by multinationals in the 
late 1980s. In each case the value of the domestic research and development 
base influences the attractiveness of a particular country for foreign interests 
and investors. Judging by the stock of scientific resources inherited from the 
Soviet Union, Russia will have much to  offer and be an attractive partner 
in international research. Thus, it seems Russia has chosen to  return to  the 
world stage of science and technology during a time when more interaction 
between the players is desirable and much can be gained by each. 
Becoming a part of the world economy and transforming the internal 
system to a market oriented style simultaneous to  the opening of the S&T 
sector will facilitate a working environment more conducive to  better techno- 
logical choice and more efficient use of R&D resources. Prices of products, 
costs of inputs, and returns on investment will finally have a meaning in 
choosing policies and projects. Links t o  the world will do much for the de- 
velopment of domestic markets to which domestic research and technology 
must cater and from which demand impulses are expected to  aid in guiding 
reformulation of principles and institutions. 
One of the keys t o  a future for the Russian S&T sector is to sever 
all links to  the former legacy of ideological orientation. Cooperation with 
other nations, mainly those of the industrialized West, will prove to  bear 
important fruits for the development of Russian R&D, molding it to  be a 
significant factor in economic growth. Benefits can be realized in the pro- 
curement of marketing- and technological assessment infrastructure, policy- 
setting processes, methods for science management, means for modernizing 
and retrofitting those branches of industry worth saving, and measures for 
determining and demonstrating how applied research can be used to  make 
traditional industries competitive (Popper, 1992, p. 114). 
It would be incomplete to  consider the international aspects of the im- 
portance of R&D and technology for economic growth without citing the case 
of Japan. Notwithstanding the differences, a comparison with the Russia of 
today makes the Japanese case especially useful due to  similar historical 
events and lessons for the future. Already in the pre-WWII period Japan 
had entered a phase of international isolation that extended until the end 
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of the war. Postwar Japan inherited a technological gap t o  Western in- 
dustrialized countries and inflated heavy industries (machinery, metals, and 
chemicals) often associated with the previously extensive military ~ e c t o r . ~  
Inward foreign investment was practically prohibited and to  compensate for 
the  isolation the  s ta te  increased the allocation of resources to  research and 
development. This strategy was, however, unsuccessful in closing the tech- 
nology gap t o  the  Western leaders. If there were no mention of names or 
dates, this portrait could just as fittingly apply t o  the late phase of the  Soviet 
Union and the early predicament facing Russia. 
One of Japan's most notable solutions to  the dilemma was t o  acquire 
advanced foreign technology in many ways, with an emphasis on knowledge 
rather than capital, largely exclusive of inward direct investment (Goto, 
1991, p. 10). The Japanese perceived technology as knowledge and informa- 
tion embodied in many forms ranging from persons t o  equipment. In postwar 
Japan a vigorous program of personnel exchange with the leading Western 
nations was initiated and supported a t  both the  enterprise and scholastic 
levels. Japan also imported the backlog of technologies developed overseas 
during the war, and soon moved to  new technologies not yet pervasive else- 
where and developed these further a t  home for both the  foreign and domestic 
markets. The entire process of effectively utilizing imported knowledge and 
technology t o  create Japan's own technological base and promote economic 
growth was helped by the level of indigenous science, research, development, 
and technology (primarily created during the isolation period) and a well de- 
veloped education system. Firms were very active in importing, concluding 
technological agreements with American and Western European companies, 
and in sending engineers and managers abroad regularly t o  search, find, and 
return with interesting and useful things being done elsewhere. 
This short account of the postwar Japanese situation was t o  reveal the 
benefits of utilizing effective international R&D policy t o  spur domestic 
growth. Although there are not all too many such examples, it gives a 
hint of successful measures that  can, in one form or another, be useful in the 
management of Russian R&D during the transition to  a market economy. 
Growth will create a demand for more advanced technology, which promotes 
growth in turn. Advanced technology can be produced at home or acquired 
from abroad. The latter is not an automatic product of the cyclical process 
'The percentage of heavy industry production in total manufacturing output was 79% 
in 1944 (Goto, 1991, p. 6). 
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described, but requires a deliberate effort on the part of the buyer and the 
appropriate environment into which it is introduced if it is to  be productive. 
Prospects and Prescriptions for R&D Manage- 
ment and Technological Advance in the Transition 
to a Market Economy and ~ e ~ o n d ~  
Reform, Transition, and R&D 
The presentation of R&D in the Soviet economy in the previous papers of 
this book reveal the enormity and complexity of the task to appropriately 
manage this factor. It has particular relevance due to  its position at the core 
of the relationship between science and technological growth. Management 
of research and development in the USSR was characterized by a conflict 
between political, national, and historical priorities (competing at all levels 
of science and technology), and countless distinct cultural and regional pecu- 
liarities. Although the economic transition has been recognized as necessity 
and reality, the existing influences appear to adhere to an excess devotion 
to  maintain all institutions and employment in R&D, including the applied 
area. Different solutions are required in both the basic and applied areas. 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in late summer 1991, the processes 
of transformation in Russian science administration and policy have been 
accelerated, but have yet to be successfully concluded. 
Two major factors have differentiated Eastern and Western R&D sys- 
tems. They are: 
1. The origin of busic research. A great portion was conventionally done in 
the special research institutes of the Academy of Sciences rather than in 
the higher education institutions. In this sense, the Soviet system most 
resembled the French system of those in the West. Generally, there are 
different mixes in the West, but determining the precise mixture for 
the Russian R&D community is, perhaps, not the most crucial issue at  
present. 
2. The role of the enterprises. In the planned economic system, industrial 
R&D was not the responsibility of enterprises' management. If pere- 
'The views and propositions made throughout this section are founded on the author's 
personal discussions with leading experts and policy-makers from Russia and Western 
nations who participated at an IIASA conference on Research and Development Manage- 
ment in the Tmnrition to a Market Economy in Moscow in July 1991. 
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stmika, in its new form under the Russian reform-oriented leadership, 
proceeds and competition is successfully established through demonopo- 
lization and privatization, the present system will prove to  be infeasible 
and the number of free standing or independent industrial research lab- 
oratories will diminish because the industrial enterprises will themselves 
take up the research. Building a R&D laboratory into the enterprise 
allows the firm to  work effectively and in a proprietary fashion with the 
laboratory to  reduce the actual needs for formal legal instruments (as 
patents) in order for companies t o  best appropriate their returns. 
The organization of science often reflects the organization of the econ- 
omy. The differentiation and separation between fundamental and applied 
science is a crucial policy issue. This has direct implications for the distinc- 
tion between basic and commercial R&D. The latter depends not only on the 
quality of R&D personnel. In a market economy, resources for applied R&D 
are primarily allocated by the market mechanism in a decentralized manner 
responding to market forces. Resources for basic research are largely sup- 
plied by the government. Thus, a review of the experiences and literature on 
the integration of science and technology in a market economy would seem 
in order before considering policies that can propagate a simple division of 
R&D activities into non-profit (fundamental) and commercial (applied). 
Research and development, like the general situation in the USSR, was 
confronted with a lack of interactions between users at economic, societal, 
and regional levels. In analyzing Soviet R&D, a number of criticisms can be 
distinguished that have not been uncommon in the West. These include: 
1. Technological progress in the USSR has been characterized as proudly 
originating essentially from its own roots. This influenced the manner in 
which scientists and engineers solve problems, often far from economic 
reasoning, particularly in the short term, as it is unnecessary to start 
most investigations for new innovations or inventions from scratch in 
today's international scientific community. 
2. Science has habitually neglected the market influence of society's de- 
mands. Science and technology appeared to  be more imposed on society 
in the centrally planned economies than in the West. S&T were based 
much more on social integration in Western than in socialist society. It 
is considered by some to  be a paradox that a capitalist based system has 
lead to  a better quality of life. 
3. A major problem was the branch system or monopoly, which has been 
previously discussed in this paper. While management of S&T in the So- 
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viet Union is rapidly becoming increasingly obsolete causing significant 
inefficiencies and unproductiveness in the economy, the advanced west- 
ern industrialized countries are building new systems with technological 
growth potential. 
The Russian science and technology policy, which is being developed 
parallel t o  the other measures for economic transition, could have a more 
relevant and applied perspective for dealing with issues concerning the man- 
agement of R&D if the  following initiatives were undertaken: 
1. Conversion of the  defense-oriented R&D t o  concentrate more on civilian 
issues. This is, at least to  a some extent, beginning t o  happen. In fact, 
some specific branches within the military-industrial complex (MIC) was 
already responsible for producing certain civilian goods in the 1980s 
under the still communist leadership. Additionally, there is a need for 
simultaneous commercialization and privatization of the s ta te  MIC that  
can make conversion effective. 
2. Directing a portion of the scientific effort towards specific areas that  are 
less sensitive to  short term price changes so that  valuable resources and 
potential will not be lost. 
3. Closer interaction with other policy areas. Science does not operate in a 
vacuum, so i t  should not be isolated from but integrated in society and 
economy facilitating the liberation of creativity and the encouragement 
of exchanges and reviews. 
4. Closer ties with user needs. These make R&D effective and commercial- 
izable. If R&D is linked to  industry in a more competitive environment, 
i t  is consequently tied to  user needs. 
5. Actual integration of R&D into industry in order to  link i t  more closely 
to  the production process and eliminate administrative and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and barriers. This implies a need for the development of 
more in-house research. 
With regard t o  the time horizon of R&D activity, an  increased devo- 
tion to  short term projects causes the squeezing out of relevant long term 
research. Furthermore, the question concerning the portfolio of R&D has 
been a contentious issue in the West; this was also true in the final phases 
of Soviet reform and is still the case now and will continue to  be so in the  
Russian reform of R&D policy. The rise of the independent industrial re- 
search laboratory owned by the firm in the West, was to  separate some of 
the scientists and engineers from short term work. A typical example of 
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the structure is a central laboratory (dealing with longer term issues) and 
decentralized laboratories that are closer to  production, doing shorter term, 
demand oriented work. A final note related to  timing: the R&D community 
of the former USSR and now especially in Russia is struggling to  accommo- 
date economic reform and not the other way around. 
In order t o  make valuable contributions when proposing alternative mea- 
sures for change, good and reliable statistics must be available to  work from. 
Numerous questions have arisen in the discussion surrounding the reform of 
Soviet/Russian R&D management and the science and technology sector on 
the whole with respect to  the availability of such statistics, their value, reli- 
ability, comparability and meaning. Information provided indicates a need 
for major restructuring in the field of R&D statistics in Russia. Before any 
policy decisions are made, it is crucial to  have a clear and undistorted pic- 
ture of the existing situation (i.e., R&D performance and potential). There 
is a need for modern and comparable statistics because the historical data 
collected are the product of the old institutional structure and were normally 
presented in isolation. The new style in the last years of the USSR and in 
the first years of the RFR is to  rely heavily on surveys. But, whether these 
generate the best results, particularly because so much depends on who is 
filling in the questionnaires, is uncertain. 
As a result of traditionally inflated numbers coming from the Soviet 
Union, there is much interest in the precise definitions of the measures re- 
ported. For example, whether only full-time workers are included in R&D 
employment, who is actually classified as a scientist: what precisely dis- 
tinguishes a higher educational institution, what should or should not be 
included in material and technical resources and so forth. The meaning of 
certain indicators must also be clarified. For example, the age of equipment 
leads to  questions of whether they were state-of-the-art when purchased, or 
an increase in graduate students may not have as positive an increase as 
first thought if, as in the US, there is a strong influx of foreign students (in- 
dicating that the number of domestic students may actually be decreasing 
while the total is increasing). Finally, the key will be a successful restruc- 
turing of R&D categories to  best allow domestic analysis and international 
comparisons (possibly on a value basis). A first step may be to  compare the 
'In the United States, only 35% of scientists are directly employed a s  R&D personnel, 
while 45% are employed in related activities. These make an essential contribution to 
research development and growth without being immediately associated with R&D. They 
are involved in marketing, communication, exchange programs, etc. 
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definition of former Soviet categories or indicators with those defined in the 
F'rascati Manual and routinely used in OECD countries. 
The Survivability of R&D 
Western experts often question why and how the Soviet science and tech- 
nology sector was able to grow so large in the presence of such formidable 
obstacles. Obviously, there were political and ideological goals at the foun- 
dation, not those of the economy or the market. 
The decline of state R&D financing must be seen as a process of weaning 
the R&D sector from full state dependence. Market forces inevitably result 
in a dilemma; no success without failure. But, the uncertainty incorporating 
the risks of failure and the benefits of success provide precisely the incentives 
required for competition. On the whole, Soviet state enterprises did not show 
sufficient initiative. Thus, private entrepreneurs may do better in striving 
for survival. In the case of computers for example, i t  appears that a great 
market for specialized and tailored software existed in the USSR. However, 
having the best technology will only be part of the success required to  achieve 
market share, others are development, service, marketing, and so on. 
Science and technology is a mixed system in most western economies. 
The key is to move the research into an innovation quickly so that it can enter 
the market soon in order for the benefits of the product to be available. In the 
steel industry, for example, the producers themselves develop the research 
due to  inter-industry competition (this is referred t o  as suicidal R&D, but 
if they do not do it, their competitor will). While the decrease in Soviet 
state funding was been accompanied by an increase in contract funding, the 
quantity of research contracted out in the West is kept to a minimum. The 
Western combination of in-house and external R&D is a perfect example of 
the mix of market and planned economics: internal R&D is more part of 
planning rather than market because the risk is high, there is uncertainty 
that often makes contracts unenforceable, and once much has been invested 
in a project there is a desire to  preserve that continuity. 
Soviet policy-makers should proceed with caution when attempting to  
directly apply present western standards with respect to  R&D management 
in any industry or sector because many of these standards are undergoing 
transitions in the West. It would be preferable to  aim for longer term goals 
rather than short term advance that would only close in on a current level 
that may prove to  be obsolete by the time it is attained. 
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R&D and Technological Change 
The Soviet economy appeared to  be the most monopolized in the world of 
industrialized nations. Soviet innovation was a function of the bargaining 
process and is associated with rising inflation. In comparison, western in- 
novation has been identified with falling prices as a result of reduced costs 
brought about by the  diffusion of the innovations. 
The following four factors are essential to  successful innovation in the 
West and could, t o  varying extents, contribute to  improved R&D manage- 
ment in Russia: 
1. Industrial R&D is largely financed by firms and done in the industrial 
laboratories owned by firms. The R&D must be done in facilities that  
are directly responsible t o  management. 
2. A competitive approach to  technological change. Russian S&T experts 
identified the domination of monopoly power (the failure t o  have a com- 
petitive industrial structure) to  have hindered innovation. Thus, there 
is a need t o  restructure in order t o  encourage competition. 
A look a t  the industries with great growth and clear technologi- 
cal progress in the West reveals that they have all been characterized 
by avid competition. A diversity of approaches t o  technological change 
developing simultaneously is an essential element that  generates techno- 
logical change in a market economy. Competition is required t o  provide 
incentives (i.e., the threat or risk of failing, not to  mention the  sweet 
taste of success). 
3. Scientists and engineers enjoy freedom to  move. Mobility is essential for 
creativity. Communication is required in generating a proper structure 
conducive for innovation. Of course, too much mobility is deleterious for 
the firm's innovative activity due t o  proprietary reasons. 
4. University research plays an important role in industrial innovation in 
the  West. The usual mechanism is people in industry identifying the 
needs that would be profitable and then reaching back to  science for the 
answers. Thus, i t  is need and demand driven rather than science driven, 
though science facilitates finding the solutions. 
The  Russian Federation cannot now simply look toward contract re- 
search t o  solve the non-market problems of the S&T sector. Towards the 
end of the communist era in the 1980s, when reform had become an in- 
evitable requirement for survival, contract research was frequently identified 
as a favored route t o  achieve market orientation in research and develop- 
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ment. More emphasis should be accorded to the need for a move toward 
in-house research. The fact that Soviet R&D laboratories were and have 
commonly remained, in a way, disconnected from manufacturing presents 
a real problem. A possible solution may be to divide them up by assign- 
ment and subsequently allow the market to direct the labor to those fields 
in demand. 
Some of the problems that previously plagued the R&D community in 
the USSR and continue to burden it under Russian authority are not unique 
and, therefore, should not be viewed so pessimistically. Inevitably, due to 
the market environment that is at its basis, Western science does not have 
an overall, coherent, concentrated, and organized unified quest for truth; 
rather, there is an intense individual sense of competition. This competition 
may not be without costs. But the advantages of dissemination of scientific 
results are very great in the West, and thus it is actively inspired. From 
this perspective, the results of a recent survey investigating R&D managers 
behavioral reaction to  the reform of R&D organization, which revealed that 
managers generally favored decentralization, private ownership, mobility and 
other aspects of reform, are encouraging and display courage and ambition 
on their part. On these grounds, the outlook for Russian S&T becomes more 
positive.7 
The area of international technology transfer is important and will gain 
in importance as the process of transition to a market economy continues. An 
entire chapter of this paper has been devoted to this subject. The emphasis 
on the export of technology is understandable due to  the need for hard 
currency, but a more appropriate policy orientation would have the emphasis 
on technology imports. This will bring the necessary results for long term 
modern economic growth if the surrounding environment is receptive. 
The current need for foreign currency should be secondary to the effort 
to build up internal welfare based on domestic economic growth. Some ex- 
perts contend that the more technologies can be imported, the faster they 
will grow, assuming that the domestic research and technology levels are at  
least sufficiently compatible to facilitate easy and useful assimilation. The 
technological balance of payments will be negative, but the trade balance 
could be running a large surplus (as in Japan, Germany, South Korea, Tai- 
wan, and others). Other problems (including hard currency shortages) will 
'Refers to the rurvey concerning managers* interpretations of RkD organization and 
structure within the framework of the economic reform program. This study was presented 
by Leonid Kosdr at the IIASA conference R&D Management in the Zl-unsition to a Market 
Economy in Moscow, July 13-15, 1991. 
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be solved in the long run, but some strategic vision from the state on R&D 
imports can be helpful immediately (particularly where problems may arise 
with respect t o  the financial limitations of enterprises). 
Possibilities for R&D Restructuring 
One of the first places t o  begin restructuring with some of the greatest 
potential rewards is the monstrous, until recently well-financed military- 
industrial complex. Conversion of the military industry is a common and 
widely discussed topic in Western industrialized economies. Countries like 
Japan or the USA have gone through quite extensive conversion programs 
in the past.8 The conversion can come from above in the guise of a centrally 
planned conversion, or i t  can come from below when each enterprise seeks 
its own destiny. The latter, decentralized manner was typical of the USA. 
In Japan, conversion was sudden, but goals of the ensuing policies were to  
facilitate competition with an early emphasis on serving the world market 
with domestically developed products. Conversion from below is usually 
more successful because i t  produces products and technology that the civilian 
sector is demanding. The reorientation from the defense t o  the civilian sector 
has great potential due t o  the big backlog of demand for civilian products 
which has arisen during the decades of concentrating on military production. 
The Russian Federation has many assets that  can be provided through 
conversion and the transition t o  a market economy. Many firms of the de- 
fense ministry are already producing a number of civilian products, primarily 
because no civilian firms engage in such production. Also, this great nation 
has a very well educated and highly trained population, particularly in the 
fundamentals. The West will need t o  provide assistance in certain areas such 
as education (exchange of students, scholars, managers, etc.) and technolog- 
ical agreements. Knowledge is more important than equipment (and much 
cheaper because i t  requires less foreign exchange) in the long run when the 
purpose is t o  build up domestic S&T potential. 
In developing the appropriate environment for progressive R&D there 
is an essential need for the construction of legal support for innovative ac- 
tivities. The law is t o  be a facilitator rather than a barrier for R&D. It 
is difficult to  provide a complete legal structure for research, development, 
'In 1945, the USA had to undergo a much larger conversion than that facing the Soviet 
Union. At that time, approximately 40% of US GNP was devoted to defense. In Japan 
the large military sector, which was built up during WWII, disappeared overnight after 
the war. 
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innovation, and diffusion. This structure must be adaptable and flexible as 
more is understood about the innovative process. Of course, providing model 
forms of contracts and legislation is valuable, but scope must be provided 
for adaptation and evolution of such documents. 
Preservation of the rights of individual scientists is very important. The 
individual inventor may not play a big role alone in developing innovations, 
but his role in an R&D enterprise is and will be crucial. There is a definite 
need for support for the intellectual labor market. There is no question 
that the concept of property rights must be clarified. In the West, different 
industries use different methods in appropriating rewards from R&D such as 
secrecy, lead time, patents, and others. Market orientation gives enterprises 
alternative modes for appropriation and there may be a lesser role for the 
more formal methods (i.e., copyrights, patents, trademarks) as would be 
expected ex-ante. 
It is ironic to observe that in the transition of the Soviet Union to a 
market economy, it is Lenin's question that we face: What is to be done? 
This section attempts to move us a considerable distance in thinking about 
this question. 
There seems to be general agreement among both experts of Soviet/Rus- 
sian R&D and scholars of Western R&D systems that basic, fundamental 
R&D will need support during the transition to a market economy in Russia 
and thereafter. There is no economy which relies entirely on private funding 
in this area. It is the nature of basic research that it investigates not directly 
profit-making areas, in which firms (profit oriented in a market economy) 
tend to under-invest. Applied research should be primarily funded by the 
private sector with the exception of private R&D that are aimed at or tai- 
lored to specific national preferences (i.e., defense), and in areas where goods 
are not really traded in the market (i.e., health, environment, ecology, and 
others)? 
Funding becomes a key issue in the transition as there may be inadequate 
demand for applied R&D during this stage of development. The danger 
of insufficient private sector demand is the potential loss or destruction of 
valuable human capital (research teams, etc.) that may be very productive 
in the future Russian economy. These may need to be the beneficiaries of 
some transition (temporary) subsidies. 
As stated earlier, a diversity of organizational forms is ultimately de- 
sirable. The same organizational form is not necessarily appropriate for all 
'This is representative of the organization of R&D funding in most market economies. 
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types of S&T activities. Many western experts are strong advocates of the 
view that the market should select appropriate organizational forms, but the 
market can only achieve such a solution with a decentralized style of labora- 
tories and institutions with a variety of alternatives. Therefore, some science 
and/or industry might be quickly integrated into a new system, while others 
may stand alone for some time. 
Let it be re-emphasized that even if one believes that R&D done within 
the manufacturing enterprise will become the dominant organizational form, 
engaging the existing laboratories in contract R&D activities is likely to be 
a viable route during the transition if market forces are allowed to operate 
in full. It may prove to be tough for laboratories to be absorbed into firms, 
because they may want to enter manufacturing directly. The latter is just 
another route the market provides. For market purposes, it is irrelevant 
whether the laboratories buy enterprises or vice versa. 
In returning to  the problem of inadequate demand for R&D products 
during the transition, it appears that the applied field will face more diffi- 
culties than the basic area, though both will need some forms of support. 
It may prove to be unavoidable to continue a similar magnitude of (only) 
financial support from the state budget to basic science as was the case in 
the recent past. This must be accompanied by simultaneous, substantial 
changes with respect to establishing principles of competition for funding, 
competing sources, peer review, expert assessment for determining national 
priorities, and so on. 
Applied research presents a more formidable problem. Assistance will 
be required in the interim, but if it is too generous it can deter and defer 
the development of competition, innovation, and the benefits thereof. Tran- 
sitional subsidies may make sense, but a new tax might accomplish the same 
results. The operation of the tax should be studied more closely to determine 
whether rules that govern the tax distort, in any way, the laboratories' or 
enterprises' choice of organizational structure. Experience has shown that 
it is preferable to avoid taxes that create an incentive to promote stand 
alone research laboratories or solely contract research. Any tax scheme is 
required to be neutral, while providing adequate funds for investment and 
development. 
Finally, there is a fundamental dependence of scientific and technolog- 
ical reform on legal and economic reform. In the legal sphere, the central 
issue is the establishment of property rights of all forms (intellectual and 
material). The more quickly an appropriate legal framework is in place, the 
more rapidly the transitional problems will disappear. 
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In the economic sphere, it is clear that  for rational technological assess- 
ment a t  the enterprise and national levels one needs the right prices (those 
that  reflect the market determined supply and demand). Demonopolization 
is essential t o  allow competition to  drive R&D investment. There are two 
separate benefits t o  demonopolization: 
1. Some competition will turn out t o  be better than no competition, and 
2. In terms of increased size of total private resources invested in R&D, de- 
monopolization and consequent competition will facilitate an  improve- 
ment of the functioning of the selection process (the moving toward more 
desirable organizational forms). 
Labor mobility is also of major importance in the economic sphere. S&T 
workers must be free t o  choose their employer and vice versa. To restrict 
labor mobility is t o  exclude a large fraction of the potential benefits of eco- 
nomic reform. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
So, what can one extract from all the preceding analysis? The Soviet-style 
central planning model has demonstrated that  i t  may be possible, a t  least 
for a while, t o  reasonably plan production (supply) and even t o  steer the 
desires of the  public depending on the ideology underlying the political sys- 
tem in order t o  plan the consumption (demand). Yet, Soviet-style socialism 
in all aspects of the economy including the management of research and 
development, particularly in comparison t o  the principles ruling a market 
economy, has proven that  i t  is incapable of planning innovation t o  achieve 
the conditions corresponding t o  modern economic growth and development. 
Innovative activities, that  is research and development, are creative, dy- 
namic, and evolutionary processes that  depend on an economic environment 
that  will provide: 
(1) the financial support when i t  is warranted and required t o  realize and 
introduce an idea for commercialization that  will increase overall social 
welfare, and 
(2) the rewards that  result in the continued interest of individuals and var- 
ious types of public and private groups (institutes or companies) t o  en- 
gage in R&D and make technological change a cumulative process. 
As Schumpeter emphasized, innovation is spontaneous (though ulti- 
mately founded on previous achievements) and occurs a t  a non-linear rate 
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over time. Thus, truly productive research and development, which supports 
the progress leading to  the successfully and continually transforming soci- 
eties in which the standard of living has reached the level we in our western 
industrialized nations have become so accustomed to, can only really flour- 
ish where economic policy has laid the foundations of a market system. One 
in which the consumers' desires reverberate all the way to  the researchers 
and scientific experts who must respond, and for whose investigations, ex- 
periments, and development certain forms of free and secured financing is 
always available but not automatic. Only potential success in a competi- 
tive arena can procure the necessary resources to  generate the success. Of 
course, as is evident in Western examples, this does not preclude the presence 
of some strategic government intervention to  aid the cause, not to  interfere 
with but rather to  support the functions of a R&D market. 
Although this may be thought of as wasteful a t  first, it  is really a method 
for improving efficiency. Namely, fewer valuable resources are discarded on 
worthless prospects, or a t  least not before their time has come. In addition, 
the actors are endeavored to  inevitably provide the optimum currently avail- 
able in an effort to  stay ahead of any competitors. The resulting choice for 
the broad populace, the consumers, starts the process all over in a continu- 
ous, dynamic fashion. 
In the former Soviet Union, the entire economic system was in a static 
state-no dynamism, no change, no evolution. Like the dinosaur, it did 
not alter its characteristics, behavior, habits, or relations with other compo- 
nents of the changing system in order to  accommodate the modifications in 
the environment. And, like the once mighty and feared dinosaur, the tech- 
nological strength of the old union of Soviet Republics is confronted with 
potential demise. The only way not to  follow in the footsteps of this prehis- 
toric analogy is with the implementation of appropriate R&D management 
in the transition to  a market economy. There must be competition, demand 
responsiveness, and international support and exchange, as well as cleverly 
directly government policy. 
In the past, a number of economists have frequently called attention to  a 
tendency to  under-invest in R&D in the private sector; that is, firms devote 
too few resources to  the development of new technology.1° There are sev- 
eral reasons for this. Firstly, by now we know that R&D is a risky activity 
and many firms appear to  be rather risk averse. But even more important 
are the short-term time horizons within which business operates that make 
''See, for example, Mansfield (1980) and Rosenberg (1980). 
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it difficult for firms to appropriate the benefits that society receives from 
new technology. In addition, some industries or even specific R&D activities 
are characterized by certain indivisibilities such as economies of scale or in- 
dustrial fragmentation which prevent some, often small organizations from 
undertaking them efficiently (Mansfield, 1980, p. 139). As a result, several of 
the experts contend that a more extensive system of government subsidy is 
needed to  better articulate society's legitimate longer-term R&D needs and 
to  strengthen the incentives of business in technology development involv- 
ing more distant payoffs (Rosenberg, 1980, p. 129). Considering all these 
difficulties in enabling productive and efficient R&D for the general benefit 
of society under market economic conditions, central planning may look like 
an attractive alternative at  first glance. 
In fact, the Soviet-style of central planning as it was formulated in the 
1930s and 1940s was based on numerous principles that could have solved 
the potential problems arising in a market structure. The Soviet scheme 
for R&D management was expected to be accompanied by many benefits, 
including the effects of larger scale, the potential to  eliminate duplicate work, 
the extension of time horizons, and the selection of projects according to  
social (not private) rates of return. 
While this style of management originally satisfied at least the planners' 
requirements, the increasing inability to detect all the rapidly growing needs 
of both society and producers lead to  inadequate quantity and quality of 
output in both the R&D and manufacturing sectors despite the overly abun- 
dant rate of growth in inputs. Indeed, during the extensive-growth policy 
environment of the 1950s and 1960s, the planners' demand for innovation 
focussed on technologies that increased the quantity of output, rather than 
on cost- or resourcesaving technologies that were the key to  a modern-style 
growth future." Therefore, the same politico-economic conditions that pro- 
moted a valuable and enormous R&D sector (as inefficient or unproductive 
as it has been accused of being) also created an environment where this sec- 
tor was essentially detached from the production or consumer sector. The 
real demand was lost in the R&D management process. 
By the end of the communist leadership in the Soviet Union, the R&D 
sector had become riddled with issues that were reason for concern when 
anticipating the future. Soviet scientists and engineers were simply engaging 
in R&D activity in an overburdened bureaucratic environment. Bureaucratic 
"See Linz (1992) for a thorough discussion of planners as barriers to innovation (pp. 
68). 
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barriers to  communication and low scientific mobility added the isolation 
of R&D workers from their domestic peers to their relative international 
solitude. There was generally a rather low sophistication of equipment and 
supplies, and especially a lack of access to  computers that could have made 
scientists' and engineers' work many times more efficient. The age structure 
of leading Soviet researchers led to  a dominance of the old (in ideology and 
age) directors of institutes that were against change. A bargaining style of 
politics developed that caused the acceptance of scientific overemployment 
a t  the expense of underutilization. 
But rather than continue t o  describe the problems of Soviet R&D, more 
enthusiasm should be shown for the positive aspects: the achievements of 
scientists and engineers in the admittedly difficult working conditions in 
Soviet laboratories other than in some particular sectors. In fact, the Soviet 
system did have some virtues that also deserve attention. These begin with 
the enhanced level of prestige afforded the scientist on ideological grounds; 
until the relatively recent past, their annual income was higher than that of 
firm managers-quite contrary to the situation in, for example, the USA. 
In general, the Soviets were devoted to  consistent long-term approaches to 
problem areas and the use of well proven techniques. 
Just previously, the low sophistication of equipment and instruments 
were alluded to  as detrimental, yet even this had its positive side. It fos- 
tered craftsmanship and creativity, and a low technician to researcher ratio. 
This, however, resulted in numerous scholars, particularly the younger ones, 
having functions very different from those they had been trained for. Com- 
bined with a relatively high standard level of idleness, this indicates that 
a considerable amount of the educated capacity was not utilized in a pro- 
ductive manner. Yet, such a phenomenon was not specific to  the input side 
of the R&D sector, but also typified the output side. A high proportion 
of research work was left unused (or incomplete) "on the shelf" and firm 
inventories were full of non-installed domestic and foreign new machinery. 
Communist leaders of the former Soviet Union had recognized this prob- 
lem and repeatedly voiced their concern a t  various party congresses since 
the early 1940s regarding the large quantity of scientific discoveries and im- 
portant inventions that lie around for years or even decades without being 
introduced into practical applications (Berliner, 1987, p. 72). Who knows 
what the potential impact may be if only a portion of the idle capacity were 
harnessed? 
The possibilities seem unabounding. Particularly today, when Russia is 
undergoing the transition to a market economy and the economic, institu- 
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tional, and ideological foundations upon which the scientists' and engineers' 
working environments were predicated for so long have finally been all but 
swept away. The former official Western discrimination and the parallel re- 
luctance of the East to become too dependent on the West are both no longer 
barriers to Russia's opportunity to rejoin the global mainstream in research, 
technology, and economics. 
Science and technology establishments in Russia, are well endowed with 
qualified personnel and other factors (R&D expenditure taking a propor- 
tionately larger share of national income for many decades under Soviet 
leadership than was and is usual in the West), and are, contrary to oth- 
ers in Central and Eastern Europe, substantial as far as the world scientific 
community is concerned. The concentration of scientists and engineers in 
the R&D institutes could provide an ideal environment in which the giant 
S&E workforce can be introduced to the functions and characteristics of a 
market economy with respect to science and technology. Russia does not 
have to fall into the classical position of a product-cycle follower as many 
of its neighbors might. During the transition and possibly for some time 
afterwards, imitation may be the dominant style of technological advance, 
but the ever present innovation should soon become more significant. 
Therefore, in a nutshell, Soviet-style R&D management resulted in an 
unproductive and inefficient use of and a low if not negative social rate of 
return in the long-term on the enormous resources going into the promotion 
of scientific and technological activity. Under new management methods, 
such as those characteristic of a country as Russia, attempting to complete 
the transition to a market economy, much of the R&D resources created 
under the former regime could effectively be used to generate crucially needed 
growth in the economy. This growth could lead to an improvement of the 
Russian economy and renewed prominence for the Russian S&T community, 
but based on reality and not the plan. Russia's position in the world market, 
and the latter's functions with respect to Russia would change. 
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